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Abstract 
 
This study analyses appropriations of King Lear in post-war British playwriting, from Edward 
Bond’s 1971 play Lear to Dennis Kelly’s 2010 play The Gods Weep. It shows that post-war 
playwrights have variously appropriated King Lear in response to the disaster of the 
Holocaust and its near-total destruction of human subjectivity. I concentrate particularly on 
the playwrights David Rudkin, Howard Barker and Sarah Kane, all of whom appropriate King 
Lear in the service of a type of playwriting and drama called ‘Catastrophism’ – a form deeply 
influenced by Frankfurt School theorist Theodor Adorno and his conceptualization of 
aesthetics and subjectivity ‘after’ Auschwitz. Catastrophism names a form of tragic drama 
that eschews resolution and retains the autonomy of the tragic subject, who cannot be 
finally constrained by any form of aesthetic or ideological closure. Over and against 
repressive systems of thought and society, the Catastrophist subject retains his/her 
freedom. I show that appropriations of King Lear have played a vital role in Catastrophism 
and its response to the degradation of human subjectivity and freedom in the Holocaust.  
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Introduction 
 
1. King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
Since the Second World War, King Lear has emerged as the Shakespeare play which seems 
to speak most powerfully to the catastrophes of modern times. The play is, without doubt, 
the most catastrophic in Shakespeare. From the fateful division of the Kingdom, which 
begins the play, to the protracted death of Lear at its end, as he cradles the dead body of his 
daughter Cordelia, the play insistently dramatizes ‘the disasters of the world’ and a vision of 
‘dark and deadly’ devastation.1 By the close of the play, only a few, distraught survivors 
remain, and there is no sign that restitution or redemption is anywhere to be found on a 
blasted vista. Emily Sun writes that King Lear speaks with distinct urgency to audiences living 
in the continuing aftermath of ‘genocidal horror and global total warfare’.2 Such sentiments 
are hard to contest. The increasing relevance of King Lear in post-war culture is clearly 
reflected in both criticism and performance, where it has gained an unparalleled status. R.A. 
Foakes convincingly shows that, after the disaster of the Second World War, King Lear came 
to displace the previously ascendant Hamlet at the pinnacle of the Shakespeare canon.3 
Even with the war now fading from living memory, Foakes contends that the most ‘urgent 
                                                          
1
 William Shakespeare, King Lear, ed. R.A. Foakes (London: Methuen, 1997), p. 170 and p. 388. All references 
to King Lear are from the Foakes Arden edition, except when I underscore the distinctions between the Quarto 
and Folio texts of King Lear, which I do using King Lear: A Parallel Text Edition, 2
nd
 edition, ed. René Weis 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2013). See below for a thorough analysis of the textual status of King Lear. All other 
references to Shakespeare are from The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works, ed. John Jowett et al 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
2
 Emily Sun, Succeeding King Lear: Literature, Exposure and the Possibility of Politics (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2010), p. 14. 
3
 R.A. Foakes, Hamlet Versus Lear: Cultural Politics and Shakespeare’s Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 1993). See especially pp. 45-77. 
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play for the times is still King Lear’ – and that it is ‘likely to remain so for the foreseeable 
future’.4 
What has so far been neglected in Shakespeare Studies, however, is the increased 
presence of King Lear in post-war British playwriting. The play has been appropriated time 
and again in post-war British writing for the stage. These appropriations comprise various 
forms of creative intervention, ranging from complete rewritings of the play, to sequels and 
prequels, to re-visionings of single scenes or speeches, to the use of individual protagonists 
from the play, to allusions and citations, whether transient or more sustained. With plays 
that represent Shakespeare, there have also been appropriations of the iconic author of 
King Lear ‘himself’. 
Why is it that King Lear has been appropriated so widely in post-war British 
playwriting? How do post-war playwrights use the play? What is the purpose of 
appropriating King Lear in the post-war era? This thesis sets out to address a gap in 
Shakespeare Studies and analyse appropriations of King Lear in post-war British playwriting. 
It will show that some of the most significant appropriations of the play – and vital trends in 
both post-war criticism and performance – can be situated historically, ideationally and 
dramaturgically as responses to the catastrophes of modern times. Most of all, it is the 
catastrophe of the Holocaust that informs appropriations of King Lear. I show that various 
post-war appropriations of King Lear use the play to respond to and ‘write’ the disaster of 
Auschwitz, the worst calamity of post-Enlightenment European modernity.5 Far from a 
                                                          
4
 R.A. Foakes, ‘King Lear and the Displacement of Hamlet’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 50:3 (1987), p. 275. 
5
 The idea of ‘writing the disaster’ is taken from Maurice Blanchot and his 1980 work The Writing of the 
Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). I return to the type of 
fragmentary writing demanded by the Holocaust in Chapter One, though I do so through Theodor Adorno. It 
will be seen that I use ‘Holocaust’ and ‘Auschwitz’ interchangeably. Auschwitz is sometimes preferred as a 
metonym for the Holocaust, as the word Holocaust has its roots in the Jewish practice of a sacrificial offering, 
which was burnt completely on an altar. The term is problematic in that it imputes a sacrificial status to the 
genocide of the European Jews – which may syncopate with Nazi ideology and its conception of the Final 
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parochial concern with questions of national and cultural identity, British playwrights have 
appropriated King Lear to engage with a European (and, indeed, world) legacy of 
catastrophe. 
This is not to say that post-war British playwrights appropriate King Lear to write 
plays that directly depict the Holocaust and the dehumanizing conditions of the 
concentration camps – though there have been ‘documentary’-style Holocaust plays on the 
British stage.6 The case I make has to do with the status of subjectivity ‘after’ Auschwitz. For 
many artists and thinkers writing in its wake, Auschwitz is an event that revealed the 
complete degradation of the human subject in modernity. Far from an autonomous agent 
shaping its own destiny, Auschwitz reveals the way modern society debases the subject, 
turning it into an object of dehumanizing processes over which it has no control and which, 
finally, destroy it.  
If, as Elizabeth Sakellaridou has written, the ‘iconography’ of the Holocaust – ruined 
scenescapes, brutalizing institutions of repression and torture, damaged and disfigured 
subjects, displacement and dislocation, desire and perverse eroticization, destruction and 
death – haunts post-war playwriting, King Lear has obvious resonances for a post-Auschwitz 
historical and cultural imaginary.7 This has seen the play develop into a vital intertext 
through which the utter degradation of the human subject – a bestializing process that 
would make humanity ‘a worm’ (IV.i.35) – might be written. The play has, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, been particularly pivotal in tragic playwriting ‘after’ Auschwitz. King Lear has 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Solution as a necessary sacrifice in the name of Aryan racial purity. Timothy Snyder in Black Earth: The 
Holocaust as History and Warning (London: Penguin, 2015) contends that using Auschwitz metonymically is 
misleading, as it reduces the Holocaust to a single camp (pp. 207-224). Precisely because of its nightmarish 
status in the post-war historical and cultural imaginary, however, I will use Auschwitz metonymically, while 
also sometimes using the more common ‘Holocaust’. 
6
 These plays include – among others – Kindertransport, a 1984 play by Diane Samuels and Albert Speer, a 2000 
play by David Edgar. The plays I study are far less ‘realist’ in approach and realization.  
7
 Elizabeth Sakellaridou, ‘A Lover’s Discourse – but Whose? Inversions of the Fascist Aesthetic in Howard 
Barker’s Und and Other Recent English Plays’, European Journal of English Studies, 7:1 (2003), p. 90.  
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enabled forms of tragic drama that would seek to represent and critique the devastating 
diminution of the modern human subject. These forms of post-Auschwitz tragedy have 
ranged from Beckettian absurdism to post-Brechtian political theatre. The play has been 
used in a variety of ways to (re)conceptualize both the subject and tragedy ‘after’ 
Auschwitz.  
My analysis of King Lear and post-war appropriation will, however, concentrate 
primarily on the plays and playwriting of David Rudkin, Howard Barker and Sarah Kane. 
These playwrights are all engaged in a form of post-Auschwitz, tragic playwriting that I 
describe as ‘Catastrophist’. To date, Catastrophist appropriations of King Lear have been 
neglected by critics; however, Catastrophism represents a compelling ‘strand’ of post-war 
British playwriting and its response to – and appropriation of – King Lear in the aftermath of 
Auschwitz.  
 I turn now to provide an overview of Catastrophism – a category I derive primarily 
from Howard Barker. I proceed to relate Catastrophism to the work of Frankfurt School 
theorist Theodor Adorno, whose profound philosophical and historical reflections on the 
disaster of Auschwitz, modernity, subjectivity and aesthetics make him a vital figure for 
theorizing post-Auschwitz culture and playwriting. I will also begin to consider the 
relationship between King Lear and Catastrophism before historicizing Catastrophism and 
the plays under study. Over the rest of the Introduction, I set out some of the theoretical 
and practical questions pertaining to intertextuality and appropriation and consider the 
fraught textual status of King Lear. I also provide a review of the critical literature on King 
Lear and post-war British playwriting, before setting out the research methods I have used. 
Finally, the Introduction provides an overview of the thesis and a breakdown of its 
structure.        
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2. Catastrophism  
 
2.1. What is Catastrophism?  
 
David Rudkin (1936-), Howard Barker (1946-) and Sarah Kane (1971-1999) are all significant 
post-war British playwrights, writing across the post-war era in distinct styles.8 What unites 
Rudkin, Barker and Kane is a concern with catastrophe and its impact on the subject. It is 
not simply that catastrophe is a force of degradation, however. On the contrary: 
catastrophe can also enable the subject. During times and spaces of catastrophe, the subject 
is suddenly emancipated from dominative social systems, which are left in ruins. This allows 
the subject to emerge ‘anew’ from the wreckage of a devastated world, re-interpreting and 
re-fashioning him or herself out of the fragments of disaster. Through catastrophe, the 
subject discovers new possibilities for selfhood, embodying freedom in the face of a 
decaying civilisation.  
Catastrophe in the plays of Rudkin, Barker and Kane serves – paradoxically – to 
catalyse autonomy. This representation of subjectivity is in sharp contrast to a culture that 
would otherwise systematically diminish and destroy the subject. This is precisely the 
experience of Auschwitz and the concentration camps. Where Auschwitz revealed the total 
domination of the subject by cruelly reductive forms of social and political control, the 
playwrights under study insist on the possibility and necessity of freedom, even in the midst 
of disaster.       
                                                          
8
 I provide more contextual and biographical information on the playwrights under analysis in each of the case 
studies.  
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Catastrophism is drawn principally from Barker and his self-styled conception of the 
‘Theatre of Catastrophe’, which he demarcates in his 1989 artistic ‘manifesto’ Arguments for 
a Theatre.9 Catastrophism, as Barker uses it, designates a form of tragic drama, which 
represents the autonomy the subject finds in moments of catastrophe. ‘Catastrophe is also 
birth. Out the ruins crawls the bloody thing, unrecognizable in the ripped rags of former 
life’.10 Catastrophe is not only a thematic concern for Barker, however; it is also formal. The 
Theatre of Catastrophe is formally fragmented and violates aesthetic closure. The upshot is 
a tragic subject who finally retains his or her autonomy in a shattered world. Catastrophe is 
never brought to an end by the reinstatement of the status quo and the Catastrophist 
subject never reaches any form of reconciliation with the prevailing social and political 
order. There are no limits – aesthetic or ideological – placed on tragic subjectivity in 
Catastrophism.  
I want to make the case that Catastrophism has a wider relevance than Barker 
necessarily recognizes and can be used to describe the work of other playwrights – most 
obviously Rudkin and Kane. These playwrights are engaged with the same constellation of 
ideas found in Barker around catastrophe, tragedy, subjectivity and aesthetic form. I do not 
contend that other playwrights would ever self-identify as Catastrophist – but Barker does 
provide a compelling critical and dramaturgical language that can be used to analyse wider 
developments in post-war British writing. By applying Catastrophism more widely than 
Barker necessarily intends, I aim to develop the possible critical usage of Catastrophism 
beyond Barker and his own, distinctive definition(s). This will be furnished through close 
analyses of the work of the other playwrights under consideration, but it will also mean 
                                                          
9
 Howard Barker, Arguments for a Theatre, 3
rd
 edition (Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1997), p. 50. I place ‘manifesto’ in apostrophes as the fragments that make up the text do not constitute 
a systematic statement of intent. I touch on the formal properties of Catastrophism again in Chapter Five.  
10
  Howard Barker, Women Beware Women, Collected Plays: Vol. 3 (London: Calder, 1986), p. 180. 
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drawing on the post-Auschwitz aesthetic theory developed by Adorno, which I now briefly 
consider.  
 
2.2. Theorizing Catastrophism  
 
Adorno, perhaps the foremost thinker of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, often uses 
the concept of catastrophe in his writing.11 It is, on the one hand, a descriptive historical 
category, and is typically related to the total degradation of human subjectivity at 
Auschwitz, which Adorno understands as symptomatic of modernity and its tendency 
towards disaster. But for Adorno, catastrophe is also an aesthetic category, which he relates 
to formally fragmented works of art.12 Adorno believes that catastrophic art, while not 
necessarily confined to a discrete era, is the aesthetic form par excellence in post-Auschwitz 
culture. Such works, by denying aesthetic harmony, implicitly reveal the catastrophic 
condition of modernity – its failure to embody its liberal ideals of harmony and progress. But 
at the same time, catastrophic art allows for the ‘force of subjectivity’.13 Through its violent 
fissures, catastrophist art shatters formal coherence and closure. This opens a space for the 
representation of subjectivity beyond the parameters of conventional aesthetic form – a 
space of freedom.  
                                                          
11
 The Frankfurt School is both an institution and a type of critical thought, which grew out of the catastrophic 
experience of the twentieth century and its impact on conventional Marxist categories. See Tom Bottomore, 
The Frankfurt School and Its Critics (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 7. The pioneering figures of the Frankfurt 
School are: Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Walter Benjamin. My emphasis falls 
on Adorno, though I do refer to other Frankfurt School thinkers, all of whom share a preoccupation with 
subjectivity and catastrophe. I also use Critical Theory and Frankfurt School interchangeably. 
12
 This is particularly apparent in his observations on the late style of Beethoven in Beethoven: The Philosophy 
of Music: Fragments and Texts ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). Adorno 
writes: ‘The fragmented landscape is objective, while the light in which it grows alone is subjective. He does 
not bring about their harmonious synthesis. As a dissociative force, he tears them apart in time, perhaps in 
order to preserve them for the eternal. In the history of art, late works are the catastrophes’ (p. 126). 
13
 Ibid, p. 125. 
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 This thesis draws heavily on the work of Adorno, as his work provides a powerful 
paradigm for analysing questions around catastrophe, subjectivity and aesthetics. Adorno, 
more than any other philosopher, offers a frame through which to theorize the historical 
catastrophe of Auschwitz and the role of subjectivity and aesthetics in post-Auschwitz 
playwriting. This is not to deny the descriptive power of other forms of philosophy and 
theory which have emerged in the post-war era. Similar thematics are addressed in the 
writings of Hannah Arendt, Maurice Blanchot, Jean-François Lyotard and Giorgio Agamben, 
among others.14 No figure addressed such questions as consistently and rigorously as 
Adorno, however, and no figure in the world of philosophy has had the same influence on 
the playwrights under study. Both Rudkin and Barker are directly indebted to Adorno, and 
Kane, through the influence of Barker, is at least residually inspired by Frankfurt School 
theory. 
With a broadly conceived definition and historical and theoretical genealogy of 
Catastrophism in place, I want to start drawing out the relationship between Catastrophism 
and King Lear, identifying the primary case studies under analysis and historicizing 
Catastrophism.  
 
2.3. Historicizing Catastrophism   
 
There are some obvious parallels between Catastrophism and King Lear. Its representation 
of human subjectivity in times and spaces of catastrophe obviously resonates with 
Catastrophism, as does its irruptive violation of closure, its failure to bring about aesthetic 
                                                          
14
 I pick up on the thoughts of some of these theorists again in Chapter One and in Chapters Two and Five, 
particularly Lyotard and, via Foucault, Agamben.  
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(and indeed social and political) order at its dénouement. To gain a more profound 
appreciation of the role played by appropriations of King Lear in Catastrophist playwriting, I 
identify as case studies the plays Will’s Way (Rudkin, 1984), Seven Lears (Barker, 1989) and 
Blasted (Kane, 1995). These plays, in various ways, all appropriate King Lear in the service of 
a Catastrophist vision.  
 The case studies I have chosen all take place over a critical era in British (and indeed 
European and world) post-war culture: the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. This period 
witnessed the end of the Cold War, the transition from industrial society to post-industrial 
globalization, the growth of consumer culture and the so-called ‘End of History’ as 
postulated by Francis Fukuyama, where liberal capitalist democracy emerges as the final 
and only system of society.15 These developments are often captured through the nebulous 
term ‘neoliberalism’ – the free-market ideology preached by Fredrick Hayek and Milton 
Friedman, which proposes to unleash the freedom of the individual via sweeping 
privatization and deregulation.16 To define the period, however, I prefer the term ‘late 
capitalism’.  
My choice is – in part – influenced by Adorno, who tends to use late capitalism to 
describe the developments in liberal, capitalist society after the Second World War.17 It is 
also influenced by theorist (and Holocaust survivor) Ernest Mandel, who popularised the 
term in his 1972 Late Capitalism.18 Mandel predicted that the era of late capitalism would 
see the capitalist system become increasingly ‘total’, with the emergence of transnational 
                                                          
15
 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 2012). 
16
 See David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). It is worth 
pointing out that, in its emphasis on the individual and rolling back the state, right-wing neoliberal theory can 
itself be viewed as a response to Holocaust – though obviously without the critique of capitalism the Frankfurt 
School provide. 
17
 See his ‘Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?’, Can One Live After Auschwitz?, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone and others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 111-125. 
18
 Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1998).  
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corporations, globalized markets and labour, the fluidities of financial capital and a culture 
of mass consumption. He also predicted that (so-called) post-industrial global capital, far 
from freeing people from repressive state administration and the inhumane depredations of 
the industrial system, would see the commodification – the ‘industrialisation’ – of ever more 
inclusive areas of human life. He insisted that, far from ‘representing a “post-industrial 
society”’, late capitalism ‘constitutes generalized universal industrialization for the first time 
in history’.19 This means the supposed historical ‘break’ between an era of administered 
industrial capital and a ‘freer’, post-industrial capitalist system is not nearly as momentous 
as it appeared to be. Both forms, as Adorno similarly contests in his thoughts on post-war 
capital, tend to commodify (‘industrialize’) the world and everything before it – including 
people.20   
The relationship between the playwrights under study and King Lear is not 
necessarily limited to the era of late capitalism. These plays should be situated against 
historical developments and catastrophes from the late 1930s onwards and, in both 
conscious and less conscious ways, are in dialogue with other various post-war 
interpretations of King Lear – and its relationship to the disaster of Auschwitz – over that 
time. I am, however, also concerned with Catastrophism as a post-Auschwitz aesthetic form 
and its more proximate relationship with the phenomenon of late capitalism. By analysing 
appropriations of King Lear in the 1980s and 1990s, I want to show that Catastrophism is – 
in part – a response to late capitalist culture. It is a culture that has become increasingly 
total and which tends, as a result, to dominate and diminish the subject, whose autonomy is 
imperilled. Adorno, when using the phrase ‘after Auschwitz’, did so with the consciousness 
                                                          
19
 Ibid, p. 387. 
20
 ‘The dialectician, above all, should not let himself be forced into a clear-cut distinction between late 
capitalism and industrial society’, ‘Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?’, p. 114.  
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that there is no conclusive ‘after’: all the time subjects are reduced to nothing more than 
the objects of a totalized social system, the atrocities committed at Auschwitz remain a 
possibility.21 I have chosen to consistently place apostrophes around ‘after’ for the same 
reason – to adumbrate the historical continuity between Auschwitz and late liberal 
capitalism, avoiding the idea of a definitive ‘break’ that places the Holocaust safely in ‘the 
past’.    
This section has provided an introductory definition of Catastrophism and traced a 
possible theoretical genealogy for catastrophic art by drawing on Adorno. These are topics I 
return to – and deepen – in subsequent chapters. It has also set out the case studies under 
analysis and the periods that will be considered. Over the rest of the Introduction, I want to 
identify some of the key conceptual – and practical – questions raised by appropriation. 
These primarily have to do with questions around textuality, intertextuality and authorship. 
These issues – for reasons that I will develop – are particularly fraught when it comes to 
analysing appropriations of King Lear. I begin by briefly considering the long ‘pre’-history of 
King Lear and appropriation and consider the status of King Lear as itself an appropriation of 
a prior work – The True Chronicle History of King Leir. I go on to consider the work of critic 
and playwright David Ian Rabey. Rabey is predominantly known as an academic and Barker 
specialist, but his own appropriations of King Lear in The Wye Plays (1994, 1996) are deeply 
indebted to Catastrophism and shed light on the way Rudkin, Barker and Kane appropriate 
King Lear.  
 
3. Appropriation  
 
                                                          
21
 See Chapter One, p. 55, for more on the idea of ‘after’ Auschwitz and the reduction of subjects to objects.  
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3.1. King Lear and/as Appropriation 
 
King Lear has a long history of appropriations. In 1681, Nahum Tate ‘revived’ the play, but 
with far-reaching ‘alterations’.22 The most telling change was to the ending: Tate replaced 
the cataclysmic finale of King Lear with a ‘happy’ ending, where Lear, after being restored to 
the throne by Cordelia, retires to a ‘cool Cell’ for a life of monastic contemplation.23 Tate 
also introduced the plot-device of a love-match between Edgar and Cordelia, who succeed 
to the throne as a ‘celestial Pair’ (V.96). The rationale for ‘altering’ King Lear was both 
aesthetic and political: the deaths of Cordelia and Lear violated formal closure and did not 
allow for the ‘blest / Restauration’ (V.95) of a legitimate sovereign, obviously a concern for 
Restoration playwrights and audiences: ‘Legitimacy / At last has got it’ (V.93). This version, 
however, far outlived its own historical moment: continuing moral disquiet about the action 
of the play and its radically irruptive form meant that the Shakespeare version of King Lear 
was not staged again until 1838, when William Charles Macready ‘restored’ the ‘original’ 
Shakespeare, most obviously the un-Tateified ending, in his production at the Covent 
Garden Theatre.24     
Tate has been much maligned for his intervention and ‘Tatification’ has entered the 
language to describe an unnecessary and ill-advised re-visioning of a canonical work.25 It is 
important to recognize, however, that Shakespeare is himself part of the long history of 
appropriation: his King Lear is in dialogue with, and consciously reworks, other ‘King Lears’ 
                                                          
22
 Quoted in Nahum Tate, The History of King Lear, ed. James Black (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), p. 1.  
23
 Nahum Tate, The History of King Lear, Adaptations of Shakespeare, ed. Daniel Fischlin and Mark Fortier 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 96. All references to the Tate King Lear are from the Fischlin and 
Fortier edition. Quotes from the play will be referenced using act and page number.  
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 See Emily Mullin, ‘Macready’s Triumph: The Restoration of King Lear to the Stage’, Penn History Review, 18:1 
(2010), pp. 17-35. 
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 David Crystal and Ben Crystal, The Shakespeare Miscellany (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 151. 
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circulating in the early modern period (and before). The tale of King Lear (sometimes Leir, 
Ler or Llyr) was, for the early moderns, a part of ancient British history, recorded by 
Geoffrey of Monmouth in his twelfth century Historia Regum Britanniae. Monmouth traces 
the story of Leir from the death of his father, Bladud, to the love-test and the division of the 
Kingdom, the civil war it unleashes and the restoration of Leir. Monmouth continues the 
story with the accession of Cordelia to the throne and her eventual suicide, as she is 
deposed and imprisoned by her nephews Cunedagius and Marganus, with both indignant 
‘that Britain was subjected to the rule of a woman’.26 The story was retold in various ways in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from the 1577 Chronicles of England, Scotland, 
and Ireland, where Raphael Holinshed gives a short retelling of the narrative, which ends 
with the suicide of Cordelia, to the 1574 The Mirror for Magistrates, where John Higgins has 
‘Cordila’ (and not Lear) recite her ‘storie tragicall ech word’. Cordila, who commits suicide 
after she is haunted by the ‘ghost’ of ‘Despaire’, ends her narration by giving an exemplary 
moral warning on the sin of self-slaughter: ‘Farre greater folly is it for to kill, / Themselves 
dispayring, then is any ill’.27 The Lear story also appears in Book Two of The Faerie Queene 
(1590) and the William Warner work Albions England (1586). For the Gloucester subplot, 
Shakespeare drew on the New Arcadia (1586) by Philip Sidney and its story of the 
Paphlagonian King, where a legitimate son (Leonatus) is disowned by his father after being 
maligned by his illegitimate half-brother (Plexitrus) – a betrayal ‘fit’ enough ‘to make the 
stage of any Tragodie’.28  
                                                          
26
 Geoffrey of Monmouth, The History of the Kings of Britain, trans. Lewis Thorpe (London: Penguin, 1966), p. 
95 and 96.   
27
 John Higgins, The first parte of the Mirour for magistrates (London: 1574). Early English Books Online. 
Accessed 27 July 2017. 
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OURCE=var_spell.cfg&DISPLAY=AUTHOR&WARN=N&FILE=../session/1501148434_13628.  
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 Philip Sidney, The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia (London: 1590). Early English Books Online. Accessed 27 
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The most obvious intertext for King Lear is the anonymous play The True Chronicle 
History of King Leir, published in 1605 (and most likely originally performed in 1594). This 
play depicts the Lear story up until the moment the ‘lawful king’ Leir is restored to his 
throne, with the martial and political aid of Cordella (Cordelia) and Gallia (France) and an 
uprising by other nobles and the commons.29 With Cordella and Leir ‘firmly reconcil’d / In 
perfect love’ (IV.iii.59-60) by the end of the action, the play conveys a socially and politically 
conservative moral steeped in Christian values, where the ‘good’ finally triumph: ‘The 
perfect good indeed / Can never be corrupted by the bad’ (V.iii.76-77) for ‘the heav’ns are 
just and hate impiety’ (V.ii.30). Where the story of Cordelia and her suicide is, in the early 
modern era, often portrayed in terms of ‘tragedy’, the anonymous author of King Leir 
precludes tragedy by ending his version in a more sentimental vein of reconciliation and 
restoration.  
But even while the Lear story was sometimes related to tragedy, the change 
Shakespeare makes to the story is unprecedented. No other version has so catastrophic a 
finale, with Cordelia being hanged and Lear dying as he bewails her death. Shakespeare 
radically subverts both a conventional romantic ending, with Lear and Cordelia reconciled, 
and a more conventional tragic ending, which usually ends with the death of Cordelia and a 
moralistic dictum about the sin of suicide. His play violates aesthetic closure and 
containment, destabilizing the meanings (social, political and moral) that are usually 
inscribed in the King Lear story. It would not be stretching the point to say that Tate is not so 
much violating Shakespeare as he is restoring King Lear to some of its formal (and moral) 
shape.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ocm17202096e&terms=New%20Arcadia&pageTerms=New%20Arcadia&pageId=eebo-ocm17202096e-106206-
1.  
29
 Anonymous, King Leir, ed. Tiffany Stern (London: Nick Hern Books, 2002). All references are to the Stern 
edition and include her act and scene divisions.  
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It is not always the case that appropriation aims to repair the damaged aesthetic of 
King Lear, however. Other playwrights have appropriated the play precisely because of its 
violation of the limits of tragic closure. This is a point made by Rabey, whose own 
appropriations of King Lear in his sequels The Back of Beyond (1996) and The Battle of Crows 
(1998) are deeply influenced by Barker and Rudkin. Rabey remarks in his ‘On Being a 
Shakespearean Dramatist’, which prefaces his King Lear plays, that, through his 
appropriation of King Leir, Shakespeare subverts a once-familiar story to prolong ‘horror and 
uncertainty beyond the conventional generic markers of tragedy and drama’.30 Rabey 
contends that, by appropriating a pre-existing play and subverting any resolution, 
Shakespeare authorizes other writers to appropriate King Lear and develop its catastrophic 
violation of the outer limits of tragic form. Rabey states that, by challenging the closure of 
‘predetermined dramatic form’, King Lear fails to restore the ‘legitimate’ social and political 
order that obtains at the outset of the play – so imperative to Tate.31 This opens a space for 
Catastrophist subjectivity, where a failure to restore the usual ‘boundaries and limitations’ 
means the tragic subject retains his/her autonomy and ‘capacity for unpredictable self-
transformation’.32   
 Rabey provides a rationale for appropriating King Lear that resonates strongly with 
the work of Rudkin, Barker and Kane.33 His allusion to The True Chronicle History of King Leir, 
however, also pays witness to various other ‘Lear’ texts in the early modern period – and 
beyond. This raises the problem of reference. What is the specific ‘text’ being referred to 
when a post-war (or any other) writer appropriates ‘King Lear’? Is it possible to identify a 
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 David Ian Rabey, The Wye Plays (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2004), p. 6.  
31
 Ibid, p. 3. 
32
 Ibid, p. 10 and p. 4. 
33
 Rabey does not cite Kane, but there are parallels, the most obvious of which is the ‘ABRUPT MASSIVE 
SHATTERING EXPLOSION’ (p. 43) that concludes Act Three of his The Back of Beyond, which recalls Blasted. 
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singular text which is being appropriated, or is it more appropriate to talk of various ‘Lears’? 
This problem is even more acute when it comes to King Lear. The play exists in two discrete 
‘versions’, both of which seem reliably ‘Shakespearean’. Should these be seen as distinct 
contributions to a wider Lear ‘tradition’? Or is it possible to speak in the singular, of a play 
called King Lear by Shakespeare? I want to address the controversy around the texts of King 
Lear, making the case that the play can (and should) be seen as a singular textual and formal 
entity, even while it exists in varying versions. I show that, while the playwrights under study 
are part of a wider Lear ‘tradition’, King Lear is the dominant intertext, with distinct textual 
and formal features which make it – perhaps uniquely – open to Catastrophist 
appropriation.  
 
3.2. Which King Lear? The Textual Problem of King Lear 
 
For any study of King Lear, the question inevitably arises – which King Lear? The play exists 
in the Quarto of 1608, originally entitled the True Chronicle Historie of the life and death of 
King LEAR and his three Daughters, and the 1632 Folio, called more simply The Tragedie of 
King Lear. On top of the titles and the generic shift from ‘Historie’ to ‘Tragedie’, which 
indicates the roots of the Lear story and its reception as ‘history’ in early modern culture, 
there are a wide array of both minor and more sweeping textual variations between the 
texts of King Lear.34  
For most of its history, standard editorial practice has been to conflate the versions 
of King Lear and preserve as many aspects from both as possible, while negotiating the 
numerous textual variants either on aesthetic grounds or on the basis of a speculative 
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 For a detailed discussion, see Weis and his parallel text edition, pp. 1-35.  
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reconstruction of printing history. The same practice, perhaps less controversially, has also 
been true of the play in performance. Directors have tended to work with a conflated text, 
even while the Folio has generally been considered to be the more amenable to the 
practicalities of theatrical realization (Quarto or Folio-only stagings remain something of a 
rarity).35  
Over the mid-1980s, however, conflation began to be challenged. Under the 
influence of various articles and the landmark 1983 collection The Division of the Kingdoms, 
edited by Gary Taylor and Michael Warren, the distinct versions of King Lear were 
increasingly regarded as conceptually separate: closely related but appreciably distinct and 
authoritative treatments of the same basic content.36 The idea that both versions are 
‘authoritative’ derives from the notion that Shakespeare himself revised his play from 
Quarto to Folio.  
Whatever the (ultimately unknowable) historical reasons for the existence of 
discrete texts, the view that Quarto and Folio can be read as distinct versions of the same 
play found favour in Shakespeare Studies, reflecting, in part, a growing interest in theatrical 
practices and the new brand of materially conscious, poststructuralist criticism that 
emerged in Shakespeare Studies in the 1980s, which tended to question the precept of 
aesthetic ‘unity’ and engaged in deconstructive interrogations of textual gaps and ellipses, 
often with distinct political aims.37 The Oxford Complete Works of 1985 printed the versions 
                                                          
35
 In the ‘Introduction’ to his parallel text edition, Weis notes that, for his 1990 RSC production of the play, 
Nicholas Hytner primarily used the Folio; yet even Hytner could not resist aspects of the Quarto, finally 
including the Quarto-only mock trial scene for III.vi. Weis concludes that the Folio could not ‘automatically 
carry the burden of performance’ (p. 30).  
36
 Gary Taylor and Michael Warren (eds.), The Division of the Kingdoms: Shakespeare’s Two Versions of King 
Lear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). See also P. W. K. Stone, The Textual History of ‘King Lear’ 
(London: Ashgate, 1980). The two-text question has recently been revived by Brian Vickers with his 
controversial The One ‘King Lear’ (Cambridge, MA and London: Yale University Press, 2016). 
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separately, and Quarto editions of the play were also published in 1994 and 2000.38 René 
Weis published his parallel text edition of King Lear in 1993, which printed Quarto and Folio 
version side-by-side – though Weis, not unreasonably, remained unconvinced that the 
revisionist theory could ever be finally proved by scholars speculating about print history 
and conditions.39   
 The revisionist theory is undeniably intriguing for a study on appropriations of King 
Lear, as it raises the prospect that Shakespeare adapted his own play. My own conviction, 
however, is that the distinctions between the texts, while no doubt important to recognize, 
have been overstated. I take the same position as Foakes, who, though he is persuaded by 
the revisionist stance on the Quarto and/or Folio debate, makes the case that the reworking 
of King Lear from Quarto to Folio is not so thorough as to mean that critics have to think of 
finally ‘separate’ plays.40 Weis similarly insists on ‘The Integral King Lear’ and contends that 
the versions of the play tell a story of convergence, not divergence, while Richard Knowles 
concludes that ‘if the Folio Lear represents a new “concept” of the play, it is a remarkably 
limited revision’.41 
Even in the wake of the bi-text controversy, King Lear can still be thought of as a 
formally and conceptually ‘singular’ work by Shakespeare – both in the world of 
Shakespeare Studies and in the wider public cultural imaginary. With that in mind, I would 
make the case that contemporary appropriators of the play are confronting a single work. 
More practically for the purposes of the present study, it is worth remembering the 
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 William Shakespeare, The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works, ed. John Jowett et al (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985); The First Quarto of King Lear, ed. Jay L. Halio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994); The History of King Lear, ed. Stanley Wells (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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 ‘Introduction’, King Lear: A Parallel Text Edition, pp. 36-37. 
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 Hamlet Versus Lear, p. 111. 
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Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
25 
 
playwrights under analysis are precisely that – playwrights, not textual historians or 
academics concerned with early modern print culture. My hunch is that, on the page, 
Rudkin and Barker would most likely have originally encountered King Lear in the popular, 
conflated 1952 Arden edition, edited by Frank Muir (reprinted in 1972). The edition Sarah 
Kane was most familiar with is harder to gauge – and it is worth pointing out that some of 
the ‘un-edited’ editions that grew out of the revisionist controversy would have been 
available by the time she came to write Blasted. Even with her diverse intellectual interests, 
however, I find it doubtful questions around early modern book culture would have been a 
priority.  
This is not to say that I completely ignore the distinction(s) between the texts of King 
Lear or insist that there is some ‘definitive’ version of the play. There are variations in the 
Quarto and Folio versions. These variations can be relevant when a contemporary author 
intervenes to appropriate, or make textual changes to, the play. I will touch on some of the 
textual and formal discrepancies between the ‘King Lears’ and pay attention to the varying 
ways appropriations may signify based on whether the Quarto or Folio is the version under 
consideration. I will also have cause to analyse some of the editorial interventions which 
have shaped the play. My emphasis, however, is on King Lear as a singular textual and 
formal entity.  
 To underscore the textual ‘integrity’ of King Lear is not to say that the playwrights 
engage in a direct and unmediated relationship with the text of King Lear, which is in some 
way hermetically-sealed from ‘outside’ influence. Nor is it to say that King Lear has a 
singular textual ‘meaning’ which remains constant through time. There is obviously a wider 
historical, cultural and interpretive milieu around King Lear in the post-war era. Various 
interpretative formations have aggregated around the play over the period and, in some 
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ways, determine its received ‘meaning’ in the wider imaginary. The playwrights under study 
are embedded in a wider cultural discourse around King Lear and, in both explicit and 
implicit ways, appropriations are always responsive to that discourse and not merely to the 
text ‘itself’. There are, however, specific textual and formal features of King Lear which 
preoccupy the appropriators under consideration – not the least of which is its catastrophic 
violation of formal containment. These distinct authorial preoccupations serve to bring 
certain aspects of the play into focus, over and against those stressed in other 
interpretations in the post-war era – whether those are by scholars, practitioners or other 
playwrights.   
The controversy around the texts of King Lear obviously raises important conceptual 
and theoretical questions around the issues of textuality, intertextuality and authorship. 
What should artworks that are based on, or consciously rework and rewrite, previous works 
be called? What role (if any) does ‘the author’ play in the processes of intertextuality? The 
complexity of the questions at hand means that there is no abiding critical agreement as to 
precisely how the artistic practice of creatively intervening in and with past texts should be 
defined. My preference is for the word ‘appropriation’ – as the title I have chosen attests. In 
the next section, I will provide a theoretical interpretation and defence of appropriation as a 
viable (and flexible) descriptor for various forms of authorial practice in relation to past 
texts.   
 
3.3. Intertextuality, Adaptation or Appropriation?  
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In her 1976 work Modern Shakespeare Offshoots, Ruby Cohn provides a litany of words to 
try and describe works that have an obvious relationship to a Shakespearean antecedent, 
considering everything from ‘version’ to ‘abridgement’, before settling on the more open-
ended ‘offshoots’.42 The surfeit of possible descriptors Cohn provides testifies to the 
‘problem of naming’ – as Daniel Fischlin and Marker Fortier have called it – when it comes to 
defining artistic works that are based on or rework a prior text.43 Fischlin and Fortier 
contend that the field remains relatively undertheorized and rightly point out that no single 
word can ultimately capture all forms of appropriative artistic practice – though Fischlin and 
Fortier do finally settle for ‘adaptation’ by way of compromise.44 Some particular terms are, 
however, more prominent than others and have tended to inform the theoretical and 
critical conversation. The most dominant are intertextuality, adaptation and appropriation. I 
want to consider these terms and the type of theoretical and critical claims that are 
generally made for them as a way of defining why and how I use the concept of 
appropriation.      
The theory of intertextuality is perhaps the most radical in its scope and implications, 
raising fundamental questions about ideas around the ‘original’, the ‘author’ and the 
integrity of the unique ‘work’. Though usage has shifted in various ways, the word still tends 
to signify a series of endlessly unravelling relationships ‘between’ various texts.45 The idea of 
intertextuality would have it that all texts, and not only consciously appropriative or 
adaptive texts, are made up of webs of allusions to – and transformations of – other texts. 
The ‘meaning’ of any work is ultimately produced by the interrelationship between it and 
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various other texts, as opposed to being a unique product of the original work or the 
intentions of its author. Like much poststructuralist thought, intertextuality is suspicious of 
the supposed ‘singularity’ of the text and of the notion of the subject (author) as a unified 
centre of meaning.46  
These very same features can, however, be problematic. The limitation of 
intertextuality is that, by concentrating on the general interplay of texts through space and 
time, it tends to elide the distinctiveness, or alterity, of the textual and formal aspects that 
make up any specific text. By treating all texts as intertexts, intertextuality is ultimately 
inadequate for a study on the appropriations of a single play and, as a theory that posits a 
universal and ahistorical theory of the relation pertaining between all texts at all times, can 
also be blind to the reasons why a particular work might be prominent at a certain historical 
moment. Its stress on the so-called ‘Death of the Author’ is similarly problematic for the 
present study: implying as it does that the meaning and autonomy of the human subject is a 
chimera, intertextuality is in theoretical conflict with a study dealing with the total 
eradication of subjectivity at Auschwitz.47 This study will, at times, use the word ‘intertext’ 
to designate an appropriated work. But while I am interested in the relation between texts – 
and so ‘intertexts’ – that should not be taken to imply a simple endorsement of the theory 
of intertextuality. 
 The word adaptation is increasingly used in criticism, as reflected by the formation of 
the International Association of Adaptation Studies in 2008, the same year the journal 
Adaptation was established. The etymology of adaptation sheds light on its usage. Derived 
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from the Latin adaptāre, to make ‘suitable’ or ‘fit’, usually for a new purpose, adaptation 
has generally been concerned with the way in which a work from one media is made to fit 
another – say the adaptation of a novel to film.48 This is certainly the dominant meaning of 
adaptation for Linda Hutcheon.49 But adaptation is not only used to designate the inter-
medial transformations of a work into another form; it has also been used in relation to 
intra-medial works – say where an old play is adapted by another dramatist to make it ‘fit’ 
with a new milieu. Fischlin and Fortier use adaptation to designate theatrical reworkings of 
Shakespeare, citing the way Tate adapts King Lear to make it fit with Restoration aesthetic 
and political principles.50 The problem with adaptation, however, is that it is potentially 
limiting in its scope. Because of its roots in intermedia transitions, adaptation tends to focus 
on the wholesale transformation of texts. This means that, when it comes to Shakespeare, 
adaptation has increasingly been used to designate complete rewritings of the ‘original’ 
adapted play. This does not necessarily leave room for other forms of artistic and cultural 
intervention in relation to Shakespeare – say the rewriting of a single scene or the use of a 
particular character.  
I think that appropriation is wider in scope. The word appropriation has its 
etymological roots in the Latin appropriāre and tends to connote the seizure of ‘property’ 
belonging to another, to ‘take to oneself’ or ‘make one’s own’.51 The word is most readily 
related in Shakespeare Studies with the Cultural Materialist criticism of the 1980s and 
1990s. Cultural Materialist critics of the time were concerned with the ways in which 
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Shakespeare is appropriated and the ideological uses the Bard is conscripted to serve. This 
mostly meant interrogating the conservative use of Shakespeare in various forms; but, at 
the same time, critics also sought to prioritize the redeployment of Shakespeare for 
politically and ideologically oppositional purposes. These critics were particularly concerned 
with the way in which feminist, queer and postcolonial writers upended the patriarchal, 
heteronormative and imperialist ideologies which Shakespeare has been used to 
promulgate, in the service of ‘marginalized, oppressed and disenfranchised cultural 
voices’.52 Such writers were seen to be appropriating the dominant, hegemonic culture – 
material belonging to the establishment – for themselves, at once interrogating the values 
attached to ‘Shakespeare’ whilst simultaneously redeploying him for new social and political 
purposes.53  
 My own use of the word appropriation is far less politicized than it is for Cultural 
Materialist criticism. Where appropriation has, in the past, often been used ‘as a weapon in 
the struggle for supremacy between various ideologies’ and ‘various poetics’, I am not as 
concerned with the way in which writers appropriate Shakespeare in the service of 
particular forms of (usually, identity) politics.54 Such appropriations often work by 
representing a character marginalized in the ‘original’ play, with feminist rewritings of 
Shakespeare written from the ‘untold’ perspective of Ophelia or Desdemona by no means 
unusual.55 While I do not want to contest the political aspirations which underpin 
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appropriation, Cultural Materialist criticism – in its search for oppositional meanings – has 
limited the scope of appropriation, which has been reduced to meaning nothing but ‘a 
seizure of authority over the original in a way that appeals to contemporary sensibilities 
steeped in a politicized understanding of culture’.56 This is hardly unjustified given the 
etymology of the word, but it has meant that other forms of appropriation have been 
overlooked. This is particularly true of Rudkin, Barker and Kane, whose appropriations are 
not necessarily concerned with (and are even suspicious of) particular political iterations of 
identity.  
What I find useful about the word appropriation is that, far more strongly than 
intertextuality and adaptation, it implies an intentional subject doing the appropriating – an 
author. This reflects the ‘proper’ in ‘appropriation’, which means ‘pertaining to a person’ ‘in 
particular, specific; distinctive, characteristic’.57 Using appropriation creates space for 
authorial agency. This authorial aspect is – for Sanders – ‘inescapable’ when thinking about 
the way a contemporary writer approaches and appropriates a prior text.58 While 
appropriation may have its root in propruis – ‘belonging to’, the ‘property of’ – the ‘a’-prefix 
denotes ‘an approach towards’.59 This conception of the ‘approach’ is open-ended; it does 
not necessitate a posture of antagonistically politicized hostility. The approach ‘toward’ 
property belonging to another may be more reverential – or simply more ambivalent – even 
if the desire of the author is to ‘take’ that property ‘to oneself’, to make it his or her ‘own’. 
This may serve to make the relationship between the appropriator and text more dialogic 
than antagonistic – a ‘conversation’ between writer and work, as Barker sometimes calls it, 
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as opposed to the complete domination of the textual object by the appropriating authorial 
subject.60  
The word appropriation can usefully serve to capture ‘approaches’ to past texts that 
are not necessarily constrained by questions of cultural and political identity. But it can also 
encompass several forms of artistic practice, in a way that is not so available to the more 
limited ‘adaptation’. Where adaptation is increasingly identified with wholesale (and usually 
intermedial) transformations of a text, appropriation may be of a single speech or character, 
or even an unchanged quotation. This will be particularly useful in tracing the various ways 
in which King Lear is appropriated in post-war British playwriting. King Lear has been 
appropriated in many ways ‘after’ Auschwitz, from complete rewritings of the play (Bond); 
to prequels and sequels (Barker and Rabey); to the appropriation of a vital scene or scenes 
(Kane); to appropriating a particular character (Rudkin). By using appropriation, it is possible 
to bring various forms of practice into dialogue as part of a wider study into the way writers 
have used King Lear.   
No single word can comprise all forms of intertextuality and, to a degree, all 
definitions will have limitations. It would be wrong, however, to take a ‘What You Will’ 
approach to the ‘problem of naming’: the theories of intertextuality, adaptation and 
appropriation, though in constant evolution, have underlying assumptions and critical 
genealogies.61 With some of those assumptions and genealogies adduced and with 
‘appropriation’ taken as a preferred term, I want to provide a brief survey of the criticism 
dealing with Shakespeare and appropriation, presenting the distinctive contribution that I 
make to the field.   
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4. Literature Survey: Shakespeare Studies and Post-War British Theatre Studies 
 
To define briefly the research milieu in which I am operating, I will concentrate on the 
foremost research areas the thesis straddles – Shakespeare Studies and post-war British 
Theatre Studies. To date, no work of criticism has emerged that deals solely with 
appropriations of King Lear in post-war British playwriting. There have, however, been some 
critical pieces on Shakespeare and modern drama and some single-author studies on the 
Catastrophist playwrights under consideration. Where critics working in Shakespeare 
Studies have tended to produce criticism dealing with the wider issue of Shakespeare and 
modern drama, critics working in contemporary Theatre Studies tend to prioritize the work 
of a single playwright. These are approaches that I hope to bring into dialogue. I will begin 
with Shakespeare Studies and, more specifically, the topic of Shakespeare and 
appropriation.   
 
4.1. Shakespeare Studies 
 
Shakespeare and appropriation is a vast, and still growing, field of critical enquiry, covering 
everything from the appropriation of Shakespeare in eighteenth century political cartoons 
to ‘YouTube Ophelias’.62 This reflects a wider historical shift in Shakespeare Studies from the 
meaning ‘of’ Shakespeare to the phenomenon of meaning ‘by’ Shakespeare, which 
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 For Shakespeare and political cartoons, see Jonathan Bate, Shakespearean Constitutions: Politics, Theatre, 
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abandons the idea that there is any finally authoritative ‘meaning’ in Shakespeare for critics 
to decipher in favour of analysing the way Shakespeare is variously used to generate 
meaning(s).63  
Perhaps unexpectedly, however, studies dealing with Shakespeare and appropriation 
have not always paid much attention to appropriations by modern playwrights, typically 
preferring inter-medial appropriations (and adaptations) of Shakespeare as opposed to 
intra-medial appropriations. This failure to address Shakespeare and playwriting can be seen 
in the 1991 Peter Erickson work, Rewriting Shakespeare, Rewriting Ourselves and the 
influential 1991 and 1999 collections The Appropriation of Shakespeare: Post-Renaissance 
Reconstruction of the Works and Myths and Shakespeare and Appropriation, none of which 
includes a single piece on appropriations of Shakespeare by historical or post-war 
playwrights.64   
 Despite the relative paucity of works dealing with Shakespeare and modern 
playwriting, some studies have emerged dedicated to the topic. In her Modern Shakespeare 
Offshoots, Cohn sets herself the task of studying theatrical appropriations (or ‘offshoots’) of 
Shakespeare, but, finding little of worth, frequently abandons her task in order to devote 
more study to novels and other generic forms that ‘offshoot’ from Shakespeare: 
‘Shakespeare offshoots are not Shakespeare or, a little less tersely, no modern Shakespeare 
offshoot has improved upon the original’.65 Cohn does dedicate some time to King Lear 
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offshoots but does not develop a reading that attends to the status of the play in post-war 
playwriting.66  
In his 1989 study Shakespeare and the Modern Dramatist, Michael Scott sticks more 
faithfully to his task and provides readings of the way contemporary dramatists have 
‘modernized’ Shakespeare, including Samuel Beckett, Eugène Ionesco, Tom Stoppard, 
Edward Bond, Arnold Wesker and Charles Marowitz.67 This ‘modernization’ of the Bard, as 
Scott conceives it, falls into distinct categories: the ‘metaphysical’ theatre of the absurdists 
(Beckett, Ionesco, Stoppard) or the avowedly political theatre of the Brechtian socialists 
(Bond, Wesker and Marowitz).68 The problem with his conception of modernization, 
however, is that it is both vague and overly schematic. It implies modern drama is split 
solely between the metaphysical and the political, with appropriations of Shakespeare 
following suit. This renders Scott somewhat blind to other forms of appropriative 
intervention in post-war playwriting and drama, which is not nearly as binary as he makes 
out. This is particularly problematic when it comes to King Lear. Scott fails to acknowledge 
the various ways the play has been appropriated in post-war British writing or the possibility 
that appropriation (‘modernization’) operates in ways other than his limited conception of 
metaphysical/political.  
In the more recent 2013 work Shakespeare’s Surrogates: Rewriting Renaissance 
Drama, Sonya Freeman Loftis draws on ideas around theatrical surrogacy to analyse the 
ways literary adaptation and appropriation is often metaphorized, in both early modern and 
modern writing, as a violent dismemberment of the human body (corpse/corpus).69 Loftis is 
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convincing in her demonstration of images of literary adaptation and/as physical 
dismemberment. Her analysis of the paradox of violence and veneration in images of 
dismemberment also has some purchase on the playwrights under study.70 For all its 
strengths, however, the work suffers – I argue – from a lack of scope. The playwrights Loftis 
considers very much represent a roll-call of the ‘usual suspects’, already considered in the 
work of Cohn and Scott: Shaw, Beckett, Brecht, Stoppard and Müller. Loftis does not 
consider the work of other playwrights who have appropriated Shakespeare, so that her 
work, while theoretically and conceptually rigorous, is not nearly as original as it might have 
been in its choices.      
 Criticism dedicated solely to King Lear and appropriation has also started to emerge 
in recent times. In her 2010 Succeeding King Lear: Literature, Exposure and the Possibility of 
Politics, Emily Sun analyses the cultural afterlife of King Lear, the way that the play 
‘generates a literary genealogy, or history of successors’.71 Drawing on the work of 
Agamben, Sun contends that King Lear depicts the originary moment of modernity – the 
disaster brought about by a crisis in the legitimacy of the sovereign.72 The play, as Sun reads 
it, inaugurates a historical rift which other writers compulsively return to in times of crisis.  
Sun concentrates on discrete historical eras – the 1790s and the 1930s, with William 
Wordsworth and the James Agee and Walker Evans multi-media work Let Us Now Praise 
Famous Men the ‘successors’ Sun is concerned to analyse. My own work on King Lear is also 
concerned with appropriation, catastrophe and modernity; however, where Sun provides an 
analysis that ranges between discrete eras, I concentrate on playwriting of the post-war 
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period and the way King Lear has been appropriated in response to the catastrophe of the 
Holocaust.  
 My area of inquiry most obviously overlaps with the work of Lynne Bradley and her 
2010 Adapting King Lear for the Stage.73 Bradley analyses adaptations (by which she means 
wholesale rewritings) of King Lear from the Nahum Tate ‘revival’ of the play in 1681 to post-
war plays from the twentieth century. This includes work on some of the playwrights I 
analyse (though it overlooks David Rudkin and Sarah Kane). My main criticism of Adapting 
King Lear for the Stage is that it does not give a particularly strong rationale for prioritizing 
King Lear. Bradley writes that she concentrates on King Lear because ‘tracing adaptation as 
it is practised on one particular work creates a consistency of focus around the methodology 
of adaptation’.74 This is surely right – but if Bradley is concerned only with ‘a consistency of 
focus’ around the way adaptation takes place, she might equally have picked any other 
play.75 By situating the play against the catastrophe of the Holocaust, I intend to provide 
some of the historical and conceptual context around King Lear, modernity and disaster 
lacking in Adapting King Lear for the Stage. By studying appropriations of the play, as 
opposed to adaptations, I also provide a wider prospectus of the way the play has been 
deployed.  
 So vast is the literature around Shakespeare and appropriation in Shakespeare 
Studies that no survey can be exhaustive. What is striking about the field, however, is the 
relative infrequency of studies dealing with appropriations by contemporary playwrights. 
Even more conspicuously, hardly any critics in Shakespeare Studies have considered the 
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appropriations undertaken by Rudkin, Barker and Kane. This is partially due to the legacy of 
Cultural Materialism and a politicized conception of appropriation, which has not always left 
room for other forms of creative intervention. By concentrating on Catastrophism, I intend 
to make a distinctive contribution to the topic of Shakespeare and appropriation, while also 
questioning the theoretical – and, indeed, political – priorities that traditionally have 
underpinned it.    
 
4.2. Post-War British Theatre Studies 
 
For the most part, Shakespeare Studies has not had much to say about appropriations of 
King Lear in post-war playwriting – and even less to say about Rudkin, Barker and Kane. The 
way these figures appropriate King Lear has, however, been considered more fully by 
scholars of post-war British theatre. Graham Saunders has written about the relationship 
between Blasted and King Lear and has also analysed Seven Lears.76 Saunders has 
consolidated his work on Shakespeare and appropriation with his 2017 Elizabethan and 
Jacobean Reappropriation in Contemporary British Drama: ‘Upstart Crows’. Saunders also 
prefers the term appropriation – though for him it captures the way British playwrights 
appropriate Shakespeare to challenge the ideologies within Elizabethan and Jacobean 
drama, questioning the legitimacy and cultural authority of Shakespeare.77 Other works on 
Barker and his Shakespeare appropriations have been produced by Andy Smith and Vanasay 
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Khamphommala, while David Ian Rabey has touched on the relationship between Barker 
and Shakespeare in his most recent monograph on the playwright.78 Criticism on Rudkin, 
perhaps the least known playwright under study, remains sparse: Rabey has, however, 
provided some analysis of the Shakespearean echoes found in his work, as has Robert 
Wilcher.79  
Some of these critics will be considered again more deeply – and critiqued – in the 
pending case studies. For now, I want to draw attention to the absence of a wider critical 
engagement with King Lear and appropriation. To date, criticism has generally only dealt 
with the appropriations of a single playwright, failing to provide a more comprehensive 
analysis of King Lear in post-war culture and playwriting. This means that criticism has (as 
yet) failed to analyse the discourse around the play and the catastrophe of Auschwitz, which 
has shaped the way in which post-war playwrights have responded to and appropriated the 
play. This failure to situate King Lear and appropriation within a deeper socio-historical 
milieu means that criticism has not always been alive to the full implications of King Lear 
appropriations. It has also meant that the relationship between various King Lear 
appropriations in post-war drama has been neglected. By bringing the appropriations of 
particular playwrights into a wider dialogue around Auschwitz, catastrophe and subjectivity, 
I intend to provide a deeper analysis of King Lear and post-war writing than has previously 
been attempted.  
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In her 2015 Adorno and Modern Theatre: The Drama of the Damaged Self in Bond, 
Rudkin, Barker and Kane – and in other previous articles – Karoline Gritzner has read the 
drama of all of the playwrights under study through the perspective of Critical Theory and 
its conceptualization of Auschwitz, the aesthetics of catastrophe and modern subjectivity.80 
My own research has many overlaps with – and is also indebted to – the pathbreaking work 
of Gritzner. My thesis, however, aims to demonstrate the critical role King Lear has played in 
the development of post-Auschwitz, Catastrophist dramaturgies, whereas Gritzner tends to 
concentrate on the formative influence of Beckett and the ruined scenescapes of 
absurdism.81 I intend to show that Catastrophism has not only a Beckettian, but also a 
Shakespearean, genealogy. To that end, I want to develop aspects of her analysis of post-
Auschwitz, Catastrophist dramaturgy and playwriting to include Shakespeare, King Lear and 
appropriation.  
This is the first full-length study to analyse appropriations of King Lear in post-war 
British playwriting, representing a new contribution to criticism on the cultural afterlife of 
the play. By drawing on Adorno and bringing various appropriations of the play into 
dialogue, I intend to situate King Lear in a wider cultural discourse around the Holocaust, 
showing that Catastrophist appropriations have played a vital role in post-Auschwitz drama 
and playwriting.  
I turn now to give a description of the research methods I have used to analyse 
appropriations of King Lear in post-war British playwriting and its role in Catastrophist 
aesthetics. I concentrate on the approach I have taken to textuality, authorship and 
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performance, which have – in part – been determined by the way in which I conceptualize 
appropriation.   
 
5. Research Methods 
 
This is primarily a study of playwrights and playwriting. To that end, I have taken an author-
centred approach to research and prioritized close textual and formal analysis of my 
selected case studies. There are various theoretical concerns that may be raised against the 
text-based approach I have taken, which can be accused of granting the text an over-
privileged status as a self-contained literary artefact it does not warrant – particularly in the 
world of Theatre Studies, where the authority of the text has increasingly been displaced in 
favour of the ‘liveness’ of the performance event.82 My primary research method 
nevertheless has a firm foundation in some of the basic presumptions of appropriation 
studies which, as Fischlin and Fortier contend, invariably involves an analysis of the way a 
writer intervenes to appropriate, and make intertextual changes to, a prior text.83 Close-text 
analysis has also been vital in recovering a wide range of appropriations of King Lear, often 
beyond plays that ‘announce’ a specific intertextual relation to King Lear via a title (as in 
Seven Lears). This has allowed for a more thorough appreciation of various forms of 
appropriation. 
 My approach to close-text analysis has been author-centred. By resurrecting a figure 
pronounced dead in some poststructuralist theory, I have attempted to situate 
                                                          
82
 See in particular Hans-Thies Lehman, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby (Oxford: Routledge, 
2006). See also the Special Issue of Performance Research entitled ‘Performing Literatures’, Performance 
Research, 14:1 (2009) for an excellent collection of essays on the question of text/performance.  
83
 Adaptations of Shakespeare, p. 7. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
42 
 
appropriations of King Lear within the wider oeuvre of the playwrights under study. To 
determine, analyse and even critique aspects of authorial intention, I have also drawn on 
other, ‘non-literary’ and ‘non-dramatic’ texts. These have come in the form of essays, critical 
articles, interviews, public addresses and so on. My prioritization of the author and 
authorship is also reflected in the original, in-depth interviews I have conducted with Rudkin 
and Barker, transcriptions of which are included in the Appendix. While the interviews are 
concerned with authorial intention, it should also be observed that these conversations are 
not always supportive of the readings I have taken and that interpretation can never be 
reduced to the (in any case, variously conceived and contingent) intentions of the author. 
These interviews were also undertaken with the aim of ascertaining more about the original 
performances of the plays and some of the conditions around staging. I have also engaged 
in archival textual research, most of all on David Rudkin, who donated an archive of 
materials to the British Library in 2010. My research in the Rudkin Archive led to the 
discovery of an unfinished ‘Shakespeare’ play, which I touch on again in Chapter Five. I 
remain one of the few researchers working on the Rudkin Archive, which I visited over 2015-
2016.   
My emphasis on close-text analysis has, in part, been motivated by practical 
concerns. Due to the relatively marginal status of the playwrights I study, revivals of the 
plays have been few and far between. Playwriting does, however, invariably (though not 
inevitably) take place with a performance in mind and, in studying appropriations of a 
drama text by playwrights, I have also undertaken performance analysis. Over 2016 I 
accessed the Exeter Digital Performance Archive in order to study its recordings of Wrestling 
School productions, which includes some of the original staging of Seven Lears. I have also 
engaged in other forms of archival work to analyse past stagings and the way Catastrophist 
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subjectivity is performatively embodied. This has meant work on various performance 
ephemera and press reviews, which have played a role in the way I read subjectivity in 
performance.  
My analysis of performance both draws on – and contributes to – Frankfurt School 
theory. In his analysis of artistic performance – most obviously in music – Adorno critiques 
the ‘compulsive repetition’ of ‘standardized performances’, whereby performers repetitively 
embody the same predictable movements and actions.84 This is something he relates to 
social and political systems that aspire to total domination, which must inhibit all individual 
spontaneity – a phenomena Arendt also analyses.85 It is a process of domination that, as 
both Adorno and Arendt contend, found its nadir in the concentration camps.86 My analysis 
of past stagings draws on the etymology of catastrophe as an unexpectedly sudden ‘turn’.87 
I show that the Catastrophist subject often performs a sudden turn away from the 
predictable action or word, in favour of something more open-ended. This may be a turn in 
physical and psychic orientation and/or in speech. These enable the autonomy of the 
subject, who turns away from prescribed actions and even from closure itself – the expected 
(or, as King Lear would have it, ‘promised’) end.88 It is also worth recalling that the oldest of 
the Three Fates in Greek mythology is Atropos, whose name signifies ‘without turn’.89 
Atropos implies the impossibility of turning away from fate, the end which is allotted to the 
tragic hero in Greek tragedy. The Catastrophist subject who has the capacity to turn reveals 
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a form of tragedy where the subject can resist the ‘inevitable’ end and preserve his or her 
bid for freedom.  
 
6. Thesis Structure  
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapters One, Two and Three are designed to 
provide the theoretical, aesthetic and historical backdrop to Catastrophist appropriations of 
King Lear, while in Chapters Four to Seven I will turn to the individual case studies I have 
chosen.  
In Chapter One, I analyse the work of Theodor Adorno to establish his historical and 
philosophical understanding of Auschwitz, analysing the impact which the camps had on his 
conceptualization of subjectivity, aesthetics and tragedy. This will establish some of the 
historical and theoretical foundations for the close readings I develop over the course of the 
study. In Chapter Two, I draw on the reading of Auschwitz, subjectivity, aesthetics and 
tragedy provided in Chapter One to analyse the thematic and, most urgently, formal aspects 
of King Lear that have made it so pivotal an intertext in Catastrophist playwriting. I intend to 
show that King Lear is a play occupied with catastrophe, modernity, subjectivity and tragic 
form, in a way that makes it uniquely viable for Catastrophist appropriation. This 
consideration of King Lear will also serve as a frame for Chapter Three, where I analyse the 
way these vital aspects of the play have been interpreted in criticism, performance and 
appropriation in the period 1939-1997. This era comprises significant shifts in the reception 
of King Lear and important developments in post-war society, from the outbreak of the 
Second World War to the consolidation of late capitalist ideology with the rise of ‘Third 
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Way’ liberal democratic parties, which largely embraced the ‘emancipatory’ potential of 
global capitalism. The chapter analyses a cultural discourse around King Lear and Auschwitz 
to show that Rudkin, Barker and Kane are embedded in a wider post-war constellation of 
ideas around the play, while I also situate Catastrophism as an aesthetic phenomenon of the 
1980s-1990s.  
My case studies begin with perhaps the most famous appropriation of King Lear in 
post-war British playwriting: the 1971 play Lear, by Edward Bond. In Chapter Four, I analyse 
Lear, showing that, through his appropriation of Shakespeare, Bond forms a critique of post-
Auschwitz culture. This has obvious parallels with the other playwrights under study. Where 
Bond departs from Catastrophism is in his Marxist-humanist ideology of engagement. This 
places the subject in an overarching historical teleology, where s/he acts out a prescribed 
role against social injustice. I will show that Bond shares his analysis of modernity and 
disaster with the Catastrophists, but that his tragic form remains reliant on ideals of 
progress and closure. My analysis of a play that falls outside the definition Catastrophism 
will serve to bring the form (or, indeed, anti-form) of Catastrophist tragedy and subjectivity 
into relief. 
In Chapter Five, I turn to David Rudkin. Through an analysis of his Will’s Way I will 
consider the vital role Edgar plays in the way Rudkin conceptualizes subjectivity – both on 
stage and in relation to his own process as an author. This revolves around the negative 
state of exile and the self-loss – and necessary self re-invention – exile involves. I will show 
that the tragic state of exile is – for Rudkin – a state of autonomy. By drawing on Adorno 
and his conceptualization of exile, I situate Rudkin and his appropriation of King Lear as a 
response to the degradation of the subject in modernity – something which found its nadir 
at Auschwitz.  
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In Chapter Six, I analyse the Howard Barker play Seven Lears, a prequel to King Lear. I 
contend that Barker appropriates King Lear to enact a radical interrogation of conventional 
understandings of the ‘good life’ in the wake of the Holocaust – an interrogation that 
Adorno also undertakes in Minima Moralia, which is dedicated to the ‘melancholy science’ 
of the ‘good life’ post-Auschwitz culture.90 My analysis of the play will concentrate on the 
way Barker appropriates Lear as a Catastrophist subject by rewriting the storm scenes from 
Shakespeare. 
In Chapter Seven, I analyse the Sarah Kane play Blasted and its appropriation of King 
Lear by drawing on the 1966 work Negative Dialectics. I consider the way in which Negative 
Dialectics deconstructs the philosophical distinction between the material and 
metaphysical, which Adorno sees as necessary ‘after’ Auschwitz. Through an analysis of 
Blasted, I show that Kane similarly interrogates the distinction between the material and the 
metaphysical by appropriating the ‘Dover cliff’ scene from King Lear. I contend Kane 
appropriates King Lear to make a space for autonomy – for transcendence – in a totalized 
world.  
In the Conclusion to the thesis, I will briefly consider the ongoing legacy of King Lear 
and Catastrophist drama in post-war British playwriting, before once again considering the 
significance of the research I have undertaken into King Lear and Catastrophist 
appropriation.   
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Chapter One 
Adorno and Tragedy ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical basis for the readings developed in the thesis as a whole, 
organizing a dialogue under various critical ‘themes’ from Adorno: Auschwitz, subjectivity, 
aesthetics and tragedy. I begin with Auschwitz as it conditions every other aspect of 
Adornian thought in the post-war era, from his analysis of the fate of the modern subject to 
his understanding of fragmented, late modernist art. I will analyse a wide range of primary 
texts, from The Dialectic of Enlightenment to Aesthetic Theory. I also draw on relevant 
criticism on Adorno and consider some of the more pressing critiques of his post-Auschwitz 
philosophy. My consideration of those critics who draw on Adorno when analysing theatre – 
whether that is Shakespeare or post-war – will take place in pending chapters and the 
individual case studies.   
In the Introduction, I observed that King Lear has risen to prominence in the post-
war era as the Shakespeare play that seems to speak most powerfully to the catastrophe(s) 
of modernity – typified by the Holocaust. I also observed that the play has been a vital 
intertext for a variety of (often competing) understandings of tragedy and subjectivity after 
Auschwitz, from Beckettian absurdism to post-Brechtian political theatre. These 
undertakings to write the disaster through King Lear will be considered in more depth in 
Chapter Three. The main aim of the present chapter, however, is to make a case for a type 
of formally fragmented tragic drama, where resolution is denied and the tragic subject 
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retains his or her autonomy: Catastrophism. This is not necessarily to say that Adorno would 
advocate a renewed form of tragedy. But while Adorno does not offer an overt theory (let 
alone a defence) of tragedy, I will show that his various insights on the Holocaust, history, 
modernity, subjectivity and aesthetics imply a theory of post-Auschwitz tragedy.91 I begin by 
analysing the dialectic of Enlightenment, which proposes a paradoxical relationship between 
Auschwitz and the humanist philosophy of reason and freedom typified by the 
Enlightenment.  
 
1. Auschwitz  
 
1.1. The Dialectic of Enlightenment  
 
Though mostly written before the full scale of the atrocity was revealed, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (1944) – which Adorno co-authored with Max Horkheimer – provides a 
formative analysis of the European Enlightenment from the disconcerting vantage-point of 
the Holocaust.92 Adorno and Horkheimer write that ‘in the most general sense of 
progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men’.93 But seen 
from the disabused perspective of the Second World War, the ‘fully enlightened earth 
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radiates disaster triumphant’.94 How did that reversal from human ‘liberation’ to total 
‘disaster’ occur?  
It was, as Adorno and Horkheimer contend, the aim of the Enlightenment and its 
humanist philosophy to critique the superstitious myths about the world that obtained from 
pre-modern times. These had perpetuated the idea that the world is created by opaque, 
divine forces that suffuse material reality and determine human fate. These same forces are 
also immanent in society and its institutions, which are part of a wider cosmic order. This 
relates most obviously to the monarch and the church – both myth-based forms of social 
and political authority, which represent divinity on earth. This means that both reality and 
society represent a providentially ordained and immutable world order, in which all subjects 
are fatefully embedded. Most of humanity in pre-modern times is in thrall to mythic ideas 
and unfree.  
The demystification of pre-modern beliefs relies on the ability of the individual to 
use his (and, less frequently, her) inherent capacity for reason, which can serve to 
interrogate and ultimately free people from dogma. This prepares the way for more modern 
social and political ideals and institutions, which reflect and enable the freedom of the 
subject – say parliamentary democracy and the legal system. Over time, liberal ideals 
ranging from freedom and equality tended to displace more traditional forms of mystified 
power, so the relationship between subject and society becomes more consensual. This 
portrayal of the development of human thought turns world history into a type of Bildung 
narrative, where humanity is understood to progress through stages of myth and rationality, 
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dependant on the human capacity to promote freedom as the basis for social and political 
life.95  
 But for Adorno and Horkheimer, the Second World War and the concentration 
camps require a newly reconfigured understanding of modernity. This is not simply because 
Enlightenment culture in some way ‘failed’ to redeem humanity from pre-modern barbarity 
and oppression. More profoundly, Adorno and Horkheimer critique the Enlightenment for 
producing the conditions that made Auschwitz possible. Far from viewing the Holocaust as 
an aberration – a violent break in the historical emancipation of an increasingly ‘rational’ 
humanity – Auschwitz is, for Adorno and Horkheimer, closely related to Enlightenment 
progress itself.  
Dialectic of Enlightenment has at its centre a Nietzschean genealogical critique of the 
epistemological practices of Enlightenment philosophy and science. Adorno and Horkheimer 
make the case that enlightened, philosophical and scientific reason produces knowledge by 
separating the material world – and the objects that make it up – into abstract categories, 
say the taxonomic distinctions between various animal and plant species. These categories 
are understood to properly reflect the object of perception, where pre-modern dogma 
superstitiously mystifies it by viewing the world as the product of divine fiat. Through the 
use of reason, more and more objects are understood and categorized, so that the 
systematization of the world is seen to be progressively complete – or total. Over time, 
every ‘thing’ (and everything) is sublated under abstract categories of perception and, 
finally, utility, where the object is increasingly used as an instrument to serve the purposes 
of humanity.  
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Adorno and Horkheimer contend that Hegel represents the pinnacle of the 
Enlightenment and its theoretical and practical attempt to produce a unified totality of all 
human knowledge.96 Hegel famously contests the Kantian ‘block’, the idea that the 
noumenal object – or the ‘thing-in-itself’ – is ultimately resistant to phenomenal human 
perception.97 He insists that the objects of human experience can ultimately be seen to 
conform to human concepts – or ‘abstract categories’. 98 By using concepts, it is possible for 
the subject to gain a complete perceptual understanding of the object, via a continuing 
process in which the subject ‘negates the negation’ – or the aspects of the object that seem 
to resist interpretation. This process is at the heart of the idea of dialectics – or the synthesis 
of thesis and anti-thesis. Hegel contends that the dialectic reaches its conclusion in the 
‘positive’ synthesis of the subject (perception) and object (reality) in time. By virtue of 
reason, the subject comes to dominate a previously opaque and oppressive material world – 
the object. Through its negation of a recalcitrant object, the subject achieves full self-
actualization and, finally, self-determination. This allows Hegel to adopt a teleological view 
of history as the universal progress of reason and freedom over time. The perfected state of 
knowledge and autonomy to which humanity is progressing is the ‘end of history’, as Hegel 
called it.99  
Hegel might represent the culmination of Enlightenment confidence in the unlimited 
powers of human reason, but, for Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘enlightenment’ refers, not only 
to the era known as the Enlightenment, but to ‘any intellectual and practical operations 
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which are presented as demythologizing, secularizing or disenchanting some mythical, 
religious or magical representation of the world’ through the power of ‘modern’ 
reasoning.100 This is not necessarily restricted to the Enlightenment, but has its roots deep in 
European thought, with Adorno and Horkheimer making the case that the ‘cunning’ 
Odysseus displays in The Odyssey represents a disenchanted understanding of the mythic 
powers supposed to control human destiny.101 The notion of a conceptual, systematic unity 
of knowledge, write Adorno and Horkheimer, remains ‘the slogan from Parmenides to 
Russell’.102  
Despite its central place in European thinking, there is a problem with the conceptual 
‘unity’ of knowledge provided by enlightenment thought. This has to do with the way 
enlightenment thinking ultimately reduces discrete objects to a conceptual category. By 
making various objects ‘fit’ into a predetermined epistemic category, the actual, specific 
uniqueness of the object under survey – its singularity – is lost to view. Every object 
becomes nothing more than a representative of the abstract category to which it has been 
consigned. This causes Adorno and Horkheimer to critique enlightenment thought as 
systematically misrepresenting reality by disregarding – and dissolving – the singular 
qualities of the object that distinguish it from the category to which abstract thought 
ascribes it.  
Adorno coins the term identity-thinking to describe the process of categorical 
thought in enlightenment reasoning, which ‘identifies’ discrete objects with a preconceived 
category.103 The idea that a particular object can be subsumed within a general category 
without remainder leads to the idea that the conceptual realm has no outer boundary, that 
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there is nothing which it does not have the capacity to identify. This means that the object 
becomes totally identical with the category under which it is sublated; but it also means that 
the whole of reality itself is necessarily subsumed within a single (total) representational 
schema. It is for that reason Adorno and Horkheimer make the case that ‘Enlightenment is 
totalitarian’.104  
This reversal is where the ‘dialectic’ of enlightenment becomes most obvious. By 
subsuming discrete objects into a totalized conceptual configuration and dispelling anything 
that does not fit, categorical reasoning institutes ‘a law of perennial sameness’.105 
Understood as identical with its representation in and by categorical reason, reality comes 
to appear as heteronomous and unchanging, an immutable order that predetermines 
human experience and seems ultimately resistant to intervention or transformation. 
Enlightenment thinking ends up reverting to the mythic state of divine fate it was 
understood to displace. For the subject, the consequences are dire. Horkheimer writes that 
reason catalyses the ‘elevation of reality to the status of the ideal’, which ‘confronts the 
subject as absolute, overpowering’.106 The subject supposedly liberated by rationality ends 
up dominated by it.  
The most pressing question, however, is the way in which a philosophy of rational 
knowledge and self-determination gave rise to a social and political policy of extermination. 
I turn now to address that shift from enlightenment to genocide and the total domination of 
the subject.  
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1.2. Enlightenment and Auschwitz 
 
Adorno and Horkheimer combine a comprehensive deconstruction of the progress of reason 
with a Weberian analysis of disenchantment and administration.107 Adorno and Horkheimer 
contend that reason did not replace pre-modern traditions and institutions with enlightened 
civic and ethical values, which protect the freedom of the individual. On the contrary: the 
modern principles of systematic order and control have been applied to the total 
administration of society itself, so that subjects are increasingly bound in a repressive, ‘iron 
cage’.108  
This process is reflected in the increasingly universal pervasiveness of bureaucratic 
systems in modern society. Adorno is profoundly critical of the various systems of 
administrative bureaucracy found in modernity, which operate by separating every subject 
into abstract classes or categories – most obviously on the basis of age, status, gender, 
sexuality and race, among other possible ‘vectors’ of identity. Just as categorical reason 
creates a totally organized system of knowledge, so the disenchanted process of 
rationalization creates a totally organized social system, which similarly proceeds by 
administratively processing and dominating everything before it. Only where categorical 
reason had previously been applied to objects – to brute material reality – rationalized 
social systems are now also practised on and through human subjects, who are deemed so 
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much ‘material’ to be arbitrarily systematized and controlled as the dictates of reason 
demand.109  
Through the rationalization process, the modern subject becomes a target of the 
very same categorizing reason it is supposed to practise and apply. Far from being 
emancipated, the modern subject is reified – turned into an object. This evinces the 
profound influence of György Lukács, whose analysis of reification in History and Class 
Consciousness uncovers the way in which a social and political system created by humans 
comes to seem independent (and originally independent) of the very social actors who 
produce it.110 This, as Lukács contends, occasions a profound reversal: subjects are turned 
into objects of the system, with the result that individuals are rendered passive or 
determined, while the system itself is increasingly understood as the active, determining 
agent – as a subject. This process means that subjects are ultimately transformed into little 
more than ‘things’ (Verdinglichung means, quite literally, ‘thingification’). Adorno contends 
that the dialectic of Enlightenment is a reifying process, whereby the subject is transformed 
into an object of ‘reason’, meaning it is ultimately left ‘without autonomy or substance of its 
own’.111  
Adorno contends that, through the process of administrative rationalization, the 
subject comes to be completely identified with the category under which s/he has been 
placed, so the unique specificity of the individual subject is obscured – or, as Adorno 
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provocatively imagines it, ‘liquidated’.112 This depersonalization reaches its horrifying 
apotheosis at Auschwitz, which represents the catastrophic nadir of a wider trend towards 
rationalization in post-Enlightenment society. The concentrationary universe, as Auschwitz 
survivor Primo Levi calls it, represents a total – and totally administered – social world, 
where subjects were processed in a closed organizational system based on the category to 
which he or she was consigned.113 Adorno does not contend that the reifying process of 
modern administration inevitably ends in genocide, as its telos. He does, however, insist 
that any process whereby subjects are reduced to the status of objects creates the 
conditions under which Auschwitz was made possible. Adorno contends that the 
‘administrative murder of millions’ which took place in the Holocaust is a result of a ‘process 
of abstract integration’ and potentially ‘in preparation wherever human beings are de-
individualized’.114 Through the camp, the social and political process of rationalization has 
been ‘refined’ until subjects are ‘literally exterminated’ – but the camps are the (il)logical 
consequence of the way modern society more widely liquidates the qualitative particularity 
of its subjects.115  
This representation of the concentration camp does not mean Adorno and 
Horkheimer dodge or deny other explicatory causes for the Holocaust – not the least of 
which is a violent history of European-Christian anti-Semitism, which culminates in the ‘Final 
Solution to the Jewish Question’.116 Nor is it to deny the particularity of the Holocaust as a 
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predominantly (though, of course, not exclusively) Jewish experience.117 The point Adorno 
makes by tying the Holocaust to the legacy of the Enlightenment is to deny that the events 
of Auschwitz represent an atavistic return of pre-modern barbarism in an era of civilized 
European progress. Adorno and Horkheimer show that pre-modern myths about the Jews 
can co-exist with – and even be strengthened by – a supposedly ‘rational’ age of modernity. 
Adorno and Horkheimer contend that the virulent anti-Semitism of European modernity is 
intensified by a social system shaped by a desire for regulated order and control. By virtue 
of not being fully ‘integrated’ into the state and the nation, the Jewish people appear 
unfixed – a part of society but also not completely desegregated into the identifying systems 
of the ‘whole’. This only deepens a mythic fear of the uncontrollable and threatening ‘other’ 
– the Jew.118  
Adorno and Horkheimer conclude that the destruction of human subjectivity 
witnessed during the 1930s and the Second World War was not some sort of deviation but 
part of a wider practice of rationality based on absolute domination – of the world and the 
subjects that comprise it. Such a danger lies in the modern condition per se. ‘It was’, writes 
Zygmunt Bauman ‘the rational world of modern civilization that made the Holocaust 
thinkable’.119 Part of that modern condition is, as Adorno sees it, totalitarianism. But he also 
– and provocatively – relates Auschwitz to capitalism and the totalization of the commodity-
form. It is that relationship I analyse next, as it conditions the way Adorno critiques post-war 
society and art.  
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1.3. Auschwitz and Capitalism 
 
Auschwitz is for Adorno deeply related to and imbricated in modernity – to Enlightenment 
thinking, the process of categorization, social rationalization and the systemizing practices 
of modern culture. But perhaps most provocatively, Adorno also relates the atrocities 
committed under Nazi totalitarianism to the social and economic system that had seemed 
to prevail over fascism – liberal capitalism. What place does Auschwitz occupy in the history 
of Western capitalism? 
Drawing on a Marxist analysis of the commodity-form, Adorno relates both 
epistemological and social systems based on identity-thinking to the way that capitalism, 
through the equalizing process present in exchange-value, enables wholly unalike objects ‘to 
be made commensurable and exchangeable’.120 The exchange-value of a commodity – the 
commodities it might be exchanged for in a trade or the price it fetches on the market – 
means that distinct objects become artificially commensurate, with the unique properties of 
the traded object obscured to understanding. It is not simply a matter of historical 
coincidence that modern capitalism and the era of Enlightenment rationality converge in 
time. Latent in the law of identity-thinking is, as Adorno understands it, the commodity-
form, and vice-versa. Categorical rationality and capitalist exchange are for Adorno 
reciprocally-informing dialectical historical developments that cannot be analysed in 
isolation.  
The way in which Adorno relates identity-thinking to capitalism means that his 
critique of Auschwitz and the history of reason also relates to pre- and post-war capitalism. 
Adorno contends that, by incorporating everything into itself as a potentially exchangeable 
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commodity, capitalism is a universalizing system, which produces a reified world of total 
fungibility. This is not a process the subject is able to escape – let alone determine. Adorno 
contends that capitalist society, while it promotes a liberal ideology of individual freedom, 
ultimately reifies the subject – turning him or her into an object of a totalized social and 
economic process.  
This process is typified by Fordism. Fordism operates by integrating the subject into a 
wholly administered industrial system, in which s/he is called upon to perform the same 
single task over and over again in a wider production process.121 The idea of reducing the 
subject to a prescribed role is to mass produce standardized commodities with a 
consistently realizable value. The result, however, is that the subject transformed into an 
identity – into an object of the administered system of production. This means the 
qualitative distinction between subjects is inevitably degraded. One subject might stand in 
for any other in the overall process of production. The abstract equalizations produced by 
the Fordist system parallels the abstract equalizations of other modern administrative 
systems, which operate by making the unalike (non-identical subjects) appear alike 
(identical subjects).  
Adorno is, however, also suspicious (perhaps even more keenly so) of rationalized 
systems of consumption in post-Auschwitz life. Adorno does not believe that the post-war 
transition from industrial (productive, Fordist) to post-industrial (consumer, late) capital 
represents a decisive shift in the administered way that capitalism operates. This is most 
obvious in the devastating critique Adorno and Horkheimer mount against the so-called 
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‘Culture Industry’.122 This concept relates to the mass production of cultural products in 
post-Auschwitz society. Adorno makes the case that modern cultural life, far from being the 
product of a human subject concretizing his or her creativity and freedom, has been brought 
under the ambit of the capitalist system. He contends that post-Auschwitz cultural 
production is akin to a factory rolling out standardized cultural products – films, novels, 
plays, radio programmes, magazines and even astrology columns – which are used to ensure 
that subjects conform with standardized systems of thought and action in an ideological 
process of ‘mass deception’.123 The result – once again – is that subjects are integrated into 
an orderly administered system. This transforms the individual from a subject of culture to 
its fungible object. This is not to say that Adorno is in some way ‘against’ popular (or ‘low’) 
art, despite often being caricatured as a mandarin cultural elitist.124 Adorno is aware that 
popular art can unleash politically oppositional and destabilizing libidinal forces. He is, 
however, deeply critical of the ‘repetitiveness, the self-sameness, and the ubiquity of 
modern mass culture’, which tends to ‘weaken the forces of individual resistance’.125 For 
him, the Culture Industry serves to incorporate subjects into a totalized world that degrades 
freedom.    
Nowhere does Adorno collapse the qualitative distinction between consumer 
capitalism and the unmitigated horrors of Nazi fascism – though it is perhaps worth 
observing that Auschwitz operated as both a death-camp and labour-camp, with an 
industrial system of production and consumption that was exploited by private industry.126 
Adorno also remains conscious of the distinctions between capitalism and Stalinism, a 
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totalitarian system which he often critiqued.127 Adorno does think, however, that capitalism, 
Nazi fascism and Stalinism are totalized systems that can all be seen as iterations of 
rationalized modernity and identity-thinking. Adorno also makes the case that capitalism, in 
its reification of the subject, can slide into totalitarian fascism far more unresistingly than 
liberal thought would like to imagine (‘whoever is not prepared to talk about capitalism’, as 
Horkheimer once observed, ‘should also remain silent about fascism’).128 These systems all 
produce widespread socialization – or the ‘total’ ‘socialization’ of society – and tend to 
disregard the particularity of the subject in the process.129 This means that, while 
contemporary capitalist culture does not necessarily produce the same horrors of the 
concentration camp or the gulag, such catastrophes remain a live possibility. ‘Auschwitz was 
possible’, writes Adorno, ‘and remains possible for the foreseeable future’: its enabling 
conditions persist in a society marked by the ‘permanent catastrophe’ of a degraded human 
subject.130  
Adorno provides an undeniably bleak portrait of the transformation of modern 
freedom back into mythic oppression. He writes in his 1966 work Negative Dialectics that no 
‘universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the 
slingshot to the megaton bomb’.131 His analysis has, however, been challenged by theorists 
of the postmodern. I want to consider the postmodern critique of Adorno to establish the 
relevance of his ideas around Auschwitz and reification for an era of postmodern (late) 
capital.  
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1.4. The Actuality of Adorno: The Postmodern Critique of Adorno  
 
While his ideas have been influential, there are inevitably criticisms of Adorno and his 
conceptualizations of modernity and Auschwitz. These have ranged from the work of Jürgen 
Habermas – who critiques Adorno for being overly reliant on the subject-object relation, 
failing to consider the subject-subject relation and the possibility of rational communicative 
interaction – to Timothy Snyder, who makes a defence of the modern administrative state 
and its role in protecting Jews from the Holocaust.132 For the most part, however, criticisms 
of Adorno have been undertaken from a postmodern position. These are both philosophical 
and historical and tend to concentrate on the ‘actuality’ of Critical Theory in the postmodern 
era.133  
This critique of Critical Theory from a postmodern perspective largely begins with 
Lyotard, the foremost theorist of the postmodern, and his 1974 piece ‘Adorno as the Devil’ – 
an allusion to the 1947 Thomas Mann novel Dr Faustus, where Adorno makes an 
appearance as Satan.134 I want to concentrate on Lyotard as his critique of Adorno rests on a 
changed understanding of the social and cultural shift from industrial to post-industrial 
capitalist society. Lyotard reiterates Adorno when he makes the case that modernity is 
shaped by totalizing ‘metanarratives’ of reason and progress – overarching stories or 
systems of thought that seek to provide a total representation of the world and its 
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development. He also critiques metanarratives as complicit with systems of domination that 
dissolve the heterogeneous. But where Lyotard ultimately parts with Adorno is with his 
more ‘positive’ representation of post-war society and his conception of a new era of 
postmodernity.  
Lyotard makes the case that post-war society is not a total system, dominating 
subjects. He contends that metanarratives have been replaced by smaller, fragmented 
stories, which are conveyed in limited but pluralistic ‘language-games’ – a phrase he takes 
from Ludwig Wittgenstein.135 Lyotard uses the term differend to describe the heterogeneity 
of diverse language-games, which can never be reduced to a totalized ‘sameness’.136 This 
proliferation of language-games is, for Lyotard, a distinguishing feature of postmodern 
society, which breaks with the totalizing conditions of modernity. Lyotard portrays the split 
between modernity and postmodernity as incredulity towards metanarratives which, in 
contradiction to totalizing systems of thought, embraces heterogeneity. This is not to say 
that Lyotard simply ignores the Holocaust. On the contrary: Auschwitz is a persistent theme 
for Lyotard in his conceptualization of the postmodern, writing that Auschwitz is the ‘crime 
opening postmodernity’.137 Auschwitz signals the end of the metanarrative of reason and 
calls for the prioritization of hybrid differends over metanarratives.138 Lyotard insists that 
postmodernity (‘after’ Auschwitz) represents that historical shift towards hybridity and 
plurality.139    
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Lyotard contends that the transition from modernity to postmodernity is a historical 
and cultural shift Adorno fails to perceive. This means the concept of totality is ultimately 
outmoded by the transition to postmodernity; but it also means that Adorno is 
retrogressively constrained by the very same universalizing historical conditions he sets out 
to critique. Lyotard makes the case that Adorno provides a negative (or ‘demonic’) inversion 
that reiterates, albeit critically, precisely the same metanarrative he wants to undermine by 
prioritizing the particular over the universal (‘the slingshot to the megaton bomb’).140 This 
leads Adorno into various contradictions. Most of all, Adorno turns Auschwitz – a specific 
concentration camp and historical event, where real subjects lived and died – into an 
abstract category through which the whole historical metaprocess of modernity and reason 
is understood.141 Adorno transforms the particular (Auschwitz) into the universal (dialectic 
of Enlightenment).142 
This historical shift also represents a shift in capitalisms. ‘We have the advantage 
over Adorno’, writes Lyotard of contemporary capitalist culture, of ‘living in a capitalism that 
is more energetic, more cynical, less tragic’, a system where ‘the tragic gives way to the 
parodic’ and where more open-ended and plural forms of subjectivity are ‘catalysed’.143 
Lyotard, in his conceptualization of the postmodern, is concerned with a shift away from 
industrial to post-industrial finance capital – which he sees as a less autocratic and 
authoritarian form of capitalism that releases more language-games, libidinal energies and 
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subjectivities.144 Where industrial capitalism (Fordism) dominates and destroys the subject, 
for Lyotard post-industrial consumer capitalism unleashes a new spirit of open-endedness 
and ‘play’. He even goes as far as to make the argument that, far from being resisted, ‘the 
dissolution of forms and individuals in the so-called “consumer society” should be 
affirmed’.145 
The question, however, is whether the reifying conditions of modernity have truly 
been displaced by a new era of postmodernity and whether totality and catastrophe as 
critical concepts have, as a result, been historically and philosophically invalidated. Adorno 
would be suspicious of any belief that post-war capitalist culture represents a decisive shift 
away from totality towards the diverse. He writes, in Negative Dialectics, that for ‘the time 
being a so-called pluralism would falsely deny the total structure of society’.146 This is 
because ‘total socialization objectively hatches its opposite’ – the ostensible diversity of 
commodities and the lifestyles those commodities are supposed to represent.147 This 
diversity is nothing but ‘the anarchy of commodity production’.148 Underlying the 
heterogeneous commodities of the market is the homogenous totality of capitalist social 
relations, a paradox Adorno captures in his critique of the ‘ever-changing sameness’ of post-
Auschwitz capitalist life.149 Postmodern theory may tend to concentrate on the fragmentary 
and hybrid in its historico-philosophical speculations but it often does so by overlooking the 
enabling totality of capitalist hegemony. This oversight becomes even more obvious in an 
age of globalization, which sees the market penetrate into every sphere of human existence 
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around the world, intensifying the disastrous reification of subjectivity far into the post-war 
era. 
Fredric Jameson famously makes the case that the seemingly fragmentary worlds of 
postmodernism are – paradoxically – the cultural ‘logic’ of an increasingly totalized 
capitalism system.150 The phenomena of post-industrialism and globalization pay witness to 
the universalization of capitalism, as opposed to its postmodern hybridization. Jameson 
contends that postmodernity, far from representing a qualitative break with modern 
totality, is a continuation (even ‘intensification’) of it, writing that postmodernity is typified 
by an ‘increasingly closed organization of the world into a seamless web’.151 Jameson 
concludes that Adorno, far from being outdated by a shift into the new spirit of 
postmodernity, should be seen as the philosopher par excellence for the cultural and 
historical developments that took place over the late 1970s into the 1980s and 1990s (and 
beyond): 
 
in which late capitalism has all but succeeded in eliminating the final loopholes of 
nature and the Unconscious, of subversion and the aesthetic, of individual and 
collective praxis alike, and, with a final fillip, in eliminating any memory trace of what 
thereby no longer existed in the henceforth postmodern landscape.152      
 
Under the conditions of postmodern capitalism, the domination of the subject by totalizing 
social and political systems has only increased; it is an era that ‘calls forth a much degraded 
subject, one defined by much diminished capabilities for autonomy and agency, so crucial to 
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the formation of human subjectivity’.153 This degradation of subjectivity means that late 
capitalist culture is a potentially catastrophic dispensation: it continues the same 
depredation and destruction of human subjectivity that – for Adorno – found its nadir at 
Auschwitz.  
Such pronouncements might seem fatally pessimistic. But there is a point to reviving 
the modernist concept of totality in the putatively postmodern epoch. Through the concept 
of totality, it once again becomes possible to conceptualize the tension between universal 
and particular, subject and object, which may otherwise be lost to view in the postmodern 
denial of totality. Jameson writes that Adorno underscores ‘the relationship between the 
universal and particular’, which is coincident with ‘the objective’ (‘and specifically 
modernist’) tension ‘between the social totality and its subjects.’154 This clash between 
subject and society, as I will go on to show, is the dynamic underlying tragic form, which 
Lyotard believes has been superseded by postmodernity. But in his writings, Adorno places 
the (properly tragic) tension between subject and totality at the forefront of his philosophy 
and cultural criticism. I turn now to address the way in which Adorno conceptualizes 
subjectivity. 
     
2. Subjectivity  
 
2.1. The Humanist Subject and ‘Negative’ Freedom  
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For the Frankfurt School, Auschwitz testifies to the liquidation of the subject in modernity. 
This liquidation necessitates a ‘turn to the subject’, as Adorno often calls it, which entails a 
recovery of the subjective dimension and, critically, autonomy.155 The subject furnishes ‘the 
only point of leverage’ in a totalized social order, insists Adorno, which ‘might indict it as 
such’.156 Yet the theory of subjectivity Adorno develops is undeniably complicated and, for 
some, even seems to be flatly contradictory.157 Adorno calls for a turn to the subject and 
insists on the possibility (and necessity) of subjective autonomy. This, however, runs parallel 
with a critique of the ‘total’ domination of the subject in post-Auschwitz culture. How can 
the subject realize even a shred of autonomy if it is totally dominated by a reified social 
system?   
The answer lies in the way that Adorno rewrites the history of the subject and 
revises the notion of autonomy itself. The turn to the subject does not herald a return of the 
humanist subject, who rationally interprets and controls the world around it. Adorno is 
deeply suspicious of the humanist conception of autonomy, which is a form of subjectivity 
that cannot simply be ‘left intact’ post-Auschwitz.158 This is not only because the subject has 
been liquidated; the humanist conception of subjectivity also plays its own, vital role in the 
dialectic of Enlightenment. The humanistic idea that the subject has total perceptual 
‘access’ to the object means that reality is hypostasized: the various categories posited by 
the subject (reason) come to seem as the only possible – indeed the only real and factual – 
interpretation of the object and the world. This process ultimately rebounds on the subject. 
Precisely insofar as it reifies the world around it, the subject finally comes to be dominated 
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by the very categories – and by the very object(s) – which it seems to rule so imperiously 
over.  
The philosophical and practical response Adorno provides in the teeth of such 
reification is typically dialectical. The way in which the humanist subject comes to be 
dominated by the reality it seems to perceptually organize around itself persuades Adorno 
to decentre the subject – to show it is not the all-knowing centre of the world. Adorno finds 
a fable of decentring in the 1957 Samuel Beckett play Endgame, where Hamm and Clov 
struggle to find the centre of the room where the play is set, having skirted its outermost 
edges in a (failed) quest for knowledge. ‘Am I right in the centre?’ enquires Hamm, as it 
becomes obvious that the centre cannot hold – or indeed even be found.159 The scene 
reveals ‘the truth that expels man from the centre of creation’: that the subject is not the 
master in its own house, but is dominated by a closed world of objects, which surrounds and 
penetrates it.160   
This aspect of Critical Theory aligns Adorno with poststructuralist and 
deconstructionist thought.161 But while Adorno seeks to decentre the subject, he does not 
completely dissolve it by proclaiming its ‘death’. This has been the case in some post-
structuralist and deconstructionist criticism, which risks removing any possibility of 
subjective autonomy by proclaiming the subject to be nothing other than a product of 
discourse and social power.162 It is also something Adorno perceives in Benjamin, whom 
Adorno critiques for discarding the ‘whole notion of a subjective dimension itself’.163 Far 
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from abandoning the subject, Adorno proposes to use ‘the strength of the subject to break 
through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity’.164 What that means is producing a form of 
subjectivity that does not involve the subject arbitrarily ‘constituting’ the object of 
perception. By disabusing the subject of the fantasy that it constitutes the object world 
around it, Adorno aims to show that the subject is itself constituted by the object and the 
reified categories through which it interprets the world. This would allow the subject to 
perceive that it is determined by the object, as opposed to being the determining agent. 
With that knowledge, a gap may open between subject and object, enabling the subject to 
recognize its imbrication in the total dominance of ‘the supra-ordinated concept’.165 Adorno 
purposes to free the subject from a reified world of objects and, critically, with the society 
that dominates it, to ‘open up critical spaces’ where the subject ‘might think against the 
world’.166  
It is that gap between subject and object, subject and world, which Adorno calls non-
identity. Over and against the ‘positive’ dialectics of Hegel, Adorno proposes his own 
‘negative’ dialectics which, far from positing the uniform identity of subject and object, 
strives to keep the antithetical tension – the non-identity – between subject and object in 
play. Adorno contends that the subject is not always completely captured – or objectified – 
by the social process. Just as no object fits completely with the category under which it 
placed, so the subject does not fit seamlessly with any of the conceptual categories which 
are used to identify it. This non-identity of the subject is something that Adorno also refers 
to as the subjective ‘share’ or ‘surplus’ – by which he means something that outstrips the 
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identity of the categorizing process.167 Adorno writes that ‘in the needs of even the people 
who are covered, who are administered, there reacts something in regard to which they are 
not fully covered – a surplus of the subjective share, which the system has not wholly 
mastered’.168  
Adorno does not necessarily define the subjective surplus in a strict way, stating that 
it is whatever ‘stirs in a man’ that ‘contradicts his unity’.169 But on occasion, Adorno does 
relate the surplus or share to the shattering experiences of disaster and catastrophe. 
Adorno is aware that crises are socially mediated by – and can even be appropriated to 
serve – the ‘total situation’.170 But catastrophic rupture also contradicts the utopian idea 
that the subject and object have reached a congruent state of reconciled identity. Such 
experiences testify to a lack of fit between the subject and object and the conflicted state of 
a society that would otherwise seek to universalize itself by interpolating all subjects into 
the totality.  
This conceptualization of the surplus speaks to the way that the word ‘catastrophe’ 
takes on a variety of potential meanings in Critical Theory. Adorno makes the case that post-
Auschwitz society is marked by permanent catastrophe – the continuing destruction of 
subjectivity in modernity, where the ‘individual disappears before the apparatus’.171 But for 
Adorno, catastrophe can also connote experiences of rupture – and particularly aesthetic 
rupture – in an otherwise closed social world that endlessly reproduces itself by reifying 
subjectivity. These disruptive experiences of crisis and upheaval – the sudden subversions of 
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catastrophe – can serve to dislocate the subject from society, allowing for a critical, negative 
perspective on totality.172 Precisely because its uncanny ‘superfluity’ disengages the subject 
from the social totality, Adorno calls for a subject who, by embracing catastrophe, refuses to 
‘fit in’. Adorno insists on a non-identical subject – a subject that resists the demands of 
identity.  
 This reinterpretation of subjectivity has profound implications for the notion of 
autonomy. Adorno does not imagine freedom as a ‘positive’ state, where the (humanist) 
subject freely determines itself as it wishes, realizing its reason and free-will in the world. 
Adorno conceives of autonomy negatively, as the power of refusal. Jameson provides an 
eloquent synopsis of the type of autonomy Adorno means, writing in his Marxism and Form 
that   
 
wherever the concept of freedom is once more understood, it always comes as the 
awakening of dissatisfaction in the midst of all that is – at one, that is, with the birth 
of the negative itself: never a state that is enjoyed, or a mental construction that is 
contemplated, but rather an ontological impatience in which the constraining 
situation is for the first time perceived in the very moment in which it is refused […]. 
It is not too much to say that the concept of freedom permits us to transcend […] the 
most fundamental contradictions in modern existence.173 
 
Subjective autonomy is coincident with the ‘birth of the negative’, the dissatisfaction with – 
and resistance to – the social totality with which the subject is confronted. Adorno writes in 
Negative Dialectics that freedom turns concrete ‘in negation only, corresponding to the 
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concrete form of a specific unfreedom’.174 The basis of Adornian non-identity and freedom 
is the deep, totalizing system Adorno equates with Auschwitz and post-Auschwitz 
rationality. To gain freedom it is up to the subject to continually break the grip of identity-
categories that ‘circulate within the (now globalized) capitalist life-world, be it in the rather 
abstract domains of philosophy, or in the repetitive and recombinant practices of the 
“culture industry”’.175  
The idea of the reified identities that circulate in the capitalist life-world brings up 
the fraught question of the relationship between identity-thinking and identity politics. I 
want to provide a critical analysis of identity politics, which as I set out in the Introduction, 
has often conditioned (and been conditioned by) particular approaches to appropriation. 
While I recognize the gains of various post-war social movements, I intend to critique 
identity politics through the prism of Adornian identity-thinking and the concept of the 
commodity-form.  
 
2.3. Identity Politics 
 
For present purposes, identity politics can be defined as a tendency for those belonging to a 
specific (and usually marginalized) gender, sexuality, race or religion to form ideological 
coalitions and social movements to agitate for political representation, based on shared but 
usually marginalized experiences.176 This form of political identity can be historicized as part 
of a wider shift away from modern humanist notions of social and political ‘progress’ – 
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which shape Enlightenment thought – to  a more socially and politically diverse postmodern 
society, with its transition from metanarratives to fragmented language-games. Such 
politicized conceptions of subjectivity show that the metanarrative of the ‘universal’ 
humanist subject is phallo-, hetero-, Euro- and ethnocentric. This has meant challenging the 
non-representational status of post-Enlightenment social and political institutions, which 
build themselves around (putatively) ‘universal’ humanist principles of freedom and 
equality. 
Adorno does not deny that the autonomous, humanist subject of enlightened 
rationality has historically been gendered – not to say sexualized and racialized, culminating 
in the Nazi vision of the racially and sexually ‘pure’ masculinity of the blue-eyed, blonde-
haired Aryan. This means, as Adorno writes in Minima Moralia, that historically women have 
borne the ‘the negative imprint of domination’.177 Adorno is similarly aware of the way in 
which other oppressed or marginalized sections of society bear the negative imprint of 
domination – not least European Jews.178 For the most part, however, critics are right to 
insist that gender, sexuality and race do not necessarily represent a political or theoretical 
priority for Adorno. 
This divergence is – for many critics – typified by the growing distance between 
Adorno and the radical Student Movement of the 1960s, a movement that often identified 
itself in the terms of the liberationist politics of gender, sexuality and race. This divergence 
(in)famously had something of a crescendo in the so-called Breasts Attack – or 
Busenattentat – where a female student bared her breasts to Adorno as he was giving a 
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lecture on dialectics, boldly declaring that ‘Adorno as an institution is dead!’.179 The incident 
is often understood to witness a transition to new forms of political identity, which Adorno 
fails to understand (Adorno notoriously called the police in response to one student 
occupation).180  
Some feminist – and also queer and postcolonial – critics have nevertheless tried to 
dialectically recruit Adorno in the service of various forms of contemporary identity politics, 
where non-normative subjects are seen to disrupt the totalizing conceptualizations of a 
white, male instrumental rationality.181 But any synthesis of Adornian negative dialectics 
and the ideological praxes of identity politics also (and perhaps necessarily) runs against a 
theoretical aporia. Despite its emancipatory aims, identity politics can itself be seen as a 
variety of identity-thinking, whereby the (particular) subject is understood as representative 
of a (universal) category. The problem with identity politics is that it ultimately risks 
reiterating the form of reasoning found in ‘the administered world’, where the subject is 
subsumed under various conceptual categories (man/woman, heterosexual/homosexual, 
black/white and so on) – however intersectionally these identities may be imagined and 
practised. The danger is that totalizing appeals about the meaning of politically-laden 
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experiences to diverse people risks obscuring the singularity of the subject supposed to be 
‘representative’.182  
This is not to deny the socio-political gains of various movements motivated by 
identity politics or indeed to downplay the reactionary forces that have contested the 
aspirations of marginalized peoples. But despite its emancipatory intentions, identity politics 
does not necessarily question the whole, de-subjectifiying process of identity-thinking itself. 
Not only does identity politics of various stripes represent a ‘negative’ inversion of the 
humanist (male, heterosexual, white) subject, but it also means the ‘positive’ avowal of 
other identifying categories – categories that have often been pre-established by 
instrumental reason.183 What is required for Adorno is not an identity politics, but a non-
identity politics. The political aspect of the subject lies precisely in its refusal to conform to 
or wholly identify with any prescribed categorization. The political emerges as the capacity 
to reflect and contest.  
The stress that Adorno lays on the non-identity of the subject, over and above its 
possible cultural and political identifications, is perhaps more and not less relevant in the 
culturally diverse milieu of capitalist globalization. The dominant form of political 
organization in postmodern society – as both sympathetic and more dubious theorists have 
shown – has been identity politics, where an era of political struggle which orientates itself 
around the clash of conflicting social and industrial classes ends and the diverse intensities 
of post-industrial society are unleashed.184 But identity politics might also be accused of too 
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often neglecting to consider the way that its own identitarian ideology mimics that of the 
commodity-form, which similarly operates by making that which is incommensurable 
appear commensurable – a point that has been made by writer and queer theorist 
Alexandra Chasin.185  
It is a provocative thesis, but if the non-identity of the subject relies on its ability to 
resist the identities that ‘circulate within the (now globalized) capitalist life-world’, identity 
politics might be thought of as inhibiting, as opposed to enabling, the autonomy of the 
subject. Such freedom is for Adorno crucially reliant on a realm of human experience and 
creativity that, despite the Culture Industry, retains some negative force – the aesthetic 
sphere. I turn now to consider the way that Adorno understands aesthetics and the role the 
artwork plays in catalysing the non-identity required ‘to deny an identity conceived as 
total’.186  
 
3. Aesthetics 
 
3.1. Aesthetics ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
Despite his often-quoted proclamation that ‘To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric’ – a 
formulation he would later revise and partially refute due to the confusion it caused – no 
twentieth century philosopher reflected as deeply about the implications of Auschwitz for 
aesthetics than Adorno, whose magnum opus, Aesthetic Theory, was posthumously 
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published in 1970.187 Adorno insists that, in ‘the wake of the European catastrophes’, the 
ostensibly ‘apolitical’ world of philosophical aesthetics and the artwork it interprets is 
undergoing ‘a crisis’.188 Most of all, Auschwitz problematizes the priorities of Enlightenment 
aesthetics – represented by Kant and Hegel, among others – which for Adorno are no longer 
valid.  
Adorno makes the case that aesthetics has traditionally prioritized notions of unity 
and harmony in its reflections on the nature of beauty. Such harmony is understood through 
the relation of ‘whole’ and ‘part’. For most Enlightenment philosophies, the more ‘beautiful’ 
artworks are those which harmoniously unify the various parts that make up the work into a 
sensuously pleasing whole, with artworks becoming more and more ‘beautiful’ throughout 
human history. The progress of art over time reflects a wider faith in the possibility of 
human development. Through its harmonious reconciliation of its parts, art concretizes 
universal history, adumbrating a more ‘ideal’ realm where particular and universal find 
synthesis.  
Adorno contends that a harmonious aesthetic relation between whole and part is no 
longer possible (or desirable) after Auschwitz. With the totalized system of the 
concentration camp in mind, Adorno is suspicious of any system – social or aesthetic – that 
subsumes the part (particular) under the whole (universal). Adorno believes that a form 
which prioritizes the universal risks destroying the particular in its drive for ever-closer 
integration. By making the case that aesthetic unity amounts to the identity of particular 
and universal, Adorno contends that the ‘task of aesthetics today’ is nothing short of the 
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‘historical suspension of aesthetic harmony altogether’.189 This allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of the so-called ‘barbarity’ of poetry after Auschwitz. Adorno is not saying 
that all art – all poesies – is compromised by Auschwitz. His argument relates to the 
‘traditional concept of the poetic’ as ‘something categorically “high” and sacred’ – the idea 
that art mimics in its form a perfected ideal realm where particular and universal find 
harmonious synthesis.190 Auschwitz renders such art – ‘before’ and ‘after’ the catastrophe – 
‘barbaric’.  
 Adorno makes the case that, in the wake of the catastrophes of modernity, ‘art that 
makes the highest claim compels itself beyond form as totality and into the fragmentary’.191 
This ‘claim’ has to do with the way that fragmented artworks allow for the aesthetic release 
of the particular – the part – from the whole, from the ‘spell’ of identity. Such works 
disallow the unified harmony envisaged in previous conceptions of aesthetics and, by virtue 
of fragmentation, invalidate the idea that art provides a semblance of the historical 
synthesis of subject and object. ‘What appears in art is no longer the ideal, no longer 
harmony’: ‘the locus of its power of resolution is now exclusively in the contradictory and 
the dissonant’.192 
Post-Auschwitz art cannot ‘return to peace and order’ – to ‘affirmative replication 
and harmony’.193 What is required, as far as Adorno understands it, is ‘a radically darkened 
art’.194 This is not simply to say that, after the harrowing events of the war, art should be 
depressing, or even more banally, ‘sad’.195 It is to say, however, that the artwork should 
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follow the ‘necessity of going to the extreme’.196 It can only do so, Adorno contests, by 
violating its own formal closure, by refusing resolution and reconciliation and insisting on 
contradiction. Adorno contends that, through formal closure, the various antagonisms and 
contradictions to be found in a work of art are artificially resolved, something Adorno 
understands as a displaced echo of the social violence that typifies modernity. Adorno calls 
for artworks that disavow every last possible trace of resolution, where ‘form tends to 
dissociate unity’.197  
Adorno draws a distinction between ‘open’ (authentic) and ‘closed’ (inauthentic) 
aesthetic forms.198 Where closed forms reflect a closed society by enforcing integration, 
open forms – which eschew closure and resolution – indict both closed aesthetic forms and, 
indeed, the notion of harmonious integration itself. The open form retains the unreconciled 
antagonism of the universal and particular, so that ‘art takes into itself the impossibility of 
the unity of the one and the many’ – an insight relevant to an Adornian conception of the 
tragic, where the clash between subject and society (‘the one and the many’) goes 
unresolved.199  
Adorno contends that ‘explosion’ is one of the ‘invariants’ of open forms.200 He 
writes that open works have ‘blasted away the overarching form’ through which part and 
whole otherwise ‘cohere’ and where it is ‘the catastrophic instant that destroys temporal 
continuity’.201 What Adorno calls for in his analysis of post-Auschwitz art is an aesthetic of 
catastrophe, which shatters formal unity. This lays the ground for the ‘social explosiveness 
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of art’. 202 Adorno contends that the formally fragmented artwork resists, not only the 
totality of closed aesthetic form, but its own inscription into the wider social totality. 
Through its dissonant form, the artwork unleashes ‘the fleeting, the ephemeral and the 
transitory in a form that is immune to reification’.203  This means that authentic works 
provide a negative, inverse image of a social system that seeks everywhere to unify whole 
and part, universal and particular, object and subject. The work of art stands critically 
opposed to a homogenous social world that perpetuates itself by reducing everything to an 
iteration of identity.  
This is where the ‘autonomy’ of the aesthetic resides.204 This is an idea which 
requires clarification. Adorno does not believe that the artwork subsists in some sort of 
rarefied sphere ‘beyond’ society. He concedes that artworks are material products of society 
informed by the cultural specificities of time and place. He also recognizes that ‘aesthetics’ 
as a branch of thought has a specific historical genealogy, as evidenced by the relatively late 
usage of the word in relation to art theory.205 But that is not to say that the artwork or the 
aesthetic sphere is completely reducible to the determinations of society and history. The 
artwork, as Adorno understands it, has a relation to society analogous to that of the subject: 
it is a product of society, but it is also able to realize its autonomy by negating society, which 
it does through its fragmentary form. This negation of totality underpins ‘metaphysics of 
art’, as Adorno calls it – its partial transcendence of the immanent material and social 
world.206  
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The idea that artworks open a perspective beyond the social totality persuades 
Adorno to dismiss those artworks that reflect social reality – or the world as it is. Adorno 
denounces ‘dull-minded doctrines of aesthetic realism’ that would strive to reflect (and 
reflect on) topical social and historical events, as opposed to challenging totality through the 
aesthetic form.207 But it also (and relatedly) prompts Adorno to dismiss artworks that are 
socially and political ‘engaged’, or which seek to promulgate a social and political ‘message’ 
– something Adorno accuses Brechtian theatre of doing.208 ‘The view of art as politically 
engaged or didactic’, contends Adorno, ‘integrates art into the reality it opposes’.209 This 
compromises the autonomy of the aesthetic and sinks art into a social world characterized 
by total fungibility, as the singularity of the work of art is compromised by turning it into an 
iteration of something else, a political proposition. This, paradoxically, aligns politically 
engaged art with Culture Industry, which similarly integrates the subject into the social 
totality.   
This critique of politically engaged art is not to say that Adorno conceives of works of 
art as apolitical. He insists that art does have distinct social and political ramifications. This, 
however, arises from its fragmented form, not from its content. ‘By shattering the symbolic 
unity of the work of art’, writes Adorno, ‘the artwork reveals the untruth of any 
reconciliation of the general and particular in an unreconciled reality’.210 Precisely by virtue 
of its refusal to ‘engage’, the artwork negates a social and political world that has become 
totalized. This goes some way to clarifying why Adorno similarly refused to adopt a clear-cut 
position on political action. It also sheds lights on his decision to deploy a fragmented and 
aphoristic writing-style (Darstellung) in his own philosophical reflections. His sometimes 
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fractured, sometimes dense style is intended to be resistant to integration and the pitfalls of 
a holistic philosophical ‘system’, where discrete observations all serve to underwrite a 
binding whole.211  
The disconcerting irony of politically committed art is that it integrates subjects into 
the society it sets out to critique. This is precisely the opposite of authentic aesthetic 
experience, as Adorno understands it. Adorno makes the case that aesthetic experience is 
ecstatic and individuating, that it momentarily throws the subject beside him or herself and 
outside of the collective parameters of the social totality. This – once again – results from 
the way the artwork fragments itself. By denying reconciliatory synthesis, the artwork 
releases its parts from an overarching whole. This means that ‘in art one experiences 
something singular, something particular in its necessity’.212 The fragmented work of art 
cannot be reduced to a totalizing concept; it is up to the viewer to self-reflexively interpret 
the work without recourse to the shared categories of understanding derived from the 
social totality. This severs the subject from a reified world of conceptual identity, so the 
subject ‘becomes aware of itself as a negativity’, which ‘no fiction of a positive community 
can abolish’.213 The autonomy of the aesthetic, as Adorno views it, catalyses the autonomy 
of the subject. This form of aesthetic response sometimes goes under the enigmatic name 
of ‘the shudder’.214 It is a phrase Adorno uses to try and capture the disequilibrium caused 
by artworks that cannot be determined by the usual categories of identity, pushing the 
shuddering subject (fractionally) out of wider conceptual order. It has to be said, however, 
that Adorno does not empirically ‘evidence’ his claims about aesthetic response. His 
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imagined aesthetic subject is an ‘ideal’, arising from his conception of formal disunity and 
fragmentation.215  
These reflections on the disintegration of aesthetic form occasion a ‘turn’ to the 
friable and fragmentary forms of modernist art, which Adorno tends to favour in his writings 
– most notably in the atonal and dissonant works of Kafka, Beckett, Schoenberg and Picasso. 
This valorisation of the modernist avant-garde (conventionally understood as a pre-war 
constellation of phenomena) in the post-war era obviously raises questions of periodization 
and, once again, brings up the modernism and/or postmodernism question in relation to 
Adorno. These are questions that I address in the next section by drawing on the notion of 
‘late’ modernism.  
 
3.2. ‘Late’ Modernism versus Postmodernism 
 
Adorno laments the dwindling of the modernist tradition and complains of the ‘loss of 
tension in post-war art, much of which goes slack the moment it appears’.216 To historically 
and philosophically ‘place’ Adorno, Jameson uses the category ‘late modernism’. Jameson 
understands late modernism as an iteration of modernism that was made possible by the 
critical re-theorization of modernism in the post-war period – or ‘after’ Auschwitz.217 Where 
‘high’ (or as Jameson sometimes calls it, ‘classic’) pre-war modernism often embraced 
mythic ideas around national ‘unity’ with a simultaneous investment in the possibility of 
social and scientific progress, late modernism brings those values into question in the face 
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of the catastrophe of the Second World War and Nazism. This precipitates a shift towards 
aesthetic disintegration, as opposed to the unity and coherence of form concomitant with 
classic modernism.  
This transition obviously has parallels with postmodern aesthetics, which is similarly 
understood in terms of fragmentation, disallowing metanarratives and the totalization of 
whole and part.218 Jameson makes the case that postmodernism is epitomized by the 
collapse of the traditional distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, techniques of 
pastiche and parody, the cannibalization of past styles, the play of random stylistic allusion, 
a loss of the feeling of social alienation and a more schizophrenic consciousness, which 
embraces the synchronic understanding of time and space in modern consumer 
capitalism.219  
But late modernism and postmodernism are – for Jameson – also qualitatively 
distinct. The problem with postmodern aesthetics is that it risks formally reiterating the 
total reification of historical and cultural life in post-Auschwitz society. Jameson makes the 
case that, precisely by virtue of its collapse of all sorts of qualitative distinctions, 
postmodern aesthetics reflects and enables the system of universal equivalence that reigns 
in the totalized world of late capitalism. He contends that the cultural practice of 
postmodernism concretizes a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity that ultimately 
obscures an underlying homogeneity – the social totality. This, critically, leaves little room 
for formulations of subjectivity and autonomy. This is no doubt consistent with a 
postmodernist and poststructuralist worldview that would seek to deny the idea that the 
subject (or indeed the artwork) is an autonomous entity, but is composed of heteroglot 
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discourses (language-games) which collapse the modernist subject-object dialectic. But the 
denial of the subjective dimension in postmodern aesthetics also tends to foreclose the 
possibility of resisting a reified totality which, more often than not, postmodern theory 
disavows.      
This is where late modernism might be seen as a potential ‘corrective’ to 
postmodernism. Unlike postmodernism, late modernist aesthetics as Jameson understands 
it remains suspicious of mass society and culture and, as a consequence, seeks to retain the 
autonomy of the aesthetic and the subject in post-Auschwitz life.220 This formalization of the 
autonomy of the subject over and against society means that late modernism has obvious 
parallels with tragic form. Christopher Butler writes that ‘modernism has a close affinity to 
the conflicts of the tragic tradition’, as modernist art prioritizes a subjectivity that is 
‘opposed to any political or institutional forces’.221 This reception of the tragic distinguishes 
modernism from postmodernism, as viewed by Lyotard. Adorno, however, is deeply 
suspicious of the idea of post-war tragedy, which ‘after’ Auschwitz he understands to be an 
invalid form. I turn now to an analysis of the way Adorno understands tragedy and the 
tragic, showing that his philosophical and historical analysis of Auschwitz implies a 
conception of the late tragic, even if he ultimately refuses – or fails – to make a case for 
tragedy in modernity. 
 
4. Tragedy  
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4.1. The (Im)possibility of Tragedy 
 
The idea of post-Auschwitz tragedy may, for Adorno, be something of an oxymoron. Adorno 
contends that Auschwitz renders tragedy problematic because, historically, tragic form 
relies on a tension between the subject (individual) and object (society) which is increasingly 
being nullified in post-Auschwitz culture. Auschwitz testifies to the reification of subjectivity 
in modernity and, as such, similarly testifies to the possible ‘death’ of tragedy as a viable 
idiom.222 
Adorno clarifies his theory concerning the negative relation between artwork and 
society by analysing the dialectic between the content and form of classical tragedy. It might 
be that Greek tragedy depicted, as its thematic content, the same violent events that took 
place in society; but the deeper relation between society and tragedy is adumbrated by its 
form:  
 
It is possible to argue over how much Attic tragedy, including those by Euripides, 
took part in the violent social conflicts of the epoch; however, the basic tendency of 
tragic form, in contrast to its mythical subjects, the dissolution of the spell of fate 
and the birth of subjectivity, bears witness as much to social emancipation from 
feudal familial ties as, in the collision between mythical law and subjectivity, to the 
antagonism between fateful domination and a humanity awakening to maturity. This 
antagonism, as well as the historico-philosophical tendency, became an a priori of 
form rather than being treated simply as thematic material, endowed tragedy with 
its social substantiality.223 
 
The social ‘substance’ of tragedy, as captured in its form, is the opposition between subject 
and society, where ‘mythical law and subjectivity’ and ‘the antagonism between fateful 
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domination and a humanity awakening to maturity’ is concretized in the clash between 
conflicting social forces. The language recalls that of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. It is vital 
to recall, however, that ‘enlightenment’ is not a strictly historical category in Adornian 
thinking, to be identified with the era known as the Enlightenment, but a tendency with 
deep roots in Western civilization. Greek tragedy formalizes the collision between the 
fateful domination of the object world (society) and the autonomy of the tragic protagonist 
(subject) – a clash that becomes increasingly pronounced in modern European society and 
its art. The collision between subject and society is for Adorno ‘the basic tendency’ of 
Western tragic drama from the Greeks onwards and is an a priori of the form per se, 
similarly discernible in subsequent iterations of tragic form – including, of course, 
Shakespeare.224 
This is not to say that Adorno collapses the historical distance between Greek and 
Shakespearean tragedy, or that he proposes a universal concept of the tragic that might 
sublate its particular historical and formal iterations – a form of identity-thinking. Adorno 
gives due consideration to the historical conditions inflecting tragedy over time while 
retaining a consciousness of the ideational ties between discrete forms. The split between 
subject and society is something that Adorno takes to be an integral aspect of tragic form in 
its various historical guises – so much so that ‘tragedy’ is impossible, or abolished, without 
it.  
While he insists that the dialectic between subject and society is the driving principle 
of tragic form, Adorno is under no illusions about the usual result of that clash. Adorno is 
aware that tragic drama frequently ends with the demise of the tragic ‘hero’, whose death 
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results from hubristically transgressing the inherited norms and values of the community. 
This vision of the tragic is confirmed in tragic theory – most obviously as it is found in 
German Idealism. Peter Szondi observes that the philosophy of the tragic in German 
thought more or less coincides with the Enlightenment era. This is because tragedy provided 
philosophers with a formal paradigm for the dialectical synthesis of forces which are in 
contradiction.225  
It is an understanding of tragedy built, in part, on Aristotle. Though perhaps most 
famous for his notion of catharsis, where tragic incidents arousing pity and fear allow for the 
safe ‘purgation’ of anti-social feelings, Aristotle also provides an analysis of tragic form. 
Aristotle makes the case that tragedy should depict the downfall of the tragic hero, who – 
via a process of revelation and recognition (anagnorisis) about the dominant powers of fate 
or the divine – undergoes a change ‘from ignorance to awareness’.226 It is not always 
necessary for the hero to die in a tragedy; but if the hero does survive, there should be a 
resolution in which the hero recognizes and reconciles him or herself to dominant forces 
beyond intervention.  
 Hegel similarly prioritizes tragic resolution, but incorporates that Aristotelean 
reading of the form into his wider analysis of the historical process as a synthesis of 
dialectical forces. Tragedy is particularly vital for the way in which Hegel understands the 
relationship between subject and society. Hegel insists on the freedom – the self-
determination – of the individual. But he also contends that the state – and its civic and 
ethical customs – reflect and institute the freedoms of all.227 Hegel contends that tragedy 
depicts the conflict between the individual subject – the tragic hero – and the institutions of 
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civic and ethical life. These embody society and, for Hegel, are typically represented in 
Greek tragedy by the Chorus.228 By pursuing his or her freedom without consideration for its 
impact on the rest of community, the tragic hero over-privileges his or her autonomy, 
clashes with the institutions of civic life and imperils the rights and freedoms of others. This 
means the tragic subject ultimately acts in an irrational way and, as freedom and rationality 
are inseparable for Hegel, even unfreely. If the tragic hero should remain in contradiction 
with society, s/he will either die or society will disintegrate and human life descend into 
anomie.229 The other possible outcome is the synthesis of opposing forces, where the tragic 
hero recognizes the predominant claim of the state and reconciliation between the subject 
(individual) and object (society) is formalized, as history progresses towards its perfected 
telos.  
The idealist reading of tragedy which insists on formal reconciliation and resolution 
is – of course – deeply suspicious for Adorno and the rest of the Frankfurt School. The idea 
that the tragic hero (particular) is finally integrated in, or destroyed by, society (universal) is 
no doubt consistent for a philosophy which posits that historical progress proceeds via the 
‘negation of the negation’. Such a reading has, however, become deeply problematic ‘after’ 
Auschwitz, where the progress of reason led – not to the final synthesis of subject and 
object – but to the Final Solution and the complete ‘liquidation’ of subjectivity. ‘The 
annihilation of the individual’, as Adorno contends, ‘can no longer be seen as transcended 
positivity’.230  
The historical fate of the subject and tragedy ‘after’ Auschwitz is, for Adorno, most 
powerfully revealed in in the plays of his favourite playwright, Beckett. Adorno contends 
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that the damaged and incapacitated characters found in Beckett testify to the liquidation of 
subjectivity – and so the impossibility of tragedy – in post-Auschwitz life.231 Adorno makes 
the case that Beckett ‘writes the comedy of the tragic’.232 His plays represent the complete 
collapse of the tragic subject, who is transformed into a useless and reviled comic figure.233 
This diminution of the voluntaristic subject of tragedy into a clownish failure is reflected in 
the way Endgame reduces the name ‘Hamlet’ to the porcine ‘Hamm’ – though Beckett 
disagreed with that reading and was frustrated when Adorno chose to pursue it 
publically.234 Adorno contends that, where Hamlet has been understood as witnessing ‘the 
birth of the subject’ – the ‘nominalistic Shakespearean breakthrough into mortal and 
infinitely rich individuality’ – Hamm reveals the mutilating damage that has been done to 
the subject, its reduction to thing-like, consumable status.235 Through Hamm, Beckett forms 
a post-Holocaust response to Shakespeare that centres on the degradation of the tragic 
subject.  
It is not simply that tragedy has ‘disappeared’ from post-Auschwitz life, however: it 
has also been misappropriated by the Culture Industry. Adorno and Horkheimer make the 
case that the Culture Industry does not necessarily shrink from the representation of ‘tragic’ 
suffering. What it does, however, is present that suffering as a fate to which the subject falls 
when it flouts prevailing norms and values, to which the subject must adapt for its own well-
being and self-preservation.236 This means that tragedy becomes an institution for moral 
improvement and that catharsis – à la Aristotle – catalyses the controlled purgation of anti-
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social feelings about the dominant culture.237 It is an understanding of tragic ‘inevitability’ 
that has some parallels with Brecht and his critique of the tragic – though for Brecht tragedy 
resembles fate only because the solitary tragic hero cannot possibly oppose society alone: 
meaningful social and political change can only take place through concerted collective 
action.238  
There is a contradiction in the way Adorno thinks about modern tragedy. On the one 
hand, Adorno praises Beckett for his representation of an incapacitated subject and the 
‘death’ of tragedy. On the other, Adorno provides a profoundly sceptical reading of the 
representation of tragic suffering in the Culture Industry. What both forms share, however, 
is a denial of the properly negative, subjective dimension of tragic form. Adorno vies that 
Beckett represents the only adequate dramaturgical response to the Holocaust, as his plays 
portray the total reification of the subject – and the death of tragedy. This ‘unprotesting 
depiction of ubiquitous regression’ is perceived by Adorno as ‘a protest against a state of 
the world that so accommodates the law of regression that it no longer has anything to hold 
up against it’.239 Though purposefully paradoxical, it is not necessarily a convincing 
argument: it is hard to see that Beckettian drama is likely to provoke ‘protest’ if the very 
(tragic) subject required for negative critique is no longer able to contest its reification. It 
may be that Beckettian drama, in the same vein as the Culture Industry, transforms tragic 
suffering into ‘fate’ – an irresistible social and historical necessity to which subjects must 
resign or adapt. 
This contradiction causes Adorno (albeit occasionally) to provide analyses of 
subjectivity and totality that would seem to undermine his otherwise consistent valorisation 
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of Beckettian drama as the post-Auschwitz form par excellence. Adorno writes suspiciously 
in Negative Dialectics of any philosophy (or, indeed, of any work of art) that might ‘confirm 
the sense of impotence’ that typifies post-Auschwitz culture, which can only serve to 
reinforce ‘the spell of identity’.240 With words that could form a critique of Beckettian 
silence, Adorno contends that a denial of the subjective dimension can be seen to be 
‘directly abetting speechless domination and barbarism’, precluding the negativity of the 
subject in ‘a gesture of self-imposed muteness and vanishing’.241 This undermines the 
possibility of even the ‘tiniest bit of self-reflection by a subject pondering upon itself and its 
real captivity’.242  
What the reification of subjectivity in post-Auschwitz culture requires is tragic 
autonomy. Gritzner writes that ‘life in late capitalist culture has transformed into a nexus of 
[…] reification, which problematizes the notion of individual freedom and […] makes a 
renewal of the discourse on tragedy relevant and necessary’, as tragedy inherently implies a 
dialectical ‘recovery of the notion of autonomous individuality’.243 Despite the absence of a 
fully articulated tragic theory in his writings, tragedy and autonomy, both subjective and 
aesthetic, are deeply intertwined in Adornian thinking. Adorno makes the (admittedly 
speculative) case that tragedy ‘may have been the origin of the idea of aesthetic 
autonomy’.244 This originating status lies in the way that tragedy can be seen as ‘an 
afterimage of cultic acts’.245 The cultic acts Adorno refers to are sacrificial. Adorno contends 
that, in pre-modern, myth-based societies, ritualized sacrifice was seen as performing the 
role of appeasing otherwise uncontrollable divine forces and ensuring the continued 
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survival of the community as a whole. This scapegoating continues into tragedy, only now 
the ‘sacrifice’ is of the tragic hero, who transgresses the ethical norms of the body politic 
and threatens the survival of the polis. The eventual ‘sacrifice’ or re-integration of the hero 
into conformity with the values of civic life is necessary if the social whole is to be 
preserved.  
Adorno contends that sacrifice generates a dialectical relation between subject and 
object, particular and universal. On the one hand, the sacrifice is a cipher for the community 
as a whole – a sort of ‘stand-in’ to expiate the wrongs of the politic. On the other, the 
sacrifice is uniquely singular, an entity which nothing else can take the place of in the ritual. 
The sacrifice is both exchangeable and non-exchangeable; or, perhaps more precisely, the 
sacrifice becomes non-exchangeable even in the act of its exchange. The sacrifice exhibits 
the ‘non-specifity of the example’ and so conforms to the norms of categorical reason; but it 
also embodies the uniqueness of the ‘chosen one’, which ‘radically marks it off’ and makes it 
‘unfit for exchange’.246 Sacrifice, as Adorno understands it, is the historical origin of the idea 
of autonomy.  
 Sacrifice is vital for Adorno because it allows for a properly social and historical 
understanding of autonomy. The sacrifice, for Adorno, is ‘social by its opposition to 
society’.247 This dialectic continues into tragedy, which formalizes the autonomy of the 
subject, its release from the domination of society – even if that autonomy is revoked by his 
or her sacrificial death. It also lays the foundations for the autonomy of the aesthetic, 
whereby ‘the emancipation of the subject in art is the emancipation of the autonomy of 
art’.248 Though not always stated explicitly, the alignment between tragedy, subjectivity, 
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aesthetics and autonomy is critical to Adorno. Part of the problem with post-Auschwitz 
culture is that it demands ‘the introversion of sacrifice’, as Adorno and Horkheimer call it, 
where the individual actively ‘sacrifices’ aspects of his or her self that do not conform to 
society.249 This introversion disallows non-identity: the opposition between subject and 
society is pre-empted.250  
The critique of conventional tragic synthesis – and indeed, aesthetic resolution per se 
– and the introversion of sacrifice serves to adumbrate a conception of tragedy in which the 
antagonism between subject and society remains intact, as opposed to being nullified by 
formal closure. Far from upholding reconciliation, a conception of the tragic informed 
(though not necessarily advocated) by Adorno would refuse the sacrificial process of 
resolution, keeping the tension between the tragic ‘hero’ and society unresolved by insisting 
on a subject who refuses the need to identify, to reconcile with the collective. This would 
mean a tragic subject who violates aesthetic closure, instantiating precisely the type of 
formally open-ended aesthetic form Adorno calls for in response to post-Auschwitz totality. 
Where aesthetic fragmentation occasions the autonomy of the viewer, the tragic hero who 
upends resolution can even be thought of as catalysing subjective freedom – a point I return 
to throughout the case studies. It is such a form of tragic drama that I have described as 
Catastrophist.  
 
Conclusion  
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This chapter has analysed Auschwitz, subjectivity, aesthetics and tragedy in the work of 
Theodor Adorno. I have shown that, for Adorno and Horkheimer, Auschwitz exemplifies the 
dialectic of Enlightenment, the process whereby the social and historical ‘progress’ 
promised by Enlightenment thought ultimately led to the creation of rationalized 
administrative systems that reduce the subject to a mere object. I have also considered the 
way Auschwitz relates to capitalism and the commodity-form, showing that, for Adorno, the 
conditions that made the Holocaust possible continue into post-Auschwitz society and its 
Culture Industry, as opposed to being transcended by a new phase of postmodernity. I have 
also analysed his understanding of the subject and subjectivity and shown that, while 
Adorno critiques the humanist subject, he also retains the idea of autonomy through his 
concept of non-identity. I have provided a critique of identity politics through the concept of 
identity-thinking and presented an interpretation of the role the aesthetic plays in catalysing 
the non-identity of the subject. I finally show that, while Adorno deems tragedy to be an 
obsolete form that has been appropriated by the Culture Industry and transcended by 
Beckett, his analysis of post-Auschwitz cultural life implies a Catastrophist theory of tragic 
subjectivity and aesthetics.  
 ‘To save the tragic from the limits set to it by a redundant dramatic form’, writes 
Mark Nivalainen, ‘it is necessary to find the modern locus of the tragic outside the 
traditional forms of tragic art’.251 The idea that the canonical Shakespeare has been the 
‘locus’ where tragedy has been refigured outside ‘traditional forms of tragic art’ may seem 
perverse. In Chapter Two, I will provide a reading of King Lear informed by the insights I 
have drawn from a reading of Adorno and tragedy, showing the play transgresses the ‘limits’ 
of ‘dramatic form’.  
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Chapter Two 
Why King Lear? 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the thematic and, most importantly, formal aspects of King Lear that 
make it so vital an intertext for Catastrophist tragedy. By providing a close-reading of the 
play and by drawing on relevant areas of Shakespeare Studies informed by the work of 
Adorno and Critical Theory, I show that King Lear is a play concerned with catastrophe, 
social and cultural modernity, subjectivity and the limits of tragic resolution, in a way that 
makes it – perhaps uniquely – open to Catastrophist intervention and appropriation ‘after’ 
Auschwitz.  
 I begin by showing that King Lear thematizes catastrophe. The play consistently 
portrays disaster and its impact on subjectivity, whereby catastrophe brutalizes the human 
individual and occasions a degenerative reversal into a form of ‘base life’. I proceed to 
analyse the way catastrophe is understood by the protagonists of the play itself. These 
interpretations adumbrate the emergence of a new humanist and rationalist ethos that, 
pace the dialectic of Enlightenment, ultimately reifies subjectivity. By providing a close 
reading of Edgar and his transformation into Poor Tom, I go on to analyse the way 
subjectivity implicitly emerges as a site of non-identity – most obviously in those moments 
of crisis and upheaval that fissure totality. I finally consider the aesthetics of catastrophe in 
King Lear. Drawing on early modern dramatic theory, as derived from Aelius Donatus, I show 
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that King Lear violates formal closure – or, as early modern usage would have it, ‘the 
catastrophe’.  
 
1. Catastrophe in King Lear 
 
King Lear is a play that piles disaster upon disaster. Its unremitting catastrophes seem to 
‘top extremity’ (V.iii.206) and ‘amplify too much’ (V.iii.205) to allow for respite or reprieve, 
as humanity is ‘left darkling’ (I.iv.208) in a desolate world of ‘ruinous disorders’ (I.ii.113-
114). ‘Who is’t can say “I am at the worst”?’, reflects Edgar, in a speech that epitomizes the 
‘sequent’ (I.ii.106) movement of ever-worsening ‘terrors’ (II.ii.279) in the play, ‘I am worse 
than e’er I was’ (IV.i.27-28): ‘And worse I may be yet’ (IV.i.29). So cataclysmic are the events 
of the play that Gloucester believes ‘the great world / Shall so wear out to naught’ 
(IV.vi.130-131) – perhaps an apocalyptic consummation devoutly to be wished, as humanity 
cannot ‘carry / Th’affliction, nor the fear’ (III.ii.48-49) of the devastation that begins to ‘mar’ 
(I.iv.32) it.  
The sheer ‘extremity’ (III.iv.100) of the ruin depicted in King Lear occasions a 
reversion of the subject into its ‘worst estate’ (V.iii.208) – a ‘worse than brutish’ (I.ii.77) 
condition. This reduction of people to a form of ‘base life’ (II.iv.212) is most obvious in the 
storm scenes, which dominate Act Three of the play. ‘Is man no more than this?’ (III.iv.101) 
wonders Lear, as he gazes upon ‘Poor Tom’, the ‘basest’ (II.ii.7) form of humanity that Edgar 
can imagine. Poor Tom, as far as Lear sees, is ‘the thing itself’: ‘Unaccommodated man is no 
more but such a poor, bare forked animal as thou art’ (III.iv.104-106). ‘Is man no more than 
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this?’: for some Holocaust scholars, the question takes on new urgency ‘after’ Auschwitz.252 
The words are even echoed in If This Is a Man – the title which Levi gave his reflections on 
his internment at Auschwitz.253 ‘Consider if this is a man’, writes Levi.254 ‘Consider him well’ 
(III.iv.101) declares Lear, importuning Kent and the Fool to reconsider the status of the 
human. 
The question – and, indeed, the word – that King Lear time and again invokes, 
however, is the ‘cause’ (III.iv.150). What (or perhaps who) is ‘guilty of our disasters’ 
(I.ii.120)? The play itself provides a variety of interpretations. The most consistently realized 
can be designated as the reactionary/traditionalist response and the nihilistic/absurdist 
response. The traditionalist response would have it that catastrophe inevitably results from 
the collapse of a providentially ordained, hierarchical world order, which is embodied by the 
sovereign; the nihilistic interpretation of events, however, would have it that catastrophe 
simply is the lot of a wretched humanity, which suffers humiliating (yet also grotesquely 
comic) depredations through the agency of arbitrary forces that are beyond appeal and 
intervention.  
I want – briefly – to trace both interpretations of disaster. Both have been influential 
in important post-war readings, stagings and appropriations of King Lear, which I analyse in 
Chapter Three. Both also serve to adumbrate a social and historical shift depicted in the play 
towards a more obviously modern, proto-Enlightenment worldview that, in the same 
dialectical reversal analysed by the Frankfurt School, precipitates catastrophe. The 
reactionary conservative stance is the worldview against which a proto-modern, rationalist 
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discourse emerges; while the constant apostrophes to a violent universe beyond human 
reckoning (whether driven by fate, fortune, or the gods) unwittingly reveal the way in which 
the protagonists of the play have become trapped in – and dominated by – impersonal 
forms of power and control.255 By analysing the way catastrophe is interpreted in the play, I 
show that King Lear both ideationally and rhetorically frames the emergence of an 
incipiently modern subject-object split, which portends the brute reification of human life.    
 
2.1. Understanding Catastrophe in King Lear  
 
 
The opening scene of King Lear famously depicts the division of the Kingdom, where the 
ageing King Lear seeks to divide his Kingdom between his daughters (and, more to the point 
in his patriarchal world, his current and prospective sons-in-law) so ‘that future strife / May 
be prevented now’ (I.i.43-44). Lear, as part of the wider public ceremony, sets up a ‘love-
test’:   
 
    —Tell me, my daughters, 
Since now we will divest us both of rule, 
Interest of territory, cares of state 
Which of you shall we say doth love us most 
That we our largest bounty may extend 
Where nature doth with merit challenge? (I.i.48-53) 
 
Goneril and Regan instantly comply and ‘profess’ (I.i.72) to love Lear ‘Beyond what can be 
valued’ (I.i.57). Cordelia, however, refuses the rhetorical inflation, insisting that ‘I love your 
majesty / According to my bond, no more nor less’ (I.i.92-93). She tells Lear that she has 
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‘Nothing’ (I.i.89) to add to the words of her sisters (‘Nothing will come of nothing’ (I.i.92), 
replies Lear). Loving Cordelia ‘most’ (I.i.124) and having intended to set his ‘rest / On her 
kind nursery’ (I.i.124-125), Lear vents his wrath and banishes Cordelia, leaving Albany and 
Cornwall to ‘digest’ (I.i.129) her portion of the Kingdom. Lear goes on to ‘invest’ Albany and 
Cornwall with his ‘power’ (I.i.131) but intends to ‘retain / The name, and all th’addition to a 
King’ (I.i.136-137). 
Kent admonishes Lear for banishing Cordelia after she refuses to ‘heave’ (I.i.91) her 
heart into her mouth and produce the ‘glib and oily’ (I.i.226) rhetoric Lear demands. But for 
Kent, for the sovereign to renounce his ‘power’ (I.i.149) and split the Kingdom is, in and of 
itself, catastrophic. Though undertaken with the aim of preventing rivalrous power-
struggles, Kent insists that the violation of social order can only result in chaos. ‘Reserve thy 
state, / And in thy best consideration check / This hideousness rashness’ (I.i.150-152): ‘thou 
dost evil’ (I.i.167).  
The order Kent valorizes is not only social and political; it is also natural and divine. 
By abdicating the throne, dividing the Kingdom and disowning Cordelia, Lear not only 
ruptures the order of both state and family, he also threatens the orderly system of 
hierarchy that obtains in nature and the cosmos. When Lear invokes the cosmic ‘orbs’ 
(I.i.110) and the ‘mysteries’ (I.i.111) of the natural world, Kent chastises him for swearing 
‘thy gods in vain’ (I.i.162). Lear has violated the providentially ordained order he is supposed 
to embody on earth. Kent implies as much when he states that the ‘madness’ of Lear allows 
him to break with decorum and openly indict the actions of his monarch: ‘be Kent 
unmannerly / When Lear is mad’ (I.i.146-147). This ‘unmannerly’ intervention adumbrates 
the wider collapse of order, allowing Kent to addresses the ‘divine’ figure of the King as ‘old 
man’ (I.i.147). The pagan world of King Lear obviously predates the Incarnation and the 
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advent of Christianity. It is ‘the gods’ and not ‘God’ who appear in the rhetoric of the play – 
and those gods named individually are all drawn from classical myth: ‘Hecate’ (I.i.111), 
‘Apollo’ (I.i.161) and even ‘blind Cupid’ (IV.vi.134). But the cosmic order represented in the 
play, and the social world it permeates and sanctions, is by no means incompatible with the 
hierarchic universe found in early modern theocentric political thought – not least as 
propagated by James I. This would similarly have it that the subversion of social and political 
order is a violation of Godly precepts and can only result in unmitigated disaster for 
humanity.256 
For the arch-traditionalist Kent, the division of the Kingdom violates a providentially 
ordained social and political world. With the breaking of that world order, chaos ensues. 
This conservative understanding of catastrophe is also taken up by Gloucester. Gloucester 
similarly fears that the division of the Kingdom heralds ‘death, dearth, dissolutions of 
ancient amities’ (I.ii.145) – or the collapse of the old (‘ancient’) order and various unifying 
relationships between individuals (‘amities’). Gloucester believes that unusual natural and 
astrological events are intimately related to the emergent social and political chaos. He frets 
that 
 
These late eclipses of the sun and moon portend no good to us. Though the wisdom 
of Nature can reason it thus and thus, yet nature finds itself scourged by the sequent 
effects. Love cools, friendship falls off, brothers divide: in cities, mutinies; in 
countries, discord; in palaces, treason […] We have seen the best of our time, 
machinations, hollowness, treachery and all ruinous disorders follow us disquietly to 
our graves (I.ii.103-112).         
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What the speech reveals is the profound intertwining of the natural and cosmological 
hierarchy with the social and political hierarchy. The ‘late eclipses’ Gloucester worries over 
portend the collapse (the ‘falling off’) of traditional society, the subversion of its natural and 
divine ‘bonds’, which degenerate from order into ‘discord’: ‘We have seen the best of our 
time’.257  
 Gloucester is reacting to the ‘plot’ against his life formed by his ‘legitimate’ (I.ii.19) 
son, Edgar – a plot, in reality, cooked-up by his bastard ‘whoreson’ (I.i.22) Edmund, who has 
designs on the ‘land’ he cannot inherit. The plot, as far as Gloucester is concerned, is 
testament to the collapse of hierarchical relationships and civilized – or as Lear imagines it, 
‘sophisticated’ (III.iv.104) – social life. This unleashes a self-interested, individualist ethos 
which propagates ‘hollowness’ and ‘treachery’. The collapse of all social values seemingly 
presaged by late eclipses raises the prospect of a bellum omnium contra omnes – a war of all 
against all where, as the Duke of Albany states, ‘humanity must perforce prey on itself / Like 
monsters of the deep’ (IV.ii.50-51) in a state of appetitive homo homini lupus. It is the same 
nightmare Thomas Hobbes would go on to imagine: humanity in a cruelly anarchic ‘State of 
Nature’, from which traditional social authority and constraint is the only possible 
salvation.258  
Over the action of the play, however, the idea that disaster results from the violation 
of a providentially sanctioned world order is transformed into something even more 
pessimistic – that catastrophe simply is the ‘lot’ of a degraded humanity, which is prey to 
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arbitrary forces beyond its ken. Perhaps ironically, it is Gloucester who, after being viciously 
blinded by Cornwall and Regan, provides the most trenchant statement of that despair, 
when he insists that ‘As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods / They kill us for their sport’ 
(IV.i.38-39). Lear provides a similarly nihilistic image of that condition, which is both tragic 
and absurdly comic: ‘When we are born, we cry that we are come / To this great stage of 
fools’ (IV.vi.178-179).  
This nihilistic interpretation of catastrophe leaves little room for meaningful human 
agency. Lear preaches ‘patience’ (IV.vi.174) to Gloucester in the face of tragi-comic 
absurdity – a reaction echoed by Edgar when he tells Gloucester that ‘Men must endure’ 
(V.ii.9) as, finally, ‘Ripeness is all’ (V.ii.11).259 Such responses would have it that resigned 
endurance is the only response to an inherently catastrophic world, which, far from an 
immanently meaningful cosmological order, appears as a torturously ‘tough rack’ (V.iii.313) 
on which human subjects are stretched, broken to pieces and finally destroyed – for no 
reason whatsoever.  
Neither interpretation of catastrophe is, however, adequate. On the one hand, the 
conservative reading exculpates a hierarchical order that itself is obviously liable to produce 
disaster. Lear may act rashly in dividing the Kingdom – but his rashness is, as Goneril and 
Regan so piercingly observe, ‘a long-engrafted condition’ (I.i.298). His rashness has been 
socially and culturally ‘conditioned’ by the ‘long-engrafted’ (or artificially implanted) 
autocratic power and authority that devolves to the King.260 Perhaps more urgently, as the 
play progresses Lear also begins to see that hierarchical ‘authority’ (IV.vi.154) as such is 
politically suspect and socially unjust. Not only is the ‘great image of authority’ that a ‘dog’ is 
‘obeyed in office’ (IV.vi.154-155), but – as Lear perceives – ‘Through tattered clothes great 
                                                          
259
 This is the view which, as I will show in Chapter Four, Edward Bond is most concerned to contest.  
260
 The word engrafting relates to horticulture and the artificial grafting of plants.  
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
105 
 
vices do appear; / Robes and furred gowns hide all’ (IV.vi.160-161). Such sentiments leave 
little room for the backward-looking, conservative nostalgia evinced by Kent and Gloucester. 
On the other hand, the nihilistic interpretation provided by Gloucester (and, at other times, 
by Lear and others) would serve to release humanity from any responsibility whatsoever for 
disaster, implying as it does that people are at the mercy of implacable forces beyond 
intervention. Both Lear and Gloucester are culpable for the disaster that overtakes the 
Kingdom: Lear for dividing the Kingdom and trusting to the sincerity of Goneril and Regan, 
disinheriting Cordelia and banishing Kent, and Gloucester for his own utterly insensitive 
treatment of Edmund, treatment itself authorized by the system of primogeniture and its 
‘order of law’ (I.i.18).261  
But while the traditionalist and nihilistic interpretations are both flawed, neither 
should be dismissed outright. Both frame the emergence and experience of new, and 
potentially catastrophic, ‘dispositions’ (IV.ii.32): capitalist self-interest and humanist reason 
– those irruptive social and historical phenomena commonly understood as modernity. 
Through the ‘images of revolt and flying off’ (II.iv.279) that suffuse the play, King Lear 
conveys the ‘great decay’ (V.iii.296) of a mystified hierarchical system as it gives way to a 
disenchanted, capitalist worldview, a rapacious ideology that, once set in motion, seems 
divorced from human control. I turn in the next section to an analysis of Edmund, who 
embodies the newly emergent, modern view of the world and its dialectical reversal into 
reifying domination.   
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2.1. The Catastrophe of Modernity in King Lear 
 
It is often observed that King Lear depicts a historical – and, indeed, a generational – 
transition, from a pre-modern (feudal) to a more recognizably modern (capitalist) society.262 
The ‘old’ order is based on hierarchy, embodied by the figure of the sovereign, and is 
characterized by superstitious beliefs, most obviously in the gods/God and other non-
human entities that determine human life (whether beneficently or cruelly). The ‘new’ order 
is less hierarchical and more individualistic, with a new set of scientific, rational beliefs that 
overturn the more superstitious ideas inherited from the past. The old order is – for the 
most part – taken to be represented by the older characters – Lear, Gloucester, Kent and, 
though in a perhaps more complicated way, the Fool.263 The new order, on the other hand, 
is represented by a younger and more hard-hearted generation – Goneril, Regan, Cornwall 
and Edmund.  
Using the dialectical reading of modernity provided by Adorno, the reactionary 
interpretations of catastrophe provided by Kent and Gloucester evince a pre-modern, 
mythical worldview, where a hierarchical society is understood to manifest a deific order – 
an order Lear refers to as the ‘mystery of things’ (V.iii.16). But the play also depicts a 
modern, disenchanted worldview that interrogates the type of mystified thinking other 
characters cleave to in the midst of catastrophe. This iconoclastic worldview is epitomized 
by Edmund.  
During his reading of astrological signs, Gloucester contests the ‘wisdom of Nature’ – 
by which he means the type of scientific ‘reason’ (I.ii.103-104) that would seek to provide a 
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more ‘naturalistic’ interpretation of the material world and its mysteries. This is precisely 
the type of worldview that Edmund embraces when he gleefully ironizes his credulous 
father:    
 
This is the excellent foppery of the world that when we are sick in fortune—often 
the surfeit of our own behaviour—we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the 
moon, and the stars, as if we were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly 
compulsion, knaves, thieves, and treachers by spherical predominance, drunkards, 
liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence, and all that we 
are evil in by a divine thrusting-on. (I.ii.118-119) 
 
Far from being providentially ordained, the disasters which trouble the world have, as 
Edmund perceives it, a human cause.264 This is a humanistic shift in perception. Where, for 
Gloucester, humanity is dominated (‘compelled’) by deterministic forces (‘spherical 
dominance’) beyond its control, for Edmund the individual subject is free to act on the world 
as he or she wishes (which also comprises the choice to be ‘evil’). This turns the world and 
the various phenomena that constitute it into an instrument of the willed purposes – or as 
Edmund calls it, ‘business’ (I.ii.180) – of a rationally interposing and self-fashioning human 
subject. Edmund boasts that, for him, everything is ‘meet that I can fashion fit’ (I.ii.182). 
Edmund, armed as he is with a rational understanding of the world, is able to ‘fashion’, to 
frame, the world and himself in a way that suits (is ‘meet’ with) his own ends.265 He is, quite 
simply, free. 
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 Reason allows Edmund to overturn the belief that humanity is prey to divine forces 
beyond its understanding. But he also pours scorn on the hierarchical society which that 
cosmological order is supposed to sanction. For him, traditional social and political authority 
is nothing but convention. In the soliloquy that opens Act One, Scene Two of the play, he 
declares:  
 
 Thou, Nature, art my goddess; to thy law 
My services are bound. Wherefore should I 
Stand in the plague of custom, and permit 
The curiosity of nations to deprive me, 
For that I am some twelve or fourteen moon-shines 
Lag of a brother? Why bastard? wherefore base? 
When my dimensions are as well compact, 
My mind as generous, and my shape as true, 
As honest madam’s issue? Why brand they us 
With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base? 
Who, in the lusty stealth of nature, take 
More composition and fierce quality 
Than doth, within a dull, stale, tired bed, 
Go to the creating a whole tribe of fops, 
Got ’tween asleep and wake? Well, then, 
Legitimate Edgar, I must have your land: 
Our father’s love is to the bastard Edmund 
As to the legitimate: fine word, legitimate! 
Well, my legitimate, if this letter speed, 
And my invention thrive, Edmund the base 
Shall top the legitimate. I grow; I prosper: 
Now, gods, stand up for bastards! (I.ii.1-22)  
 
Edmund provides a deeply sceptical, rationalistic critique of the ‘plague of custom’ and the 
‘curiosity of nations’, customs which mean that he – as an illegitimate bastard – is 
marginalized from civilized social discourse and barred from inheriting land. His is a form of 
(as he calls it) ‘base’ life – life that is lived outside of received social and political legitimacy 
and meaning. His response – in an ironic, even quasi-satirical twist – is to make all human 
life ‘base’.  
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Edmund, in his quest for self-promotion, turns the customary order into nothing 
more than an instrument of his own designs. His falsified ‘conspiracy’ manipulates the 
disavowed intergenerational tensions that are produced by the traditional system of 
primogeniture. This desacralizing instrumentalization of the social order also means the 
desacralizing instrumentalization of the subjects who make it up. Through his 
demystification of superstitious beliefs and traditional social forms, Edmund turns other 
subjects into mere objects – most obviously his father and brother, who become means to 
his ends. Without the legitimacy conferred by the social order, potentially any and all 
subjects are ‘base’ – are not afforded the authority and even protection that a ‘lawful’ place 
in the hierarchy should underwrite. When he ironically calls upon the gods to stand up for 
bastards, Edmund is not only inverting the usual order by claiming grace for those outside 
the social and cosmic hierarchy; he is also saying that now, with everybody reduced to the 
illegitimate status of baseness, all subjects are ‘bastards’ and will need divine favour – which 
he knows not to exist. Edmund, as part of his humanistic perspective on the world, ends up 
delegitimizing all human life. His rationalist critique reveals the way in which the 
‘sovereignty, knowledge and reason’ (I.iv.223-224) purposed with freeing the subject from 
traditional authority can degenerate into ‘slaughter’ (I.iv.312). He embodies the dialectic of 
Enlightenment.  
 It is worth pausing over the word ‘business’ and its relationship to the 
universalization of base life. Edmund is not only depicted in the play as a proto-humanist 
figure; he is also a nascent, self-interestedly acquisitive capitalist, who seeks for his own 
advancement in the world (typified by his use of the word ‘prosper’). There is an obvious 
relation in King Lear between humanist reason and the commodity-form. By making all life 
base, Edmund collapses any and all qualitative distinctions between individuals, creating a 
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world of total fungibility that brings about the transvaluation of all values (‘Fine word, 
legitimate’, as Edmund says – but perhaps only a word and open to transformation). This 
makes the subject (potentially) interchangeable – a commodity with no obvious inherent 
value or meaning. Through his rationalistic deconstruction of hierarchy, Edmund plans – 
quite literally – to exchange himself for his brother, whose own life is (as far as Edmund is 
concerned) no more sacrosanct than his own form of base (‘illegitimate’) life. The rhetoric of 
disenchantment and the rhetoric of reification are symbiotic in King Lear: proto-humanist 
rationality and proto-capitalist commodity fetishism cannot be neatly parcelled out in the 
play.  
 What the speech also reveals is the ideational and rhetorical tie between scientific 
reason and the natural world it is meant properly to interpret and dominate. Edmund, in a 
statement that might seem to contradict his status as a rational humanist, cites ‘Nature’ as 
his ‘goddess’, proclaiming the ‘lusty stealth of nature’ over and above the type of civilized 
cultural relations epitomized by ‘lawful’ primogeniture. This is deeply paradoxical. Edmund 
uses his reason to undermine the ‘naturalness’ of the prevailing social and political order, 
part of his bid for freedom. But his reason ends up creating conditions that once again take 
on the semblance of ‘nature’ and to which subjects must subscribe for the sake of self-
preservation. Edmund thinks that dog-eat-dog competition is simply the way of the world – 
‘natural’. This, however, is not the natural state of humanity at all; it is a state produced by 
the new order of capitalist reason Edmund represents. The freedom that reason is supposed 
to provide ultimately relapses into a new form of heteronomy, into conditions that take on 
the appearance of ‘a law of nature’.266 This reversal sheds light on the oft-repeated 
apostrophes to ‘Nature’ (and the ‘gods’) in the play. The appeals to various inhuman 
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agencies in King Lear reveal the way in which reason takes on an autotelic life of its own, 
apparently beyond the control of the individuals it is supposed to serve. The representation 
of ‘Nature’ as a detached, ravening system reflects the reign of capitalist reason run wild: 
images of beast-like life evince, not humanity in ‘a state of Nature’, but its brutalization by a 
reified rationality.  
The notion that reason brutalizes the subject – and produces inhumanly cold and 
rapacious individuals – is particularly relevant to Goneril and Regan, who are variously 
described as ‘Tigers’ (IV.ii.41) and ‘wolvish’ (I.iv.300). These epithets, and the absence of any 
characterization that may offer some orientation in telling ‘one o’the pairings’ (I.iv.179) 
from the other, has been critiqued as misogynistic – a misogyny that is most obvious when 
Lear talks of the vagina as a place of ‘hell’ and ‘darkness’ (IV.vi.123-124).267 But the seeming 
absence of any distinction between Goneril and Regan may also be read as symptomatic of 
the type of depersonalized subjects produced by ‘a reified power’.268 Goneril and Regan are 
depicted as typical of the depersonalized ‘automaton-like subjects’ to be found ‘in the new 
system of nothing’.269 It would also be wrong to solely identify that ‘new system’ with 
Goneril and Regan (or even Edmund and Cornwall): its ascendancy is apparent even in the 
opening scene of the play, where the abstract quality of love is turned into the quantity of 
land to be (prematurely) inherited by the next generation. During the division of the 
Kingdom, Lear describes the resistant Cordelia as ‘untender’ (I.i.107). He means that she is 
emotionally hard-hearted (quite literally, un-tenderized); but the word ‘tender’ also signifies 
her refusal to engage in the system of exchange (tendering) that Lear institutes through the 
love-test. Lear tells the King of France that, as a result, ‘her price is fallen’ (I.i.198). The 
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emergent dispensations represented in King Lear cannot be isolated to a single, ‘immoral’ 
character, even if Edmund is the most eloquent rhetorician of base life found in the play. 
The historical and ideological shift the play depicts ultimately debases the whole of 
society.270  
Foakes observes that, of all the plays by Shakespeare, King Lear speaks most directly 
to a late capitalist culture that appears to place ultimate ideological importance on 
‘individual expression and fulfilment, on the freedom and autonomy of the individual’ and 
its actual material ‘diminution of the subject to a nobody’, another ‘entry in the systems of 
the government, banks, police and advertisers, marking the social, economic and political 
insignificance of each person in a mass society’.271 King Lear, as Foakes understands it, 
represents nothing short of a prophetic indictment of a (still developing) culture of abstract 
capitalist rationality. It is a boldly stated argument – but Foakes does not pursue it as far as 
he might. By portraying the total reification of the subject, King Lear can also be seen to 
portend the ‘future strife’ (I.i.43) and ‘the image and horror’ (I.ii.173) of the concentration 
camps, where human life truly did become vanishingly ‘base’. What Edmund (and other 
characters) institute through the reduction of the human being to a form of base life is a 
world of bio-politics, as Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben call it.272 This names a social 
system where human life is stripped of its cultural legitimacy and the subject reduced to a 
bare organism (the ‘poor, bare forked animal’). When he searches for a paradigm of a bio-
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political regime, Agamben alights on the concentration camps, which he calls ‘the nomos of 
the modern’.273  
But while King Lear depicts the often disastrous outcomes of modern rationality, it 
also presents catastrophe as potentially generative – a paradox captured in the storm-flung 
imagery of Act Three, when Lear calls out for the end of the world, desiring that the storm 
‘crack’ the ‘moulds’ through which ‘Nature’ produces and reproduces its many forms, so 
that ‘all germens spill at once’ (III.ii.8). It is an image of catastrophic destruction that, 
simultaneously, raises the prospect of anarchic (re)creation, which takes place without 
being determined by the forms and shapes (‘moulds’) that have obtained before. The play 
comprises the diverse meanings of catastrophe found in Critical Theory: modernity as a 
form of permanent catastrophe, a ‘general woe’ (V.iii.318) which reduces human subjects to 
mere ciphers, to be disposed of at will; and catastrophe as potentially emancipatory, a 
disastrous upheaval that ‘blasts’ the subject from prevailing social and political systems and 
forces. I now analyse the relationship between catastrophe and subjectivity in King Lear by 
considering Edgar, who begins the play typical of the non-descript ‘tribe of fops’ (I.ii.14) 
Edmund rails against, but in catastrophe also discovers new forms of subjectivity – and, 
indeed, freedom.   
 
3. Catastrophe and Subjectivity in King Lear 
 
Despite the violent terrors it represents, King Lear also evinces a paradoxical ‘openness to 
change and catastrophe’.274 It is in moments of disruption and crisis – in moments when, to 
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quote Lear, ‘We are not ourselves’ (II.iv.296) – where new possibilities for subjective 
experience and autonomy might be actualized. This is typified by Edgar. When, in Act Two, 
Edgar is exiled and violently shorn from his inherited social and political identity, he is forced 
to reinvent himself as the raving Bedlamite Poor Tom, an identity that cedes to a host of 
others as Edgar embodies a whole variety of other ‘selves’ over the action of the play.275 
Hugh Grady makes the case that Edgar is a ‘consummate figure of human indeterminacy 
and potential’, who confirms through his self-transformations the open-ended ‘possibility of 
human change’, defying absorption into ‘ready-made signifying systems’.276 Edgar does not 
necessarily apostrophize against the social and political totality or even form a coherent 
critique of the type of all-consuming, modern ratio which arises in the play. But his protean 
transformations testify to the way in which subjectivity implicitly emerges as a space of 
resistance to a reifying modernity. Edgar retains a form of autonomy, of freedom from 
totality.  
The importance of Edgar and his non-identical subjectivity is underscored by the 
Quarto version of the play, which, after advertising the ‘True Chronicle History of the life 
and death of King Lear’ also features ‘the unfortunate life of Edgar, son and heir to the Earl 
of Gloucester and his sullen and assumed humour of Tom of Bedlam’.277 The words 
‘assumed’ and ‘sullen’ are significant. The word ‘assumed’ obviously means more than Edgar 
simply ‘pretends’ to be Poor Tom: the Latin adsumere, meaning ‘to take to oneself’, implies 
that Edgar takes another identity to himself in his time of crisis; while the word ‘sullen’ is, as 
the OED notes, derived from the Anglo-Norman ‘solein’ or ‘solain’, from the Latin solitaneus, 
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meaning ‘sole, solitary, alone’, or ‘singular’.278 By taking up the figure of Poor Tom, Edgar 
testifies to the tragic non-identity of subject (the one) and society (the many) in King Lear. 
Edgar takes it upon himself to become a singular figure in – and non-identical with – his 
social world.  
Grady develops an interpretation of modernity that is informed by Habermas and 
the idea of consensual intersubjectivity.279 He makes the case that modern, reifying 
‘systems’ in the play should be set against the resistance provided by customary ‘lifeworlds’ 
that have yet to be fully incorporated into a dominative social totality.280 Where systems 
tend to reify the subject, lifeworlds foster the possibility of mutual understanding.281 Grady 
is drawn to a subaltern, plebeian culture of communal solidarity that he finds in the play – a 
world Edgar comes to be identified with in his (initial) transformation into the impoverished 
Poor Tom. Grady picks out the servant who tries to stop Cornwall from blinding Gloucester – 
‘A peasant stand up thus?’ (III.vii.79) is the incredulous response given by Regan, while 
Cornwall orders the body of the dead ‘slave’ to be cast on a ‘dunghill’ (III.vii.95-96); the 
servants who, in the Quarto, tend to the blinded Gloucester – bringing ‘flax and the whites 
of eggs / To apply to his bleeding face’ (III.vii.105-106); and the Old Man who leads 
Gloucester to safety and brings him ‘the best ’pparel that I have’ (IV.i.52). The most stunning 
political identification with a subaltern lifeworld, however, takes place in the storm scenes 
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of Act Three, when Lear makes his famous ‘prayer’ to the destitute masses he has ignored 
during his reign: 
 
 Poor naked wretches, whereso’er you are, 
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm, 
How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides, 
Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you 
From seasons such as these? Oh, I have ta’en 
Too little care of this! Take physic, pomp. 
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel, 
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them. (III.iv.28-35)  
 
Through his own suffering, Lear comes to learn about and empathize with the suffering of 
others. He will even attempt to assert his common identity with ‘unaccommodated man’ by 
removing his royal ermine – ‘Off, off, you lendings: come unbutton’ (III.iv.105-106). Lear 
postulates a new form of sociality where the ‘superflux’ – the surplus wealth and property 
owned by the ruling-classes – comes to be distributed to the poor, overturning the social 
injustice that obtains in the Kingdom. This more consensual relationship between self and 
others means that Grady perceives ‘utopian alternatives to reification within the debris of 
King Lear’.282 There is, as Grady understands it, hope that self and society can synthesize in 
King Lear. 
This collective unity represents for Grady the main agent of resistance against the 
impersonal power of the new regimes of modernity. This interpretation recalls previous 
humanist, Christian and indeed Marxist readings of King Lear, which I analyse more fully in 
Chapter Three. These readings of the play similarly concentrate on the storm scenes and the 
idea that Lear undergoes some form of moral (and indeed social) redemption. Christian 
readings of the play have it that Lear is finally redeemed through his suffering and discovers 
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the value of humility and charity; humanist readings plot a progressive narrative action 
whereby Lear is disabused of his mythical conviction in his divine status and discovers 
himself as fleshy and mortal, allowing for his wider insight into the ills of his society; and  
Marxist readings of the play similarly prioritize the moral progress made by Lear in his new 
vision for an egalitarian society, where ‘distribution should undo excess / And each man 
have enough’ (IV.i.73-74).     
This is where a Catastrophist interpretation of King Lear parts ways with Grady. I do 
not deny the play depicts powerful moments of empathy and solidarity that contradict the 
cruelly reductive, depersonalizing form of modern reasoning implemented by (and, indeed, 
through) Edmund, Cornwall, Goneril and Regan. Nor do I contest the political aspirations 
which underpin the desire to find utopian alternatives to a totalizing autotelic ratio. The 
problem with the type of reading pursued by Grady is that, by insisting on the possibility of 
reconciliation between subject and society, he is guilty of ignoring the form of the play, its 
violation of aesthetic closure. The reconciliatory movement Grady identifies in King Lear is 
obviously dashed at the end of the drama, which denies the sort of telos he wants to trace. 
The prospect of some sort of sort of dialectical synthesis of subject and society seems 
remote by the end of a play which, as Ewan Fernie writes, insists on a ‘tearing tension’ 
between ‘the gored state’ (V.iii.319) and an ‘equally wounded and deformed subject’.283 
Subject and society, as Fernie observes, remain in an unreconciled state at the close of King 
Lear.  
 I will now provide an analysis of the fragmentary, catastrophic form of King Lear, 
which Grady neglects. I want particularly to concentrate on its final moments, where an 
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irruptive violation of closure means that the play ‘cannot be bordered certain in itself’ 
(IV.ii.42).  
 
4. ‘Is this the promised end?’ King Lear and the Aesthetics of Catastrophe 
 
My analysis of King Lear so far has tended to use the word ‘catastrophe’ as more or less 
equivalent with ‘disaster’, so that catastrophe can be understood as ‘terrible event’. This 
was not necessarily the dominant meaning of the word in the early modern era, however, as 
‘catastrophe’ did not begin to be more readily identified with ‘sudden disaster’ (or ‘an event 
producing a subversion of order or system’) until toward the end of the seventeenth 
century.284 When King Lear was composed, catastrophe was a term related to dramatic 
form.  
For early moderns, catastrophe meant the resolution of a play or simply the end or 
conclusion of something more generally, as evidenced by Thomas Cooper in his 1565 
Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et Britannicae, where catastrophe is defined as ‘the latter end 
of a comedie, the ende of any thing’, a definition reflecting the Greek καταστροϕή, which 
connotes ‘overturning, sudden turn, conclusion’.285 Samuel Johnson (whose own famed 
reaction to the death of Cordelia – and Lear – will be touched upon again) similarly defines 
catastrophe as the ‘change or revolution which produces the conclusion or final event of a 
dramatic piece’ – though his definition conspicuously widens the potential generic scope of 
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catastrophe beyond comedy to any ‘dramatic piece’, so that catastrophe might apply 
beyond comedy.286  
The early modern usage derived largely from the reception of the writings of fourth 
century Roman rhetorician, Aelius Donatus, via his commentary on Terence and his comedy 
The Andrian, published in the fifteenth century.287 Donatus separated drama into the 
prologue, followed by the protasis (‘the beginning of the drama’), the epitasis (‘the 
development and enlargement of the conflict and, as it were, the knot of all error’) and, 
finally, catastrophe – ‘the resolution of the events’ in comedy ‘so that there is a happy 
ending which is made evident to all by the recognition of past events’.288 By tying up the 
epitasis in a moment of recognition – or anagnorisis – catastrophe strongly denotes a 
resolution of conflict. The catastrophe, as a sudden transformation, may for Donatus be an 
event, but it may equally be a character that intervenes from ‘outside’ of the plot to resolve 
the conflicts which the action of the play has generated – a sort of non-narrative persona ex 
machina.289  
Leo Salingar makes the case that, in his reading of Terentian comedy, Donatus shifts 
an Aristotelian interpretation of tragic form onto comic drama.290 Not unlike Aristotle, 
Donatus stresses the formal necessity of resolving conflicts and confusions – a reading of 
tragic form which, as I set out previously, is critical for Hegel and his conception of dialectics. 
While early modern thought tends to classify catastrophe in terms of comic drama, the 
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word, particularly insofar as it implies formal resolution, might be understood to transcend 
genre.291  
Kenneth Muir has made the case that catastrophe is a word Shakespeare derived 
from the John Florio translation of Montaigne, where catastrophe is understood in 
Donathusian terms as ‘the conclusion or shutting up of a comedie or any thing else’.292 On 
the very rare occasions when he uses the word, Shakespeare tends to do so in an ironic 
vein, as typified by Henry IV Part Two, where Page tells Mistress Quickly that he will ‘tickle’ 
her ‘catastrophe’ (II.i.58) – by which he means beat her backside (her ‘end’, her 
‘catastrophe’). The same comic-ironic tone appears in King Lear, when Edmund, in Act One, 
Scene Two of the play, uses the word (which, pace Donatus, he relates to comic form) to 
describe the entrance of his hapless brother, against whom, moments previously, he had 
been plotting. ‘And pat he comes’, Edmund exultantly states, ‘like the catastrophe of the old 
comedy’ (I.ii.134). The superficial point is that Edgar, like the character of the catastrophe in 
both Old and New Comedy, has arrived right on ‘cue’ (I.ii.135). This implies the total 
authorial control Edmund seems to have over (even ‘chance’) events. He has trapped his 
brother in a pre-scripted plot of his devising and Edgar arrives, ex machina, on cue and on 
time. 
But the allusion also self-reflexively ironizes the artificiality of the catastrophe as a 
formal device – and indeed the overdetermined conventions of dramatic resolution more 
widely. It is telling that King Lear is the only tragedy where there is a citation of the 
catastrophe. The allusion to dramatic theory, as Alan Rosen has convincingly shown, invites 
attention to the wider violation of formal closure in King Lear, its (as Rosen calls it) anti-
                                                          
291
 See also T.W. Baldwin, Shakespeare’s Five-Act Structure: Shakespeare's Early Plays on the Background of 
Renaissance Theories of Five Act Structure from 1470 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1947), pp. 252-311.  
292
 Kenneth Muir, Shakespeare’s Sources: Comedies and Tragedies (Oxford: Routledge, 2005), p. 161. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
121 
 
formalist ‘shape’.293 The catastrophe, conventionally supposed to take place at the end of a 
drama and resolve its outstanding conflicts and confusions, makes a ‘displaced’ appearance 
in Act One of King Lear – almost as if the rest of the play were a grotesquely elongated 
catastrophe. Through its untimely allusion to the catastrophe and early modern dramatic 
theory, King Lear self-consciously reveals its own violent transgression of ‘due resolution’ 
(I.ii.100). 
Perhaps the most astute interpreter of the anti-form of King Lear is Stephen Booth, 
who provides a particularly insightful reading of the way in which King Lear constantly 
transgresses its own formal limits.294 Booth analyses a range of closure-defying techniques. 
These range from the way Shakespeare draws repetitively on a constellation of words – 
‘fool’, ‘kind’, ‘nature’, ‘fate’, ‘nothing’, ‘something’ and so on – but with diverse possible 
meanings, so that repeated words are constantly and ‘arbitrarily redefined’.295 This serves to 
forestall any final ‘meaning’ – any closure. The same can be said for the way Shakespeare 
uses words that are ‘densely resistant to verse articulation’ – ‘tender-hefted’ (II.iv.166), ‘sea-
monster’ (I.iv.258), ‘sepulchring’ (II.iv.127), ‘head-lugged’ (IV.ii.42) – which adumbrate the 
‘operation of some dangerously unregulable power, something not quite contained by the 
procedures that seek to organize it’.296 The failure of formal closure also relates to the 
representation of space and time, where the main characters spend most of the play 
wandering about in (literally) unbounded, outside spaces, without any obvious ‘conclusive’ 
destination. This dilates the onward progress of time itself, which, far from obeying 
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conventional linearity towards a teleological end, is often suspended. It also relates to the 
representation of death in the play, where characters that, to all intents and purposes, seem 
‘dead’ might also and at the same time be ‘alive’ – an idea I return to when I analyse 
Blasted. 
This violation of formal limits pertains most obviously to the end of the play, which, 
as I set out in the Introduction, subverts the usual Lear/Leir narrative. Over the action of Act 
Five, the play seems to be resolving the ‘complications’ that characterize the epitasis and 
working toward the catastrophe, ‘the resolution of the events’ and ‘recognition’. The plot 
against the life of Albany is revealed (V.iii.71-90); Edgar defeats Edmund in single combat 
(V.iii.160-171); the sisters who have vied for marriage to Edmund both die, Goneril killing 
Regan with poison (V.iii.105) before she kills herself (V.iii.222-225); and Albany and Edgar 
both give moralizing speeches that are typical of the end of a play – of the catastrophe – 
with Edgar stating ‘the gods are just and of our pleasant vices / Make instruments to plague 
us’ (V.iii.168-169).    
But while the play seems to be enacting a formalized ‘catastrophe’ that will, by the 
end of the action, have ‘concluded all’ (IV.vii.42), it soon becomes apparent that, as Booth 
contends, King Lear only appears to be formally concluding ‘while its substance is still in 
urgent progress’.297 The precise whereabouts of Lear and Cordelia towards the end of the 
play have been overlooked: ‘Great things of us forgot!’ (V.iii.235). No sooner has Edmund 
repented and revealed his ‘commission’ (V.iii.250) on the life of Lear and Cordelia than Lear 
re-enters the stage – carrying the dead Cordelia in his arms: ‘Howl, howl, howl, howl!’ 
(V.iii.255). Booth writes that, in having both Lear and Cordelia finally die, Shakespeare 
presents the ‘final action of the play after the story is over’, so that King Lear transgresses 
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the ‘generic promise inherent in its story’.298 King Lear outstrips the formal containment it 
seems to be observing, creating a sense of uncertainty and irresolution at precisely the 
moment it should be providing closure. The play has violently subverted its own 
catastrophe.  
This uncertainty and irresolution spills over into the speeches that take place ‘after’ 
the deaths of Lear and Cordelia. I quote from the Folio version of the play – for reasons I will 
develop shortly:   
 
Lear:      No, no, no life. 
  Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life 
  And thou no breath at all? Thou’lt come no more. 
  Never, never, never, never, never. 
  Pray you, undo this button. Thank you, sir. 
  Do you see this? Look on her, look, her lips. 
  Look there, look there.     He dies. 
Edgar:   He faints. My lord, my lord. 
Kent:   Break, heart, I prithee break. 
Edgar:   Look up, my lord. 
Kent:   Vex not his ghost. O let him pass. He hates him 
  That would upon the rack of this tough world 
  Stretch him out longer. 
Edgar:     He is gone indeed. 
  The wonder is he hath endured so long. 
  He but usurped his life.  
Albany: Bear them hence. Our present business  
  Is general woe. [To Edgar and Kent] Friends of my soul, 
  you twain 
  Rule in this realm, and the gored state sustain. 
Kent:  I have a journey, sir, shortly to go. 
  My master calls me, I must not say no. 
Edgar:  The weight of this sad time we must obey, 
  Speak what we feel, not what we ought to say. 
  The oldest hath borne most; we that are young 
  Shall never see so much, nor live so long. 
 
  Exeunt with a dead march.299   
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The final action and speeches of King Lear are deeply ambiguous, from the final state of Lear 
(rapturous about the seeming survival of Cordelia, or completely deluded?) to the precise 
intentions of Kent (does ‘shortly to go’ indicate his suicide, or simply that he will shortly die 
of old age?). Perhaps most uncertain, however, is the political situation, which remains 
unresolved. Albany is the socially superior of the survivors and should be the obvious heir to 
the throne; however, he instantly passes the crown to Kent and Edgar, as he had previously 
tried to ‘resign’ it back to the ‘old majesty’ (V.iii.298): Lear. Kent, however, implies that he 
must follow Lear into death, meaning that the crown (if the resignation of the state to Kent 
and Edgar ‘twain’ still obtains after Kent has stated his apparent intention to commit 
suicide) seemingly falls to Edgar. But his ascension to the place of King is not stated 
unambiguously: Edgar (or in the Quarto, Albany) is provided with a truly obscure quatrain 
which leaves both the political situation and the play disconcertingly ‘unfixed’.300 The final 
speech offers ‘no strongly felt reassurance that the world is now once more firmly the right-
way-up’.301  
The ending of King Lear departs from the other tragedies of Shakespeare, Hamlet, 
Macbeth and Othello, which portray the imminent reinstitution of the social and political 
order. Hamlet dies importuning Horatio to tell his ‘story’ (V.ii.328) and formally gives his 
‘dying voice’ (V.ii.335) to ‘th’election’ (V.ii.334) of the questing and ‘warlike’ (V.ii.330) 
Fortinbras, whose newfound status as de facto King of Denmark is signalled by his delivery 
of the final speech of the play, where he commands that the body of Hamlet be borne ‘like a 
soldier to the stage’ (V.ii375). The same formality – and the restoration of a broken social 
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and political order – is found in Macbeth. With the death of the ‘hellhound’ (V.vi.42) 
Macbeth, the true heir to Duncan, Malcolm, is restored to the throne of Scotland – and is 
duly given the climatic speech of the play, proclaiming his coronation by inviting his thanes 
‘to see us crowned at Scone’ (V.vi.114). The ending of Othello does not repeat the ritual 
state ceremonies of Hamlet and Macbeth; but Othello is given a final, climatic speech, 
where a distracted Lear is not, in which he asks others to ‘relate’ (V.ii.339) his story, kissing 
Desdemona before his suicide (V.ii.366-367). Lodovico appears to consent, settling the new 
political organization of Cyprus before he states his intention to return to Venice and ‘relate’ 
the tragic events, ‘straight aboard, and to the state / This heavy act with heavy heart relate’ 
(V.i.368-369).302  
I have quoted the Folio version of King Lear because the Quarto provides even less in 
the way of resolution. This version has no stage direction indicating when (if?) Lear finally 
dies and is also missing the rapt words found in the Folio, where Lear seems to die in the 
belief that Cordelia lives (the discrepancy has prompted some critics to observe that the 
Quarto is the ‘bleaker’ version of the play).303 Albany (not Edgar) is given the final quatrain 
of the play (which appears unchanged) – but, as in the Folio, Albany has already resigned 
the crown and the care of the ‘gored state’. Though he is given the final speech, the precise 
status of Albany (and that of the state itself) remains unclear. The Quarto is also missing the 
direction ‘Exeunt with a dead march’, which is found in the Folio, a processional, funeral 
ritual proper to the ending of a tragedy.304 But as Booth shows, even the ‘dead march’ of the 
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Folio is ambiguous: King Lear is the only Shakespeare tragedy in which the final speeches do 
not point to an immediate off-stage location to which the bodies (and the survivors) are 
meant to repair. Albany, Kent and Edgar are left to simply walk off the stage – seemingly to 
nowhere.305      
This failure to restore communal social and political relations at the end of King Lear 
is reflected in the (relative) absence of collective pronouns in its final speeches. Kent refers 
to himself, using ‘I’, while ‘thou’ and ‘you’ are used on five occasions, cognates of ‘him’/‘her’ 
on ten. The distant (and distancing) ‘them’ is used once, while ‘we’ only occurs in the final 
quatrain. The referent is, however, unclear. ‘[W]e that are young’ would presumably 
disqualify Kent (who roundly declares himself to be in his late forties in Act Two) and 
potentially also Albany, so that the collective imperative (‘we must obey’/‘speak what we 
feel’) does not have any obvious onstage addressee(s). It may be that Edgar delivers the 
final speech directly to the audience, turning the final quatrain into a sort of quasi-epilogue. 
But, if so, the demands the play/Edgar is making on that collective entity (‘we’) ‘remains 
enigmatic’.306 There is an irreconcilable contradiction implicit in the appeal. Edgar insists on 
the need to pay full witness to experience, speaking feelingly (and so truthfully) about 
everything that has been seen. But at the same time, the survivors will ‘never see so much’ 
as those who have ‘borne most’. It is up to the survivors to speak about, to bear witness, to 
events and experiences that defy comprehension, violating the limits of understanding. This 
paradox is as liable to make ‘breath poor and speech unable’ (I.i.60) as it is to encourage ‘us’ 
to speak ‘feelingly’ (IV.vi.145). It is precisely the same contradiction that, for survivors and 
those who ‘come after’, besets Auschwitz, the un-narratable event: paying witness to the 
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un-witnessable, speaking the un-speakable.307 Edgar does not go on to say anything at all, 
let alone speak from the ‘heart’ (I.i.105). The type of response King Lear calls for remains 
open-ended.308 
 This contradiction means the shared, collective response Edgar calls for cannot be 
made operative. Some of the other Shakespeare tragedies – most obviously Hamlet and 
Othello – place an emphasis on ‘relating’, on telling a story around which society can, once 
again, unify. But the scale of the catastrophe in King Lear, the devastation of witnessing so 
much, would seem to prevent narration – or relation. The end of the play invalidates all of 
its morally trite but shareable ‘conclusions’ – ‘the gods are just’/ ‘the wheel is come full 
circle’ – and so does very little to ‘approve the common saw’ (II.ii.158). This inability to 
relate adumbrates a wider failure of relationships as such – the possibility of shared social 
meaning and being. Even while Edgar calls for a collective response, the play leaves 
individuals adrift; it does not allow for the social relation(s) that may enable a ‘wholesome 
end’ (II.ii.333).  
It is its shocking violation of formal coherence and resolution that has preoccupied 
critics of King Lear throughout its history. I will provide an in-depth analysis of the critical 
reception of King Lear in Chapter Three, where I concentrate on its post-Auschwitz 
‘afterlife’. But I also want to provide a brief survey of pre-Holocaust criticism to show the 
way in which the fragmentation of the play can take on new meanings in discrete cultural 
moments.  
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5. King Lear and Catastrophe in Criticism 
 
 
In his reflections on King Lear, Samuel Johnson famously bewailed the death of Cordelia, 
which, he confessed, left him so shocked he did not re-read the final scenes until he 
‘undertook to revise them as editor’.309 Johnson laments the end King Lear, which violates 
‘poetic justice’: 
 
Shakespeare has suffered the virtue of Cordelia to perish in a just cause, contrary to 
the natural ideas of justice […] and, what is yet more strange, to the faith of the 
chronicles […]. I cannot be easily persuaded that the observation of justice makes a 
play worse; or that […] the audience will not always rise better pleased from the final 
triumph of persecuted virtue. 
In the present case the public has decided. Cordelia, from the time of Tate, 
has always retired with victory and felicity.310 
 
By transgressing the formalized convention of the final recovery (and ‘felicity’) of Lear and 
Cordelia – however temporary that recovery is even in other versions of the story – 
Shakespeare, as far as Johnson is concerned, upends both formal resolution and the ‘form 
of justice’ (III.vii.25) supposedly enshrined in that closure: that the morally ‘good’ finally 
prevail. Though Johnson also provides some criticism of Tate in his remarks on King Lear – 
‘blaming’ him for some aspects of his ‘alteration’ – he ultimately endorses the horrified 
‘sensations’ which (for his era) still makes the Tate version more popular with the theatre-
going ‘public’.311  
 The concerns articulated by both Tate and Johnson with regard to the ‘ruinous 
disorders’ (I.ii.113-114) of King Lear reflect an increasingly ‘enlightened’ emphasis on 
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aesthetic order and ethical decorum in the Restoration era and beyond, against which the 
disintegration and disorder of King Lear as it shatters into ‘a hundred thousand flaws’ 
(II.ii.472) seems out-of-place. But for the Romantics, the unbounded aesthetic overflow of 
King Lear was testament to its sublimity, which poets from Coleridge to Keats usually tied to 
its representation of an awesome and ‘convulsed Nature’, which escapes arbitrary human 
categories and cannot be compassed by the ‘little world of man’ (III.i.10).312 Even Coleridge, 
however, finally critiqued King Lear for its failure fully to ‘harmonize’ – though it was the 
blinding of Gloucester that he seems to have found most excessive, despite his (somewhat 
Bardolatrous) ‘reluctance’ to ‘find Shakespeare wrong’ in his choices for the action of the 
play.313  
The absence of harmonious aesthetic resolution became even more apparent in the 
nineteenth century, particularly after 1838, when Charles McCready ditched the Tate 
version of the play for the Shakespeare King Lear (albeit still in a cut and altered version). 
Algernon Swinburne observed that the ‘tragic fatalism’ of King Lear denied ‘atonement’ and 
the usual tragic ‘pledge of reconciliation’ – an insight reiterated by George Bernard Shaw, 
who, observing its failure to instate resolution, remarked on ‘the blasphemous despair of 
Lear’.314 Such thoughts were also on the mind of the perhaps most influential of early 
twentieth century Shakespeare critics, A.C. Bradley. Though Bradley, as I will show in 
Chapter Three, was concerned to try and make the action of King Lear fit a providential 
schema that relies on generic closure, he also laments, in words that recall Donatus, the 
‘unexpected catastrophe’ of the deaths of Lear and Cordelia.315 This ending (or indeed non-
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ending) takes place ‘outside the dramatic nexus’, writes Bradley, as if it were a sort of 
grotesque outgrowth – ‘or embossed carbuncle’ (II.ii.413) – that ‘monsters’ (I.i.221) 
closure.316  
Though it has often been criticized or even negated entirely through the act of 
appropriation, the violation of closure – of the catastrophe – in King Lear takes on shifting 
meanings in discrete historical moments. Rosen, who is also a Holocaust scholar, writes that 
‘historical catastrophes’ (by which Rosen principally means Auschwitz) ‘intersect with and 
alter the formal properties of catastrophe’ and that ‘formal violations of endings play a key 
role in the invention of genre’.317 This point has also been picked up by John Joughin. 
Joughin insists on the necessity of situating the (non)ending of King Lear in relation to post-
Auschwitz culture. The ongoing cultural and historical ‘afterlife’ of the play in late modernity 
is, as Joughin understands it, related to its deep-seated formal disintegration. Joughin makes 
the case that King Lear is remarkable for its aesthetics of ‘irruptive excess’ – something 
Joughin (à la Booth) sees being epitomized by the final deaths of Cordelia and Lear, which 
happens ‘outside an a priori grid of expectations’ and refuses ‘generic and ideological 
foreclosure’.318 This, as Joughin perceives it, makes King Lear the ‘exemplary’ Shakespeare 
play ‘after’ the catastrophe of Auschwitz. By virtue of its failure to resolve – by being 
‘constitutively incomplete and unfulfillable in its very failure to reconcile’ – the play obviates 
the cumulative, ‘harmonious’ synthesis of part and whole, individual and universal, subject 
and object, instantiating the more fragmentary aesthetic that Adorno calls for ‘after’ the 
Holocaust.319  
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This aesthetic also serves – for Joughin – to formalize an ‘excessive affect’, where the 
‘viewing subject experiences a sense of ungrounding and disorientation’.320 The play, as 
Joughin reads it, occasions the same type of uncanny disequilibrium Adorno calls the 
shudder. Edgar (or Albany) might call for a form of collective response at the end of the play, 
but King Lear cannot ultimately be experienced through any unifying generic categories of 
‘meaningful interpretation’ or ‘reasonable explanation’.321 By virtue of its violation of 
aesthetic resolution and the type of moral ‘saws’ provided by Edgar and Albany, King Lear 
does not offer any consensual interpretive frame through which to contain the action, so 
displacing the subject ‘outside’ of a totalizing conceptual system and occasioning a more 
individual response. There is, as Joughin observes, no straightforward sense in which King 
Lear underwrites ‘a form of restoration’.322 The play opens out ‘a form of inexplicable 
alterity or otherness rather than providing the grounded repleteness of a “meaningful” 
solution’.323  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
My analysis of the anti-form of King Lear is not to say that the play can be considered 
uncomplicatedly ‘Catastrophist’, or that it depicts the type of ideologically illimitable 
subjects found in Catastrophist tragedy. The play is, however, obviously concerned with 
questions around catastrophe, modernity, subjectivity and tragic form in a way that makes it 
uniquely ‘open’ to post-Auschwitz appropriation. I have shown that King Lear thematizes 
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catastrophe and its impact on human subjectivity; that the play depicts a historical shift to a 
rationalist ethos that precipitates disaster; that, in the throes of a systematically totalizing 
ratio, subjectivity implicitly emerges in the play as a force of non-identity; and that, through 
its violation of the formalized dramatic convention of the catastrophe, King Lear subverts 
tragic resolution. This is not a comprehensive reading of King Lear; the aim has been to 
identify facets of the play that have made it so vital an intertext for Catastrophist 
appropriation.  
In Chapter Three, I analyse the history of King Lear in the post-war era, and consider 
the way in which a range of critics, practitioners and playwrights have interpreted its 
representation of catastrophe, modernity, subjectivity and its aesthetic form ‘after’ 
Auschwitz.  
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Chapter Three 
 
‘Strange Mutations’: The History of King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyse the critical, performance and appropriation history of King Lear in 
the post-war era. The aim of the chapter is to provide a new history of the play, which 
reveals the vital historical role King Lear has played in shifting ideational and dramaturgical 
responses to the Holocaust. This analysis, while wide-ranging, cannot be exhaustive. To gain 
a wider historical understanding of King Lear ‘after’ Auschwitz, I have identified for analysis 
some of the more important interpretations, stagings and appropriations of the play, which 
emblematize developments in its reception. By analysing the post-war history of King Lear, I 
intend to situate Rudkin, Barker and Kane in a community of discourse that aggregates 
around King Lear ‘after’ Auschwitz, where various conceptions of subjectivity, tragic 
aesthetics and catastrophe were mediated through changing responses to a play that 
increasingly came to be seen as the Shakespearean drama for ‘our times’. It is not 
necessarily the case that Rudkin, Barker and Kane are responding directly to other 
interpretations or stagings of the play in the post-war era. But if King Lear ‘has entered the 
fabric of artistic and critical discourse as a play somehow capable of shedding light on 
catastrophe, of providing illumination in the wake – and the midst – of disaster’ Rudkin, 
Barker and Kane should be seen as part (if a distinct part) of that wider artistic and cultural 
‘fabric’.324  
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This analysis, as I set out in the Introduction, will trace changing responses to King 
Lear from 1939-1997, from the outbreak of the Second World War up until the election 
victory of New Labour, whose post-socialist ‘Third Way’ ideology consolidated the 
hegemony of late capitalist culture. The chapter will be split into sections on the 1940s- 
1950s, 1960s-1970s and the 1980s-1990s, and will analyse King Lear in criticism before 
going on to consider the play in performance and any dramatic appropriations, drawing out 
some of the relationships between these various forms of interpretive intervention. The 
approach I have taken to periodization is not to say that new understandings of King Lear 
completely displace previous interpretations. On the contrary: it is often the case that an 
interpretation of the play lives far beyond an originary moment and continues to influence 
its cultural reception. The periods I have organized do, however, represent important 
changes in the post-Auschwitz history of King Lear and the way in which the play has been 
understood.  
 
1. The 1940s and 1950s: Christian Redemption and the Threat of Modernity  
 
1.2. King Lear in Criticism 
 
During the Second World War and its immediate aftermath, King Lear was predominantly 
understood to represent something akin to the Christian Morality Play. The play, as Christian 
readings would have it, depicts a proud and sinful King who, through his suffering, 
ultimately achieves salvation, as he undergoes a Christian pilgrimage through ‘sin-suffering-
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redemption’.325 These religiously-inclined readings of King Lear (and Lear) were 
unwaveringly common, and can be traced in the work of R.W. Chambers, Irving Ribner and 
Kenneth Muir.326  
 This interpretation pays witness to the profound influence of A.C. Bradley on post-
war Shakespeare criticism. In his reading of the play, Bradley concentrated most acutely on 
the storm scenes, where Lear, after being pushed out into the wilderness and stripped of his 
status and even his clothes, reaches through suffering ‘the power of moral perception and 
reflection’ as a result of a ‘process of purification’.327 The language Bradley uses – 
‘purification’, ‘acquittal’, ‘redemption’ – and his insistence on a world of ‘rational and moral 
order’ indicates a Christianized reading that would universalize King Lear into a Morality 
Tale on the suffering of ‘Man’ (or Everyman) on his ‘quest’ to find redemption from sin.328 
Bradley even goes as far as to contend the play might be retitled The Redemption of King 
Lear.329  There are moments in his analysis where Bradley seems to contradict his own case 
– not least when stating that the end of the play appears to be ‘a dramatic mistake’ and 
that, while the ‘destruction of the good’ is surely a tragic ‘reality of life’, its use has to be 
contained within ‘certain limits in tragic art’.330 The implication is that King Lear does not 
necessarily observe the traditional limits of tragic art – that the play breaks through the type 
of Christianized, formal organization where Lear is ‘a thousand-fold redeemed’.331 But such 
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doubts were not recognized by the more zealously Christian interpreters of the post-war 
period.   
The prominence given in Christian readings to the ‘final victory’ of the good over and 
against a ‘poisonous evil’ concerned with total power had an obvious attraction during and 
after the Second World War.332 Where the rise of Nazism had represented ‘a mortal’ threat 
to the very survival of ‘British Christian civilization’, for wartime and post-war critics the 
Bradleyean notion of redemption proved ‘an irresistible temptation’.333 This concern with 
the traditional values of ‘British Christian civilization’ preoccupied no few critics, from 
Theodore Spencer to Edwin Muir, but found its most eloquent interpreter in the form of 
John F. Danby. 
Danby analyses a historical shift in King Lear from a traditional Christian order that 
has its basis in ‘organic’ human relationships of familial and national fealty, to a more 
recognizably modern, ‘inorganic’ world where such relationships are overturned.334 Danby 
writes of ‘the new age of scientific enquiry, of industrial development, of bureaucratic 
organisation and social regimentation’.335 This nascent era of Weberian disenchantment is, 
in its capitalistic iteration, epitomized by the ‘New Man’ Edmund, who spurns traditional 
social relationships in his individualistic ‘impulse to acquire’.336 But it can also be seen in 
other characters. When an irate Lear casts Cordelia out for refusing to quantify her love in 
the gross conditions he demands – ‘Which of you shall we say doth love us most / That we 
our largest bounty may extend’ (I.i.51-52) – he falls foul of the same, instrumentalizing 
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rationality seen in Edmund. This causes Danby to make the case that Cordelia – in her 
commitment to the ‘natural’ ‘bonds’ (I.i.93) of familial and patriarchal fealty, which are at 
threat of being displaced  – is representative of ‘the perfection of truth, justice, charity’.337 If 
in his dark night of the soul Lear gains new moral perception, for Danby that ‘redemption’ is 
not merely personal, but also implies a return to the ‘bonds’ of traditional society.338 Danby 
sees Lear as being ‘redeemed’ from nothing less than the ‘New Age’ of disenchanted secular 
rationality.  
The critique Danby mounts in his analysis of King Lear is predominantly against the 
‘New Man’ of the capitalist revolution; but when Danby makes the (frankly startling) 
observation that the ‘prison’ (V.iii.9) Lear and Cordelia are led away to towards the end of 
the play ‘points to the continuing possibility of the concentration camp’, it becomes 
apparent that, in his reading of King Lear as a conservative, Christian drama, his critique 
relates not only to capitalism but to modernity and – in its most horrifying manifestation – 
fascism and the Holocaust.339 This critique of modernity from the perspective of the 
concentration camp has obvious parallels with Adorno and his post-Auschwitz 
interpretation of the Enlightenment. Where Danby departs from Adorno, however, is in his 
reactionary idea of the possibility of a return to a pre-modern Christian past, where the 
depredations of modernity are reneged. Danby is strangely blind to the way in which Nazism 
had integrated industrial modernity with dark myths around a more rooted ‘organic’ society 
and Fatherland.   
 Danby contends that King Lear represents the catastrophic eruption of modernity 
and a less disenchanted time when subject and object, individual and society, word and 
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feeling, and even mind and body were not – as Gloucester imagines it – ‘crack’d’ (I.ii.105) 
but part of a harmoniously unified form of life, ‘ordered and patterned’.340 The inherent 
desirability of that more naturally harmonious society is, as Danby sees it, the ‘final 
outcome’ of the ‘achieved insights’ of Shakespeare and ‘the wisdom the tragic period 
establishes’, with tragedy identified with the ruinous breakdown of society but also its final 
reinstitution.341 These ideas around organic ‘unity’ also inform the way Danby understands 
aesthetic form.342 Danby views King Lear as a unified aesthetic whole, which progresses 
toward closure – a conception of aesthetics disputed by Adorno in his analysis of 
fragmentation. While it depicts the catastrophe of modernity, for Danby King Lear 
ultimately enacts formal resolution, which he sees as embodied by Edgar, his victory over 
Edmund and rise to the throne.343 The play, as Danby sees it, is as formally unified as the 
idealized world it represents, and progresses toward an artistically and morally coherent 
outcome.  
For many critics in the 1940s and 1950s, Edmund, Goneril and Regan typify 
modernity and even, in the words of Muir, ‘the rise of Fascism’, while Lear, Cordelia and 
Edgar represent an imperilled but finally triumphant ‘communal tradition’.344 This 
interpretation represents a desire to find within ‘an idealized British culture the basis for 
regeneration into a desired post-war redemptive utopia, in the wake of the Gonerils and 
Regans of Nazism’.345 This same desire can also be seen in the performance history of King 
Lear over the period.  
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1.2. King Lear in Performance    
 
John Gielgud took up the role of the ageing King Lear in a 1940 production of the play at the 
Old Vic, a staging nominally directed by Lewis Casson but, in reality, dominated by the ideas 
and presence of Harley Granville-Barker.346 While the choice of Shakespeare for a wartime 
production was not unusual, the choice of King Lear was: in 1940 the play was ‘not part of 
the Shakespeare canon that dominated the English theatre’ and, perhaps more to the point, 
a play that depicts a foreign army invading Britain ‘may not have seemed a wise choice at 
the time’.347  
King Lear, as viewed by Gielgud and Granville-Barker, is representative of the 
traditional values that were under threat from modernity. The choice of King Lear at the 
outset of the war reflected, on the parts of both Granville-Barker and Gielgud, an ‘idealistic 
view of the social role of theatre’ converging with a ‘sense of the Nazi threat to civilized 
values’.348 ‘Nothing but a mighty work like King Lear could have kept one so concentrated’, 
reflected Gielgud, ‘with such a holocaust going on around us’ – his use of the (un-
capitalized) word ‘holocaust’ signifying the war generally, as opposed to the Shoah.349 The 
play was to be used to unify audiences around British, Christian ideals in a period of wartime 
suffering and deepening social and political distress. ‘Our fight has been a fight for the 
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future of Christian civilization’, stated Granville-Barker after the war, ‘and it was bound to 
be won’.350   
The collective address (‘our fight’) was reflected in the spatial arrangements of the 
Old Vic stage, recorded in the copious notes of Hallam Fordham.351 During the storm, 
Gielgud occupied the front of the stage and physically knelt during his ‘prayer’ to the 
suffering, the ‘poor naked wretches’. When the prayer ended – ‘And show the heavens 
more just’ (III.iv.28-36)  – Gielgud ‘dropped his hands in front of him, palms outward, in a 
gesture of complete supplicatory resignation to suffering’.352 This posture signified that his 
struggle has been resolved, as suffering evoked – not rage and egoistic pride – but patience 
and compassion.353 By bringing Lear out of the picture-frame of the proscenium arch and 
onto the apron during the scenes in the storm, Gielgud and Granville-Barker catalysed 
deeper identification with the suffering of Lear, bringing Gielgud closer to the audience with 
the aim of ‘empowering them with the mythic collective power’ of the ‘Christian’ and 
national values Lear ‘embodied’.354 The play ended with formalized gestures of mourning, 
implying an end to the violence and the restitution of a divinely sanctioned Christian 
order.355    
William French observes that the ‘positive’, Christian interpretation of King Lear in 
the 1940 production seemed more plausible at a time ‘before bombs fell upon London, 
before the first Nazi rockets whistled in, before Auschwitz had become a household word 
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for horror, before Hiroshima was incinerated’.356 Even so, the conservative interpretation of 
King Lear as a parable of Christian redemption still held sway in both criticism and on the 
stage for most of the 1940s and 1950s.357 It was not until the 1960s that the Christian 
consensus began to be challenged. I turn now to consider the absurdist and political 
readings of the play that emerged after the 1950s, which challenged the idea King Lear is a 
Christian play. 
 
2. The 1960s and the 1970s: From the Absurd to the Political  
 
2.1. King Lear in Criticism  
 
Over the 1940s-1950s, King Lear was typically read ‘positively’ as a story of Christian 
redemption, even being conscripted as a bulwark of traditional social and moral values in 
the face of a catastrophic modernity. But in the 1960s, the play began to be read 
‘negatively’, as violating the type of schematic Christian worldview that would see Lear 
redeemed through his sufferings. This newly negative tone was set by Barbara Everett in her 
pathbreaking 1960 piece ‘The New King Lear’, in which she contests the Christian readings 
of King Lear that had dominated Shakespeare criticism – and the recent performance 
history of the play.358 J. Stampfer echoes Everett by insisting that the ‘purgation’ and 
‘spiritual regeneration’ of Lear take place, not at the end of the play, but in Acts Three and 
Four, while Act Five only served to confirm ‘the worst fear’ – that humanity inhabits ‘an 
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imbecile universe’.359 William Elton similarly contends that – crucially – ‘no evidence exists 
to show that Lear arrives finally at “salvation”, “regeneration” or “redemption”’, meaning 
the benevolent providence ascribed to the play ‘cannot be shown to be operative’.360 These 
interpretations stress the irruptive aesthetic deformity of King Lear, as opposed to the 
redemptive resolution found by Danby. The play, as read by Everett, Stampfer and Elton, 
violates the aesthetic closure imputed to it by previous critics, undermining the idea that 
King Lear progresses toward a morally Christian ending. This involves a radically changed 
understanding of its tragic vision: far from revealing a providentially ordained world order, 
which is finally restored, King Lear depicts a Godless cosmos, which is resistant to meaning 
and understanding.   
Foakes makes the case that the challenge mounted to the Christian orthodoxy in the 
early years of the 1960s can (and should) be read in direct relation to contemporaneous 
political events – most obviously the deepening tensions of the Cold War and the threat of 
nuclear apocalypse.361 But shifting responses to the play also reflected the growth of public 
and political consciousness about the Holocaust. It was only in the 1960s and the 1970s that 
the full scale of the atrocities committed during the Second World War began to be more 
widely known. The Adolf Eichmann trial in 1961, famously covered by Hannah Arendt in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, and the Frankfurt Auschwitz trials of 1963-1965, increased public 
awareness about the unparalleled suffering and degradation of the Nazi camps.362 The scale 
of destruction unleashed in the Holocaust – along with the prospect of total nuclear warfare 
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– profoundly challenged the idea that history has any providential meaning or that salvation 
from a fallen world is possible, inaugurating a new conception of human life – as inherently 
absurd.363  
Writing in his 1965 King Lear in Our Time, Maynard Mack contends that, ‘after the 
World Wars and Auschwitz’, the violence of King Lear – ‘its sadism, madness and 
processional of deaths’ – ‘resonates more powerfully’ than it had done for pre-war and even 
wartime audiences.364 By far the most powerful voice proclaiming the urgent ‘resonance’ of 
King Lear (and Shakespeare) in the 1960s was Jan Kott in his 1964 Shakespeare Our 
Contemporary.365 Kott – a Pole from a Jewish background who had lived through Nazi 
occupation, the Holocaust and the social and political regressions of Soviet Communism – 
insists on reading King Lear through the prism of disastrous modern events, which 
comprised: 
 
modern war in all its destructiveness, occupation by invading armies, living in 
bombed out cities, the univers concentrationnaire – that whole Dante-esque inferno 
of concentration camps, gas chambers, genocide – and the world of ghettos and 
systematic destruction.366   
 
These catastrophic events revealed that human life, far from inhering to the type of 
immanently meaningful providential schema Christian critics had found represented in King 
Lear, is absurd – that its ‘sole meaning is its meaninglessness’.367 ‘Auschwitz is no exception, 
but the rule’, writes Kott: ‘History is a sequence of Auschwitzes’.368 The concentration camps 
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have, as Kott understands it, revealed the absurdity of the human condition, which pertains 
throughout history.  
Kott stresses the contemporaneity of King Lear by drawing parallels between its 
hopeless vision of an imbecile universe with the drama of Beckett. He remarks that, in the 
world of King Lear, ‘there is neither Christian heaven, nor the heaven predicted and believed 
in by humanists’ – precisely the endpoints that had been imagined in recent interpretations 
of the play:  
 
King Lear makes a tragic mockery of all eschatologies: of the heaven promised on 
earth, and the heaven promised after death; of both Christian and secular 
theodicies; of cosmogony and of the rational view of history; of the gods and natural 
goodness, of man made in the ‘image and likeness’.369 
 
King Lear, as Kott understands it, is less of a conventional tragedy than it is a presciently 
absurdist play. This, for Kott, is typified by the representation of subjectivity in the play. Kott 
contends that, in King Lear, the subject finds him or herself trapped in degrading but 
inescapable situations – a reading that, as I show in Chapter Seven, relies on his reading of 
the scene at Dover cliff.370 This stress on closed systems reflects the apparent absence of 
any wider metaphysical schema that provides history and tragedy with meaning – or, as Kott 
calls it, ‘the Auschwitz experience’.371 With the collapse of any transcendent value, human 
life is deprived of tragic worth and grandeur, as the subject is reduced to pathetic comic 
clowning and arbitrary violence. King Lear represents a ‘great stage of fools’ (IV.vi.172) in a 
world where humanity has been abandoned and left ‘darkling’ (I.iv.208). Far from pursuing 
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self-realization, all the individual can do is stoically endure the depredations of an absurd 
cosmos. 
The Kott reading of King Lear as paradigmatic work of the Theatre of the Absurd 
gave, in the words of Foakes, ‘powerful currency’ to ‘a bleak reading’ of King Lear that 
stressed its ‘supreme tragic horror’.372 But some more positive, politically-informed 
understandings of King Lear were also beginning to emerge in Shakespeare Studies over the 
1960s into the 1970s. If the play truly did presage a world of violence and the concentration 
camps, for Marxist critics the response it called for is not resignation to events, but 
revolutionary social and political action. This required a new conception of the subject and 
tragedy. Where the absurdist interpretation provided by Kott denied the possibility of 
human agency, political interpretations of King Lear called upon a ‘heroic’ subject able to act 
meaningfully on the world. Such tragic heroism was often understood to be embodied by 
Lear himself.    
Arnold Kettle set the priorities for political readings of King Lear in his 1964 piece 
‘From Hamlet to Lear’.373 Kettle contends that, in its representation of a transition from a 
feudal to a bourgeois social order, a more radically egalitarian socialist ethos is also incipient 
in King Lear – not least in the scenes in the storm and on the heath, where Lear identifies 
with the poor and promises to act against social inequality. Kettle sees the rampant 
individualism of Goneril, Regan and Edmund as being already outmoded by a more humane 
dispensation the play is prefiguring in the midst of images of historical strife and ruin. This 
dispensation is, as Kettle reads the play, embodied by Lear, who Kettle sees as a tragic ‘hero’ 
– by which he means someone who, though ultimately destroyed by the dominant forces of 
                                                          
372
 Foakes, Hamlet versus Lear, p. 59.  
373
 Arnold Kettle, ‘From Hamlet to Lear’, Shakespeare in a Changing World, ed. Arnold Kettle (London: 
Laurence and Wishart, 1964), pp. 146-171.   
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
146 
 
history, bears ‘something of the actual aspirations of humanity in its struggle to advance its 
condition’.374  
The revolutionary spirit of the late 1960s is perhaps most apparent in the words of 
H.A. Mason, who writes in his 1970 work Tragedies of Love that Lear dies, not in a rhapsody 
of Christian hope or in nihilistic despair, but as ‘an obstinately unreconstructed rebel’ – as if 
Lear died ‘most rebel-like’ (IV.iii.14) with a Molotov cocktail in his hand.375 The same idea is 
pursued by S.L. Goldberg in his 1974 An Essay on King Lear, where Goldberg echoes Kettle 
and make the case that Lear can be seen as a ‘heroic’ figure, who discovers the impulse to 
act ‘energetically in and on the world’.376 Lear, as Goldberg reads the play, recognizes ‘the 
need both to realize an essential capacity of the self and to make “justice” an objective 
reality’.377 The ‘true need’ of humanity, as Goldberg views it, is for nothing less than ‘action 
and justice’.378  
These readings were obviously informed by the radical political interventions of 
1968, which saw student unrest and protests break out across Europe and other parts of the 
world.379 The uprisings were inspired by the prospect of a radically changed future society, 
which broke with the capitalist system. But as Hans Kundnani has shown, the protests were 
also about a reckoning with the past, where a new generation questioned the legitimacy of 
institutions that had remained unchanged since the war and challenged the culpability of 
the ‘Auschwitz generation’.380 Moshie Postone and Eric Santner observe that ‘the student 
revolts in the 1960s are generally held to be a crucial breakthrough in the history of 
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responses to the Holocaust’, which often ‘took shape within the frame of critiques of 
capitalism’.381 It was not unusual for the movements of the time to ‘discern a continuity of 
the societal relations characteristic of National Socialism and those of post-Auschwitz 
Western liberal democracies in capitalism’.382 ‘The world today’, as Marcuse writes in his 
1964 One-Dimensional Man, which is sometimes thought of as the ‘Bible’ of the student 
movement, ‘is still that of the gas chambers and concentration camps’: ‘Auschwitz continues 
to haunt’.383  
 This divergence between absurdist and political interpretations of King Lear (and, 
indeed, the Holocaust) also relates to the performance history of the play over the 1960s 
and 1970s. To show the profound influence which Kott had on stagings of King Lear, I will 
analyse the 1962 production by Peter Brook. I go on to analyse the 1974 Buzz Goodbody 
production, which, though influenced by Brook, takes a politically radical approach to the 
play.  
 
2.2. King Lear in Performance  
 
 
Shakespeare Our Contemporary did not appear in English until 1964, but Peter Brook – 
whose production of Titus Andronicus, with Laurence Olivier as Titus, Kott had seen in 
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Warsaw in 1957 – read the French edition in the early 1960s.384 His 1962 RSC production of 
King Lear at Stratford, with Paul Scofield taking the title role, was famously influenced by 
the absurdist reading that was pioneered by Kott, which changed the way Brook thought 
about Shakespeare, tragedy and modernity. Through Kott, Brook had come to view King 
Lear as a prototypically absurdist drama – a play that might almost be a ‘Concentration 
Camp document’.385  
Brook chose a stage aesthetic that reflected the cataclysmic fallout of recent 
European history. His stage was virtually bare, while the few props Brook did use were in a 
state of disintegration – as in the rusty thunder-sheets that visibly descended from the flies 
to rumble ominously in the storm scenes.386 This bare space was meant to signify a vacant 
and Godless universe – a pitiless void in which human life is drained of any meaning or 
purpose, leaving individuals bereft of hope and unable to act. ‘The emptiness was 
metaphysical, as well as “actual”’: ‘The fierce illumination banished any shadows of divinity, 
mystery or superstition’.387 By treating King Lear as the ‘prime illustration of the theatre of 
the Absurd’ – ‘from which everything valuable in modern drama has been drawn’ – Brook 
also stressed the grotesque violence of the play.388 This meant cutting any moments that 
might relieve the brutality, from the servants who tend to Gloucester after he is blinded to 
the final, doomed attempt of Edgar to do ‘Some good’ (V.iii.291) and reprieve Lear and 
Cordelia.  
By intensifying the violence, Brook disallowed the redemptive consolation found in 
Christian interpretations of King Lear. This was epitomized by the ending (such as it was) of 
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the production. Where the 1940 Gielgud production ended with formal acts of mourning, 
adumbrating the return of some form of Christian metaphysical order, in his production 
Brook had the actor playing Edgar unceremoniously drag the corpse of his vanquished 
brother off-stage, while, somewhere in the distance, the low, ominous rumble of thunder 
that had presaged the storm scenes was heard again.389 This not only forestalled any 
possibility of resolution; it also intimated that there would soon be another outbreak of 
catastrophic violence. The dénouement – once again – drew on Kott, who in his image of the 
‘Grand Mechanism’ observed that, in Shakespeare, individuals are mere ‘cogs’ in a self-
perpetuating and repetitive historical cycle, which does not admit of any transcendent 
meaning.390 
Even while acknowledging that Kott set the ‘dark’, post-Auschwitz tone of his 
production, Brook self-consciously drew on an array of Continental stylistic influences and 
theories: Kott, Beckett, Ionesco, Artaud and Brecht.391 The use of Brechtian dramaturgy in 
1962 was most obvious in its use of the distancing Verfremdungseffekt. Whereas past 
productions (as in Gielgud-Barker in 1940) sought to promote empathetic identification with 
Lear, Brook wanted to ‘detach the audience’.392 This was evident in the storm scenes, where 
the thunder-sheets hanging over the stage served as a constant reminder of the aesthetic 
unreality of the events Lear is (ostensibly) struggling through on his path to ‘redemptive’ 
self-realization.  
 Book also drew on Artaud, whose Theatre of Cruelty aims less at rational disinterest 
and more at puncturing the subconscious of the spectator through remorseless sensory 
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agitation.393 This informed the way in which Brook chose to stage the blinding of Gloucester. 
Brook purposefully contradicted the way the scene was usually staged. It had been 
customary for the blinding to be staged after the interval, so that anyone in the audience 
unwilling to watch the violence could prudently postpone his or her re-entrance. Brook not 
only placed the blinding before the interval, forcing the audience to watch, but also ‘cruelly’ 
raised the house-lights, intensifying the visceral impact of the scene on a stunned 
audience.394  
The 1962 production remains, in the words of Jay Halio, ‘undeniably the most 
influential post-war production of the play’.395 But the most important contribution of the 
Brook production was to ‘de-Englishize or de-nationalize King Lear and Shakespeare’.396 
Where in the 1940s and 1950s the play was typically understood as positive reminder of 
British Christian civilization, over and against the destructive threat of ‘unnatural’ forms of 
Continental modernity, Brook used the play for the purposes of a far less insular 
engagement with the catastrophes of twentieth century Europe and to reflect on the shared 
experience of living through Stalinism, Nazism and, most harrowingly, the Holocaust. Brook 
brought Shakespeare and King Lear into dialogue with a variety of European, late modernist 
theories and dramaturgies as these developed in the wake of Auschwitz, from Beckett to 
Brecht. This would set the scene for other post-Auschwitz analyses and appropriations of 
the play.  
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Buzz Goodbody was, as Elizabeth Schafer has remarked, influenced by Brook.397 Her 
1974 RSC production of King Lear drew on the same empty aesthetic Brook had used, with a 
mise-en-scène that was, for the most part, ‘uncluttered’ by props.398 But her version was far 
more consciously politicized, offering a vision of the play that was ‘forcefully directed 
towards social change’.399 This production, which has been viewed as the most important 
re-evaluation of King Lear since 1962, was the first production at The Other Place, the 
smaller studio space Goodbody opened in 1974 with the intention of staging more politically 
and artistically avant-garde productions than were possible at the main Royal Shakespeare 
Theatre.400  
Goodbody cut the play drastically and concentrated her interpretation of its action 
around the poor and the disenfranchised, revealed to Lear when he confronts Poor Tom. 
Dympna Callaghan observes that, over the action, the gulf between rich and poor was 
powerfully shown in the simple distinction being ‘being clothed and going naked’.401 
Goodbody sought to underscore the way in which the modern capitalist system reduces the 
masses to a form of naked – ‘unaccommodated’ – bare life. She would go as far as to include 
a controversial prologue – spoken in unison by Lear (Tony Church) and Edgar (Mike Gwilym) 
– that drew parallels between the condition of the iterant poor in the early modern era and 
that of the industrial working-classes of the 1970s.402 For her, the aim was to indict ‘the 
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capitalist order’ and its ‘cultural apparatus’ in its ‘totality’.403 It is an order which debases 
and – quite literally – denudes subjects. The moment when Lear chances on Poor Tom and 
‘unbuttons’, as he promises to pass the ‘superflux’ to the naked masses, became the centre 
for a revolutionary Marxist-socialist staging of the play that stressed the necessity of social 
and political action. Lear gained a heroically ‘oppositional consciousness’ over the 
production, becoming a radical critic of the social injustice he has blindly presided over 
during his reign.404   
By showing the subject reduced to a form of bare ‘naked’ life, Goodbody revealed 
that her social and political conception of modern capitalism is implicitly informed by 
Auschwitz and the production of ‘unaccommodated man’ in the concentration camps. This, 
as I have shown, is not unusual in post-1968 critiques of capitalism; but it also reveals her 
specific debt to Bond. Goodbody, evincing the influence of Bond, shortened the title of King 
Lear to Lear, signalling the importance which she placed on the transformation of the King 
to a destitute figure. Her understanding of the play and its relevance for modern capitalist 
society was informed by Bond and his post-Auschwitz version of the play, which views King 
Lear as ‘a play where people are getting on and off a train with a lot of luggage’ – an image 
that recalls the mass transportation of Jews to the camps and the appropriation of Jewish 
property by the Nazis.405   
 Goodbody was both a Marxist and a feminist.406 Her production concentrated on 
Lear and his nascent understanding of social injustice; but it also sought to provide a critique 
of patriarchal culture by showing ‘how much the “bad” sisters had to put up with’.407 This 
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desire to fashion new perspectives on the play, from institutionally and politically ‘marginal’ 
spaces, would become an important aspect of Shakespeare criticism. It is to the increasingly 
politicized understanding of culture and identity in Shakespeare Studies that I turn in the 
next section.    
 
3. The 1980s and 1990s: Identity Politics and Postmodernity   
 
3.1. King Lear in Criticism  
 
The transformation in Shakespeare Studies over the 1980s and 1990s can, for Kiernan Ryan, 
be summed up in a single word: ‘politics’.408 For many Shakespeare critics in the 1980s and 
beyond, even the ‘political’ readings of King Lear that had emerged after the Second World 
War were deaf to political struggle as it related to the plight of marginalized and oppressed 
sections of society – from homosexuals to Black and Asian men and women. Over the 1980s 
and 1990s, Shakespeare critics sought increasingly to secure the representation and social 
and political freedom of specific constituencies marginalized in society – and indeed in 
Shakespearean drama – challenging oppressive discourses of identity and subjectivity in the 
dominant culture and its cherished canonical plays. This political agenda, as I have also 
shown in the Introduction, was perhaps most obvious in the work of Cultural Materialist 
critics.409  
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Most problematic for the Cultural Materialist critics was the humanist conception of 
the subject to be found in Shakespearean tragedy, which for Catherine Belsey is the white, 
heterosexual, male subject of European Enlightenment modernity.410 This conception of the 
tragic subject is, as Belsey understands it, exclusive of other forms of subjectivity and 
identity – non-male, non-white, non-heterosexual – and not universally intelligible or 
meaningful at all.   
Jonathan Dollimore, writing in his 1984 Radical Tragedy, similarly critiques humanist 
understandings of Shakespeare and King Lear. He remarks that, in recent times, the 
humanist view of King Lear has been ‘culturally dominant’, and alludes to the writings of 
Clifford Leech, Wilbur Sanders and Philip Brockbank, all of whom adopt humanist readings 
of the play.411 This humanist reading of King Lear is, for Dollimore, nothing more than a 
secularization of the Christian reading and its interpretation of the ‘redemption’ of Lear. 
Where the Christian reading places ‘Man’ at the centre of a providential universe, the 
humanist reading places the tragic subject (Lear) at the centre of meaning and action, as 
through ‘kindness and shared vulnerability human kind redeems itself’.412 The same 
constraining humanism is visible in politically Marxist readings of the play, which also centre 
on the redemption of Lear and his identification with the suffering masses. It can even be 
seen in absurdist interpretations, which are as beholden to the idea of the tragic subject as a 
centre of meaning that life without that subject is barely imaginable – and hardly worth 
living. Dollimore makes the case that previous readings are guilty of an ‘essentializing 
humanism’, which ignore that King Lear is ‘above all a play about property, power and 
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inheritance’.413 The vision of the ‘human’ promulgated by the play is – as Dollimore sees it – 
socially and politically exclusive. The human comes to be identified with the white, 
patriarchal figure of a King – Lear – whose identification of himself with ‘unaccommodated 
man’ (or ‘Man’) in the shape of Poor Tom obliterates class, sexual and racial distinctions 
and, paradoxically, indorses the status quo and the systems of marginalization and 
oppression perpetuated through the inequitable division of ‘property, power and 
inheritance’.  
This politicized reconsideration of the humanism of King Lear was also (and perhaps 
most powerfully) reflected in feminist interpretations of the play. In her 1984 critique of 
‘The Patriarchal Bard’, Kathleen McKluskie contends that the subject of tragedy, far from 
being simply ‘human’, is explicitly and misogynistically gendered as male, while the female 
characters in the play are marginalized in a repressive, patriarchal world. This world insists 
on heterosexual relations in which the woman is subordinated, with any figures contesting 
that social and familial organization deemed disruptively ‘monstrous’ or ‘unnatural’ and in 
dire need of containment – as Goneril and Regan consistently are by Lear and, indeed, by 
Cordelia.414 Feminist interpretations of the play are also advanced in the nuanced 
psychoanalytic readings of Coppélia Kahn (1986) and Janet Adelman (1992). Both critics 
attended to the ‘missing’ wife/mother figure from the play, with Adelman observing that 
 
King Lear has no wife, his daughters no mother; nor, apparently, have they ever had 
one: Queen Lear goes unmentioned, except for those characteristic moments when 
Lear invokes her to cast doubt on his paternity.415  
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Adleman and Khan both read the absence of any mother figure from the play as part of a 
wider, homosocial desire to supress the debilitating memory of maternal origin and disavow 
an uncontrollably sexualized female presence – a fear reflected in the anxiety-ridden 
speeches of Lear, where he refers to the vagina as a ‘sulphurous pit’ (IV.vi.130) and to the 
‘riotous appetite’ of women: ‘Down from the waist they are centaurs, though women all 
above’ (IV.vi.120).  
Less common were readings that contested the perceived heteronormative or racist 
aspects of the play – though as Keith Linley observes, the ‘lust’ that Lear bewails was often 
understood in the early modern era to comprise all ‘unclean thoughts and unclean acts, 
involving unnatural desires like bestiality, incest and homosexuality’, so that the rage 
against female lust might (albeit spectrally) include a variety of possible and unspecified 
sexual acts.416 Benjamin Minor and Ayanna Thompson also draw attention to the early 
modern ideational tie between diabolic possession and the figure of ‘the Moor’, so that – in 
his ostensible possession by and flight from demonic forces – Poor Tom can be said to be 
haunted by a figure against which the Eurocentric norm of the civilized white Christian male 
was formed and became recognizable.417 Minor and Thompson do not make the argument, 
but the implication is that, in identifying with the figure of Poor Tom, the common human 
identity Lear avows in the storm is a white, Europeanized identity pathologically haunted by 
the devilish ‘black’ figure it would seek to disavow and (quite literally) exorcize – if it only 
could.     
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By bringing the various subjectivities marginalized or oppressed in the play back to 
the fore, many Shakespeare critics were concerned to show that the ‘tragic’ discourse of 
subjectivity in King Lear is not universal, but revealed the need for ‘dissident politics of class, 
race, gender and sexual orientation, both within texts and in the role those texts play in 
culture’.418 This often involved a self-consciously deconstructive hermeneutic practice, 
which concentrated on the gaps, omissions and ellipses in the play (the missing mother, the 
absent ‘back-stories’ of Goneril and Regan, the disappearance of the Fool and so on). These 
various ‘gaps’, along with the newly acknowledged divergences between Quarto and Folio 
versions of King Lear, provided critics with the opportunity to interrogate the play and its 
investment in suspicious ideological and aesthetic values. It was the work of criticism to 
reveal the lie of aesthetic unity and read the play against the grain of its superficial 
‘meaning’ by analysing its disavowed absences and interstices – though that often meant 
simply accepting that King Lear is the unified aesthetic phenomena previous (most usually 
Christian) critics had found. This failure to give proper consideration to aesthetic form would 
ultimately undermine much political criticism over the period, as both Joughin and Grady 
have contended.419 Most political interpretations of King Lear treated the idea of aesthetic 
form with suspicion, insisting the play – far from being in any way ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ 
society – is ultimately made up of ideological discourses that ought to be interrogated by 
critics.420 
On the one hand, Shakespeare critics in the 1980s were obviously and openly 
responding to previous readings of King Lear as a Christian, humanist or absurdist play – a 
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response informed by growing social movements from the 1960s onwards and by the 
reception of Continental theory via Cultural Studies. On the other hand, the politicization of 
Shakespeare Studies in the 1980s and 1990s is also a response to the rise of the so-called 
New Right, as represented by the election victory of Margret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald 
Reagan in 1981.  
Deeply influenced by the work of Friedrich Hayek, most obviously his 1943 The Road 
to Serfdom, the New Right were ideologically committed to a version of neoliberalism that 
promoted the freedom of the individual, with central policies including the dismantling 
various forms of state bureaucracy, the deregulation of markets and the privatization of 
previously nationalized industries.421 The New Right were equally committed to a vision of 
social conservativism – a vision that did not necessarily square with, and was even 
undermined by, its neoliberal economic policies.422 This aspect of the New Right stressed 
conservative (‘British’) values that were exclusive of precisely those marginalized peoples 
and identities which the Cultural Materialists were keen to defend and promote. The wide 
range of social and religious concerns (abortion, education, gay rights) around which the 
New Right organized itself were disproportionately damaging for sections of the community 
that did not seem to fit into the ideological vision of traditional (male, white, 
heteronormative) values. Various cuts to state infrastructure also impacted already marginal 
communities.423  
But the development of Cultural Materialism can, as Grady has shown, also be seen 
as indicative of a shift from modernism to postmodernism – and from industrialism to post-
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industrialism – in culture and theory over the 1980s and 1990s.424 Previous Christian, 
absurdist and political readings of King Lear were, if in various ways, all responsive to the 
reification of the subject by modern totalized systems. But with its new preoccupation with 
pluralist discourses of the subject, Shakespeare Studies reflected the transition to post-
industrial society, where the heterogeneously postmodern worlds of globalized capitalism 
and consumer culture made more hybrid forms of identity newly intelligible. These social 
developments were – ironically – largely brought about by the neoliberalization of economic 
policy wrought by the New Right, even its social policy promoted a return to ‘Victorian 
values’. 
 With the movement from modernist reification to postmodern identity politics, 
Auschwitz more or less disappears from the critical discourse surrounding King Lear. Where 
in previous readings Auschwitz is seen as the nadir of modernity, in the politically radical 
criticism of the 1980s and 1990s the Holocaust largely falls from view. There is no allusion to 
the event that – in many ways – had led to the unrivalled supremacy of King Lear in the 
Shakespeare canon in the pathbreaking 1984 collection Political Shakespeare: Essays in 
Cultural Materialism. It is also absent from The Subject of Tragedy and a host of other vital, 
works of Shakespeare criticism that deal with King Lear, including Radical Tragedy.425 
Postmodernism – as I set out in Chapter One – has been theorized as a critical response to 
the Holocaust.426 But the near-total absence of Auschwitz from critical analyses of King Lear 
is telling: it is indicative of a paradigm-shift away from a concern with de-subjectification in 
totalized, modern society to the articulation of various forms of political identity in 
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fragmented, postmodern society, comprising feminist, post-colonial and queer 
intersections.  
 Cultural Materialist criticism set out to critique both King Lear and its critical 
reception. But it also critiqued the meanings produced by both past and contemporary 
stagings. These were often seen as inadequate and caught up in institutional forms of power 
that did not represent the marginalized and oppressed. I now turn to analyse King Lear in 
performance in the 1980s and the 1990s, before considering the way in which the critical 
and performance history of the play was understood to necessitate subversive acts of 
appropriation.     
 
3.2. King Lear in Performance   
 
It would be wrong to say that stagings of King Lear over the 1980s and 1990s were 
‘apolitical’. But it would also be wrong to say that productions of the play pursued the social 
and political questions that were relevant to the anti-hegemonic priorities of Shakespeare 
criticism. Productions of King Lear were predominantly shaped, on the one hand, by the 
discourse of Christian or humanist redemption and, on the other, by the discourse of 
absurdism – precisely the universalizing interpretations of the play critics were placing 
under scrutiny.  
For his 1982 production, Adrian Noble directed King Lear in repertoire with Lear 
(King Lear was played on the main stage, Lear at The Other Place). The decision reflected a 
desire to produce a political interpretation of the play that drew on Brecht; but Noble also 
drew on Kott and, as he put it, sought to stress ‘the savage cruelty and the sense of the 
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absurd’ found in ‘a vengeful, Godless universe’.427 Precisely the same vision informed the 
1997 Peter Hall production at the Old Vic. Fresh from having directed the same company in 
a production of Waiting for Godot, Hall made the case that King Lear conveys a ‘Sophoclean 
– almost a post-Beckett – recognition of the awful meaninglessness and randomness of life’, 
with director, company and reviewers playing-up – perhaps unavoidably – the ‘unmistakable 
echoes between these plays’.428 Nicholas Hytner similarly refuted ‘the idea of the tragic hero 
ennobled and achieving wisdom through suffering’ and in his 1990 staging insisted that King 
Lear is ‘a brutal play which offers no consolation’ for the unmitigated ‘catastrophe’ that Lear 
‘unleashes’.429  
 It is perhaps not surprising to find that David Hare – former Royal Court playwright 
in-residence in 1971-1972 and a co-founder of the politically radical Joint Stock Theatre 
Company – found the Kott reading of Shakespeare as ‘an unknowing forerunner of Beckett’ 
and King Lear as a prototypical work of the Theatre of the Absurd ‘nonsense’ – even though 
it was his attendance at the 1962 Brook production that had originally inspired Hare to 
become a playwright.430 Hare had alluded to King Lear in his play The Great Exhibition 
(Hampstead Theatre, 1972) – a satirical anatomy of the self-enclosed middle-class world of 
the political elite as typified by the temperamentally aloof Labour MP, Charlie Hammet. The 
epigraph to the play was the ‘unaccommodated man’ speech from King Lear, placed 
alongside statistics concerning the ‘Distribution of Private Property: Percentage of total net 
private capital in relation to percentage of total population’.431 Maud Hammet – the Tory 
wife of Charlie – is the casting director in an amateur production of King Lear and ends up 
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playing Cordelia in a performance that is deemed a failure. Even more of a failure, however, 
is the way Charlie meets his mistress, Catriona. Charlie publically exposes (or ‘exhibits’) 
himself to Catriona on Hampstead Heath. She fails to respond, rendering Charlie impotent. 
The whole scene, with its parodic inversion of the heath scenes from King Lear, is indicative 
of the way the ostensibly radical Charlie fails to live up to and properly ‘perform’ socialist 
politics – the politics of the heath.432 His interest lies less in distribution undoing excess than 
tawdry self-display and illicit affairs, and does nothing to advance the condition of the 
working-classes. 
Hare might be accused of the same type of political failure. Hare directed King Lear 
at the National Theatre in 1986 – the first time he had directed Shakespeare and the first 
time the play had appeared at the National.433 Hare stated that King Lear is a play ‘about’ 
‘Family, religion, politics, madness, sex’.434 Whereas in the 1970s ‘politics’ may have been 
paramount, by the 1980s ‘politics’ had been displaced by a concentration on family and 
religion, fading into the distance with ‘madness’ and ‘sex’. This division served to artificially 
separate areas of social life from ‘politics’, rendering family, religion, madness and sex 
ostensibly ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ material cultural and historical specificity. Carol Homden 
contends that Hare produced a humanist King Lear that was ‘incompatible with a supposed 
genesis within a tradition of political theatre’, where the ‘mystery is no longer merely 
political, it is eternally human’ – a sense of the ‘eternal’ formalized by the Brook-influenced 
bare stage Hare used.435  
Perhaps the most openly ‘political’ staging of King Lear in the 1990s was the Max 
Stafford-Clark production at the Royal Court in 1993. For reviewer Paul Taylor, ‘tremors of 
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contemporaneity’ were stirred in images of a disintegrating state that echoed the breakup 
of Yugoslavia – not least in the final act, where cowed refugees were seen hurrying with 
meagre worldly goods bundled into supermarket trolleys while artillery fire sounded in the 
distance.436 Such images would return to the Royal Court with the 1995 Blasted (I analyse 
some of the overlaps in Chapter Seven). But for most reviewers and critics, the most 
remarkable aspect of the production was the ‘drag-queen’ Fool, played by Andy Serkis.437 
The sexually indeterminate Fool underscored the misogyny of Lear, even as he disrupted 
and undermined the performative nature of the gender binaries on which that misogyny 
rests. This aspect of the production was applauded for its feminist and queer credentials 
and its reconsideration of the ‘heroic’ Lear, who in the opening scenes was seen bending 
over while the Fool pretended to ride him, whipping the monarch with his own crop.438 But 
the politically radical feminist/queer aspects of the production were – for some – ultimately 
diminished by the way in which Lear underwent ‘a late-flowering recognition of social 
injustice’, where a universalizing humanism restated the image of ‘unaccommodated 
“Man”’.439 
For the most part, the production history of King Lear in the 1980s and 1990s did 
little to progress the sort of interrogatory political agenda being advanced in the world of 
Shakespeare Studies. Susan Bennett takes an irrevocably dim view of the prominence of 
King Lear on-stage in the 1980s (and beyond); she contends that the Cultural Industrial 
‘over-production’ and unceasing ‘proliferation’ of the play over 1980s-1990s served to 
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perform ‘a nostalgic identification with “greatness” – of the text, of Shakespeare’.440 
Bennett sees productions of the play as relying on a narrow set of design, acting and 
conceptual choices, which did little to shift the dominant interpretations that had been 
formed by previous stagings. This is most apparent, for Bennett, in the persistent ideational 
tie between the play and Beckettian absurdism and Christian-humanist redemption, both of 
which restate the ‘transcendent’ cultural value of the play. Such choices leave little room for 
the cultural representation of marginalized peoples, which Bennett sees as politically 
urgent. 
This cultural homogenization of King Lear is portrayed in the Caryl Churchill satire 
Serious Money (Royal Court, 1987), which represents the machinations of the London 
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange. One of the more rapacious traders in 
the play, Billy Corman, is elected to the Board of the National Theatre and uses the cultural 
capital his new position affords him to burnish his own self and public image and to make 
contacts that augment his various business and political interests. Earlier in the action, 
Corman had met the Tory Cabinet Minister Gleason, during an intermission at the National, 
which is used for the purposes of a consultation. The play on offer is King Lear – but while 
Gleason perfunctorily deems the production to be ‘excellent of course’, he also admits to 
bouts of sleep that are spasmodically interrupted by the ‘shouting’ onstage, while he also 
confuses both Goneril and Regan with Ophelia from Hamlet.441 This brief interlude reflects 
the commodification of Shakespeare in the market-driven world of the 1980s and the 
privileged canonical status given to King Lear as a piece of ‘high’ national and cultural capital 
– even while that position remains haunted by the memory of the once ascendant Hamlet. 
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The implication is that King Lear has become a cultural ‘experience’ to be consumed by 
Philistine audiences in a state of post-work stupor – a situation akin to the commodification 
of ‘leisure time’ critiqued by Adorno and the growing role of the Culture Industry in post-
Auschwitz life.442 
It is the increasing cultural homogenization of Shakespeare which underpins calls for 
appropriation in politically radical readings of Shakespeare – the arrogation (and 
transformation) of property that belongs to the establishment in the service of politically 
oppositional meanings. It is to the intersection of political Shakespeare(s) and appropriation 
I now turn. By providing an analysis of Lear’s Daughters (1987) and King of England (1988) I 
want to show that some writers have appropriated King Lear to represent socially and 
politically marginalized subjectivities. I go on to consider where Rudkin, Barker and Kane ‘sit’ 
in the wider cultural and political developments around appropriation and King Lear in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
 
3.3. King Lear and Appropriation 
 
For the most part, Cultural Materialist criticism addressed itself to the conservative social 
and political ideologies Shakespeare is appropriated to serve. But for Dollimore and Sinfield, 
writing in Political Shakespeare, ‘appropriation could work the other way: subordinate, 
marginal or dissident elements could appropriate dominant discourses’ – even while, for 
Francis Barker, it would take ‘a massive re-writing’ to make the action of King Lear 
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‘radical’.443 This reflects a wider prioritizing of acts of so-called ‘creative vandalism’ in 
Shakespeare Studies over the 1980s and 1990s.444 Cultural Materialist critics called on artists 
(and other critics) to engage in acts of artistic and political sabotage against Shakespeare, 
often through the use of ironic postmodern aesthetic strategies, including pastiche and 
parody. Such vandalism was to be undertaken with the aim of deconstructing the ‘original’ 
play and allowing the space for marginalized subjectivities to (re)appear in an exclusionary 
dramatic work. 
Such ‘creative vandalism’ is typified by the 1987 play Lear’s Daughters – a play 
originally written by Elaine Feinstein, but heavily and collaboratively rewritten by the 
Women’s Theatre Group (WTG).445 Described by Lizbeth Goodman as ‘a landmark in 
feminist “re-inventing” of Shakespeare’, the play is a ‘her-story’ prequel that deconstructs 
the moralistic ‘fairy-tale structure of King Lear’ and its simplistic binary of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
daughters.446 Over a series of fifteen, short non-linear scenes, Lear’s Daughters depicts the 
early-lives of Goneril, Regan and Cordelia – with a Nanny and androgynous (‘a woman or a 
man?’) Serkis-like Fool, who acts as a morally ambiguous narrator, in tow.447 The play fills 
out the back-stories of the daughters to show that all are victims of psychological and sexual 
abuse on the part of Lear. Lear’s Daughters omits Lear from the stage completely, indicative 
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of its deep-seated interrogation of the Lear-figure, his perceived moral ‘progression’ and his 
misogyny.   
This shift from a humanist (phallocentric) narrative of moral progress and tragic 
recognition to the marginalized subjectivities of Goneril, Regan and Cordelia is typified by 
the way the play subverts the word ‘unbutton’. Lear ‘unbuttons’ in King Lear to assert his 
identity with the poor and suffering – with ‘man’ in its most basic, denuded state – but in 
Lear’s Daughters Goneril remembers Lear ‘unbuttoning’ (8.224) as a prelude to incestuous 
rape. ‘I cannot put it all together’, admits Goneril (10.229) – a failure of self-narration that 
witnesses a traumatized history. The non-linear form of the play allows for a more open-
ended, exploratory dramatization of the damaged subjectivities of the daughters, all of 
whom are individualized in a more compelling way than in King Lear. The Nanny even 
provides ‘fairy tale’ stories about the daughters, recalling that Cordelia conveys her history 
through ‘words’, Goneril through ‘colours’ and Regan through ‘touch’ and ‘shape’ (1.217-
218).  
The absence of the ‘missing mother’, Queen Lear, is also clarified in the play, though 
she never appears onstage. In his patriarchal desire for a male heir, Lear – as the Nanny 
remembers – constantly ‘whined on at her to let him fuck her’ (10.228). This, however, 
results in a string of miscarriages which eventually kills the Queen; any memory of her is 
subsequently repressed and her plight is understood as nothing short of biological destiny: 
‘It is our role. To marry and breed’ (12.229). While the play depicts the oppressive 
patriarchal ideology that reduces women to ‘daughters, wives and mothers’, however, it 
also insists on the possibility of female empowerment and liberation. Despite her death, the 
Nanny remembers that the Queen was ‘important’ to Lear: ‘Yes. She was important to him. 
She organized the budget. Looked after his interests. Night after night when he was not with 
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her, adding and subtracting’ (10.228). The idea that Queen Lear would make a more 
responsible and morally upright ruler in view of the chaos presided over by Lear – ‘He will 
have to manage on his own now’, as Goneril plaintively puts it (8.224) – is  also broached by 
Barker in his Seven Lears. The play also stages something akin to the discovery of the gaol in 
the opening scene of Seven Lears, where the ‘poor’ – ‘begging for food’ (9.226) – plead with 
those in power: ‘Bars. As I walked past, these hands came from out of them, clawing and 
scratching. Nanny. There were people in there. Shut in. He is the King. He must know that 
they are there?’ (10.228).448 The final image of the play shows the crown belonging to Lear 
being thrown unceremoniously into the air before it is caught by Goneril, Regan and 
Cordelia simultaneously – an unambiguous image of collective female self-empowerment 
and sovereignty.449  
In his play King of England (1988) – staged at the London Theatre Royal in the 
ethnically diverse community of Stratford – Barrie Keefe produced a ‘racialized’ King Lear, 
which used the play to dramatize the contradictions and intergenerational conflicts that 
shape the racial and class identity of succeeding generations of Black Caribbean migrants. 
The play transforms ‘King’ Lear into the black Trinidadian tube driver Mr King, who on his 
retirement decides to leave his (now, mortgage-free) council home in Forest Gate to his 
daughters, Susan (Cordelia) and Linda (Goneril and Regan), and re-locate back ‘home’ to 
Trinidad, after the recent death of his wife (the ‘missing’ mother) – Malvina. Both daughters 
are sceptical – and, in the case of Linda, downright resentful – of the social and political 
conservativism of King. King is a monarchist and he also upbraids Susan for her ‘un-ladylike’ 
criticism of Thatcher, who – for King – necessarily demands respect because she is Prime 
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Minister: ‘I find such sentiments particularly astonishing coming from a woman’.450 During 
an ‘intimate family occasion’ (1.1.12) of a restaurant dinner to mark his retirement, King 
waxes lyrical about the ‘Mother Country’ (by which he means England) and insists that his 
daughters drink a toast to the nation – which both resent: ‘England – some bloody mother!’ 
(1.1.23).  
King recalls how, ‘after the war’, he thought he would be ‘welcome home to 
England, the Mother Country’ as a ‘hero’ (2.3.35) – a statement of post-war optimism in the 
type of social justice King Lear has often been thought of as envisioning. King even seems to 
see the dream of home-ownership (as expedited by the Thatcherite, Right-to-Buy policy) as 
a natural extension of the ‘better things’ (2.2.35) promised after the war. Susan, however, 
disabuses her father of his ‘fantasy’ (1.1.23) with a more clear-eyed view of Thatcherism. 
‘Thatcher is butchering the NHS’, observes Susan, who provides her Cordelia-like ‘kind 
nursery’ (I.i.125) as an NHS nurse. ‘England is going to rack and ruin’ (1.1.12): ‘This country 
now, does not care about its weak, or its poor or its ill. Not really care. Because that costs 
money’ (1.1.24).  
Keefe uses King Lear to reflect on the ‘shame’ and the ‘tragedy’ (2.1.30) of the 
disproportionate impact New Right policy had on marginalized and oppressed sections of 
society – as typified by the inadequate care the missing mother Malvina receives in her 
struggle against breast cancer, the disease that finally kills her (2.4). Keefe does not 
necessarily ‘interrogate’ the humanist, redemptive understanding of King Lear in King of 
England; indeed, the play even restores the ‘happy ending’ of the original myth, as King and 
Susan reconcile before his return to Trinidad, with the Bob Marley score that accompanies 
the play shifting to ‘Redemption Song’ (2.4.37) in the final scene. But Keefe does appropriate 
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the play to represent otherwise marginalized subjectivities. He even provides some 
ideologically suspicious demystification of King Lear in his re-working of the storm scenes. 
When he meets a former tube-worker called Jimmy – now a homeless alcoholic after being 
made redundant – in a scrap-yard, King engages in some Lear-like rhetoric, about his 
apparent loss, and rediscovery, of ‘humanity’: ‘I am a man now!’ (2.1.26). The partial 
character of that ascription ‘man’ is betrayed by Jimmy, whose repugnant, homophobic 
rhetoric reveals the ideological and cultural limits inscribed in patriarchal ideals of 
masculinity.   
 Both Lear’s Daughters and King of England represent the type of appropriation 
Cultural Materialist critics thought necessary to ‘radicalize’ Shakespeare and allow King Lear 
to represent marginalized subjectivities. What place, however, do Rudkin, Barker and Kane 
occupy in the developments of the 1980s and 1990s? It is to the Catastrophists that I now 
turn.   
 
3.4. Rudkin, Barker and Kane 
 
 
There are some obvious parallels between the politically-informed understanding of 
appropriation advanced by Cultural Materialist critics and the Catastrophist appropriations 
of King Lear by Rudkin, Barker and Kane. These dramatists all repudiate both the Christian 
and/or humanist redemptionist reading of King Lear and the absurdist reading of the play 
developed in its wake. These playwrights are also deeply suspicious of the growing role of 
various Culture (including ‘Shakespearean’) Industries in society. Rudkin, Barker and Kane 
diverge from Cultural Materialist criticism, however, in stressing the autonomy of the tragic 
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subject, who cannot be finally constrained by any form of identity. These playwrights also 
insist on the autonomy of the aesthetic sphere, which is reducible to neither society nor 
politics.    
This prioritization of subjective autonomy can be (and, in the case of Barker, has 
been) seen as an expansion of New Right ideas and the ideological fetishization of the 
neoliberal individual, who is understood to be completely unconstrained by traditional 
forms of power and authority in his/her bid for self-actualization.451 What such readings 
collapse is the contradiction between rhetoric and reality. Where late capitalist culture 
proclaims ‘universal concepts of “freedom”’ and ‘“social emancipation”’ it does so even ‘as 
individuals are consumed by an economic totality’.452 What the dominance of neoliberal 
capitalist democracy and the so-called ‘end of history’ precipitated in the 1980s and 1990s 
was no less than the totalization of a reifying capitalist system and its related socio-political 
forces. The period saw the ‘massification’ of a society that Thatcher had proclaimed did not 
even exist: ‘There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and 
there are families’.453 
It is in response to the catastrophic totalization of late capitalist society that Rudkin, 
Barker and Kane develop ideas around the autonomy of the subject and the aesthetic – a 
point I develop in the case studies. Through appropriations of King Lear, Rudkin, Barker and 
Kane radically extend a late modernist critique of totalization into the postmodern era. This 
critique is less preoccupied with political conceptions of identity than it is with the 
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destruction of subjectivity as such in the totalized social systems of post-Auschwitz culture. 
This situates Catastrophism in an ongoing discourse around King Lear, modernity and the 
Holocaust that stretches back into the 1940s. King Lear becomes a vehicle through which 
Catastrophist playwrights can interrogate the destruction of the subject in post-Auschwitz 
life and insist on the autonomy of the tragic subject, who (re)fashions him or herself out of 
disaster. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has analysed the critical, performance and appropriation history of King Lear in 
the post-war era. I have shown that, since the Second World War, King Lear has emerged as 
the play through which the Auschwitz experience – the total destruction of the subject by 
modern social systems – has been interpreted and ‘thought through’. This discourse around 
King Lear and the Holocaust has comprised reactionary Christian readings that analyse (and 
critique) the whole process of modernity itself and absurdist interpretations that use the 
play for a wider engagement with the Holocaust and the European catastrophe. I have also 
shown that political readings of the play, which generally take a Marxist approach to 
conceptions of the historical process and the necessity of engagement, can also be located 
against the ongoing legacy of Auschwitz. My interpretation of King Lear in the 1980s and 
1990s shows that political conceptions of King Lear morphed into a concern with identity 
and appropriation. This, as I understand it, reflects a wider shift in criticism and the history 
of ideas from a modernist (society as totality) to postmodernist (society as fragmented) 
paradigm. I have shown that Rudkin, Barker and Kane share some traits with Cultural 
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Materialist conceptions of appropriation; but I have also contended that Catastrophism 
continues a late modernist critique of totality into the postmodern epoch. This sees a 
reorientation around the autonomy of the tragic subject and the non-reified space of the 
aesthetic sphere.   
 Chapters One, Two and Three have analysed the theoretical, aesthetic and historical 
backdrop to Catastrophist appropriation. With that backdrop now considered, I turn to 
close-readings of the chosen case studies. I begin with Edward Bond and his 1971 play, Lear. 
Bond, as I set out in the Introduction, cannot necessarily be considered a Catastrophist 
writer. His analysis of modernity and Auschwitz has parallels with the Catastrophists, but his 
tragic aesthetic ultimately repeats the reification of subjectivity, as opposed to contesting it. 
This makes his play invaluable as a frame through which to analyse Catastrophist aesthetics 
and subjectivity.    
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Chapter Four 
 
‘The Man Without Pity is Mad’: Edward Bond’s Lear and the Dialectic of Engagement 
 
‘Coldness, the basic principle […] without which there could have been no Auschwitz’ – 
Theodor Adorno.454 
 
‘Once the wall is built, it takes almost a miracle to break through it’ – Max Horkheimer.455 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter will analyse the Edward Bond play Lear. The play, which has been described as 
a ‘landmark’ in post-war British theatre, was originally staged at the Royal Court Theatre in 
1971, with William Gaskill directing and Harry Andrews taking the eponymous title role.456 
The play is a wholesale rewriting of King Lear, which makes sweeping textual and formal 
changes to the Shakespearean ‘original’. The action of the play, which reduces the Five Acts 
of King Lear into a more condensed, Three Act form, revolves around the construction, and 
attempted destruction, of a Wall, which Lear is building in order to keep out the (largely 
imagined) enemies of his Kingdom. His daughters, Bodice and Fontanelle (Goneril and 
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Regan) secretly conspire to marry the Duke of Cornwall and Duke of North – the figures 
against whom Lear has built and defended the Wall. Lear soon finds himself in conflict with 
his daughters and, by the end of Act One, is defeated and made a refugee. Cordelia is 
transformed into an anonymous woman whose husband gives the outcast Lear temporary 
haven. Cordelia is subsequently raped and widowed in an act of state terror. Prompted by 
motives of vengeance to take up arms against the daughters and the Dukes, Cordelia adopts 
the role of revolutionary utopian ideologue, subduing Bodice and Fontanelle and taking over 
the state by the end of Act Two. Cordelia, far from instituting a promised utopian society, 
repeats the depravations of the previous regimes and begins a reign of terror, symbolized by 
the rebuilt Wall. Lear, who escapes from prison, is haunted by a ghost, who in Act Three 
tries to tempt Lear away from politics into an idyllic, pastoral fantasy. Lear resists the ghost 
and confronts Cordelia: ‘Our lives are awkward and fragile and we have only one thing to 
keep us sane: pity, and the man without pity is mad’ (III.iii.84). Lear, however, fails to make 
Cordelia ‘pregnant to good pity’ (King Lear, IV.vi.211). His only recourse is a final, doomed 
gesture. The play ends with Lear scaling the Wall and attempting to ‘dig’ it up, before he is 
shot dead by a guard.  
 By providing a close-reading of Lear and by drawing on some of his own theatre 
theory and its relation to aspects of the original 1971 production, I aim to show that Bond 
appropriates King Lear in response to the totally reified world instituted at Auschwitz. This – 
in part – aligns Bond with Catastrophism. Lear departs from Catastrophism, however, in its 
Marxist-humanist conception of the historical process, which is ultimately conditioned by a 
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rationalistic Enlightenment faith in the possibility of moral and political ‘progress’ over 
time.457  
I will show that, in his appropriation of King Lear, Bond critiques a posture of 
complete resignation, which he believes to be the central trait of both absurdist drama and 
King Lear. Bond intends to replace the (perceived) absurdist passivity of King Lear with a 
version of the play that insists on concerted social and political engagement, which is 
necessary to bring about change. Not unlike other Marxist interpretations of the play in the 
1970s, which I analysed in Chapter Three, Bond sees absurdist resignation as politically 
retrogressive.458 His version of King Lear represents ‘heroic’ action against a reified and 
reifying world – the world, not only of the concentration camps, but also of Stalinism and 
Western capitalism.  
The notion that drama should both represent and catalyse action against a 
dehumanizing social system evinces the profound influence of Brecht. This is not, however, 
to ignore the critical controversy around the ‘debt’ that Bond owes to Brecht. Bond has 
increasingly come to distance himself from Brecht and, in recent times, has even accused 
Brechtian theatre of being ‘the theatre of Auschwitz’.459 This critique has to do with 
perceived acquiescence of Brecht with the East German Soviet regime (‘his answer to 
Auschwitz is the Gulag’) and to the idea that the Verfremdungseffekt ‘creates the 
psychology of the death-camp’ – by which Bond means an overly detached form of 
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subjective consciousness (or as Adorno calls it, ‘coldness’).460 Brecht intends for his 
Verfremdungseffekt to distance the audience from emotional, empathetic engagement with 
onstage characters, encouraging the audience to adopt a properly critical, ‘scientific’, 
understanding of a play and its historical materialist analysis of inequitable social conditions. 
But for Bond, Brechtian detachment does not do enough to incite committed sympathetic 
engagement, fostering an aesthetically distanced response that – as Bond sees it – is 
comparable to the silent passivity of those who failed to resist (or colluded in) the Final 
Solution.461  
This is not necessarily the place to analyse the value of the critique Bond has formed 
against Brecht. What is at stake, however, is the notion of engagement – of concerted moral 
and political action. This underpins the critique Bond has mounted against Shakespearean, 
Beckettian and – since around the mid-1990s – Brechtian drama. Bond critiques all of these 
playwrights for a perceived failure to depict and elicit imaginative social and political 
engagement.  
Despite his criticism of Brecht and the psychological distance created by the 
Verfremdungseffekt, I contend that the notion of engagement on which his critique rests 
still inheres to a relatively under-interrogated ‘scientific’ (Marxist) humanist conception of 
the historical process that Bond derived from his erstwhile theatrical master. His conception 
of King Lear is conditioned by the apparent contradiction between rational moral insight 
and political (dis)engagement that grows out of a humanist philosophical vision of the 
subject, tragedy and history. It is the same contradiction that informs his understanding of 
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Shakespeare more widely, Beckett and Brecht – though not, it seems, his own position as a 
playwright.462  
I turn now to analyse the way Bond understands King Lear, setting the scene for the 
way his appropriation of the play aims to ideologically ‘correct’ its (supposed) moral of 
political resignation.  
 
2. Bond, Shakespeare and King Lear 
 
Bond has a conspicuously split understanding of King Lear. Bond praises King Lear for its 
piercing insight into social and political injustice, stating that ‘Shakespeare created Lear, 
who is the most radical of all social critics’.463 Bond bases his interpretation of the social and 
political radicalism of King Lear (and Lear) on the storm scenes and the scenes on the heath, 
in which Lear rails against the inequality of society in his ‘Poor naked wretches’ (III.iv.28) 
speech and forms a devastating critique of all forms of authority and injustice. These scenes 
– which in previous performances from the 1940s provided the basis for a Christianized, 
redemptionist reading of the play – are secularized by Bond and interpreted from a radical 
Marxist-humanist perspective, in which Lear is transformed into the most powerful critic of 
inequality in the play, insisting on a reformed world where ‘distribution should undo excess’ 
(IV.i.78).  
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Bond ultimately finds King Lear politically and ideologically dissatisfying, however: 
while Shakespeare endows his protagonist with acute insight, he finally allows Lear to 
escape into a private fantasy in which the possibility of engagement is slowly drained. This 
fantasy of retreat from social and political life constellates around Cordelia – with whom 
Lear famously wishes to share the remainder of his days in prison: ‘We two alone will sing 
like birds i’ th’ cage’ (V.iii.10). The problem with the private fantasies Lear withdraws into is 
that he finally accepts suffering and injustice as inevitable, the product of an unalterably 
absurd universe which is resistant to intervention. This has the tendency of turning a 
changeable material situation into an unchangeable and, ultimately, absurd metaphysical 
situation. The problems dramatized in King Lear are, for Bond, irrevocably ‘political’ – but 
‘the solution is not’.464  
Not unlike Kott and Brook, Bond aligns King Lear with the theatre of the absurd. Only 
where Kott praises Shakespeare for his prescient insight into the human condition, Bond 
critiques his early modern antecedent for failing to advocate for changes in the social and 
political conditions that lead to inhuman suffering.465 ‘I don’t like the absurdists’, reflects 
Bond, ‘I’m an optimist. I believe in the survival of mankind. I don’t believe in an Endgame or 
Waiting for Godot’.466  
Bond accepts that Beckettian drama has been read ‘optimistically’ as revealing the 
power of the human spirit, but it is a reading Bond refutes. Beckett ‘is said to have shown 
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that however you degrade people an unquenchable spark of humanity remains in them’, 
with ‘experience in concentration camps offered as proof’.467 But the argument, insists 
Bond, is ‘false’: not only did those who ruled the camps fail to retain the ‘spark’, but even if 
‘the theory of the spark were true – how would that guide us through the desperately 
needed reorganization of society, or teach us to express our humanity in the changing 
world?’468 
Bond considers King Lear to be beset by the same problem. Lear might provide a 
powerful critique of social injustice but his final acceptance of suffering as the result of an 
absurd cosmos retards any possibility of concerted political engagement and change. By 
rewriting that play, Bond aims to supplant its ‘metaphysical’ absurdism with a ‘political’ 
version of King Lear that holds out the ‘possibility of revolutionary change’.469 Bond states: 
 
Shakespeare took the character of Lear and I wished to correct it so that it would 
become a viable model for us and, I would like to think, for our society. Shakespeare 
does arrive at an answer […] and that was the idea of total resignation […], 
discovering that a human being can accept an enormous lot and survive it. He can 
come through the storm. What I want to say is that this model is inadequate now, 
that it just does not work. Acceptance is not enough. Anybody can accept. You can 
go quietly into your gas chamber at Auschwitz; you can sit quietly at home and have 
an H-bomb dropped on you. Shakespeare had time. He must have thought that in 
time certain changes would be made. But time has speeded up enormously, and for 
us, time is running out.470 
 
Bond explicitly situates his response to King Lear in the social world of Auschwitz and post-
Auschwitz European culture, a milieu that – far from confirming the absurdity and cruelty of 
existence – underscores the need for progressive social and political intervention. Bond 
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contends that the ‘moral’ of King Lear is to ‘endure until in time the world be made right’ – 
but it is now ‘frivolous to say that a man can survive in Auschwitz and so prove the strength 
of the human spirit’.471 Shakespeare is, for Bond, far from being ‘our contemporary’: his 
vision of resignation has become not only redundant but regressive and dangerous in the 
face of the concentration camps, the Nazi Holocaust and the H-Bomb, not ‘pertinent’ 
because of a transhistorical insight into a timeless existential absurdity. King Lear – as far as 
Bond understands it – needs revising if it is to be understood as politically ‘relevant’ for 
modern, post-Holocaust audiences – ‘for ourselves, for our society, for our time, for our 
problems’.472  
In the next section, I analyse the way Bond ‘politicizes’ the ideologically redundant 
vision of King Lear.  
 
2.1. Politicizing King Lear 
 
In his ‘Preface’ to Lear, Bond sets out his conception of the way in which modern society has 
developed:  
 
[W]e live in what is more and more becoming a technosphere. We do not fit into it 
very well and so it activates our biological defences, one of which is aggression [...] 
What ought we to do?  Live justly. But what is justice? Justice is allowing people to 
live in the way for which they evolved […] That is the essential thing I want to say 
because it means that in fact our society and its morality, which deny this, and its 
technology which more and more prevents it, all the time whispers in your ear “You 
have no right to live”. That is what lies under the splendour of the modern world.473  
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The rhetoric Bond uses is telling – where he refers to ‘our society’, with ‘its morality’, ‘its 
technology’ – as it implies that both morality and technology have become independent, 
divorced from the human(e) ends of ‘our society’. The autonomous metaprocesses of 
modernity ‘whisper’ menacingly, insisting on the unreality, the total contingency, of the 
individual human being. Under the conditions of modern society, the subject is dispensable: 
‘You have no right to live’. Hubert Zapf writes that, for Bond, ‘the “subject” of the historical 
process may not be humanity any more but the social constructions which it has created’.474 
The forces of history have become autotelic, turning the subject into an object of 
impersonal laws.  
This vision of history is typified in Lear by the representation of the Wall. The 
construction of the Wall is symptomatic of history-turned-autonomous – or reification. Lear 
states that he is building the Wall in order to protect – and emancipate – his people: ‘My 
wall will make you free’ (I.i.3). But in a moment of obvious irony, his opening action is to 
shoot a worker (I.i.6) for an accident that delays the building-works, so that the (impossible) 
completion of the Wall takes precedence over the very lives it is supposed to protect and 
enfranchise. Bodice purposes to have the – as she tellingly calls it – ‘absurd’ (I.i.5) Wall torn 
down. But after taking power, Bodice comes to realize that her new-found position, far from 
freeing her from patriarchal authority, has turned her into a puppet of an absurdly self-
perpetuating process of ‘War’ and ‘Power’ (II.v.48). ‘I started to pull the Wall down, and had 
to stop that’, reflects Bodice, ‘the men are needed’: ‘I am trapped’ (II.v.48-49). Cordelia also 
ultimately fails to tear the Wall down, seeing it as a way of instituting a better life for the 
people: ‘The government is creating that new life’ (III.iii.83). ‘Nothing has changed! A 
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revolution must at least reform!’, states Lear, with Cordelia replying: ‘Everything else has 
changed’ (III.iii.84).    
The impersonal quality of the ‘technosphere’ in Lear also bleeds into personal 
relationships, so that an invisible ‘wall’ of cold disinterest grows between human beings, 
alienating people from each other and from reality.475 There is, as Lear begins to realize, ‘a 
Wall everywhere!’ (III.ii.80) as the edifice begins to determine every aspect of human life 
and interaction. The notion of ‘a Wall everywhere!’ was powerfully realized in the original 
production of the play, where, in a self-reflexive coup-de-theatre, the Wall itself was not 
seen onstage until Act Three, when Lear attempts to dig it up. Up until that critical point, the 
actors referred to the Wall as if it occupied the same off-stage space as the audience.476 This 
self-reflexive gesture (which obviously draws on Brecht) worked to break down the 
distanced, ‘aesthetic’ space of the stage and the ‘social’ space of the audience, reinforcing 
the sense of the Wall being ‘everywhere’ as an obstacle to more humane social relations 
and the underlying cause of social violence, for Bond symbolic of a wider ‘cultural 
malaise’.477 
 It is the cold disinterest – the failure of imaginative, empathetic engagement and 
the petrifaction of human relations – which drives the arbitrary and yet compulsive acts of 
violence found in Lear, most obviously the horrific blinding of Lear in Act Two. This act is 
undertaken by an administrative official using a ‘scientific device’: ‘This is not an instrument 
of torture but a scientific device’ (II.vi.63). The process – in which Lear has his eyes 
mechanically ‘sucked out’ (II.vi.63) into a container filled with formaldehyde – represents 
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the reification of the subject by the scientific rationality supposed to enable freedom. Even 
the actions of the servants who bring ‘egg whites’ and ‘flax’ to relieve Gloucester in King 
Lear (III.vii.112) are transformed into the far more perfunctory spraying of a healing 
‘aerosol’ to encourage the ‘formation of scabs’ and to ‘discourage flies’ (II.vi.63). The whole 
deportment and detached language of the functionary (who is, ironically, another prisoner) 
recalls Arendt and her conception of the ‘banality of evil’. Arendt famously makes the case 
that the Final Solution was undertaken by seemingly unremarkable administrators who 
were able to free themselves from personal culpability by deferring to the wider demands of 
the Nazi hierarchical machine – an irrational psychopathology that, in the words of King 
Lear, ‘Allows itself to anything’ (III.vii.111).478 Adolf Eichmann, as observed and understood 
by Arendt, was motivated more by the banal prospect of promotion than by a commitment 
to racist ideology.479 ‘This’, as the operator of the ‘device’ in Lear states, ‘is a chance to bring 
myself to notice’.480 
 The Wall is – of course – most obviously related to the Berlin Wall and the 
retrogression of the Soviet revolution, with Bond stating that the specific historical 
phenomenon informing the play was Stalinism.481 But the authorial discourse around the 
play, as I have shown, also comprises the Nazi concentration camps and Auschwitz, which 
occupies an increasingly central place in the way Bond conceptualizes modernity and his 
own dramaturgy. In his powerful article ‘The First Word’, Bond reflects on his critical 
discourse: 
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I use Auschwitz as a generic name for the various horrors of the 20th Century 
because it most clearly used the apparatus of modernity. It had the efficiency and 
expedition of a Ford production line. The raw materials received at one end were 
human beings, the finished product at the other end was ash. There is an easy 
Brueghel image for it – the locations of the human mouth and anus reversed. But the 
deformity is more extreme than that. Auschwitz used the scientific technology that 
should emancipate us […] Auschwitz is not a cancer that destroys, it is not even a 
disease that poses as a cure – it has infiltrated and taken over the processes of life 
and made them death.482 
 
These remarks have – of course – much in common with Adorno and his conception of the 
deathly process of the dialectic of Enlightenment (though Bond only ever refers directly to 
Adorno in relation to his dictum about the barbarity of poetry ‘after’ Auschwitz).483 
Auschwitz, for Bond as for Adorno, becomes a metonym for the catastrophes of the 
twentieth century and the reifying legacy of modernity. It is a critique Bond also relates to 
late capitalist culture: in a distinctly Adornian observation, Bond remarks that ‘When you 
enter a supermarket you enter the logic of Auschwitz’ – by which Bond means the ‘logic’ of 
mass, reified society.484  
 Bond insists that – post-Auschwitz – social and political action is both possible and 
necessary. Lear may have his eyes surgically removed, but his blindness is, as Bond puts it, ‘a 
metaphor for insight’.485 The play charts the moral and social progress of Lear from an 
ideologically driven despot in Act One, through to insight (as in King Lear, through blindness) 
in Act Two and finally (and unlike ‘King’ Lear) to committed political engagement in Act 
Three. This culminates in his attempt to dig up the Wall, an act of intervention against the 
‘technosphere’ and a re-appropriation of alienated human labour that undoes the 
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deadening ‘coldness’ which deforms life in the reified world: ‘Work soon warms you up’ 
(III.iv.87).  
 Peter Billingham contends that the image of Lear digging up the Wall remains ‘one of 
the most iconic in post-war British theatre and even twentieth century British drama’, 
offering an image of ‘revolutionary intent and potential’ in a ‘radical humanist re-write of 
King Lear’. 486 It should be observed, however, that from its opening performance the final 
image has been as apt to cause confusion as it has the type of eulogies proffered by 
Billingham. The case might be made that the final image of Lear digging ‘up’ the Wall is as 
Sisyphean a struggle as anything Beckett or Camus might imagine and hardly shaped to 
inspire the type of moral and political engagement Bond sees as being vital after the 
Holocaust. 
 Bond seemed aware of the criticisms that might be made against his play. In his 
Programme Note for the 1975 revival of Lear at the Liverpool Everyman theatre (‘Saving Our 
Necks’) Bond defends his play against the idea that the final stand Lear takes is – ultimately 
– absurd:  
  
My Lear makes a gesture in which he accepts responsibility for his life and commits 
himself to action [...] [But that] gesture must not be seen as final. That would make 
the play a part of the theatre of the absurd and that, like perverted science, is a 
reflection of no-culture. The human condition is not absurd; it is only our society 
which is absurd. Lear is very old and has to die anyway. He makes his gesture only to 
those who are learning to live.487 
 
Bond insists that the closing act of defiance should be understood as constituting more of a 
gesture made on behalf of its witnesses as opposed to an action that is in any way complete 
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in itself, which would ultimately reduce the play to the theatre of the absurd – a decadent 
‘reflection of no-culture’. This is reflected in the telling stage-direction in which, as Lear digs 
up the Wall and leaves his shovel stuck ‘upright in the earth’ (III.iii.88), a worker ‘looks back’ 
(III.iii.88) – before being hurried along offstage by a foreman to continue building the Wall. 
The gesture Lear makes against the Wall is intended to shape the consciousness of its 
witnesses. This – of course – includes the audience itself: the final image is intended to 
convince the audience of the necessity of engaged moral and political action, as opposed to 
the apathy of absurdism or the disengagement Bond believes to result from the Brechtian 
Verfremdungseffekt. 
 This reflects the divergent understandings of tragedy and the subject in Brecht and 
Bond. I have shown that tragedy, as far as Brecht understands it, is too preoccupied with a 
single tragic ‘hero’, whose inability to overcome society transforms his/her demise into 
‘fate’. The sympathy tragedy engenders for the fate of the individual inhibits the type of 
detached, collective consciousness needed to bring about a more critical understanding of 
society and history.488 Bond is similarly suspicious of the significance of individual action – as 
the final and seemingly ‘meaningless’ death of Lear shows. But he does see tragedy as 
amenable to a properly dialectical understanding of human history, where defiant action 
negates the inhumanity of a reified society. Bond demands from the audience a response 
which is at once sympathetically engaged in the individual fate of Lear and yet sufficiently 
detached to allow an objective grasp of the political necessity of collectivity. The final action 
of Lear is intended to address the audience as a collective entity capable of radical political 
action. 
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There is, however, another criticism that might be made of the play aside from the 
possible absurdity of its final image of Lear on the Wall – that Bond ultimately fails to 
challenge the Christian-humanist problematic that informs the pre-Kott understanding of 
King Lear and, as a result, equally fails to challenge the Enlightenment narrative of rational 
human ‘progress’ which had been so severely disabused by the war and the Holocaust. Lear 
displays an underlying faith in the forces of historical progress and the eventual control of 
an enlightened and ‘redeemed’ humanity over the abstract social-political system that it has 
itself created and which now destroys it. This, in itself, is not necessarily problematic. What 
is problematic, however, is the way that narrative overdetermines subjectivity. The result of 
the rational and humanistic view of historical progress Bond relies on is that Lear ultimately 
re-inscribes the subject into an overarching historical process – once again turning the 
subject into an object as it fulfils the teleological destiny toward a ‘rational’ and ‘just’ 
society.  
 I now turn to the contradiction between the critique Bond has formed of 
Auschwitz/the dialectic of Enlightenment and his continuing dependence on Enlightenment 
precepts of human reason and progress, which undergirds his idea of social and political 
engagement.  
 
3. Bond, Humanism and the Dialectic of Enlightenment  
 
Bond may have intensified the cruelty and violence of King Lear, but Lear also recapitulates 
the redemptive understanding of the play derived from Christian-humanist readings, where 
the ‘growth’ of Lear into a form of critical self-knowledge remains the central concern, even 
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if that ‘pilgrimage’ now comes to signify a ‘scientific’ and secularized humanist teleology. 
The overarching Three Act structure of Lear is indicative of the residual dependence of the 
play on a humanist understanding of the historical process. Bond writes that, in Act One, 
Lear is trapped in a world of ‘Myth’ – a false perception of reality. In Act Two, Lear 
‘progresses’ to a correct (objective or scientific) perception of ‘Reality’ and, in Act Three – 
which Bond considered integral to his appropriation – Lear engages in rational moral and 
political action against a world he ‘proves real’ by tragically ‘dying in it’.489 The whole 
movement echoes the Enlightenment progression from false belief (myth) into rational 
knowledge (science) and into agency based on that new-found knowledge – producing an 
emphatic image of formal closure as Lear attempts to remove the Wall he himself had 
instigated. 
The central pattern of the play recalls the ‘sin-suffering-redemption’ paradigm of 
pre-absurdist, Christian readings of King Lear, in which Lear learns through his suffering the 
reality of a society that is inimical human life. Lear, in a critique of His apparent resignation, 
states that ‘If I saw Christ on his cross I would spit at him’ (III.76); but Lear undergoes his 
own secular pilgrimage over the course of the play: ‘I am going on a journey’ (III.iii.85). 
During Act Two, Scene Seven of the original production, Lear even fell to his knees, a gesture 
that recalls Gielgud in 1940 and his prayer-like posture in the storm: ‘I will kneel by the Wall’ 
(II.vii.66).490  
Undergoing a radical transformation in his perception of himself and the world, Lear 
engenders a dialectical synthesis between his subjective consciousness and the objectivity 
of reality – and society. Lear ‘sees better’ (King Lear, I.i.162) and, in doing so, acts against 
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the social and political oppression he is witness to. But his revolutionized (or ‘enlightened’) 
consciousness has, in the inadvertently telling words of Billingham, ‘inescapably political 
consequences’: the digging up of the Wall.491 The cycle of history in Lear has become 
nothing other than (tragic) fate. This is conveyed (or perhaps more appropriately, betrayed) 
by the foreshadowing of the final action of Act Three in Act One. During the opening 
moments of the play, Lear reports that displaced rural farm workers (including an ‘old man’) 
have been ‘digging up the Wall’ (I.i.3). Lear, in an act that reveals his cold misperception of 
reality, has these ‘diggers’ shot; but, as he grows into a more enlightened social and political 
consciousness, Lear finally attempts to dig up the Wall himself, before he too is shot. This 
foreshadowing is intended to reveal in a relatively simple way the progression from 
ignorance to knowledge. But it also betrays the ‘inescapable’ teleology of a humanist 
narrative form, as Lear becomes an object as opposed to the subject of the historical 
‘progress’, moving inexorably toward ‘the promised end’ (King Lear, V.iii.277) intimated 
from the outset.  
Despite setting his ‘political’ interpretation of King Lear in opposition to the resigned 
‘metaphysical’ interpretation of the absurdists, Bond is similarly culpable of turning history 
into the type of impersonal ‘mechanism’ imagined by Kott, where the subject is no more 
than a cog in the wider machine of a historical process that is, finally, beyond his or her 
direct control. This – as much as the apparent impossibility of the act itself, digging ‘up’ a 
wall – is arguably the underlying reason for the final scene of Lear being viewed as a 
confused and possibly even absurdist image.492 The deterministic conception of history and 
progress that underpins the form of Lear points to a deep-seated contradiction in Bondian 
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drama. On the one hand, Bond develops a conception of the historical process that is more 
in keeping with the dialectic of Enlightenment than it is with a more conventional Hegelian-
Marxist understanding of the progress of humanity. On the other hand, Bond often seems 
indebted to the very problematic of social and historical progress he brings into question. 
Bond positions his appropriation of King Lear as a response to Auschwitz and the dangers of 
post-Auschwitz ‘resignation’. Lear, however, relies both formally and thematically on the 
idealist-humanist philosophy that – for the Frankfurt theorists – lay behind the dialectic of 
Enlightenment and, in the most radical realization of is de-subjectifying tendencies, the 
Holocaust. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has analysed the 1971 Bond play Lear. I have shown that, through his 
appropriation of King Lear, Bond develops a critique of post-Auschwitz modernity and its 
destruction of subjectivity. I have also shown that the notion of engagement which Bond 
proposes as a ‘corrective’ to reification and political resignation still ultimately inheres 
within a humanist conception of the ‘necessary’ progress of human history toward a more 
rational and enlightened state, which reifies the subject.493 This criticism is not to 
underestimate the importance of Lear: the play remains perhaps the most well-known 
theatrical appropriation of Shakespeare and, in many ways, its historical relevance may be 
becoming more acute in an age of both symbolic and literal ‘wall-building’. The notion of 
                                                          
493
 Bond has continued to write about, and appropriate, King Lear in more recent times, aligning the play with 
his concept of Radical Innocence. For an analysis see my forthcoming ‘Beyond Lear: King Lear, Edward Bond 
and Radical Innocence’. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
192 
 
necessary progress formally inscribed in Lear is, however, contradicted by Catastrophist 
appropriations.  
 In Lear, Lear uses his status as an exile to try and evade engagement, before he 
comes to a fateful understanding of the necessity of revolutionary action. But for David 
Rudkin, exile is not merely a temporary state, which is transcended when the subject fulfils 
his or her (predetermined) ‘responsibility’ for engagement. On the contrary: for Rudkin, the 
state of exile is, in and of itself, socially and politically meaningful. In Chapter Five, I turn to 
Rudkin. I will show that, through his appropriation of Edgar, Rudkin develops an 
understanding of exile as a form of tragic non-identity, which in an era of totality, must be 
preserved at all costs.  
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Chapter Five 
 
‘Rudkin I Nothing Am’: Edgar, Exile and Self Re-Authorship in David Rudkin’s Will’s Way  
 
‘The émigré […] is always astray’ – Theodor Adorno.494 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyse the David Rudkin play Will’s Way. The play was originally staged at 
The Other Place in 1984, directed by Alison Sutcliffe, with Nick Woodeson taking the role of 
Shakespeare.495 The play places Shakespeare ‘himself’ alone on-stage to deliver a personal – 
and seemingly extemporized – talk on the recurring themes to be found in his plays, his 
imaginative ‘process’ and the role of the playwright in society.496 The talk traverses a variety 
of plays from the canon, from the early comedies to the tragedies and the late Romance 
plays.  
I will contend that the portrayal of Shakespeare in Will’s Way typifies the vital 
concept of ‘self re-authorship’, as Rudkin calls it.497 This names a process whereby the 
subject continually re-authors him or herself, never fully embodying any final identity, but 
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engaged in the open-ended process of authoring new selves and subjectivities. Rudkin 
states that: 
 
It is not granted to each of us to be a hero or a martyr. But in our culture, with its 
benign appearance of satisfying our primary needs, and its increasingly sophisticated 
techniques of diverting and exhausting our essential energies, it is more and more a 
struggle for us, this constant process of re-authoring ourselves. If I insist on the vital 
necessity of this self re-authoring, it’s because the impulse of political institutions is 
always reductive: to limit us to identities that can be mechanically satisfied, thereby 
‘managed’ – i.e. controlled; to reduce us to identities that are predictable. I see it as 
our human duty to resist that reductive pressure; as our existential duty, to subvert 
it at every turn. I won’t describe this as moral. It’s a matter of survival, really.498  
 
The notion of self re-authorship is not to say that Rudkin embraces the ‘fluidity’ of the (so-
called) postmodern condition. His conception of self re-authorship should be understood as 
a response to the reification of the subject in the totalized world of late capitalist culture. 
Where modern culture (‘our culture’) forever strives to identify and so ‘reduce’ the subject, 
it becomes necessary, if reification is to be contested, for the subject continually to re-
author the self.499 The urgency of that undertaking is revealed by Auschwitz and its total 
destruction of subjectivity. Rudkin reveals in a 1964 Encore interview that, before he 
become a professional playwright, he had written an (ultimately, abortive) one-act play set 
inside a Nazi concentration camp. Nearly all of his subsequent plays depict similarly reifying 
systems of social control, which are based on ‘rational’ Enlightenment principles. These 
range from ‘the Pit’ in his The Sons of Light (1976), a vast underground system designed to 
achieve ‘total’ control over the subjects that make it up by dispelling ‘The popular dogma of 
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the Self’ – which for ‘all its mystique of Dignity, Liberty, is a romantic archaism’ – to the 
G.O.D. (Global Online Distribution) Tower in the 2012 play Merlin Unchained, which is 
purposed with stimulating conformity and productivity by dominating ‘all outward life’ and 
‘all inner life’.500 ‘[W]e have’, states Rudkin in his interview with the author, ‘a responsibility 
to endeavour to integrate the Holocaust (and all its freight) into the “order” and logic of our 
art’.501   
Rudkin views self re-authorship as a necessary process for the very ‘survival’ of 
subjectivity itself – but at a cost. The process of constant self re-authorship involves being 
expelled from any reified category – and so community – the subject may identify with. This 
means that self re-authoring necessarily entails a permanent state of exile. This is not a 
process with a determinate telos. On the one hand, the loss of identity which exile involves 
necessitates self re-authorship, the re-invention of the self. On the other, self re-authorship 
occasions a continuous exilic condition. This is something Rudkin has called ‘catastrophic 
existentialism’.502 The idea is that catastrophic self-loss enables new ‘existential’ 
possibilities, as the subject is exiled from an inherited social and political identity that is 
violently disrupted.  
Rudkin is averse to applying overdetermined generic categories, but his 
preoccupation with exile and catastrophe is indicative of a tragic aesthetic idiom. This 
discourse of tragic exile also relates to Rudkin himself. Though he won the Evening Standard 
award for ‘Most Promising New Playwright’ for his 1962 debut Afore Night Come, his next 
play – The Sons of Light – would not be completed and staged until 1976 (‘I knew I was going 
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into a lifetime in the wilderness’, states Rudkin).503 Other important plays – including The 
Triumph of Death (1981) and The Saxon Shore (1986) – followed, but Rudkin has spent no 
small part of his writerly career on the margins of the theatrical and cultural establishment – 
an exile, with professional stagings of his plays a rarity after the 1980s.504 Being bisexual and 
half-English, half-Irish, Rudkin has not only spent his professional life on the boundaries, but 
also his personal life, challenging as he does conventional categories of identity and culture 
(heterosexual or homosexual, English or Irish – for Rudkin it is ‘both-and’ as opposed to 
‘either-or’).  
Such non-identity has arguably become more and not less vital in totalized society, 
as reflected by the renewed attention now being paid to Rudkin. The British Library acquired 
the Rudkin Archive in 2010 and, in 2016, there was a BFI retrospective on his writing for film 
and TV. Rudkin is also beginning to find his way back to the stage, after a lengthy period 
without professional productions: Afore Night Come was revived at the Young Vic, London, 
in 2001; Red Sun by the AJTC Theatre Company in 2003; and in 2017 Ashes was staged at the 
Octagon Theatre.  
Will’s Way is not a wholesale rewriting of King Lear – in the same vein as Lear. King 
Lear is, however, a play that Rudkin has been in dialogue with throughout his writing (and 
indeed, his personal) life and which has shaped his own playwriting and dramaturgy.505 
Will’s Way is an important play in his oeuvre as it casts a revealing light on the profound 
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impact which Edgar – and his self-transformations over a desolately exilic landscape – has 
had on Rudkin.506  
This analysis will involve a closer reading of King Lear and Edgar than was possible in 
Chapter Two. I will also develop a close reading of Will’s Way, while alluding to various 
other Rudkin plays, many of which invoke Edgar. I also draw on and analyse some of the 
public statements Rudkin has made in regard to his own playwriting craft. Through an 
analysis of his various addresses and talks, and by drawing on the original interview I have 
conducted with Rudkin on King Lear and the Holocaust, I show that Edgar, with his 
transformation into Poor Tom, provides for Rudkin a powerful image of self re-authoring 
and exile. To frame exile as a response to Auschwitz and post-Auschwitz culture, I begin with 
an analysis of Adorno and his theorization of – and approach to – the self-transformative 
experience of exile, concentrating on perhaps his most famous work, the 1951 Minima 
Moralia.  
 
1. Adorno and Exile 
 
 
1.1. ‘Permanent Exile’ 
 
 
Exile represents a deeply formative experience for Adorno and other German intellectuals. 
Adorno fled Nazi Germany with other Frankfurt School thinkers in 1938, spending time as an 
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exile in England (at Oxford) and the United States (in New York and California) before he 
returned to Germany permanently in 1953, partly in response to an invitation to participate 
in the de-Nazification of West German society.507 During his time away from Germany, 
Adorno wrote both Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) and Minima Moralia, (1951). The 
analysis of the exiled Odysseus in Dialectic of Enlightenment is often seen as a prelude to 
the more direct and sustained contemplation of the life of the homeless émigré in Minima 
Moralia, where Adorno often reflects on the ‘damaged life’ of the intellectual in exile. Both 
works shed light on exile as an experience of ‘permanent change, upheaval and catastrophic 
loss’.508  
Exile should not, however, only be seen as an adverse condition – an imposed state 
to be endured until a time of homecoming. The time Adorno spent abroad as a social and 
cultural ‘outcast’ also had a deep impact on his theoretical and political orientation. This 
relates most obviously to his conception of non-identity.509 Lisa Yun Lee writes that, for 
Adorno,  
 
the painful experiences of anxiety, alienation and estrangement that resulted from 
emigration coalesced into a form of resistance in both his theoretical and personal 
life as the inability and refusal to achieve complete integration into a social system 
characterized by radical self-preservation and instrumental rationality.510  
 
On the one hand, exile imperils the received identity of the displaced subject, whose 
attachments to the ‘home’ culture are radically disrupted; on the other, the exile can also 
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never ‘fit’ completely into the officially sanctioned social practices – and identities – of the 
new social order: ‘He who integrates is lost’.511 With neither nostalgic attachment to the old 
nor assimilation to the new viable possibilities, the exiled subject fails to integrate into any 
customary social and political collectivity – s/he is, as Adorno writes in Minima Moralia, 
‘always astray’.512 The state of exile involves the ‘identity’ of not having a fully culturally 
recognizable identity: it is a form of non-identity, an indeterminate non-coincidence with all 
identity-categories.  
Edward Said makes the case that exile ought to be seen as ‘an alternative to the 
mass institutions that dominate modern life’.513 Using the same word Lear uses to describe 
Edgar/Poor Tom in King Lear, Said privileges ‘unaccommodated, essentially expatriate or 
diasporic forms of existence’.514 Adorno typifies precisely that sort of non-identical 
subjectivity. Said writes that ‘Adorno saw all life as pressed into ready-made forms, 
“prefabricated homes”’.515  Under such conditions, it becomes necessary to consciously 
avoid ever being ‘at home’, to be ‘never and nowhere accommodated’.516 Even though 
Adorno would return to Germany, he self-consciously adopted a state of ‘permanent 
exile’.517  
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This understanding of non-identity tends to place exile within ‘the constantly 
renewed struggle for freedom’, as Horkheimer called it.518 Where society forever tries to 
conscript the subject into systems of identity, exile is an ongoing process that must be 
continually ‘renewed’ by the subject. Roger Foster contends that, in his conceptualization of 
exile, Adorno issues ‘a call for self-transformation’.519 It is necessary for the subject to 
continually transform his/her self if the state of exile – of being outside the social totality – 
is to be preserved. The type of self-transformation Adorno calls for is typically understood to 
be catalysed by experiences of breakdown and collapse – by catastrophe. He writes of ‘self-
forgetting’, ‘being overwhelmed’ and the ‘dissolution of the subject’ as ‘moments of 
breakthrough’.520 Such moments betray the contingency of an inherited identity and open 
out the possibility of self-transformation beyond the reified categories of the social and 
political totality. Catastrophe enables the type of exilic subjectivity Adorno sought to 
embody.    
Adorno also posits a deep-seated relation between exile and the catastrophic formal 
fragmentation of his own literary style. Adorno remarks in the ‘Dedication’ to Minima 
Moralia that the situation of continuing displacements in which it was written is inscribed in 
the ‘disconnected’ and ‘non-binding’ quality of its ‘form’.521 The work is famously made up 
of fragmentary aphorisms and short essayistic pieces with ambiguous titles, from ‘The 
Health unto Death’, to ‘Who is who’ and ‘Gaps’.522 The precise relation between the various, 
diversely conceived parts is never entirely manifest; Minima Moralia does not have any 
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obvious narrative orientation, which might tie the various observations into an overarching 
‘argument’. This derives from a desire to avoid a holistic philosophical system, which may 
unify (and, for Adorno, destroy) the various individual parts.523 But it also speaks to the 
experience of exile – to the continuous interruptions that come with the experience of 
displacement.524 The fragmentary style of Minima Moralia can be seen as an imprimatur of 
an exilic condition.  
 The exilic forms Adorno uses pose a profound challenge to both conventional 
narrative linearity and formal closure. The fragmentary – even wandering, properly 
‘essayistic’ – style Adorno uses does not allow for narrative progression. Adorno also 
describes the aphorisms of Minima Moralia as ‘never pretending to be complete or 
definitive’.525 Final aesthetic resolution is never achieved – and purposefully so. Such closure 
would inhibit the continuing exilic state that Adorno wanted to realize and embody by 
producing resolution, or ‘homecoming’. Adorno opts for a form where any prospect of a 
cumulative synthesis is postponed in favour of a ‘still developing, fragmentary, dynamic 
course defined by its engagement with its own internal and so necessary or essential 
contradictions’.526  
These exilic forms of writing and thought are also intended to produce very specific 
subjective responses. Through the discontinuities and fragmentariness of his writing style, 
Adorno intends to displace his audience – his reader – who is never allowed to ‘settle’ into a 
progressive narrative with a decisive end, but is constantly uprooted and dislocated. By 
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violating both narrative progression and closure, Adorno seeks to catalyse aesthetic spaces 
of exile, of non-identity. This underpins the use of aesthetic fragmentation in Adorno more 
widely, where a ‘radical experience of the foreign is related to the self-reflexivity which it 
awakens’.527  
Exile has – of course – been both a theoretical and an aesthetic concern for 
postmodern thinkers.528 Adorno, however, is a late modernist, not a postmodernist. His 
conception of exile does not necessarily mean embracing the ‘liberating’ non-places of the 
postmodern condition. Exile, as Adorno understands it, represents a space divorced from 
the recognizable practices and identities of the social order, the subversion of totalized 
administrative forms that would otherwise seek to interpolate the subject. This rift between 
the social totality and its subjects is, as I set out in Chapter One, a paradigmatically 
modernist trope and various critics have analysed the value of exile in modernist art, which 
is seen as a vehicle for resistance and autonomy.529 This is most true of the related figures of 
the intellectual and artist, whose ongoing exile is understood as a refusal to ‘surrender his 
or her radical freedom to the demands of an oppressive state or system’.530 But if exile is a 
modernist trope, it is also deeply historically and ideationally related to tragedy, which I turn 
to in the next section.  
 
1.2. Exile and Tragedy  
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Exile is a motif in tragic drama from its beginnings in ancient Greece, where exile is often the 
price paid by the tragic protagonist for his/her violation of the shared norms and values of 
the polis.531 Jennifer Wallace writes that ‘to be exiled was to be apolis, outside the city and, 
by implication, outside humanity’ – a fitting punishment for those who transgress the limits 
of the political (and so human, as opposed to animal) order.532 By losing his/her place in the 
collective, the tragic exile suffers a devastating loss of self and identity – even humanity. ‘To 
be exiled’, writes Wallace, is ‘to become nobody’, a ‘no one, nothing’ – an ‘O without a 
figure’ (I.iv.183-184).533  
Precisely by virtue of being expelled, however, ‘the order of the city, from which one 
might be exiled, is questioned’.534 On the one hand, exile serves to uphold the values of the 
community, even providing the basis for the original creation of a community through the 
exclusion of the ‘other’; on the other hand, the exile outside the rest of the community 
brings the social and political identity of the collective into question. By disintegrating the 
subject from the dictates of the community, exile instantiates a tragic conflict between the 
autonomy of the subject and the identity of the social and political order. If that order is to 
be reinstated, the homeward return of the exile – or failing that, his or her death – is 
required.535  
Hal Duncan writes that ‘the tragic hero is that part of society (that part of us) who 
becomes distinct from it, ceases to be a part of it and is denied, prohibited, a victim of 
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revulsion’.536 This obviously speaks to the relationship between tragic exile and the abject, 
as theorized by Julia Kristeva. Kristeva shows the abject is that which causes disgust and, as 
a result, must be cast aside from both self and society (Kristeva cites faeces and corpses, 
among other provocations).537 This conceptualization of the abject derives from tragic 
drama (‘the true theatre’, as Kristeva calls it) and its representation of exile, where exile 
involves expelling the pharmakós or scapegoat, who is cast out of society in a ritual of public 
purification.538  
Through his own exile, Adorno shares a kinship with the plight of the tragic 
protagonist and his/her self-loss. But he also shares the status of the abject, among ‘the 
waste products and blind spots that have escaped the dialectic’ and the ‘refuse heap of 
discarded subjectivity’.539 This abjected position on ‘the refuse heap’ is conceived by Adorno 
as both personally emancipating and critically empowering. Adorno warns in Minima 
Moralia against reifying the position of the intellectual ‘outsider’, writing that the 
intellectual risks ‘believing himself better than others and misusing his critique of society as 
an ideology for his private interest’.540 But at the same time, only ‘at a remove from life can 
the mental life exist, and truly engage the empirical’.541 From a ‘removed’ (exilic, abjected) 
position on the margins, the intellectual can ‘engage the empirical’, can interpret – and 
subvert – the social and political totality from which s/he is outcast (Kristeva, herself an exile 
from her native Bulgaria, similarly writes of ‘the necessity of adopting a stance of otherness, 
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distance, even limitation’).542 The seemingly ‘degraded’ condition of abjection, as Adorno 
and Kristeva conceptualize it, actualizes a properly negative experience of the social and 
political totality.   
Where in tragic drama the conflict between subject and society is typically resolved, 
for Adorno ‘no reconciliation or identification is possible for the exile’.543 This ongoing 
division between subject and society obviously forecloses the possibility of tragic closure. By 
turning exile into a permanent condition, Adorno paves the way for a tragic form where the 
exile – the abjection – of the subject is retained. The way Adorno conceives exile, I would 
contend, potentiates Catastrophism, with its unresolved contradiction between subject and 
society. These reflections on Adorno, exile, aesthetic form, modernism, tragedy and the 
abject all have a distinct bearing on Rudkin and his appropriation of Shakespeare and Edgar. 
I begin by showing how Edgar/Poor Tom embodies the condition of exile, abject and 
scapegoat, as iterations of his tragic non-identity with the society from which he is violently 
outcast.   
 
2. Edgar and/as Poor Tom  
 
2.1 Poor Tom and Non-Identity: Exile, Abject, Scapegoat   
 
The idea that Edgar provides an image of exile and self re-authorship revolves around his 
transformation into the outcast figure of Poor Tom. In the speech that ends Act Two, Scene 
Two, Edgar, ripped from his inherited social and political identity, responds by authoring and 
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embodying the persona (or perhaps persona non grata) of Poor Tom. Edgar is not officially 
‘banished’ from the state in the same way as Kent is (I.ii.116-117). The sentence given to 
Edgar is more serious: capital punishment, a result of his supposed ‘plot’ against Gloucester 
(II.ii.111-112). But for Jane Kingsley-Smith, the representation of Edgar, escaping as he does 
into the wilderness, is obviously indebted to the tropes of exile in Shakespearean drama, 
where characters, forced from a socially-sanctioned role, respond to self-loss in a process of 
re-authorship.544 ‘I heard myself proclaimed’, whispers Edgar, as he evades capture and his 
death-sentence: 
 
And by the happy hollow of a tree 
Escaped the hunt. No port is free, no place 
That guard and most unusual vigilance 
Does not attend my taking. Whiles I may ’scape, 
I will preserve myself, and am bethought 
To take the basest and most poorest shape 
That ever penury in contempt of man 
Brought near to beast. My face I’ll grime with filth, 
Blanket my loins, elf all my hair in knots, 
And with presented nakedness outface 
The winds and persecutions of the sky. 
The country gives me proof and precedent 
Of Bedlam beggars, who with roaring voices 
Strike in their numbed and mortified bare arms 
Pins, wooden pricks, nails, sprigs of rosemary, 
And with this horrible object from low farms, 
Poor pelting villages, sheepcotes, and mills, 
Sometime with lunatic bans, sometime with prayers, 
Enforce their charity. ‘Poor Turlygod!’ ‘Poor Tom!’— 
That’s something yet. Edgar I nothing am (II.ii.172-192). 
 
There are no more powerful instantiations of the Shakespearean exile who ‘must rewrite 
him- or her-self’.545 Edgar responds to his outlaw status by radically re-authoring himself: his 
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catastrophic self-loss, paradoxically, opens the way for a new form of (non-)being: Poor 
Tom. Emerging as he does from the ‘hollow’ of ‘a tree’, Edgar even undergoes something 
akin to a (re-)birth. 
The speech begins with a burgeoning sense of self-estrangement. ‘I heard myself 
proclaimed’ introduces a split between subject (‘I’) and object (‘myself’): Edgar is suddenly 
able to hold his received social and political identity – Edgar, the son and heir of Gloucester 
– at a distance, in self-reflexive contemplation. This self-estrangement reaches its crescendo 
at the end of the speech, with the syntactically contorted declaration ‘Edgar I nothing am’. 
The basic meaning is relatively straightforward: Edgar has lost his official self, his title as the 
son and heir of Gloucester. This has devolved to his bastard half-brother, Edmund. To be 
without that officially ratified self – that title – in the social and political totality is to become 
a ‘nothing’. Paradoxically, however, Edgar is able to turn that nothing into a ‘something’: 
Poor Tom.   
Emily Sun perceptively writes that ‘To play the part of Poor Tom is to substantialize 
the condition of banishment as an identity’: it is, however, ‘the identity of not having an 
identity within the Kingdom’.546 Sun does not use the phrase, but the figure of Poor Tom can 
be understood as a form of non-identity, a type of identity without any ratified place in the 
social and political totality, from which Edgar is outcast. Poor Tom represents a fundamental 
non-coincidence with ‘any given identity’, which ensures ‘his radical unknowability to others 
and himself; his singularity’.547 By transforming himself into Poor Tom, Edgar comes to exist 
outside of the normal system of cultural identification, having ‘no place’ – ‘None at all’ 
(I.ii.157) – in socially continuous identitarian categories. Poor Tom is not even a fully 
personalized identity: it is more of a generic name in the play for exilic life, which is lived 
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outside society and its totalizing system of identity (Edgar markedly refers to ‘Bedlam 
beggars’ in the plural and not to any specific ‘Bedlam beggar’ he has chanced across). It is in 
that sense that Edgar/Poor Tom truly is an embodiment of ‘nothing’: ‘I nothing am’. Poor 
Tom embodies the negation of identity. He is an amorphous ‘shape’ – not so much the 
identifiable subject of a social and political world as an unidentifiably negative ‘deformity’ 
(IV.i.64) of it.  
The figure of Poor Tom might seem weirdly gratuitous. It almost seems as if Edgar 
discovers a dissonant, darker self in the form of Poor Tom, an unsuspected ‘inner’ stranger 
who appears out of nowhere and yet might also have been present from the outset, lurking 
– ‘Lurk, lurk!’ (III.vi.113) – somewhere on the peripheries of consciousness and reality. Edgar 
takes the form – the ‘shape’ – of Poor Tom, however, precisely because ‘Poor Tom’ is not a 
recognizable identity. If he is to continue to evade ‘the hunt’, Edgar must ‘scape’ 
identification, must be fundamentally unidentifiable. This distinguishes Poor Tom from the 
gruff retainer, ‘Caius’ – the disguise Kent adopts. Through his new identity, Kent seeks for a 
place in the society from which he has been exiled, offering to serve ‘Authority’ (I.iv.30). He 
also defends the status quo by ‘teaching’ Oswald to respect hierarchical distinctions (I.iv.88). 
By contrast, Poor Tom seems to generate only indistinction: he similarly casts himself as a 
former ‘serving-man’ (III.iv.84) but at no point seeks for an identifiable ‘place’ in the social 
totality. 
The exilic condition Edgar embodies involves a spatial shift. Edgar is thrust from the 
(presumed) civility of the court into a desolate wilderness of ‘winds and persecutions’ and 
‘pelting villages’, a world where there is ‘scarce a bush’ (II.ii.492). This wild scenescape is 
usually described as ‘the heath’. It is, however, worth observing that the heath is an 
editorial intervention on the part of Nicholas Rowe, who introduced it as part of his 1709 
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edition of Shakespeare.548 There are, in both the Quarto and Folio versions of King Lear,  
very few determinate signifiers that might serve to more firmly locate the space Edgar (and 
also Lear and the Fool) occupy from Act Three onwards, aside from that it is ‘out o’ door’ 
(III.ii.11). The ‘heath’ gives determinate shape to a space that is far less defined than even 
that open-ended descriptor would allow. Exile in King Lear involves ‘a new spatio-temporal 
dynamics’, which takes the form of an ‘open place, vague and frontierless, a sort of 
wasteland’ that is ‘devoid of landmarks’ – truly the ‘obscured course’ (II.ii.166) Kent 
forlornly imagines: ‘I know not whither’ (II.ii.487).549 This scenescape is a windswept 
wasteland – an exilic space. But it is also chthonic: in his transformation into Poor Tom, 
Edgar enacts something of a descent underground, into the primal, pre-evolutionary mud 
and ‘grime’.550 
The shift into exilic space also entails a radical discursive shift, from the light-hearted 
and self-satisfied irony of a civilized courtier – ‘How now, brother Edmund, what serious 
contemplation are you in?’ (I.ii.138-139) – to a ‘roaring’ voice of ‘lunatic bans’ and 
demented ‘prayers’. The word ‘bans’ is telling: as Edgar uses it, the most obvious meaning is 
‘curse’; but the etymological root of ‘bans’/‘ban’ also relates to banishment – the ‘curse’ of 
exile.551 Exile involves a new ‘lunatic’ way of speaking, which takes place outside of 
conventional social discourse – though the allusion to ‘prayers’ may also adumbrate a more 
supplicatory form of speech that witnesses a (finally, unrealizable) desire for divine and/or 
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social succour. It is worth recalling that Poor Tom repeats over and over again that he is ‘a-
cold’ (III.iv.81).  
If, in his transformation into Poor Tom, Edgar embodies the negative state of exile, 
he also embodies the abject. Lear touches on the relationship between the abject and exile 
when banishing Cordelia – who is ‘strangered with our oath’ (I.i.205) – which he thinks of as 
a sort of self-excision, or blood-letting, both from his own body and the body politic (I.i.114-
117). Gloucester thinks in the same way about Edgar, who is ‘outlawed’ from his ‘blood’ 
(III.iv.162-163). The abject, as with exile, involves the subversion of usual categories; it is 
that which cannot be made to ‘fit’ into systems of identity. Being abject means being 
unidentifiable: Edgar even ‘grime[s]’ his face with ‘filth’ – a word which, in early modern 
usage, connoted various forms of excrement, which is expelled from the ‘clean and proper 
body’.552 Defiling his physical identity, embodied by his face, Edgar quite literally ‘outfaces’ –
dis-guises – himself.  
Derek Cohen has written that King Lear can be read as ‘a secular re-enactment of a 
sacrifice ritual’, where the ‘physical removal’ – by death or exile – of a subject understood to 
be the root of ‘discord, dissension, and danger’ is a necessary precondition of the ‘re-
establishment of the cultural practices and norms that enable the supposedly peaceful 
continuance of social order’.553 This subject is – of course – known as the scapegoat. Cohen 
picks out Oswald and Edmund as scapegoats in King Lear; but Edgar/Poor Tom also – and 
perhaps more powerfully – embodies the ritual place of the scapegoat, at one point 
revealing the way he has been ‘whipped from tithing to tithing and stocked, punished and 
imprisoned’ (III.iv.130-131). In Chapter One, I provided an analysis of the relationship 
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between the scapegoat (the sacrifice ritual) and tragic subjectivity, making the case that the 
sacrifice at once ensures the survival of the commons but also lays the foundation for the 
autonomy of the tragic subject – and, indeed, of the aesthetic. Cohen makes the same 
point: ‘Every scapegoating, every cleansing in blood, is fraught with insoluble 
contradiction’.554 The scapegoat figure pays witness to the ‘insoluble’ non-identity of the 
subject, who challenges the hegemony of the community from which s/he is exiled. This 
same contradiction is apparent in Poor Tom: his exclusion from the polis aligns him with the 
archetypal scapegoat and the autonomous tragic subject, with his/her negation of the social 
totality.   
I have, so far, argued that Poor Tom can be thought of as embodying a form of non-
identity. This, in an Adornian understanding of subjectivity, would align him with autonomy 
and freedom. By defying socially and politically prescribed categories, Edgar (as Poor Tom) 
enables non-identity and the autonomy of the subject. But is Edgar/Poor Tom free? He is 
certainly able to escape detection, but whether or not exile represents a state of freedom in 
King Lear is open to question. Does the exile escape identitarian determination? It is 
possible that the exile is not so much ‘outside’ of totality as circumscribed ‘within’ it.  In the 
next section, I turn to the writings of Agamben to explore these fraught questions around 
‘bare life’. 
 
2.2. Edgar/Poor Tom and ‘Bare Life’ 
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Lear, in his storm-flung ravings, identifies Poor Tom as ‘the thing itself’: ‘Unaccommodated 
man is no more but such a poor, bare forked animal as thou art’. From his encounter with 
Poor Tom, Lear takes away an image of bare life: of life lived outside the social and political 
‘accommodations’ which imbue human existence with symbolic cultural value and meaning. 
Such life seems – to Lear – to precede cultural ‘legitimation’. What he misses, however, is 
the way in which new systems of thought and social organization produce bare life in his 
world, a process I analysed in Chapter Two, where I provided an interpretation of Edmund 
and his universalization of ‘base life’. Critics are not necessarily wrong to concentrate on the 
political ‘moral’ Lear draws when he meets Poor Tom – that a king and a beggar are, after 
all, fundamentally the same and that the ‘superflux’ might be shaken in the name of a more 
equitable society. The problem, however, is that Lear reifies human life as inherently 
debased, as much as Edmund does in his equalization of all human life as ‘base’ (or ‘bare’). 
This is not the ‘natural’ state of humanity ‘outside’ of society; it is a condition produced by 
society. ‘That all men are alike’, writes Adorno, ‘is exactly what society would like to 
hear’.555 
Agamben theorizes the state of exile through the Aristotelian zoē–bios distinction, 
where zoē connotes the bare ‘animal’ life of the human being and bios a historical form of 
‘political’ life.556 Agamben famously makes the case that the state of exile, outside the polis, 
constitutes a form of bare life. But he also contends that modern bio-political society is 
remarkable for the complete integration (the paradoxical ‘inclusive exclusion’) of biological 
life into the political state. This reached its nadir at Auschwitz, which Agamben reads as the 
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catastrophic culmination of bio-politics and the total domination of the body and its ‘naked 
life’.557  
This interpretation of exile does partially speak to King Lear. It is worth noting that, 
in The True Chronicle History of King Leir, Leir and the other exiles ultimately find refuge in 
France – another place outside the rule of Britain. There is, however, no ‘other place’ in King 
Lear. Shakespeare excises France, so that exclusion – paradoxically – is internal. ‘Am I in 
France?’ (IV.vii.76) wonders Lear, as he awakens to see Cordelia in Act Four. The answer is – 
of course – no: Lear is in his ‘own kingdom’ (IV.vii.76). When he uses the legalistic language 
‘proof and precedent / Of Bedlam beggars’, Edgar might be viewed as inadvertently 
betraying the comprehensive inscription of base life within the compass of the juridical-
political totality. Simon Palfrey writes that Poor Tom ‘prefigures the Holocaust’, as the nadir 
of Western modernity and its bio-political regime: ‘he haunts it, expects it, is unsurprised by 
it’.558 
There is, however, an obvious problem with the idea of the total integration of the 
supposedly outlawed (legally ‘bare’) subject into the ambit of the state: it leaves little to no 
room for resistance or autonomy. Agamben – as a result – pays scant attention to the sort 
of social and political transgressions that might lead to a subject being exiled from the 
commons in the first place. This understanding of the relationship between subject and 
society, as Steven DeCarioli has contended, tends to elide tragedy.559 The idea that bare life 
is integrated into the social and political totality means that Agamben cannot conceptualize 
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the challenge the exile represents to the dominance of the polis; he cannot conceptualize 
non-identity.560  
It is important to recall that Poor Tom is not ‘the thing itself’ – as a deranged Lear 
imagines – and so a petrified image of base life. Poor Tom is, as Edgar states, a radically 
indeterminate ‘something’ (II.ii.192). Poor Tom is far more open-ended and undefined than 
Lear is able to imagine in his reifying conception of de-cultured ‘base life’ – ‘the thing itself’. 
It is his status as a provisional, indeterminate ‘something’, as opposed to the idea of ‘the 
thing itself’, which implies that ‘Poor Tom’ will ultimately cede to a host of other identities. 
Over the course of the play, Edgar engages in a process of continuous self re-authorship, 
conducting a whole legion of voices and identities in and through his fissiparous ‘self’, from 
a country yokel – ‘Chi’ll not let go, zir, without further ’cagion’ (IV.vi.231) – to a many-nosed, 
horned ‘demon’ (IV.vi.72) and, in his final triumph over his rival Edmund, a heroic knight: 
‘Draw thy sword’ (V.iii.124-126). This self-fragmentation is physicalized by Edgar: by sticking 
‘pins’, ‘wooden pricks’, ‘nails’ and ‘sprigs’ in his ‘bare and mortified’ arms, Edgar enacts 
something akin to the ritual of sparagmos – a form of self-rending that symbolizes violent 
self-dispersal.561 What unites the various ‘selves’ that Edgar adopts ‘post-Tom’ is that they 
are all unnamed and ‘untitled’ –  and even Poor Tom, as I have indicated, is more of a 
generic name than a fully conceived ‘personal’ identity. These figures can be understood as 
yet further embodiments – further iterations – of ‘nothing’. With no name – and no ‘title’ – 
the figures Edgar transforms into over the course of the play can all be said to inhere to his 
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self-negation (‘Edgar I nothing am’) and his radical subversion of normative social and 
political identity.  
There is – of course – some ambiguity about Edgar and his transformation into Poor 
Tom and other figures, which may bring his apparent non-identity into question. How far 
does Edgar remain Edgar ‘underneath’ his disguises? Does the ‘disguise’ gain autonomy over 
its overwhelmed originator? These often-asked questions around Edgar/Poor Tom are no 
doubt important.562 What is more important, however, is whether or not Edgar is able to 
enact a return to the social totality, taking up his ‘lost’ place in the order from which he is 
outcast.  
The indeterminate topology of King Lear is, as Michel Goldman has shown, unique in 
the Shakespeare, in that the central characters of the play are all displaced into a vast 
transitional space, without any sense of a final destination – aside, perhaps, from Dover, 
which itself becomes a shifting and liminal (non-)place in the play, perhaps most obviously 
in the scene at Dover ‘cliff’: ‘Wherefore to Dover?’ (III.vii.51).563 This representation of space 
fragments and suspends the onward movement of narrative progress, as characters wander 
about the ‘heath’ without any obvious purpose. It also suspends formal closure. Without 
any final and ‘fixed place’ (I.vi.261) to which the characters can ‘fly’ (II.i.56) or return, King 
Lear ultimately obviates resolution, whereby the ‘promised end’ (V.iii.261) – or indeed the 
Promised Land – is never realized. There is, as Kingsley-Smith has contended, no 
‘homecoming’ in King Lear: the surviving characters are ultimately left stranded in a 
devastated landscape, ending the play ‘out o’ door’.564 Edgar may seek to perform a process 
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of self-return through his duel with Edmund, from ‘My name is lost’ (V.iii.19) to ‘My name is 
Edgar’ (V.iii.167). There is, however, no final return to identity by the catastrophic end of 
the play. King Lear – as I have shown in Chapter Two – has no obvious restitution of the 
social and political order, to which the outcasts may return. Even if he is given the final 
speech, Edgar speaks from the position of ‘exclusion, exile and expatriation’ – not 
necessarily as heir.565 Poor Tom is perhaps not as far away as he might appear in the final 
moments of the play: Edgar remains in a state of exile, revealing the ongoing non-identity of 
subject and society. 
Rudkin shares the idea that Edgar cannot enact a process of self-return or social 
restitution, making the case that Shakespeare ‘recognizes that at the ending of a play whose 
cosmos is so faulted and flawed, and whose pessimism is so deep, a formal promise of a 
“healer” will not sit well’.566 I want now to consider the deep influence which Edgar, and his 
transformation into Poor Tom, has had on Rudkin. I begin by identifying the way in which 
Edgar informs the representation of dramatic character in Rudkin, before showing that 
Edgar also informs the way Rudkin conceptualizes his own self-transformative authorial 
‘process’.  
 
3. Rudkin and Edgar 
 
Rudkin has acknowledged the way in which his conception of dramatic characterization and 
his ideas around self re-authorship and exile are indebted to King Lear and Edgar. Rudkin 
remarks that King Lear sends its characters ‘flying out from the centre to the extremes, 
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where they are rendered conventionally meaningless, and become self-performing 
existential figures in a void’.567 ‘Particularly formative’, reveals Rudkin, is ‘the transformation 
speech’.568 ‘Edgar invents and tries on a role in the “Edgar I nothing am” speech’: ‘The series 
of performances that thereafter constitute his journey remains influential’.569 Rudkin 
typically depicts protagonists who undergo an Edgar-like process of self re-authorship, 
abandoning an official social self for a non-official self, which does not fit into the regulatory 
identity-systems of the social totality (is ‘conventionally meaningless’). This can be a 
response to exile – and the catastrophic loss of self it involves – or can equally occasion 
exile, as the subject is forced from the community as a whole because of his/her 
contravention of culturally ratified identities. This process entails a radical physical and 
linguistic shift. Rudkin depicts characters that physically ‘transform’ themselves on stage, 
often through self-abasement. This is paralleled by a linguistic shift towards a type of lunatic 
‘bans’ Edgar takes up.570  
Many of the characters Rudkin has created in his plays – including Merlin (‘Now 
nothing am’), Hitchcock (‘Hitchcock eye; nothing am’), Amadu (‘What I Amadu am?’) and 
even Shakespeare himself (‘Shakespeare I nothing am’ (27)) – directly echo Edgar, typically 
in moments of catastrophic personal and social upheaval that challenge the presumed 
identity of the self.571 The same influence can be traced in those Rudkin characters who are 
‘determined to play the role of a filthy “thing” pelted out onto the very margins of society 
and history’ – the ‘filthy “thing” Rudkin refers to obviously recalling Poor Tom as ‘the thing 
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itself’, while the word ‘pelt’ similarly alludes to those who – like Edgar – ‘abide’ the ‘pelting 
of the pitiless storm’ in King Lear.572 These range from the ‘uncertain person’ of Child 
Manatond in The Sons of Light, to Athdark in The Saxon Shore and Gil/Giles in The Triumph 
of Death, all of whom wrestle with the negative persona of a ‘Nobody’ and a ‘Not’: ‘This is 
not Not’.573  
Rudkin states that Edgar underpins his thinking about the dramatic character ‘alone 
on stage’ (something echoed in his notion of ‘self-performing’ figures ‘in a void’).574 
Whether or not Edgar is truly ‘alone’ on stage during his transformation is something of a 
moot point. The transformation scene (as Rudkin calls it) occurs after Kent is put in the 
stocks – his ‘shameful lodging’ (II.ii.170) – and, in the Quarto version at least, falls asleep. 
Neither version has a scene-break – though both editors and directors have traditionally 
introduced a break after Kent drifts into sleep, turning the transformation scene into a 
soliloquy. Rudkin obviously visualizes the scene in an individualized way. This stress on 
existential isolation – on being ‘alone’ – reflects the way in which Rudkin conceives of exile 
and self re-authorship: as processes that individuate the subject from society. This idea of 
the ‘void’ is similarly telling: Rudkin draws on the indeterminate topology of exile in King 
Lear, where the subject is left ‘alone on an empty blasted earth, beneath a polluting sky’.575 
This conception of spatiality owes something to Brook and his 1962 production. Only where 
the empty space of the Brook production signified an absurd, Godless wasteland where 
subjects were left forever paralyzed, Rudkin understands the desolate spaces of King Lear 
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through Edgar: as exilic spaces that allow the subject to cast off inherited identities and re-
author the self. 
In his interview with the author, Rudkin draws an intriguing distinction between 
‘theatre’ and ‘drama’. Where theatre names the physical and public space where plays take 
place – the institution of theatre, which Rudkin was forbad by his strict religious upbringing 
– ‘drama’ names something quite distinct: the deep ‘impression’ which plays ‘stamp’ on the 
individual, most obviously through the act of reading.576 This distinction is revealing: drama 
seems to be an ‘internal’ process, which is produced by overpowering (Rudkin says 
‘nightmarish’) images in the plays, while theatre is ‘external’ – involving the practicalities of 
staging. This distinction speaks to a wider scope of engagement between Rudkin and King 
Lear. The figure of Edgar, his self-loss and re-authoring, manifestly preoccupies Rudkin and 
has found a unique place in his theatrical understanding. But for Rudkin, Edgar is also 
related to the dramatic authorial process itself: playwriting involves a continuous process of 
crisis and self-transformation, ‘not on the space, but for the author to do’, so that self re-
authorship – even its ‘indistinguished space’ (IV.vi.266) – is psychically ‘internal’, a form of 
inner exile.577  
In his 1996 talk ‘Being an Artaudian Dramatist’, Rudkin offers a particularly revealing 
exposition of his process of self re-authorship. Rudkin provides a brief reading of his works 
and makes the case that ‘being’ an Artaudian dramatist – as opposed to simply writing 
Artaudian plays – means shedding old selves ‘like a skin’, so that ‘a new self emerges’: 
‘Again and again, one re-invents oneself’.578 Yet while the talk putatively relates that process 
to Artaud, the figure that (once again) emerges, and informs the reading of Artaudian 
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dramaturgy Rudkin develops, is Edgar. Rudkin concludes his address by alluding to Edgar, 
insisting that self re-authorship (‘forever re-midwifing oneself’) parallels Edgar and his 
transformation into ‘the Bedlam beggar’.579 Rudkin also underscores the exilic state that self 
re-authorship necessarily involves, stating that by ‘the same act, again and again, one re-
exiles oneself’, as Edgar similarly ‘puts himself out beyond the boundaries’.580 Through his 
constant self-transformations, Rudkin makes himself – as he puts it – ‘indigestible’ within 
any community, so preventing his inclusion within any ‘constituency’ that may reduce him 
to a static identity.581  
 To understand the way in which Rudkin writes his own authorial subjectivity through 
Shakespeare and Edgar, I turn now to analyse his conceptualization of the act of 
appropriation, which in his drama tends to be ‘biographical’ – the appropriation of past 
artists. I will consider some of his other appropriations of ‘Shakespeare’, before I analyse the 
way Will’s Way thematizes ideas around exile and self-authorship through its appropriation 
of Edgar.   
 
4. Rudkin, Shakespeare and Appropriation 
 
 
In his remarkable 1995 interview ‘Burning Alone in the Dark’ – a notably exilic title – Rudkin 
sets out his approach to biographical writing and appropriation, which in various media has 
included Gustav Mahler, Dimitri Shostakovich, Antonin Artaud and Alfred Hitchcock – all 
figures that can be situated in the modernist tradition and who have inspired and continue 
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to haunt Rudkin.582 Rudkin states that his appropriations do not develop ‘a dramatic 
deconstruction’ – a sceptical ‘writing back’ to a past artist from the perspective of a 
prescribed identity politics.583 Rudkin recalls his disillusionment with the Gay Liberation 
movement of the 1970s, where he ‘encountered institutionalized bigotries and 
prescriptivism’ as ‘narrow, closeted and self-stereotyped’ as anything he found in the wider 
‘administered world’.584 ‘I would not wish to be categorized in any way which is limiting or 
prescriptive’, states Rudkin: ‘I believe that also an essential part of liberation is to confront 
that exile and experience of being excommunicated by one’s own brethren’.585 Rudkin 
reveals that, far from politically interrogatory or historically ‘factual’ representations, 
writing about the lives and work of other artists is a means of self-authorship, whereby he 
finds that the work of past masters ‘yield questions’ he discovers to be ‘pertinent’ to his 
‘own existence’ and ‘relevant’ to his own ‘inner journeys’.586 The lives and the artistry of the 
figures Rudkin appropriates become, he contends, ‘metaphors’ for, and ‘aspects’ of, his 
‘own biography’ and ‘creative processes’.587 This is not to say that Rudkin completely 
‘colonizes’ his predecessors, reducing these figures to a mere inflection of his own 
biography or dramaturgy. This would be tantamount to a form of identity-thinking – a 
reduction of the other to the same. Rudkin is writing through as opposed to over the figures 
he appropriates.  
Shakespeare has made appearances in several Rudkin plays, where his presence 
tends to thematize ideas around exile, fragmentation and self-authorship. These interwoven 
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ideas can be traced back to Afore Night Come. The play depicts a gang of fruit-pickers who 
ritually decapitate an Irish vagrant called Roche, who is dubbed ‘Shakespeare’ by his ‘fellow’ 
workers.588 The situation in Afore Night Come resurfaces in the 2012 play Merlin Unchained, 
in which the spatially and temporally displaced Merlin is misidentified as Irish and, 
intriguingly, as Shakespeare.589 Rudkin also began a Shakespeare monologue in 1974, which 
he left unfinished. This short solo-play occurs at the end of a personal diary – much of which 
is comprised of early drafts of The Triumph of Death – that I discovered in the British Library 
Rudkin Archive. Shakespeare, entering the stage alone, is burdened by a raft of papers and a 
calculator. It transpires he is in the midst of completing his tax returns. This imposition on 
his writing time causes Shakespeare to reflect on the contradiction between economic and 
artistic production. Where economic production simply treats art as a means to an end – 
profit – artistic production, as Shakespeare understands it, responds to existential necessity: 
the need to author and re-author the self. This process turns the playwright into an 
inherently ‘ungovernable’ outsider, who provides a ‘token of our freedom’ in a ‘corporate 
Age’.590 
These appropriations of Shakespeare can all be understood in relation to Will’s Way. 
The play is distinct, however, in its self-reflexive engagement with the figure of Edgar. In his 
address, Shakespeare dedicates substantial time to discoursing on his unique relationship 
with one of his more ambiguous creations. In creating Edgar, reflects Shakespeare – ‘finding 
out how to inhabit that character on that journey’, which is ‘a journey, / out into the wilds’ – 
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‘I fell back on myself as an author’ (24, 37). Shakespeare reveals that authorship is – for him 
– a process of self-authorship and re-authorship. Through his playwriting and the various 
characters he creates, Shakespeare is able to author and re-author his self. ‘As a playwright 
you blindly touch that unhatched self / or selves, / into life’, remarks Shakespeare, so that 
the plays are ‘myself, all broken up’ into various characters, which find vicarious literary and 
dramatic ‘life’ on-stage (26, 9). Over the course of his address, Shakespeare refers to a 
variety of other characters drawn from the canon, from Othello to Cymbeline. But it is Edgar 
who embodies the authorial process as a whole, the way in which Shakespeare is ‘always on 
the change’, authoring and re-authoring his self through his playwriting (32).591 Like his 
creation, Shakespeare exhibits a powerful ‘negative force’ (21): the ability to negate his 
officially sanctioned social self and embrace exilic, self-transformative change: ‘Shakespeare 
I nothing am’ (14). 
Rudkin appropriates Shakespeare to reflect on his own authorship, turning 
Shakespeare into a sort of dramatic surrogate.592 Shakespeare, as Robert Wilcher has 
contended, ought to be seen as ‘a symbolic embodiment’ of Rudkin, epitomizing the idea 
that ‘the dramatist goes through a self-transforming process in the course of writing a 
play’.593 The idea of a ‘process’ is critical to Will’s Way and its portrayal of Edgar. In the next 
section, I provide a close-reading of Will’s Way. I will concentrate particularly on the 
authorial process as a form of self re-authorship and its relation to a fragmentary, exilic 
aesthetic form.    
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5. Will’s Way 
 
5.1. The Process Play 
 
Through his appropriation of Shakespeare and Edgar, Rudkin defines the type of playwriting 
he practises as ‘the process play’, in which he undergoes a process of continual self-
transformation. Like his avatar Edgar, Shakespeare continuously authors and embodies new 
subjectivities – new ‘selves’ (39). In his thoughts on his ongoing ‘process’, Shakespeare 
observes: 
 
There comes a point while you’re thinking all this  
when you start to say Hang on,  
the story is important  
but the story isn’t the be-all and end-all of the play.  
I think a play is a,   
it has to put you through a process,   
so that at the end of it  
[…] you’re at a new beginning. (21-22) 
 
The process Shakespeare undergoes in his playwriting never truly ends: every (ostensible) 
‘end’ opens up a ‘new beginning’, so that the process starts over again. This obviously has 
implications for aesthetic form and, most obviously, for narrative (or as Shakespeare calls it, 
the ‘story’). By drawing a subtle distinction between ‘the play’ and ‘the story’, Shakespeare 
reveals the play and its ‘process’ cannot be contained by, and tends to violate, narrative, 
which – in an allusion to Macbeth and ‘Might be the be all, and the end all’ (I.vii.5) – can 
never be the ‘be-all and end-all’. Narrative closure (the end of the story) cannot not put an 
end (‘end all’) to the process Shakespeare undergoes through his plays or encompass his 
own constantly shifting being (‘be all’) – a point I touch on again when I come to analyse the 
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Catastrophist non-ending of the play. It is, as Shakespeare declares, not ‘the story’ but ‘the 
play that matters’ (38). 
Rudkin created his appropriation of Shakespeare by extemporizing – and voice-
recording – the talk that would become Will’s Way.594 This compositional technique throws 
light on the way Rudkin turns biographical appropriation into a form of vicarious self-
authorship. But it also goes some way to clarifying the discontinuous and fragmentary style 
of the play, which is meant to resemble ‘an unscripted personal address’ (7). Shakespeare 
never settles into a progressive ‘story’, but moves unpredictably between various ideas and 
motifs, in a far more unpredictable and discontinuous way. The ‘uneven’ form of the 
address is perhaps most obvious in the constant delays – usually taking the form of 
parentheses or self-reflective ‘mms’ –  deviations and digressions that punctuate the talk, 
arresting narrative progress and adumbrating other possible but untaken avenues of 
exposition (22). Shakespeare even self-reflexively remarks on his own violation of narrative 
progress – ‘How did I get onto all that?’ – and that various other ‘directions’ were possible, 
with ‘a thousand paths’ the talk might have taken: ‘This is the path it took’ (36, 39). This 
violation of narrative progress through disruptions and digressions has obvious parallels 
with the unsettled physical and psychic ‘wandering’ of King Lear – its errant movement 
through an indeterminate topology. The deformation of narrative linearity in Will’s Way 
testifies to an exilic form of subjectivity, where the subject takes a more ‘unpredictable’ 
route.  
 Shakespeare intuits that his process – his continuous self re-authorship – inevitably 
makes him an outsider, an exile. He observes that his process means he can never ‘fit’ into 
society or its prescribed forms of identity. Shakespeare describes himself as a ‘non-
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belonger’ – he does not ‘really belong’ (11). Shakespeare is partially a victim of the politics 
of, as he calls it, ‘including’ and ‘excluding’, his status as a ‘non-belonger’ meaning that he is 
forever barred from ‘being brought / Home’, and being allowed ‘Within, and not a stranger’ 
(15,11). The plaintive cry of Poor Tom – that he is ‘a-cold’ – might also be heard: 
Shakespeare is also permanently stranded out of doors, exposed to the ‘persecutions of the 
sky’. But at the same time, his experience of non-belonging – his non-identity – also ‘equips’ 
(24) him. Shakespeare remarks that his ‘outlaw’ (20) status, his unaccommodated form of 
subjectivity, is deeply formative: it allows him to avoid being ‘underlined by everybody else’ 
(10), even to exist as ‘the opposite of everything’ (12) – a powerful form of ‘negative 
mischief’ (33). Shakespeare embraces negation, over and above the reifying demands of 
social belonging.  
Once again relating his self and artistry to the figure of the exiled Edgar, Shakespeare 
pursues the idea that the playwright ought to be ‘thrust out / onto the very edges of the 
universe’: 
  
 And the author does in a sense live outside. 
 A stranger in his own world, he has to be that, 
 in order to see that world. 
 And he has to be in contact with the mud at the bottom of the well. 
 I mean, for all our sakes,  
 it’s the dramatist above all who has to have bad dreams. 
 Edgar goes physically down into all of that. (24-25) 
 
Not unlike Edgar, who subsists ‘on the very edges of the universe’, Shakespeare appears in 
Will’s Way as an exile, a ‘stranger’, living ‘as an alien’ and occupying an exilic space ‘outside’ 
(24) society as whole. This marginalization is, at the same time, a form of chthonic ‘descent’ 
– a going ‘down’ into ‘the mud’, so as to make ‘contact’ with ‘the darkest reaches’ (24). The 
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spatial dynamic owes itself to King Lear: the conceptualization of being ‘thrust’ outside – 
‘thrust him out at gates’ (III.vii.92) – obviously draws on the exilic topology of King Lear, 
while the chthonic descent Shakespeare describes – a degeneration into ‘elemental 
excrement’ – reflects the way Edgar ‘goes down’ into the primordial ‘grime’ and ‘filth’ (‘the 
mud at the bottom of the well’). Shakespeare is an abject figure, found in the ‘pigsties and 
the ashes’ (34). He becomes, as Edgar does, ‘utterly distorted and unrecognized’ (20) in his 
world. 
This is a necessary condition (‘he has to be that’) for the playwright: his outsider 
status provides the space for a critical perspective on the social totality (‘to see that world’) 
and allows him to bring the identity of the community – its norms and values – into question 
(Shakespeare compares his seemingly ‘warped perspective’ with ‘the eyes of a foreigner’ 
(28)). This means the playwright takes an exilic position akin to that of the tragic hero, 
whose ritual expulsion from society at once serves to solidify the community, but can also 
entail freedom from a repressive social and political order. Shakespeare even appears as 
something of a Christ-like, sacrificial martyr, who takes it upon himself to suffer at the hands 
of, but also paradoxically for, the wider community. His painful experience of marginality is 
represented as formative, allowing him to provide a negative critique of that order on 
behalf of others: ‘for all our sakes’. Through his appropriation of Shakespeare and Edgar, 
Rudkin imagines a dramatist whose value – even universal value, ‘all our sakes’ – to the 
world flows from a position outside society, as a determinate negation of totality. This 
serves to put the tragic figure of the playwright at the social and cultural ‘centre’, as 
Shakespeare calls it, where a playwright ‘should be’ (24). Precisely by virtue of his exile to 
the margins, Shakespeare is able to both ‘see’ and address himself to the ‘centre’, from 
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which he is outcast. ‘The edge’, as an unpublished Rudkin play has it, ‘is where the centre 
is’.595  
When he remarks that Edgar goes ‘physically down’ into the ‘darkest reaches’, the 
implication is that Shakespeare – as an author – is also going through a psychic process, a 
dichotomy that arguably speaks to the distinction Rudkin draws between ‘theatre’ and 
‘drama’. The ‘well’, along with the Hamlet-like ‘bad dreams’ – ‘a king of infinite space, were 
it not that I had bad dreams’ (II.ii.255) – the playwright suffers from, may indicate a chthonic 
descent into the subconscious, a ‘well’ where other possible but normally repressed selves 
are buried. This would serve to turn the process of self re-authorship into a psychoanalytic 
process, an engagement with the dark ‘shadow’ self – those aspects of the self the ego 
would disavow, but which can be brought to consciousness as part of a wider process of 
self-transformation. Rudkin has an ongoing interest in Freudian and Jungian theory – and 
often refers to his transformative time with the Reichian Robert Ollendorf, to whom The 
Sons of Light is dedicated.596  
This would mean ‘theatre’ serves to embody the inner physic ‘drama’ of the 
playwright, as an externalization of ‘inner life’.597 Shakespeare even goes as far as to say 
that the continuous process of self re-authorship has a vicarious, therapeutic value for the 
playwright:  
 
I think that’s the only play worth writing,  
from the author’s point of view.  
The process play.  
It’s the only kind of play that the writing   
is going to do him any good. (21)  
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 Rudkin concedes that his concentration on self re-authorship and its related exilic processes 
might appear ‘solipsistic’ and that the ‘constant re-emergence of new selves’ might be 
viewed as being at risk of ‘disappearing up its own arsehole’.598 ‘What is its meaning for the 
audience? For the community? Society? The world?’599 But for Rudkin, self re-authorship 
and the exile it involves is profoundly political – even a means, to quote Palfrey in his 
analysis of Poor Tom, of ‘living political’.600 The act of ‘refusing to be, or remain, defined’ is 
for Rudkin an existentially and politically ‘subversive’ act in the increasingly reified and 
administered world of post-Auschwitz culture.601 His appropriation of Edgar-Tom should be 
situated as a deeply political response to that reified, post-Holocaust world and its petrified 
identities.    
 
5.2. ‘The Temper of the Time’ 
 
 
While it is valuable from the ‘point of view’ of the author, self re-authorship also has a 
public (even universal) political meaning. Shakespeare remarks that the ‘conjunction / 
between the inward, and the public, / is vital for a dramatist to make / if his drama is to 
have meaning’: 
 
If all I did as a playwright 
was stand up on stage and beat my breast 
how frightened I am, how miserable I am, 
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how confused I am, oh how I suffer: 
no one quite rightly would want to know. (28) 
 
Shakespeare disclaims declamatory, Lear-like apostrophes to a hostile universe. He states 
that, while his ‘creative energy’ springs from personal pain and his own personal ‘struggle’, 
his process of self re-authorship has ‘public’ implications far beyond the life of the 
playwright (27-28). Shakespeare may be able to engage creatively in the act of writing; but 
he is also conscious of nascent socio-historical shifts that may narrow the possibilities for 
self-authorship and re-authorship. Shakespeare voices concerns about the dehumanizing 
impact of ‘new social principles’, paying witness to a violent epochal transition to a new 
dispensation:   
 
I think there are new social principles coming in 
which do not seem to have the same room  
for the wholeness of human nature;  
a much more mechanistic and mercenary approach to a man. (32)   
 
This reductively ‘mechanistic’ and ‘mercenary’ approach to humanity portends the 
beginnings of capitalist modernity, which Shakespeare denounces as ‘A whirlwind utterly 
without humane values, / charged with a terrible unprinciple. / A new breed of people are 
given license to ravage’ (22). The ‘new breed of people’ Shakespeare rails against – recalling 
the language of figures from John Danby to Arnold Kettle – is principally represented by 
Goneril, Regan and Edmund, whose amoral intrigues epitomize the ‘terrible unprinciple’ 
that underpins capitalistic self-interest: ‘a whole new generation / motivated by greed, for 
power, wealth, land’ (22). These figures ‘are muggers basically. Grab grab grab, and to hell 
with ethics’ (22). This compulsion to ‘grab’ captures the fusion of Enlightenment 
instrumentality with capitalistic consumption, where the drive to dispel myth and make the 
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world fully knowable and graspable – to bring every ‘thing’ within the sphere of 
consciousness and utility – is formally commensurable with capitalist interchangeability, in 
which potentially everything is ‘up for grabs’ by virtue of being speciously equalized by 
market forces.  
By depicting a Shakespeare who condemns the cost of capitalist modernity, Rudkin 
posits a dialectical historical continuum between the beginnings of the bourgeois 
‘revolution’ and his own critique of a society in which the subject is at risk of being 
completely absorbed into the social totality. The critique Shakespeare provides of the 
‘temper of the time’, as he calls it, is obviously as much a critique of late capitalist culture as 
it is of the beginnings of early modern capitalism. The ‘temper of the time’ relates to the 
contemporaneous Thatcher revolution and its ‘reductionist and inhumane political ethos’, 
as Rudkin calls it.602 This critique has less to do with the loss of communal social and political 
values than it does with the totalization of society under the capitalist principle, which in 
contradiction to the neoliberal ideology of the ‘free’ individual, mechanically liquidates the 
subject. 
Rudkin understands capitalist modernity as an inherently catastrophic dispensation, 
which has ‘proved a colossal failure on a historic scale’.603 But ‘for all that capitalistic 
progress is a terribly convincing lie, it is comfortingly anti-paradoxical in its profession to 
have defined, colonized and expunged all contradictions’.604 This idea of the ‘contradiction’ 
that capitalist reification has failed to completely ‘colonize’ and ‘expunge’ relates to the 
subject – and most obviously, to the exilic subject of tragedy. Rudkin writes that exile 
testifies to the ‘limits of self-control’ and reminds the ‘citizens of the polis just how 
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shapeless, (self-) destructive and unregenerate an individual can be in official terms’.605 This, 
as Rudkin sees it, has ‘universal political significance’: where globalized late capitalism turns 
reification into a worldwide phenomenon, non-identity takes on meanings far beyond the 
exiled individual.606 
Kingsley-Smith has made the case that the way Edgar transforms into Poor Tom is as 
significant for its ‘impact on others’ as it is for ‘its impact on Edgar’.607 By transforming into 
Poor Tom, Edgar catalyses new insights and understanding in those around him – not least 
Lear, who is acutely sensitive to the ‘unaccommodated’ state of Poor Tom and its wider 
social and political implications: ‘Consider him well’ (III.iv.111). Not too dissimilarly, the 
Shakespeare of Will’s Way – and, by implication, Rudkin himself – aspires to rouse both self 
and others into an awareness of a common crisis through a creative and political practice of 
self re-authorship. I want, in the next section, to analyse the way in which Rudkin conceives 
of the relationship between the autonomous exilic subject, aesthetic form and audience 
response.  
 
5.3. Exile, Self Re-Authorship and the Audience  
 
 
Rudkin has recently set out his ‘intention’ for his art: 
 
Certainly my wish for it – my intention and purpose for it – is to address itself to, to 
awaken […] the unsuspected within the listener, viewer, auditor; to individuate that 
person. Where I feel betrayed – yes, I will say that – by much, much of what calls 
itself cinema and television and art now, is that it somehow addresses me as a 
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member of a homogeneous public, which I don’t think I am. So I think that art’s 
function is to individuate and, by that same token, inevitably, to subvert […] I mean, 
this is not a popular view, in context, but the flight into forms of collective faith 
seems to be queuing up to have your hands chopped off […] Its [sic] opting into a 
form of slavery […“] We leave these questions for the apparatus to answer! Just tell 
us what we have to think; just tell us what we have to do.”608     
 
Rudkin understands aesthetic response in terms of exile. Whereas the Culture Industry – 
with its pretensions to authentic ‘art’ – catalyses a ‘flight’ into collectivity, Rudkin wants to 
inspire a ‘flight’ out of collectivity, to distantiate the subject from society. Rudkin intends for 
his art to displace the subject, for it to produce a state of exile from a homogenized 
‘public’.609 This exilic withdrawal from the collective, is, as Rudkin sees it, a politically 
‘subversive’ process: by exiling – or ‘individuating’ – the subject from all collectives, Rudkin 
intends to produce forms of non-identity that serve to bring the status quo into question. 
Rudkin wants to catalyse the self-reflexivity of the subject, which the Culture Industry 
inhibits by homogenizing audience response (‘We leave these questions for the apparatus to 
answer!’). To simply adopt the dictates of collective faith is, as Rudkin sees it, a form of self-
mutilation (‘queuing up to have your hands chopped off’) – or, as Adorno and Horkheimer 
call it, the introversion of sacrifice. So when he states that he intends for his art to arouse 
the ‘unsuspected’ in his audience, he means the unsuspected ‘inner’ exile lurking, as Poor 
Tom does with Edgar, within the subject – or the ‘stranger from within’, as Kristeva calls 
it.610 This shuddering ‘awakening’ of the unrealized is the same type of affect Adorno 
analyses.  
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 Rudkin, as with the other playwrights under study and indeed Adorno himself, does 
not necessarily substantiate his claims about aesthetic response and the processes it is 
supposed to catalyse. With the relatively infrequent stagings of his plays in mind, it should 
also be observed that Rudkin has, all too often, not even had an audience to ‘address’. His 
conception of aesthetic response is, as a result, more reliant on a theoretical understanding 
of form. Rudkin – in the same vein as Adorno – tends to think about the affective (and, 
relatedly, the political) dimension of art in terms of aesthetic form, as opposed to content 
(or as Rudkin calls it, ‘the formal necessities of the material itself’).611 In his interview with 
the author, Rudkin states that he does not go ‘all the way’ with Adorno and his belief that 
Auschwitz renders all ‘symphonic’ (harmonious) art, not only obsolete, but indefensible. But 
his preferred aesthetic has some undeniable overlaps with Adorno and his understanding of 
fragmented post-Auschwitz art. Most obviously, Rudkin violates aesthetic closure in his 
plays.  
In Chapter One, I observed that the autonomous tragic subject, by refusing final 
resolution, instantiates a type of open-ended aesthetic form. This process is obviously at 
work in the (non-)ending of Will’s Way. Even at the end of his address, Shakespeare remains 
inscrutable, ultimately refusing to give a cumulative, closing statement on himself or his 
artistry. Shakespeare is only too keen to abort the talk – ‘I think perhaps I should not say any 
more. / I should stop there’ – calling for questions (‘Are there any questions?’) that remain 
unanswered as he suddenly disappears from the space, as the play ends with the stage 
directions calling for an abrupt ‘CUT TO BLACK’ (40). Shakespeare does not fulfil any ‘formal 
promise’ of resolution. He transgresses the aesthetic limits that may constrain his 
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subjectivity, preserving his restless, exilic refusal of a ‘fixed’ identity, which may end his self 
re-authorizations. 
The (non-)ending of Will’s Way also provides a compelling image of Catastrophist 
performance. By abruptly turning away from the audience and disappearing from the stage, 
Shakespeare epitomizes the type of sudden ‘turn’ to be found in Catastrophism, as his volte-
face subverts both narrative and aesthetic closure. Much the same might be said of Rudkin 
as his avatar. At the end of a workshop for aspiring playwrights at the 1984 Birmingham 
Theatre Festival – the same year as Will’s Ways was written and performed – Rudkin gave a 
talk on his playwriting process and its wider cultural ramifications, recorded in the film 
Interrogations. Rudkin, at the end of his talk, abruptly left the stage, without taking (or 
answering) any questions, in precisely the same way as Shakespeare does at the end of 
Will’s Way.612  
If the deformation of closure preserves the autonomy of the Catastrophist subject, 
however, it is also crucially intended to shape the type of aesthetic response Rudkin intends 
for his drama. By calling for – but then refusing to answer – questions, Shakespeare returns 
the responsibility for interpretation to the individual subject, a process Rudkin has aligned 
with the rabbinic tradition.613 Where questions answered by the author may serve to unify 
audience response, as if there were a singular ‘authoritative’ interpretation to be had, 
Shakespeare/Rudkin intend to individuate the subject, to force the spectator to consider the 
play and the questions it raises for him or herself, without recourse to forms of ‘collective 
faith’ – the ‘apparatus’ that may otherwise answer ‘for’ the subject and so prescribe his or 
her understanding. Rudkin wants to fragment audience response. The idea – once again – is 
to separate the subject from a homogenous public, to distantiate him or her from forms of 
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collectivity and awaken the ‘unsuspected’ exile within. Shakespeare even goes as far as to 
undermine the textual and interpretive authority over the plays his position as author 
should grant him – ‘Now do not quote me on any of this. / I am not sure that any of what I 
say can be found in the text’ – and acknowledges that there can finally be no authoritative 
reading or interpretation of his work (13). By having Shakespeare deny his interpretive 
authority over the plays, Rudkin implicitly denies his interpretive authority over 
Shakespeare. It is finally left up to the individual to interpret the meaning of the play and 
‘Shakespeare’.  
 
Conclusion  
 
 
This chapter has analysed the David Rudkin play Will’s Way. I have shown that the 
representation of Shakespeare in the play is indebted to the vital concepts of self re-
authorship and exile. I have also shown that Edgar provides a paradigmatic image of a self 
re-authoring subject, and has had profound influence on the way Rudkin conceptualizes 
dramatic character and his understanding of his own authorial subjectivity and process. By 
drawing on the work of Adorno, I have illustrated that exile can be seen as an alternative to 
the reification of the subject in mass, post-Auschwitz society and culture. I have shown that 
Rudkin extends that conception of exile – and its critique of a reified subject – to both 
identity politics and the dehumanizing system of capitalist exchange, as it is totalized by a 
late capitalist social system. I have also sought to show that Rudkin is indebted to the ‘late’ 
modernism of Adorno and its conceptualization of aesthetic form. By subverting aesthetic 
closure, Rudkin instantiates a Catastrophist aesthetic that, in the same vein as King Lear, 
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retains the non-identity of subject and society. This violation of formal resolution plays a 
vital role in the way Rudkin understands aesthetic response: by subverting closure, Rudkin 
intends to fragment his audience, to individuate – or exile – the subject from collectivity and 
collective action.  
Not unlike David Rudkin, Howard Barker has described himself as an ‘exile par 
excellence’ and fundamentally ‘incomprehensible’ to those around him, with his plays 
representing ‘a challenge to the whole principle of enlightenment’ and the ideology of 
‘liberal humanism’.614  This position of non-identity, as I will show in the next chapter, is for 
Barker profoundly bound up with questions of ethics and morality, the idea of the ‘good 
life’.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
614
 Howard Barker/Eduardo Houth, A Style and Its Origins (London: Oberon, 2007), p. 25. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
238 
 
Chapter Six 
 
‘WHAT IS THIS GOOD?’: The Ethics and Aesthetics of the ‘Good Life’ in Howard Barker’s 
Seven Lears 
 
‘Anti-morality, in rejecting what is immoral in morality, inherits the deepest concerns of 
morality’ – Theodor Adorno.615 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyse the Howard Barker play Seven Lears.616 The play was originally 
staged at the Leicester Haymarket Theatre in 1989 and was amongst the first plays 
produced by The Wrestling School, a company solely dedicated to staging Barker plays, with 
Kenny Ireland taking the role of director.617 The play is a prodigiously imaginative ‘prequel’ 
to King Lear that (ostensibly) portrays the ‘Seven Ages’ of Lear in a series of tableaux-like 
scenes, which depict Lear as he progresses from boyhood to old age – some time before the 
action of King Lear begins. The play also presents the famously ‘missing’ wife/mother from 
King Lear, who is given the name Clarissa.618 Over the action of the play and its series of 
scenes – entitled First Lear, Second Lear and so on, with an ‘Interlude’ between Fourth and 
                                                          
615
 Minima Moralia, p. 95. 
616
 Howard Barker, Seven Lears and Golgo (London: John Calder, 1990). All references to Seven Lears are from 
the John Calder edition, except where otherwise indicated. I refer to the text using scene and page numbers. 
Some of the text is in bold, which usually indicates a forcefully articulated idea or anger. 
617
 See Andy Smith, ‘“I am not what I was”: Adaptation and Transformation in The Theatre of Catastrophe and 
the Wrestling School’, ed. Karoline Gritzner and David Ian Rabey Theatre of Catastrophe: New Essays on 
Howard Barker (London: Oberon, 2006), pp. 40-42.  
618
 While Lear mentions his father in the play, his mother is – ironically – notable for her absence.  
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
239 
 
Fifth Lears that alludes to the ‘interlude!’ (V.iii.93) of King Lear – Clarissa tries to make Lear 
‘See better’ (I.i.161) – to make him fit ‘the hand of intelligence into the glove of 
government’ (4:26). Lear, however, engages in a series of disastrous misadventures that 
imperil ‘the tender of a wholesome weal’ (I.iv.196). ‘Sixth Lear’ ends with the murder of 
Clarissa – in which the whole Lear family participates – while ‘Seventh Lear’ ends with the 
total destruction of the commons, represented in the play by a Chorus, which is finally 
hanged.  
 I will show that, in his appropriation of King Lear, Barker is primarily concerned with 
the question of morality and ethics – the possibility of the ‘good life’ (Seven Lears is 
subtitled The Pursuit of the Good). Barker appropriates King Lear to enact a radical 
interrogation of conventional philosophical and ethical understandings of the good life and 
the idea, which has its roots in antiquity, of the ‘common good’ – the notion that the 
common good of society takes priority over the individual and should ethically orientate his 
or her actions. The revised understanding of morality and ethics Barker develops through his 
appropriation of King Lear insists that the good life rests, not as thinkers from Aristotle to 
Kant and Rawls would have it, in conformity with the common good of life in the 
community, but in autonomy, in a state of non-identical deviance from that community and 
its ‘good’.    
The reading of Seven Lears I develop will concentrate on the way Barker re-visions 
Lear, whom Barker has called ‘perhaps the greatest tragic figure in the modern world’.619 I 
show that Barker sets out to upend a humanist reading of King Lear that he takes to have 
become routine. He does so by subverting the conventional image of Lear as an initially 
hubristic but finally humbled and all-too-human figure, who – through his own sufferings – 
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comes to recognize the suffering of others, reconciles with those he has wronged and even 
begins to provide a powerful critique of his failure to attend to the common good of his 
Kingdom. Barker produces a Lear who fails to ‘repeal and reconcile’ (III.iv.114) with others, 
challenging the reconciliatory figure that has often been read out of King Lear. This 
Catastrophist appropriation of King Lear principally involves a subversion of the storm 
scenes, where Lear laments his failure to provide for the common good of society and prays 
for the impoverished ‘naked wretches’ (III.iv.28). ‘When Shakespeare made Lear rage did he 
not love him more than when, humiliated and broken by events, he brings him to the brink 
of an apology?’620 
This analysis will involve a close reading of Seven Lears and King Lear. It will also 
involve some performance analysis of the original 1989 staging, which forms part of the 
Exeter Digital Archives. The recording does not comprise the whole of the play and the film 
is of relatively poor quality, but the recording does shed some light on the way Nicholas Le 
Provost (who played Lear) embodied Catastrophist ‘turns’ in both body and voice. I also 
draw on and analyse some of the critical writings Barker has produced in relation to his 
conception of the Theatre of Catastrophe. I will refer particularly to his Arguments for a 
Theatre, which was originally published in 1989 – the same year Seven Lears was written 
and staged. By analysing a range of critical as well as theatrical works, I want to 
demonstrate the vital role Seven Lears – and indeed King Lear – plays in the development of 
Catastrophist form. I will also draw on the original interview I conducted with Barker in 
2016.621  
Prior to developing a close-reading of King Lear and Seven Lears, it will be necessary 
to give a more complete picture of ethics in the writings of Adorno and the recent ethical 
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‘turn’ in Adorno Studies. Barker has described Adorno as his ‘philosophical master’ and self-
consciously echoes Adorno when he observes ‘the death of Enlightenment in the ashes of 
Auschwitz’.622 My analysis of Seven Lears will show that Barker, in producing his profoundly 
divergent conception of the good life, is influenced by Adorno. Most obviously, Barker takes 
his cue from Minima Moralia, a work which is preoccupied with the ‘melancholy science’ of 
the ‘good life’ in the ‘damaged world’ of post-Auschwitz culture.623 Minima Moralia is the 
Adorno work Barker is most familiar with and indebted to, both in terms of themes and the 
fragmentary Catastrophist style Barker has developed (he even once said that it was, for a 
long time, his ‘bedtime reading’).624 I will draw on both Minima Moralia and Problems of 
Moral Philosophy, a 1963 series of talks in which Adorno addresses questions of ethics and 
morality.625  
 
1. Adorno and Ethics  
 
1.1. Ethics versus Morality and the Value of Mündigkeit 
 
 
J.M. Bernstein remarks that ‘No reading of the works of Adorno can fail to be struck by the 
ethical intensity of his writing’.626 Adorno is not always consistent in his usage, but he does 
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draw a distinction between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’.627 This division broadly inheres to the 
Hegelian distinction between ethical life (Sittlichkeit) – the ‘customs’ (Sitten) and rules that 
make up the life, the ethos, of the community – and moral will (Moralität) – which connotes 
the moral self-reflexivity of the individual subject. Where for Adorno ethics is made up of 
the customary ‘rules’ of the community, which interpret actions and people based on 
prescribed standards, such as ‘Right’ or ‘Wrong’, morality denotes autonomous moral 
reflection, the ability to consider and critique the ethical norms and values of the 
community. The split between morality and ethics – between individual moral agency and a 
collective ethos – is the split between the subject and society, which is ‘the decisive problem 
of moral philosophy’.628  
The problem with post-Auschwitz culture is that it is so ethically integrated the 
subject has been robbed of the capacity self-reflexively to motivate and direct practical and 
moral orientation. The particular (subject, morality) has been completely drowned by the 
universal (society, ethics). This process can, in its most dangerous form, be seen to have 
created the conditions under which Auschwitz was made possible. Adorno contends that 
the Holocaust typifies the way in which individual subjects failed morally to interrogate the 
ethos of society as a whole – which in the case of Nazi Germany meant the total destruction 
of so-called inferior races for the ‘good’ of the Aryan community.629 Auschwitz represents a 
totalized system in which subjects were completely incapacitated; but it also reveals the 
morally complacent and compliant response from subjects that failed to reflect on the 
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‘ethical’ ends of the community. If Auschwitz requires a newly configured understanding of 
ethics and morality, it is the imperative of abandoning communitive appeals to ethical life 
and resuscitating a morally diminished subject undergoing ‘the last surrender of his will’ 
(King Lear, I.i.295).  
Adorno understands the development of ethical norms and values to be imbricated 
in the dialectic of Enlightenment. He contends that Enlightenment thought – most obviously 
represented by Kant and Hegel – stresses the idea of rational moral freedom. Such thought, 
however, also had it that rational moral laws are socially and historically embedded in the 
ethical customs of the state, which institutes the common good of all. This means that 
freedom ultimately relapses into heteronomy, as the subject is called upon to act in 
conformity with already established ethical customs. Adorno does not refer to Eichmann in 
his writings; but, as Arendt shows, Eichmann made the case that he derived his idea of 
‘duty’ to the ethical laws of the state from Enlightenment philosophers – even contending 
he was a Kantian.630     
Adorno does not reduce the Enlightenment or its ethical philosophy to a single 
thinker. He does not even limit the dialectic of Enlightenment to the era of Enlightenment, 
but performs a foundational critique of Western philosophy from the classical era onwards, 
as I have shown in Chapter One.631 This means Adorno provides a deep-seated critique of all 
standing philosophies that stress the dominance of communal ethical life over and above 
the moral autonomy of the subject. This critique comprises Aristotle, who famously insists 
on the ‘natural priority’ of society – the polis – over the individual subject in his 
Nicomachean Ethics, to Hegel, who similarly prioritizes the established order in his 
conception of the precedence which ethical life takes over the moral will and desires of the 
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individual subject.632 Adorno contends that communitarian ethics perpetuates illusions of 
social integration that potentially tolerate and rationalize the destruction of the individual 
subject – as seen in the Holocaust. The type of open-ended, moral self-reflexivity Adorno 
calls for does not refer to any established form of communal life. Adorno stresses subjective 
reflection over and above collectivist ethics or an all-encompassing plan for ‘right action’ 
and ‘the good life’. He writes: ‘the very possibility of the good life in the forms in which the 
community exists, which confront the subject in pre-existing form, has been radically 
eroded’.633  
This has obvious repercussions for the way in which Adorno conceptualizes the 
distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. For most communitarian ethical theories, the good life 
involves living in alignment with society and its common good, while evil involves subverting 
the common good of all – most often when the individual prioritizes his/her personal 
advantage. But for Adorno, good and evil relate to the presence or absence of critical 
consciousness. Evil, as Adorno understands it, connotes the violent forms of social 
integration (Auschwitz is, for Adorno, ‘radically evil’).634 Under the totalized conditions of 
post-Auschwitz culture, ‘goodness’ and ‘the good life’ begin to be understood as the ability 
to engage in moral reflection, to deliberate on the ethical norms and values of the 
collective. This experience of moral self-reflection is for Adorno ‘good’ in itself; it is not the 
case that the subject posits positive ‘rules’ that should be adhered to as part of his/her 
moral thinking.635  
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It is, Adorno believes, the ongoing ‘quest’ for moral reflection that constitutes the 
‘good life’ in post-Auschwitz culture – and indeed holds out the hope that Auschwitz will not 
happen again. The word that Adorno uses to signify such critical self-reflection is 
Mündigkeit. He writes that ‘the single genuine power standing against the principle of 
Auschwitz is Mündigkeit’, which is the ‘power of reflection, of self-determination, of not co-
operating’.636 Mündigkeit means engaging in proper moral inquiry, in a way that places 
inherited ethical norms and values into question without prescribing positive ‘rules’ that 
must be obeyed. It signifies a capacity to take a critical stand, but a stand which is also 
vigilantly conscious of its own fallibility (and revised by continuous self-criticism) as opposed 
to propagating ethical laws. Bound up with the operation of critique, for Adorno morality 
involves  
 
self-conscious non-cooperation with institutionalized forms of social unfreedom and 
with prevailing norms and values. Adorno maintains that practical resistance to the 
bad is possible even in the absence of any positive or ‘normative’ conception of the 
good.637  
 
This notion of the non-co-operator, of the non-corporate subject, aligns the morally 
reflexive subject with a figure that Aristotle calls the azux – the ‘apolitical’ being who does 
not contribute to the common good of the community.638 This non-corporate subject is, for 
Aristotle, ‘like an isolated piece in a game of draughts’.639 But the non-co-operator is for 
Adorno the properly moral post-Auschwitz subject and even provides a new image of the 
good life. 
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Adorno makes the case that properly moral questions tend to arise in moments of 
crisis and disaster, when the prevailing norms of thought and conduct have ‘ceased to be 
self-evident and unquestioned in the life of the community’.640 This destruction of 
collectively ethical values is not necessarily something to mourn. On the contrary: as far as 
Adorno is concerned, complaints about the decay of traditional values are invariably 
undertaken from a reactionary position, which decries any deformation in ethical life as a 
public crisis of ‘morality’, as opposed to an opportunity for moral reflection and 
interrogation. Far more concerning for Adorno is the problem that outmoded ethical norms 
continue to ‘live on’. Even as ethical customs dissolve and cease to be self-evident, such 
customs are even more forcefully insisted upon, diminishing the space required for the type 
of moral reflection that should take place when the prevailing ethos is shown to be 
problematic – if not insupportable. While moral questions arise when the collective ethos is 
no longer undisputed or commonly shared, ethics continue to stake a claim to universality – 
often violently. 
It should hardly be surprising to find that – for Adorno – the most pernicious 
manifestation of outmoded ethical ideas continuing to live on is ‘after’ Auschwitz. Adorno 
contends that the universal humanist values promoted by Enlightenment thought – 
freedom, rationality, progress, ethics and the common good, the rule of civil and political 
society and so on – were revealed by Auschwitz to have an authoritarian aspect that renders 
such values in desperate need of moral and conceptual critique – and indeed of revision. 
Even so, the humanist values of Enlightenment, which dialectically reversed into total moral 
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catastrophe, continue to have a sort of ‘zombified’ afterlife and are still thought of as being 
universally valid.641  
Upheavals which disintegrate the social and political order have the potential to 
become sites of moral self-reflexivity, even constituting an inaugural experience of morality. 
The problem with post-Auschwitz culture, as Adorno understands it, is that its 
standardization of the norm in all areas of social and ethical life means that the subject 
cannot engage in the type of moral reflection which the catastrophe of Auschwitz so 
obviously requires, meaning that the subject once again over-identifies with the ethical life 
of the collective. But for Adorno, spaces of moral self-reflexivity do remain: the discontinuity 
and disorientation that results from social and political crises can be experienced vicariously 
in the domain of aesthetics, most obviously in the fragmented, Catastrophist aesthetics of 
late modernism.  
 
1.2. Ethics and Aesthetics  
 
Several critics have considered the intersection of Adornian ethics and aesthetics – 
particularly James Finlayson and Asaf Angermann.642 Such critics share a conviction that, for 
Adorno, the aesthetic sphere might elicit autonomous moral reflection. This is not because 
the artwork offers paradigms of moral/ethical action. It is precisely by virtue of its failure to 
restate customary ethical ideas that authentic artworks force the subject into individual 
moral self-reflection, without recourse to the various ethical concepts that obtain in the 
community. This is part of the reason that Adorno valorises fragmented late modernist art. 
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By violating aesthetic closure, authentic works of art do not allow for a final statement of 
consensual ethical ideas. This allows the subject to cultivate Mündigkeit, to resist passively 
conforming to ethical precepts that proceed from ‘outside’ the self – and, most perniciously, 
from the Culture Industry. 
Adorno contends that the Culture Industry is ethically regressive. It tends, as Adorno 
understands it, to convey already established ethical ideas that do little to inspire the moral 
autonomy of the subject. Perhaps more than any other cultural form, Adorno is wary of 
narrative. Adorno is suspicious of narrative form because he believes it shares a kinship with 
the Enlightenment master-narrative of the progress of reason – the idea of ongoing cultural 
and historical development. He also – and relatedly – argues that narrative ‘reanimates’ 
anachronistic humanist values which have been invalidated by Auschwitz. This most 
obviously relates to the idea that narrative closure brings an end to conflict and 
contradiction. Adorno contends that narrative form tends to formalize a synthesis between 
the individual (morality) and society (ethics). This is true not only in regards to the content 
of the cultural product in question; it is also true of its formal impact on the audience. The 
aesthetic resolution provided by narrative implicitly works to totalize audience response and 
enforce the (false) identity between subject and society, individual and collective. It is in 
that sense the Culture Industry might be considered ‘Evil’: it does not allow for moral self-
reflexivity.   
It is, Adorno declares, ‘no longer possible to tell a story’: Auschwitz has rendered 
conventional narrative continuity and closure impossible.643 What is true in the domain of 
aesthetics is also true for the stylistic presentation (Darstellung) of philosophical thought. 
Adorno remarks that, for a philosophy that avoids providing universal ethical principles, the 
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only appropriate style is a form that eschews ‘a continuous argument with all the usual 
stages’ in favour of ‘a series of partial complexes whose constellation not sequence 
produces the idea’.644 The moral problem with a more conventional style of an argument, 
which pursues a continuous case with ‘all the usual stages’ before reaching a comprehensive 
conclusion, is that it risks producing a systematic statement, even a final plan, about the 
way in which good life and the good society might be realized. It involves a set of 
prescriptive ethical ideas as opposed to a more speculative and open-ended form of moral 
inquiry.  
This obviously sheds light on the form of Minima Moralia. Minima Moralia is, as I set 
out in Chapter Five, a deeply fragmentary work made up of short reflections and aphorisms, 
which moves from everyday experiences to disturbing insights on the wider cultural 
tendencies of post-war society. The way in which Minima Moralia is organized (or, perhaps 
more appropriately, disorganized) is testament to perhaps its most famous insight – ‘The 
whole is the false’.645 The fragments that go to make up the work disallow any sense of 
argumentative progression or a holistic philosophical ‘theory’ that establishes the rules for 
the ‘good life’. This reflects the way Adorno conceptualizes aesthetic response: his 
disintegrated form speaks to a desire to catalyse moral self-reflexivity, to have the subject 
morally engage with the problems his work poses, not passively inculcate ethical 
arguments.646  
If aesthetic experience can catalyse the type of moral reflection that should attend 
on moments of social and political upheaval, then tragedy, with its representation of times 
and spaces of catastrophe, provides a viable aesthetic space for the clash between ethics 
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and morality. I have already shown that Hegel takes up an Aristotelian reading of tragic form 
as the clash between subject and society, individual and collective.647 He also takes up the 
conflict between the tragic hero and the Chorus to elaborate his distinction between 
Moralität – the moral will of the individual subject – and Sittlichkeit, or the customs and 
laws that make up the established ethical life of the polity. The upshot of that conflict, as 
Hegel perceives it, is that the subject pursues a moral claim that is overly partial – overly 
individual – and, as a result, imperils the universal system of rights embodied in and by the 
community, represented by the Chorus. Either the tragic hero realizes the partiality of his or 
her claim or dies. The individual must be absorbed by the universal: morality must give way 
to ethics.648  
Tragedy does not, however, have formally to resolve the contradiction between 
moral autonomy and communal ethical ‘necessity’. By prioritizing the moral will of the 
individual subject over and above the ethos of the community and by deconstructing 
narrative progress and closure, Adorno opens the way for a Catastrophist form of tragedy 
that insists on moral autonomy. It is precisely that morally autonomous, tragic form Barker 
aspires to create. I now turn to Barker and the historical and formal origins of the Theatre of 
Catastrophe. I show that the genesis of the Theatre of Catastrophe can be understood in 
terms of the distinction between communitarian ethics and subjective morality, where 
Barker understands the ethical and political culture of late capitalism to be moving toward 
an increasingly totalized consensus that compromises the moral autonomy and will of the 
individual.  
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2. The Theatre of Catastrophe 
 
 
2.1. The Theatre of Catastrophe  
 
 
Barker, who was born in South London in 1946 to a working-class family, began his 
playwriting career as an avowedly political writer, part (if always a distinctive part) of the 
wider wave of post-1968 British playwriting, which produced provocative socialist drama 
clearly influenced by the Marxist epic theatre of Brecht and the post-war interest in social 
realism.649 Over the 1970s, Barker produced a range of startling ‘State of the Nation’ plays, 
from his landmark Claw (1975) to That Good Between Us (1977) and The Hang of the Gaol 
(1978).650 These darkly satirical plays portray the many ‘squandered opportunities of the 
British Left’ while also critiquing ‘the demagogic and atavistic tendencies of the extreme 
Right’.651  
Early in the 1980s, however, Barker began to question his political outlook – or at 
least the notion that theatre might provide a useful vehicle for political and ethical analysis 
and agitation. He remarked in 1981 on a personal and artistic ‘sense of overcoming’ and the 
‘stirrings of some change in form’.652 This formal and thematic shift would be reflected in a 
new preoccupation with tragedy. Over the course of the 1980s, Barker became increasingly 
drawn to the dramatic idiom of tragedy. In his 1986 article for The Guardian, ‘Forty-Nine 
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Asides for a Tragic Theatre’, Barker sets out a series of aphorisms in which he (elliptically) 
advances his conception of a new tragic form and, crucially, its relevance to a new cultural 
and historical moment. Barker writes that ‘Tragedy resists the trivialization of experience’; 
that tragedy ‘restores pain to the individual’; and that ‘Tragedy is not about 
reconciliation’.653 Barker would increasingly identify his new tragic form as ‘The Theatre of 
Catastrophe’ over the mid to late 1980s, with The Bite of the Night (written 1986, staged in 
1988) and a series of other plays – The Possibilities and The Last Supper (1988) and Seven 
Lears and Golgo (1989) – all representative of the shift towards a Catastrophist form of 
tragedy.654 
Of the playwrights under study, none has theorized the role that tragedy and the 
autonomous tragic subject might play in the totalized milieu of contemporary, post-
Auschwitz society as powerfully as Barker, most obviously in his Arguments for a Theatre 
(1989) and his other critical works, Death, the One and the Art of Theatre (2004) and A Style 
and Its Origins (2007). Barker, in the same vein as Adorno before him, believes that 
progressive humanist ideals, derived from the Enlightenment, have produced ‘a culture of 
moral totality’.655 Most of all, Barker is suspicious of liberal humanist democracy in a period 
of late capitalist totalization. This, as Barker understands it, represents a new consensus 
around which the political Left and Right have homogenized, a theme that Barker returns to 
time and again in his critical writings of the mid to late 1980s.656 Barker contends that late 
capitalist society is dominated by shared liberal values that leave little room for proper 
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moral interrogation – a collectively approved ethos that dominates the social and ethical 
‘ecology’ of global capitalist life. This ethical consensus involves a ‘by-passing of moral will’ 
and ‘moral suicide’.657  
Barker understands the contemporary cultural moment as ‘authoritarian and 
totalitarian in its propagation of false humanistic ideals’.658 This totalizing ethical consensus 
also comprises culture and theatre. Barker, once again evincing the influence of Adorno, 
makes the case that late capitalist society has produced a totalizing world of administered 
‘mass’ consumption – a Culture Industry, which propagates anodyne liberal humanist values 
for the public and its ‘good’.659 This even comprises politically oppositional art and theatre, 
with Barker identifying the prevailing orthodoxy of political art as ‘liberal-humanist, left-
leaning, socially progressive’.660 Such theatre is – for Barker – guilty of promulgating already 
established ethical values that do little to inspire the moral freedom of the subject; it tends 
to emit ‘normative calls to be “good subjects”, “good citizens”’.661 Barker writes: ‘All 
mechanical art, all ideological art (the entertaining, the informative) intensifies the pain but 
simultaneously heightens the unarticulated desire for the restitution of moral 
speculation’:662 
 
it is precisely the hinge between the independence of the moral will, claimed and 
performed [by the tragic protagonist] and the crushing imperatives of public order 
and its necessary pieties, that a drama of moral speculation discovers its resources, 
and fractures the repression of experience that characterizes a culture industry […] 
bent on […] seamless narratives.663 
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It is the totalization of ethical and political life which underpins the turn to tragedy and the 
tragic subject in the Theatre of Catastrophe. ‘Tragedy is the art form of resistance in an age 
such as ours’, writes Barker, ‘it resists incorporation by its very form’.664 Barker views 
tragedy and the tragic as the properly critical, morally negative aesthetic form in an era of 
ethical totality precisely because it stages the clash between the moral will of the tragic 
hero and the dominant ethical norms and values of the community. Only where 
conventional (Aristotelian/Hegelian) tragedy usually punishes moral transgression – 
‘Aristotle and tragedy – nothing so great that it cannot be annexed in the interests of the 
social order’, quips Barker – in the Theatre of Catastrophe the clash between morality and 
ethics is never resolved.665 Quite the contrary: Barker insists on the continued non-identity 
of the tragic subject, who resists the ethos of the community and remains morally 
irreconcilable. The Catastrophist subject typifies the idea of Mündigkeit – the power of not 
co-operating. There is, as Barker provocatively contends, no ‘possibility of the Solution’: for 
even ‘an idea as seemingly innocuous as Harmony hides within it the shadow of the torture 
chamber’.666  
 The way in which Barker conceptualizes moral autonomy owes an obvious debt to 
Adorno. In the most recent (2016) edition of his Arguments for a Theatre, the word ‘moral’ 
appears on forty-six occasions, as does the word ‘morality’.667 The way in which Barker uses 
the words moral and morality shifts. On the one hand, the word ‘moral’ often signifies for 
Barker in the same way that ethics signifies for Adorno – as the constraining precepts of the 
commons. On the other hand, ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ can also signify a situation in which the 
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suspension of obligatory ethical values invites autonomous moral reflection and action. ‘I 
am a moralist, but not a puritan’, states Barker: ‘By moralist I mean one who is tough with 
morality, who exposes it to risk, even to oblivion’.668 Elisabeth Angel-Perez writes that 
Barker is ‘a moral activist who paradoxically discards all set morals’.669 This abandonment of 
ethics, in the service moral freedom, is something that ‘Auschwitz has horrendously 
compelled us to realise and which is confirmed by the genocidal episodes of recent 
history’.670  
 Barker also draws on Adorno for his fragmentary aesthetic form. Most of all, his 
plays evince the profound influence of Minima Moralia and its miscellany of thoughts. The 
Theatre of Catastrophe shares with Minima Moralia a fractured non-narrative aesthetic. 
Barker tends to present, in place of an overarching ‘story’, a series of constellatory scenes – 
or individuated ‘minima moralia’ that speculate on various themes and ideas, often of an 
ethical and/or moral quality. ‘Narrative itself is the principal component in the construction 
of moral meaning’, writes Barker: ‘What occurs in the form of consecutive scenes, or in real 
time played out on the stage, inevitably implies a moral perspective’.671 With the 
totalization of ethical life in late capitalist society, Barker turns to the fragmentary, non-
narrative style of Frankfurt School aesthetics in a bid to produce a more open-ended form of 
moral speculation.     
Part of the challenge that Barker has mounted against collectivist ethics are his 
profoundly disorientating appropriations of plays (and other works) that have been 
integrated into the modern liberal humanist canon, which are typically reduced to a state of 
catastrophic aesthetic fragmentation. Such plays have been identified as promoting 
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universally valid ethical values, which Barker sets out to subvert, opening the space for 
autonomous moral interrogation. These have included appropriations of Thomas Middleton 
(Women Beware Women – 1986), Thomas More (Brutopia – 1990), Gotthold Lessing (Minna 
– 1994), and, perhaps most notoriously, Anton Chekhov ((Uncle) Vanya – 1992).672 The place 
that Shakespeare occupies in the Theatre of Catastrophe is, however, more fraught. I want 
now to consider the relationship between the Theatre of Catastrophe and Shakespearean 
tragedy. I will show that – for Barker – Shakespeare is the figure who stands atop the liberal 
humanist canon and, at the same time, represents a powerful antecedent for his own 
Catastrophist form.  
 
2.2. The Theatre of Catastrophe and Shakespeare: The ‘Monstrous Assault’ as an ‘Act of 
Reverence’ 
 
 
Barker is deeply ambivalent about Shakespeare. On the one hand, Shakespeare is the 
playwright that Barker has returned to and appropriated most frequently – in his 1971 
satirical radio play Henry V in Two Parts, in Seven Lears and his landmark 2002 appropriation 
of Hamlet, Gertrude – The Cry. Barker has also identified Shakespeare as the only playwright 
who is a conscious influence on his writing, lamenting the ‘tragedy’ that Shakespeare is now 
a ‘negligible influence on the tone of contemporary writing in Britain’.673 On the other hand, 
Barker has dismissed outright the idea – routinely peddled by critics and dramatists alike – 
of a debt or an artistic resemblance to Shakespeare as ‘sheer ignorance’. ‘The critical class 
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knows nothing about creativity’, moans Barker, and so is only able to make ‘facile 
identifications.’674  
Whenever critiquing Shakespeare, Barker seems torn between the disruptive 
potential that he acknowledges in the works of his early modern predecessor and the 
embodiment of canonical literary and ethical value that Shakespeare has come to represent. 
Barker states that ‘Shakespeare was the last English writer who was not a moralist’ and 
praises the catastrophic situations in which he unleashes his protagonists, stating that the 
distinctive feature of Shakespearean drama is a situation of ‘crisis’ – or catastrophe.675 
Barker is, however, also deeply suspicious of Shakespeare. While praising Shakespearean 
tragedy for its refusal to propagate prescribed ethical ideas – ‘meaningless pain is the thing 
that drives Shakespeare into his highest ecstasies’, writes Barker – he also contends that 
Shakespeare has come to embody the literary and theatrical canon, his plays turned into 
symbols of the presiding ethos of liberal humanist Western culture and its ideals about self 
and society. 676   
King Lear, as I observed in the Introduction, has displaced Hamlet to stand atop of 
the Shakespeare canon in the post-war era.677 It has, as I have shown, been interpreted 
through various matrices in that time. But for Barker, it is the Christian-humanist 
interpretive schema, which is derived from the storm scenes and the way Lear identifies 
with the poor, that has come to dominate conceptions of King Lear in the popular 
imaginary, even becoming the culturally dominant understanding of the play and its 
‘meaning’. In his interview with the author, Barker contends that King Lear has been 
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‘contaminated’ with a culturally ‘fixed Christian, humanist view’ and ‘absurd’ liberal 
platitudes.678 
Barker questions the prevailing humanist conception of King Lear. Barker sees King 
Lear as a ‘savage play’, which violates both aesthetic closure and conventional ethical 
‘meanings’ – an aspect of the play typified by the violent, catastrophic deaths of Lear and 
Cordelia. It would, Barker observes, be ‘whimsical’ to try and make the case that ‘the 
humiliation and death of Cordelia was a sacrifice to the eventual civilizing of King Lear’.679 It 
is, however, precisely the ‘civilizing’ of Lear that – for Barker – has come to dominate 
common understandings of the play. King Lear has, for Barker, been turned from a ‘savage 
play’ into ‘a placid story’.680 This shift from ‘play’ to ‘story’ is telling: Barker makes the case 
that King Lear has been transformed from a violent and morally challenging play into a 
placid and ethically recognizable story, a Bildung narrative which charts the ethical 
enlightenment of Lear, from a wildly tyrannical despot to a chastened and compassionate 
humanitarian.  
Barker, in his appropriation of King Lear, is less concerned to challenge the play 
‘itself’ than to question the social and political uses it has been conscripted to serve: ‘The 
depth of social and political investment in classic texts, ironically enhanced by apparently 
daring modernizations can only be properly shifted by an equivalent bravery made by a new 
interrogation’.681 He writes that to ‘deface a monument, to smear a public property, is an 
act of reverence more profound, because of the investment of will, than any common 
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genuflection of the uncritical believer’.682 The act of appropriation is – for Barker – an act of 
desecrating violence, a ‘monstrous assault’; but it is also ‘an act of reverence’.683 Barker 
undertakes a violent onslaught against King Lear, but, both ‘more and less reverential’ in his 
approach to the play, he does so in order to ‘open up’ its ‘moral fissures’, to show the play 
for the ‘frail and naked exposition of feeling, tender and afraid, that it once was’.684 This is a 
critical point: the violation of King Lear is, at the same time, an act of fidelity – even 
recovery. Barker is appropriating (or re-appropriating) a play which, despite being used to 
serve liberal humanist ideology, is genealogically Catastrophist in its transgression of ethics 
and aesthetics.685 
This is a reading which allows for a timely reconsideration of the place Seven Lears 
occupies in the Barker oeuvre, while also revealing the critical role played by appropriations 
of King Lear in the development of a Catastrophist aesthetic that challenges the 
standardization of post-Auschwitz culture and subjectivity. The appropriations of 
Shakespeare that Barker has undertaken all take place at critical moments in his 
development as a playwright. His very early 1971 appropriation Henry V in Two Parts is a 
satirical radio play that critiques the ‘war criminal’ Henry from a socialist perspective, while 
Barker has identified the 2002 play Gertrude – The Cry as a formative moment in the 
development of the Art of Theatre, with its fascination for the sacred and death.686 While it 
has drawn some attention from critics, however, Seven Lears has often been overlooked in 
Barker Studies in favour of Gertrude – The Cry, which is usually taken to be the more 
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‘significant’ Shakespeare appropriation – a valuation endorsed by Barker himself, who 
describes Gertrude – The Cry as his ‘greatest play’.687 But while Gertrude – The Cry has 
usually been considered the key Shakespeare appropriation, Seven Lears represents a 
formative moment in the development of Catastrophism and the way Barker conceptualizes 
aesthetics and morality.  
The most obvious intervention that Barker makes against the Christian-humanist 
interpretation of King Lear is his transformation of Lear himself, who fails to fit into a 
narrative of redemptive enlightenment. I will show that, in Seven Lears, Barker purposefully 
sets up the prospect of a politically-motivated feminist interrogation of King Lear (and Lear) 
which is subverted, as his play revolves around Lear and his morally transgressive bid for 
autonomy.  
 
3. Seven Lears 
 
3.1. ‘I am not what I was’: ‘De-Humanizing’ King Lear  
 
In the ‘Programme Notes’ for the original 1989 production of Seven Lears, Barker gives a 
short introductory statement on King Lear and its ‘missing mother’, which, though it 
appears in the 1990 John Calder edition, is missing from 2005 Oberon Barker: Plays Five 
edition:  
 
King Lear is a family tragedy with a significant absence. 
The Mother is denied existence in King Lear. 
She is barely quoted even in the depths of rage or pity. 
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She was therefore expunged from memory. 
This extinction can only be interpreted as repression. 
She was therefore the subject of an unjust hatred. 
This hatred was shared by Lear and all his daughters. 
This hatred, while unjust, may have been necessary.688  
 
This short introduction is typical of Catastrophist form and its subversion of expectations. 
Everything about the Introduction to Seven Lears indicates a politically interrogatory 
feminist interpretation of King Lear: the idea that the play is ‘a family tragedy’; that the 
‘absence’ of the wife/mother – and the apparent failure to ‘quote’ her – is symptomatic of 
‘repression’; and that she was the victim of an ‘unjust hatred’. It would seem Barker is 
intending to write the missing mother back ‘in’ to King Lear in order to interrogate the play 
and its privileging of male subjectivities. The final remarks in the Introduction, however, 
subvert the idea of an ideologically feminist hermeneutics: for while the ‘hatred’ is deemed 
‘unjust’, it ‘may have been necessary’. The idea of a ‘hatred’ which is unjustified but 
‘necessary’ nonetheless complicates the idea of socially unjust familial and patriarchal 
‘repression’. Barker writes that his appropriation of King Lear is not undertaken with a 
prescribed identity politics in mind, or ‘prompted by a spasm of feminist sensibility’.689 Such 
a concept of political identity would – as Barker perceives it – be part and parcel of a socially 
progressive form of theatre that aims at some form of public ‘good’. Despite its professed 
prioritization of the mother figure, Seven Lears concentrates on the character of Lear, for 
whom Barker has an ‘unhealthy curiosity’– a reversal that has drawn the ire of some 
feminist critics.690 Barker is drawn to the missing mother because – as far as he sees it – the 
silence around her is a ‘dark space’ that betrays a profound moral transgression, a 
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transgression that complicates normative understandings about the nature of ‘goodness’ 
and ‘necessity’.691  
By writing a prequel and calling it Seven Lears – which recalls Jacques from As You 
Like It and his famous ‘Seven Ages of Man’ speech, though it may also echo the ‘seven stars’ 
(I.v.21) of the Fool in King Lear – Barker implies that his Lear-play will portray something 
akin to a Bildungsroman, a coming-of-age that represents the ethical and spiritual 
development of the hero. Barker, however, offers something far less predictable – and a far 
less predictable Lear. The play, far from providing the progression of conventional narrative 
form, is made up of a series of individuated scenes, from the ‘First’ iteration of the Lear 
figure to the final ‘Seventh’ iteration of Lear. These fragmentary tableaux all depict Lear as 
he violates his personal and political obligations for the good life of the Kingdom, his 
‘citizens’ and – indeed – his family. These range from initiating a disastrous war without any 
obvious purpose in Third Lear – ‘disaster was not the failure – but the purpose of the War!’ 
(3:16-17) – to inventing a flying machine that requires an immense and catastrophic 
diversion of resources, which are desperately required elsewhere, in Fourth Lear – ‘For this 
a hundred children starved’ (4:28) – to attempting to drown the infant Cordelia in a barrel of 
gin, only to ‘rescue’ her from death at the final moment: ‘Oh, was that a good thing, hey?’ 
(6:46).  
From the inordinately sensitive ‘child’ Lear in First Lear to the ageing and increasingly 
senile ‘Lear’ in Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Lears, the ‘Seven’ Lears presented in the play might 
represent Lear as he ‘progresses’ from boyhood to old age, but that hardly covers the 
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vertiginous volatility which Lear embodies.692 Barker is – as I set out above – most 
concerned to contest the image of Lear derived from the storm scenes. These scenes 
famously depict a raving Lear who, deprived of the usual ‘accommodations’ (IV.xi.84) that 
attend on his position, is reduced to the same state as the ‘Poor naked wretches’ that make 
up his Kingdom. Based on his discovery of his own common, suffering humanity and the 
empathy for the less fortunate his pain engenders, Lear begins to regret his past ‘blindness’ 
and even begins to develop a more humane conception of the social and political 
community he rules over, which he suddenly recognizes he has taken all ‘too little care’ 
(III.iv.33) of:  
 
Take psychic pomp  
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,  
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them   
And show the heavens more just. (III.iv.33-35)  
 
These scenes, as I demonstrated in Chapters Two, Three and Four, have been critical in 
various Christian, liberal humanist and also Marxist readings of King Lear. Once thrust out 
into the storm, Lear discovers that he is not ‘everything’ – is not ‘ague-proof’ (IV.vi.104) – 
and begins to understand that he has blindly abnegated his responsibility for the Kingdom. 
This leads him to a new political vision of the basis of the common good of the community 
as a whole.  
It is not necessarily wrong to read King Lear as a humanist play. But as David 
Lowenthal shows, such a reading of King Lear ultimately invokes a classically Aristotelian 
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interpretation of the nature of the good life, in which Lear engages with the fundamental 
questions of ‘good political order and life in a community and the principles and activities 
that make that life good’.693 Lear sets out the foundational principles of the good life of the 
community – the way in which the polis may be (re)organized so that the political question 
of the good life, or of the good society, may be addressed and resolved. Even in politically 
radical readings of King Lear that underscore the apparent Bildung of Lear, critics are – as 
Lowenthal shows – recycling conceptions of the common good that stretch all the way back 
to classical antiquity. 
Barker engages with the Aristotelian precepts that underpin the Christian-humanist 
interpretation of King Lear by turning the ‘poor naked wretches’ Lear imagines in the storm 
into a Chorus – a figure more familiar from classical Greek than Shakespearean tragedy. The 
Chorus – notably described in the stage-directions as ‘a Chorus of the poor’ (5:37) – appears 
in the form of a gaol of neglected and ill-treated prisoners, who continually intervene in the 
action of the play to remind Lear of his pressing ethical responsibilities and of the social 
injustice to be found in the Kingdom: ‘Injustice yes / That is the word for it’ (2:7). This 
Choric ‘voice’ is, as Jens Peters also shows, the voice of the social and political community 
and ethical consensus, which repeatedly harangues Lear for his various perceived failures 
and misunderstandings: ‘For every child that dies a kite is flown / Lear / Are you not blind 
with kites?’ (5:36).694  
The clash between Lear and the Chorus is established from the outset of the play – 
First Lear – in which Lear and his brothers originally ‘discover’ the gaol and its suffering 
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prisoners. In the opening moments of the play, Lear and his brothers Arthur and Lud – both 
named, in the same vein as Lear himself, after mythic pre-modern English Kings – stumble 
across a (Rudkin-like) ‘Pit’ in which the ‘enemies’ of the Kingdom are gaoled – ‘THE DEAD 
WHO ARE NOT DEAD YET’ (1:1). Arthur and Lud complacently identify the prisoners as ‘bad’ 
– even abject, ‘filthy’ – confirming themselves as ‘good’ (and, indeed, ‘clean’): ‘We are clean 
children and our mother loves us’ (1:1). But while Arthur and Lud make superficial 
distinctions (good/bad, clean/dirty, pure/smelly, light/dark) based on the ethical norms of 
the Kingdom, Lear has a more reflexive response. Lear intuits that ‘something bad is 
happening’ (as opposed to merely contained) in the Pit and even echoes Hamlet in his 
conviction that the Kingdom – for Hamlet famously nothing but a ‘prison’ (II.ii.233) – is 
founded on ‘something rotten’ (1:1): ‘Something is rotten in the state of Denmark’ (I.iv.95). 
The allusion to Hamlet adumbrates a dawning socio-political consciousness on the part of 
Lear: the ‘badness’ of the prisoners becomes the ‘badness’ (‘rottenness’) of the socio-
political system as a whole, manifest in its failure to inculcate ‘goodness’ in ‘ordinary people’ 
(1:2).  
The discovery of the gaol in the opening moments of the play re-stages the equally 
revelatory discovery Lear makes of the destitute and wretched masses that go to make up 
his own Kingdom – with its unequal distribution of wealth and power – in King Lear. The 
language that First Lear uses in his response to the gaol alludes to and reimagines the 
language used in the storm scenes. The ‘poor naked wretches’ who ‘abide’ the ‘pelting’ of 
the storm are reimagined as the ‘poor wet things’ (1:2) of the gaol – the prisoners have ‘no 
sheets’ (1:1) and so suffer the same ‘looped and windowed raggedness’ (III.ii.31) that Lear 
bewails – while the rattling ‘keys’ (1:1) the princes use to open the gaol similarly revises the 
words of the Fool: ‘Fortune, that arrant whore, / Ne’er turns the key to th’ poor’ (II.vi.45-
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46). ‘I never knew’, reflects Lear on discovering the gaol, ‘the ground was so full of bodies’ 
(1:2). Like his Shakespearean antecedent, First Lear comes to a realization of the suffering of 
others – ‘Lear is thinking of our pain tonight’ (4:25) – and the (ostensible) obligation to put 
an end to that suffering: ‘I shall not be King, because I am not the eldest but…if I were 
King…for one thing…I would put a stop to this!’ (1:2). The storm scenes are even recalled in 
the way that Lear ‘unbuttons’ (III.vi.107) in Seven Lears by ‘Taking off his shirt’ (1:2) and 
removes the ‘lendings’ that furnish otherwise ‘Unaccommodated man’ (III.vi.106) – though 
as his shirt is taken off to provide a ‘penalty spot’ (1:2) for the game of football Arthur and 
Lud insist on, the gesture represents less of a spontaneous identification with the ‘poor’ so 
much as it wittily parallels a speech on the ‘proper approach’ for the ‘correct punishment’ of 
‘bad actions’ (1:2).  
On the basis of his discovery of the gaol and his empathy with its seemingly 
unwarranted suffering – ‘Whatever it did / Whatever it was / How could it justify this?’ 
(1:1) – Lear begins to formulate a philosophical response to the question of the way 
‘government’ might be used to promote the ‘good life’ of the community. ‘The function of 
all government must be –’, Lear reflects, as he tries to talk to his unresponsive siblings, ‘the 
definition of, and subsequent encouragement of goodness, surely?’. ‘You would’, Lear goes 
on:  
 
define goodness in such a way that ordinary people – who at the moment are 
so horribly attracted to bad things and immoral actions – would find it simple 
to appreciate and consequently act upon – (1:2) 
 
In First Lear, Lear has the insight that ‘government’ should work to make people ‘good’ (or, 
at the very least, ‘better’) so that the type of punishment meted out in the gaol would no 
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longer be ‘necessary’ (1:2): ‘No criticism of our father, but I wonder if it is necessary…’ (1:2). 
It is – as far as Barker perceives it – the same role that modern humanist theatre has 
allocated itself, which, as Barker puts it in Arguments for a Theatre, is driven by the 
ostensibly selfless desire to ‘make people better’ – something that Barker sees as being 
offensively paternalistic.695 Lear begins Seven Lears as a rationalistic and ‘enlightened’ – 
‘They have no light!’ (1:2) – liberal-humanist reformer: his belief that the state might be 
used to ‘improve’ people articulates a vision of the common good in which a simple and 
shared understanding of morality – of ‘goodness’ – prevails in the ethical life of the 
community.  
  The problem with the humanistic plan that Lear begins to formulate is that, by 
‘defining goodness’ in a ‘simple’ way that ‘ordinary people’ can ‘understand’ and 
‘consequently act upon’, the autonomous practice of moral reflection on the part of the 
very same subjects putatively made ‘good’ is necessarily inhibited. This, as Adorno writes in 
Negative Dialectics, is the ‘supreme injuria of the law-making subject’: the universalization 
of ethical norms that, far from providing subjective autonomy, come to dominate the 
subject as a form of heteronomy, so that subjects are unable to self-reflexively motivate 
moral reflection and action. 696 Without the struggle – the ‘pursuit’ – of goodness, there 
would be nothing to motivate the will, as the subject simply comes to conform to ethical 
dictates that proceed from the social totality. The way in which Lear formulates ‘goodness’ – 
in other words – denies and diminishes the subject: the rational programme of ethical 
enlightenment that Lear proposes in First Lear partakes of the dialectic of Enlightenment, 
becoming a form of domination that incapacitates the subject. It is, as I show above, such a 
situation that Adorno sees as being so acutely dangerous ‘after’ Auschwitz: as Lear devises 
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it, ‘goodness’ would simply produce unthinking norm-conformity and a homogenized 
subject.   
Lear, however, quickly abandons his burgeoning humanist ideals. In a flash of 
‘inspiration’ – typical of his mercurial changeability – Lear ditches his plan to find a way of 
instituting a shared vision of the good life of the community, coming to an understanding of 
the good that requires the autonomy of the subject, as opposed to diminishing it. He 
declares: 
 
(He stops. He is inspired.) No! No! That’s wrong! The opposite is the case! That’s it! 
You make goodness difficult, if anything. You make it apparently impossible to 
achieve. It then becomes compelling; it becomes a victory, rather as acts of badness 
seem a triumph now. (1:2) 
 
Lear refuses any communal understanding of the good life that would allow ‘ordinary 
people’ simply to comprehend and obey prescribed rules. By making goodness not ‘simple’ 
but virtually ‘impossible to achieve’, Lear prioritizes the moral autonomy and agency of the 
subject. Lear intertextually recalls the language of some of the Barker plays that precede 
Seven Lears: Victory (1983) and The Castle: A Triumph (1985). The ‘victory’ and ‘triumph’ of 
the subject in Seven Lears involves nothing less than resisting the unifying forces of ethics in 
pursuit of autonomous morality. Lear instantly forsakes his ‘civic sense’ (4:31) and denies 
‘responsibility for all’ (3:23). He identifies the good with the moral empowerment – the 
‘substantiation’ (3:23) – of the subject, even where that imperils the well-being of the 
commons.  
This irreconcilable contradiction between Lear and the Chorus, between morality 
and ethics, complicates received ideas around the nature of good and evil and, indeed, the 
nature of the human animal itself. These are the problems I turn to in the next section, 
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where I analyse the questions Seven Lears poses around morality and the idea of human 
commonality.   
 
3.2. Good, Evil and the Human in Seven Lears 
 
 
Lear is not slow to recognize that his ‘pursuit’ of goodness and the good is ethically 
ambiguous – to say the least. ‘The nature of beauty, as of goodness, rests in its power to 
substantiate the self’, reflects Lear in Third Lear, ‘Which is not goodness at all, is it?’ (3:23-
24). By prioritizing the subject over and above the common good of life in the community as 
a whole, Lear allows the Kingdom to crumble, and partakes in acts that range from 
attempted infanticide to various war crimes: ‘Burn the villages! Massacre the infants!’ 
(3:13). ‘I think I am evil!’, howls Lear in Third Lear: ‘Evil because… / Evil accommodates 
every idea’ (3:23).  
The way Barker appropriates the word ‘accommodates’ is typical of the way he 
transforms King Lear. Lear uses the word in his identification with the ‘unaccommodated’ 
poor, damning the ‘accommodations’ (IV.xi.83) – the ‘Robes and furred gowns’ (IV.xi.158) – 
which obfuscate the identity of a King with a beggar and that forestall a conception of the 
common needs and interests that all of suffering humanity shares. But turning ‘the word 
itself and against the word’ (Richard II, V.iii.121), Barker uses the word ‘accommodation’ to 
adumbrate the non-coincidence between Lear and the good life of the polis, as Lear 
accommodates ‘every idea’ no matter of its ‘consequences’ (4:28) for others. ‘Think of the 
people, the people will deduce –’: ‘I decline, I decline, I decline – and all deductions pox’ 
(2:10).  
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Lear recognizes that his understanding of the good is paradoxically close to the 
conventional understanding of ‘evil’: if the good life reckons the common interest, evil – as 
the opposite of the good – conventionally means abrogating the common good, or stressing 
the priority of the subject over and above the needs of the commons. The distinction 
between good and evil becomes hard to disentangle – as apparent in First Lear, when Lear 
states that treating the good as a ‘triumph’ of the will makes acts of goodness akin to ‘acts 
of badness’ (1:2). Lear collapses the usual ethical distinction between good and evil, where 
the ‘evil’ of a subject free of the obligations of the polis becomes – paradoxically – a form of 
‘good’.  
This fraying of the boundaries between good and evil is something that also troubles 
Aristotle in his definition of life ‘outside’ the communal authority of the polis, which would 
require a subject ‘either too bad or too good, either subhuman or superhuman’.697 The azux 
– the non-co-operator – cannot for Aristotle be said to be entirely ‘human’. If humanity is, as 
Aristotle famously contends, the political ‘animal’, the non-co-operator – by virtue of not 
partaking in the human community of the polis – wants some basic quality of the human 
condition.698  
 These questions around the relationship between good, evil and the human pertain 
to Seven Lears. Lear not only denies inclusive notions of the common good, but even the 
whole notion of human(e) commonality itself, which should form the basis of the good life 
of the polis. In Fourth Lear, Barker once again rewrites the action of the storm scene and its 
humanist vision of communal ethics. This time, however, Lear comes face-to-face with a 
Poor Tom-esque beggar, whom Lear completely repudiates. ‘I do think it is funny, that you 
and I have nothing in common’, Lear tells the beggar, ‘Less even than a cow and a crow. Or a 
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worm and a horse. Less than them, even’ (4:26). This catalogue of non-human animal life – 
which recalls King Lear, as Lear cradles the corpse of Cordelia, ‘Why should a dog, a rat, a 
horse have life / And thou no breath at all?’ (V.iii.30-31) – is produced to deny that Lear and 
the beggar even belong to the same kind – the same species. The beggar responds by 
paraphrasing Michel de Montaigne (‘Kings and philosophers shit – and so do ladies’) and 
insists that both he and Lear ‘shit’ and ‘piss’ – though Lear denies the supposed 
‘obviousness’ of a shared mortality and its related elimination of the inhuman and the 
‘uncommon’ (3:14). ‘Perhaps’, Lear plaintively tells the beggar, ‘you are immortal?’ (4: 
27).699  
Where in Shakespeare Lear identifies with Poor Tom – ‘Thou art the thing itself. / 
Unaccommodated man’ (III.vi.103) – in Seven Lears Lear disclaims any sense of basic human 
commonality and, with it, any notion of the common good, of shaking the ‘superflux’ to the 
less fortunate. Lear may arbitrarily promote the beggar to the aristocratic rank of 
Gloucester, but it is not with the selfless intention of making sure ‘each man has enough’ 
(IV.i.79): Lear – tellingly – ignores the mute beggar the newly-risen Gloucester tramps with 
(who, in his mutilated and dependant state, ironically recalls the blinded Gloucester from 
King Lear) and tells him that ‘This is a journey you must make alone’ (4:27) – a haunting 
echo of Kent: ‘I have a journey, sir, shortly to go’ (V.iii.340). The scene reverses the action of 
King Lear: by denying any ‘shared’ (4:27) identity with the beggar, Lear disallows any notion 
of a common ethos or an inclusive understanding of the good life – and even questions the 
hidden motivation for his supposed acts of ‘charity’, which in a distinctly Nietzschean 
reversal is a form of ‘cruelty’. ‘I cannot stick it!’, the beggar wails when faced with the 
unrelenting ‘generosity’ of Lear, who keeps providing him with more and more money. 
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‘What is it?’, asks the beggar, ‘Torture?’ (4:27). Lear quite literally ‘enforces’ his ‘charity’ 
(II.ii.191); it is an image of ‘distribution’ that inverts humanist and Marxist interpretations of 
King Lear.  
While he denies ideas about the commonality of the human, in his radical pursuit of 
the ‘good’ Lear is nevertheless admired and abetted by others. These include the Bishop, 
who provides Lear with some of his anti-ethical (anti-Bildung) ‘education’ (1:2) and insight, 
and Prudentia, the mother of Clarissa, who has a sexual relationship with Lear that pre-
dates his marriage to her daughter. Both tend to facilitate Lear, while other characters – 
most notably Horbling, Kent and, most powerfully, Clarissa – echo the Chorus.700 These 
figures all variously castigate Lear for failing to govern – ‘Come out and govern the world!’ 
(5:36) – and strive to ‘correct’ Lear of his unruly waywardness and his ethically baffling 
contrariness: ‘Why do you not give the people bread? I cannot understand it. There is bread 
enough’ (5:34). The notion of the common good is, however, frequently shown to be 
problematic – most obviously when the ‘good’ characters engage in, or directly and/or 
indirectly, support acts of bloody murder, designed to promote and enable the good life. In 
the next section, I will show that ideas about the common good are often used to sanction 
the destruction of individual subjects, while also sublimating deeply personal motivations. 
 
3.3. Speaking ‘for’ the Commons 
 
Not unlike the Fool in King Lear, the Fool in Seven Lears often admonishes Lear for his 
apparent failures. Barker, in a witty play on his conservatism, transforms the Fool into 
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Horbling – a reforming Government minister whom Lear arbitrarily ‘promotes’ (2:10) to the 
station of court Fool. Horbling has a series of Soviet-style ‘five’ and ‘ten’ year plans for the 
improvement of the Kingdom, which go unheeded, leaving him to reflect that ‘Humour is 
the grating of impertinence upon catastrophe’ (3:16). But while he does make half-hearted 
attempts at humour – ‘I so hate comedy it makes men cruel!’ (4:29) – more often than not 
Horbling tries to encourage others to assassinate Lear so that his plans for the 
‘improvement’ of the Kingdom might be enacted: ‘Stab him now! I have the policies. I have 
the plans’ (3:15). Horbling keeps his unused plans under his Foolscap – though by the end of 
the play these plans have disintegrated into ‘tatters’, resembling the way in which the map 
of the Kingdom is often torn apart in productions of King Lear: ‘He drags off his cap and 
takes out the now decaying papers’ (6:46). Preoccupied with instituting his plans, Horbling 
calls for the murder of Lear, in the name of the common good: ‘There he sits! Eliminate the 
bloody oppressor of widows!’ (5:34). The idea that such murder might ‘perchance do good’ 
(V.iii.199) is deeply problematic: it involves the destruction of the subject in the name of 
society.   
Where Horbling only calls for the assassination of Lear – never doing the ‘required’ 
deed himself – Kent and Clarissa both murder those who abet Lear – the Bishop and 
Prudentia. In the ‘Interlude’ between Fourth and Fifth Lears, Kent confronts and kills the 
Bishop, whom Kent accuses of ‘legitimizing’ (33) every thought that Lear pursues: ‘They say 
you spoiled the King’ (32). Kent rationalizes his murderous intent by recycling conventional 
notions of the common good. By killing the Bishop, Kent aims to remove a wholly negative 
influence on Lear and so encourage his sovereign to act in conformity with the material and 
ethical well-being of his subjects as a whole: ‘We must protect the weak against the 
cunning’ (33). The twisted ‘logic’ (33) of Kent is, however, mercilessly ridiculed by the 
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Bishop, who pours scorn on the notion that Kent acts selflessly, all in the interests of the 
community. ‘Who are you doing this for?’, wonders the Bishop: ‘Everybody? I do love that! 
You are smothering your personal dislike for violence in the interests of the community!’ 
(32). The notion that Kent abrogates his own will in murdering the Bishop is impossible to 
countenance: by the end of the scene, in which the bloated corpse of the Bishop returns 
posthumously to harangue his murderer, Kent confesses to the Bishop that he would ‘walk 
over the mouths of the poor of the world to grab you by the –’ (34) and admits that his 
bloodied victim is his ‘superior in perception’ (34). The notion of the common good is – for 
Kent – a pretext, a means by which he may enact his own usually smothered desires and 
satisfy his hatred.     
 In Fifth Lear, Barker re-stages the action of the Interlude, as Clarissa confronts and – 
ultimately – sanctions the murder of her mother, Prudentia. Once again, the murder is 
undertaken with the putative rationale of reversing the decline of the Kingdom by 
‘removing’ a negative influence on Lear: ‘Out there is all starvation and mismanagement and 
you encourage him!’ (5: 38). ‘I so hate lies’, remarks Clarissa, ‘But, look, the poor!’: ‘I so hate 
subterfuge. But, look, the destitute!’ (5:37). In the same vein as Kent, however, Clarissa 
struggles to disentangle her own personal motivations from her apparently disinterested 
desire to improve the lives of the poor naked wretches of the Kingdom, confronting her 
mother with knowledge of the affair she has conducted with Lear: ‘I think you lie in bed 
with my husband and – No! No! Do what you wish, I am not censorious’ (5:38). Her 
outburst and sudden about-turn are indicative of the way a reified conception of the 
common good in Seven Lears sublimates deep-seated personal motivations – motivations 
which may ultimately have little to do with the well-being of the polis, or for which the good 
life acts as a pretext.  
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The gaol negates the divided motives driving Clarissa, in its most telling intrusion into 
the action: 
 
 Oh, good! 
She is evil, if the word has meaning 
Oh, good! 
We do hate punishment but some it must be said 
Deserve 
Oh, good! 
In such a case human dignity cries out for 
One of those rare occasions when everybody must 
Agree  
Collectively we must respond. (5:39-40) 
 
With its repeated cry of ‘good’, the designation of Prudentia as ‘evil’ and its allusion to 
‘human dignity’, the gaol reinforces conventional ethical dictates on the notion of the good 
life – but does so in the name of murder. The repressive heteronomy of the Chorus is only 
too clearly indicated by its insistence that the goodness of the murder is something on 
which ‘everybody must’ (not can) agree and that the ‘collective’ requires (or once again, 
‘must’ have) a common ‘response’, subsuming the particular (subject) under the universal 
(society). But while Clarissa may agree that the murder of Prudentia is an ethical necessity, 
she also subverts the notion of the same ‘absolute morality’ for which she kills. When she 
appears in the Interlude to remove a young Goneril from the lethal fight between Kent and 
the Bishop, Clarissa remarks that ‘I never thought I would give thanks for murder, but I must 
not hide behind the fiction that all life is good. How simple that would be. How simple and 
intransigent. Such absolute moralities are frequently the refuge of misanthropy’ (33). The 
murder of the Bishop ironically prompts Clarissa to abandon the (supposedly) ‘absolute 
moralities’ for which the murders of both the Bishop and Prudentia are conducted: the idea 
of the common good. 
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By virtue of her desire to ‘correct’ (6:48) and ‘improve’ Lear, Clarissa (who Barker 
describes in his interview with the author as ‘an intolerably, unbearably moralistic person’)   
is an intertextual analogue for the famously truth-telling Cordelia.701 In Second Lear, Clarissa 
recycles the language and action of the love-test, telling Lear that it would be wrong ‘If I 
praised things merely to please you’: ‘so I will say – as best I can – only the truth’ (2:11). 
Clarissa obviously echoes Cordelia in her conviction of the possibility of ‘truth without 
contradiction’ (3:25) – a possibility that, in Seven Lears, Lear disclaims – and of the ethical 
righteousness of truth over falsehood: ‘She does not put on lipstick, Clarissa. Or any false 
thing’ (6:46). But the name Clarissa is also an intertextual echo of the 1748 novel Clarissa – 
or, The History of a Young Lady – by Samuel Richardson.702 The novel is typical of the type of 
conventional Bildung narrative of personal and ethical development that Barker believes 
King Lear has been reduced to, in which the hero or heroine achieves a form of ethical 
knowledge and self-identity (in the novel, Clarissa remains utterly virtuous, against all the 
odds of her situation).  
Clarissa is counterpointed to Lear throughout the play: where Lear engages in a 
series of transgressive self re-authorizations – ‘But that was another Lear’ (3:15) – Clarissa 
insists on a principle of ethical self-identity: ‘I like to be myself’ (2:12); where Lear engages 
in rhetorical ‘bollockry’ (3:18), Clarissa speaks only the ‘truth’ and refuses ‘gesture and false 
movements’ (3:19); and where Lear ignores the needs of the Kingdom – ‘What, brothers, no 
clinic? No warm house? No hot dinners?’ (4:26) – Clarissa insists on the need to ‘pity the 
poor’ (5:38) and on the absolute necessity of following her ‘conscience’ (5:38) in 
reprimanding the waywardness of Lear: ‘You should not do that because in governors 
extremes of emotion are not liked!’ (2:9). It would not be stretching the point to say that 
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Barker purposefully alludes to Clarissa in his appropriation of King Lear to instantiate a 
conflict between the narrative of ethical self-development that typifies the novel form and 
the far less predictable, non-narrative subjectivity that typifies his own morally speculative 
Catastrophist form.    
The clash between Clarissa and Lear is perhaps most apparent in Third Lear, in which 
Lear undertakes an utterly disastrous war with a rival state, before retreating under the 
protection of Clarissa and her Second Army (the way Cordelia leads the French troops into 
Britain to save Lear in King Lear is an obvious parallel). Clarissa upbraids Lear for his 
disastrous leadership – but Lear refuses the idea that there is an ethical ‘lesson’ to be taken 
from his apparent failure: ‘It is not the circumstance, it is the exposure, it is not the subject 
but the experience which –’ (3:16). Clarissa, however, repeatedly interrupts Lear to insist on 
the idea that the failure of the war offers an opportunity for ethical education and 
reformation: 
 
You must be sensible, and hear advice. You must regard the judgement of others as 
equal to your own. I think if this is to be a happy Kingdom you must study good, 
which is not difficult, and do it. I will help you. I will criticise you, and I will say when 
you are childish or petulant, and you must try to overcome the flaws in what is 
otherwise, I am sure, a decent character! (3:17)  
 
‘You are often amusing, which is surely a sign of goodness!’ (3:17), Clarissa concludes, in an 
incurably optimistic reading of the ‘decent character’ of Lear. Such ‘advice’ about the 
inculcation of ‘goodness’ and the good life – ‘the happiness of the Kingdom’ – has its 
precedent in First Lear, in which Lear also ponders the possibility that goodness might be 
‘defined’ and ‘taught’, so that those now ‘horribly attracted’ to acts of ‘badness’ would find 
goodness ‘simple to appreciate and consequently act upon’. Yet as Adorno contends, ‘to 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
278 
 
impute that one ever knows, unproblematically and without doubt, what the good itself is 
is, one might say, already evil’.703 It is in such a way that Clarissa might – in Adornian terms – 
be thought of as evil: she insists on universally binding ethical principles – which she 
overconfidently proclaims are ‘not difficult’ – in a way that dominates and deprives the 
subject.  
 Clarissa persists in her desire to support Lear in overcoming his tragic ‘flaws’, but 
Lear produces a response that Clarissa (and, indeed, Lear himself) is finally unable to provide 
an answer for:   
 
Clarissa: What was good in me, through seeing, is now more good. What was less 
good, there is less of. 
Lear: WHAT IS THIS GOOD? (3:17) 
 
This – arguably – is the most decisive moment in the play: the question ‘WHAT IS THIS 
GOOD?’ typifies the foundational critique of ethics that Lear enables in Seven Lears. His 
transgressive actions are a catalyst for a properly moral inquiry into normative ethical mores 
and beliefs – into the ‘first principles’ of ethics – which may otherwise be precluded by 
prevailing hegemonic understandings of the good life that stretch from antiquity to the 
modern day.704 Like various characters during the action of King Lear, Clarissa encourages 
Lear to ‘See better’ (I.i.161) – yet ultimately it is Clarissa who has a superficial understanding 
of morality, constrained as she is by received ethical norms which she fails at any time to 
question. 
 Graham Saunders makes the case that Seven Lears dramatizes the ‘slow moral 
decline of Lear’, who fails in his responsibilities as ruler and comes to realize that Clarissa 
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would have made the more capable – indeed the more ethical – monarch: ‘No, she is 
exemplary, and I should commit suicide’: ‘She should govern’ (3:18).705 What Saunders 
misses, however, is that the ethical disintegration of Lear is the point. The play does not 
allow for a determinate ethical frame through which to condemn Lear for his morally 
transgressive actions, even if Lear lapses into self-doubt. Saunders also overlooks the 
Catastrophic finale of the play, in which the rest of the Lear family conspire in the murder, 
not of Lear, but of the ethically ‘pristine’ (2:11) Clarissa, forestalling any sense of narrative or 
ethical ‘closure’.  
This murder is driven principally by Cordelia. ‘I have’, Cordelia tells her mother, ‘a 
deep and until today, an unstirred hatred for you’ (6:48). The language that Cordelia uses 
alludes to the Introduction (‘She was the subject of an unjust hatred / This hatred was 
shared by Lear and all of his daughters’). Clarissa is all too conscious of the apparent 
injustice of her assassination – ‘Someone must do good and of all people I have done least 
to –’ (6:48) – but the vital word in the prologue is ‘necessary’ – or the way in which the need 
is reasoned, to paraphrase King Lear. Where the murders of Prudentia and the Bishop are 
understood to be ‘necessary’ to facilitate the common good of the commons, the murder of 
Clarissa – the personal motivation for which is stated quite openly – would seem to derive 
from a completely distinct sense of ‘necessity’: that of obviating absolutist appeals to ethics 
that are unfeasible and which serve to endanger the properly moral autonomy of the 
subject.  
Even in the final Seventh Lear, Lear remains implacably resistant to the common 
good of the polis: in a reversal of the usual action of classical tragedy, it is the Chorus, as 
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opposed to the transgressive tragic ‘hero’, that ends up dead: ‘HOW COULD WE BE 
ALLOWED TO LIVE?’ (7:49). With the figures of the Chorus dead about him, Lear is 
discovered – in the same vein as Ferdinand and Miranda at the end of The Tempest – 
playing a game of chess with Kent, in which both participants have been openly cheating. 
The image provides a profound inversion of the usual early modern understanding of chess 
as a symbol for astute statecraft.706 There is no resolution – no synthesis – of the 
contradiction between individual and collective, morality and ethics at the end of Seven 
Lears. It is not for Lear to institute the common good and finally ‘pluck the common bosom 
on his side’ (V.iii.50). 
Throughout his performance in 1989, Nicholas Le Provost, who played Lear, relied on 
constant shifts – constant ‘turns’ – in both voice and action: ‘Time to unlock the gaol! Or 
maybe not! (3:16). When Lear originally discovered the gaol in First Lear, he paced from left 
to right, his head often in his hands, while he contemplated the way in which government 
might be harnessed to make people ‘good’. But when he is ‘inspired’ to take another view – 
when his ‘wits begin to turn’ (III.ii.67) – Le Provost physicalized the shift with a violently 
sudden turn, as he threw his hands down and changed direction in an abrupt volte-face. This 
turn, which also saw Le Provost shift into a more antagonistic vocal range, subverted 
narrative progress and the movement toward a ‘conclusion’ of the ethical ideas Lear was in 
the process of developing, creating both a physical and intellectual space for a more open-
ended form of moral self-reflexivity.707 It was a performance style that contrasted strongly 
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with the Chorus, which both moved and spoke in a shared, rhythmic fashion. This gave the 
interventions and indictments of the Chorus a strong collective force; but at the same time, 
the presentation of the Chorus – who were all dressed in draped grey costumes, which 
obscured the features of the various actors involved – indicated a homogenized ‘mass’ 
where the individual was obscured. The production created a striking visual and aural 
disparity between Lear and the Chorus and contradictory conceptions of the moral basis of 
the ‘good life’. 
This contradiction between subject and society reflects a radically reconfigured 
understanding of the role of theatre (and tragedy) in an age of cultural and ethical totality – 
to free spectators into autonomous moral reflection, as opposed to prescribing shared 
ethical meanings. Barker writes that his theatre aims to ‘return the responsibility for moral 
argument to the audience itself’ – or perhaps more precisely, to the ‘audience in its 
individual, atomised form’.708 This most obviously relates to the suspension of closure in 
Catastrophist theatre. By refusing to align with the commons – by remaining morally non-
cooperate, with his constant turns away from more predictable forms of thinking and action 
– Lear forestalls the final confirmation of shared ethical values for the common good. This 
transgressive violation of ethical values means that the audience becomes – for Barker – as 
fragmented as the play, forced morally to ‘wrestle’ with the ‘meaning’ of the play alone, 
without the crutch of collective values: ‘in tragedy, the audience is disunited. It sits alone. It 
suffers alone. In the endless drizzle of false collectivity, it restores pain to the individual’.709 
In his interview with the author, Barker states that, with catastrophic death of Cordelia in 
King Lear, ‘something is released in the audience’: ‘an innate sense of chaos’, something 
that he thinks ‘theatre can liberate all the time but which conscience-driven […] theatre 
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continually represses and tries to replace by enlightenment’.710 This individuating 
‘liberation’ from the ‘dominant pattern of thought of our time’ is the same affect Barker 
wants to catalyse in his Seven Lears, a shuddering distantiation from collective ethical ideas 
and values.711   
Seven Lears is, without doubt, an ethically problematic play. Lear resists calls for the 
common good in his radical bid for moral autonomy and, as a result, the commons is finally 
destroyed. But for Barker as for Adorno, artworks should pose moral problems, not ethical 
solutions. Seven Lears instantiates a contradiction between moral autonomy and ethical 
collectivity, a contradiction sorely absent during some of the worst catastrophes of the 
twentieth century.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has analysed the appropriation of King Lear in Seven Lears and shown that, 
through his appropriation of Shakespeare and his subversion of the conventional humanist 
image of a ‘humbled’ Lear, Barker produces a foundational critique of normative 
understandings of the ethics of the good life. This critique parallels Adorno and his own 
deep-seated interrogation of the good in post-Auschwitz culture in Minima Moralia, a work 
of philosophy that informs both the themes Barker develops in Seven Lears and the 
constellatory form which the play takes. I have shown that, for Barker, King Lear is at once a 
regressively humanist play and, at the same time, provides a vehicle for his own ethically 
and aesthetically Catastrophist form. This serves to situate King Lear as a vital intertext in 
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Catastrophism and the way Barker challenges the ethical totality of post-Auschwitz culture 
and society.   
 Sarah Kane often cited Barker and his Catastrophist form as an influence on her own 
playwriting. In the next chapter, I turn to Kane. I will show that, like both Rudkin and Barker, 
Kane creates spaces of non-identity through her appropriation of King Lear. These spaces 
are understood as transcendent of a totalized material reality, creating a metaphysical rift in 
society.   
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Chapter Seven 
 
‘Thought you were dead’: Dover Cliff, Death and ‘Ephemeral Life’ in Sarah Kane’s Blasted 
 
‘The course of history forces materialism upon metaphysics, traditionally the direct 
antithesis of metaphysics’ – Theodor Adorno.712 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will analyse the Sarah Kane play Blasted, which debuted at the Royal Court 
Upstairs in 1995.713 The original production of the play was directed by James McDonald, 
with Pip Donaghy taking the role of Ian – a terminally-ill alcoholic, who writes salacious 
articles for the tabloid press – and Kate Ashfield taking the role of Cate, his far younger 
former girlfriend, who suffers from intermittent fits.714 Blasted was met with notoriously 
histrionic reviews, due to its depiction of violence.715 The play, which is set in a hotel room 
in Leeds, is split into five scenes: in between Scenes One and Two, Ian rapes Cate, before 
Cate plaintively – and without warning – declares that there is ‘a war on’ (2:33) in the city. 
Shortly after that declaration, an anonymous Soldier (played in the 1995 production by 
Dermot Kerrigan) makes his way into the hotel room, before the room is hit by a mortar 
blast and reduced to rubble. The Soldier goes on to rape and blind Ian in Scene Three, 
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before he kills himself. Ian also tries to commit suicide in Scene Four, only for Cate to 
intervene. In Scene Five, Cate leaves the room to try and find some food, while Ian is seen in 
various states of physical and mental degradation. Ian finally buries himself under the 
floorboards of the room, with only his head visible, before ‘dying’. Ian, however, suddenly 
returns to life – with a declaration of ‘Shit’ (5:60) – before Cate returns to offer him some 
sustenance.    
 I will show that Kane, not unlike Rudkin and Barker, dramatizes the crisis of the post-
Auschwitz subject, who is trapped in a totalized system that destroys autonomy. Unlike the 
drama of Rudkin and Barker, however, Kane does not tend to depict self-authoring figures in 
her plays.716 Her drama testifies to a ‘fading of the subject’, as Gritzner eloquently calls it, a 
process that, for Gritzner, is intensified in the plays Crave (1998) and 4.48 Psychosis 
(1999).717 Kane dramatizes a world where any hope there might be for transcendence – of a 
world ‘beyond’ – is hanging by a thread. Kane understands the crisis of the subject as a 
metaphysical crisis, as the waning of anything beyond the seemingly endless horizon of late 
capitalist modernity.  
This metaphysical conception of post-Auschwitz culture and subjectivity both 
informs and is enabled by the way Kane appropriates other texts. Most prominently, a 
metaphysical conception of post-Auschwitz subjectivity both informs and is enabled by King 
Lear. The appropriation of King Lear in Blasted is not instantly obvious: Kane herself 
revealed that she only became aware of the kinship between the plays toward the end of 
the drafting process, slowly coming to the realization that she was – in part – motivated by 
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‘a subconscious drive’ to ‘rewrite’ King Lear.718 ‘When I was writing Blasted’, Kane revealed 
in a 1998 interview, ‘there was some point at which I realized that there was a relationship 
with King Lear’.719 This intertextual ‘relationship’ can be seen in the various palimpsestic 
traces of King Lear perceptible in Blasted – not least the depiction of Ian and his combined 
embodiment of the physical (Gloucester) and mental (Lear) blindness of King Lear; the 
putrefying ‘stink’ (1:8) caused by his terminal illness, which means he ‘smells of mortality’ 
(IV.vi.129); the operation he alludes to where his lung was removed – a ‘rotting lump of 
pork’ (1:11) – which literalizes the proposed ‘anatomization’ (III.vi.73) of Regan; and his 
constant ‘love-testing’, where Cate refuses to ‘heave’ (I.i.91) her heart into her mouth and 
tell Ian she loves him simply because he (repeatedly and belligerently) asks her to (1:6). 
Even the title of Blasted can be interpreted as an allusion to King Lear: Kane chose ‘Blasted’ 
because of the representation of drunkenness throughout the play; it was only after the 
event that she came to realize it also alludes to the ‘blasted heath’ depicted in the storm 
scenes of King Lear.720 These are only some of the points of contact between the plays that 
might be proposed by an intertextual reading. To trace the way in which her appropriation 
of Shakespeare enables Kane to interrogate post-Auschwitz subjectivity, however, I 
concentrate squarely on the penultimate and final scenes of Blasted – Scene Four and Scene 
Five.  
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I begin by analysing the way Kane appropriates the Dover ‘cliff’ scene from King Lear 
in Scene Four of Blasted to interrogate the prevailing immanence of totalized society, which 
by trapping the subject, seems to disallow any possibility of transcendence, of anything 
‘other’ than the world ‘as it is’. This interrogation involves the deconstruction of both 
metaphysical and material worldviews – propounded by Cate (metaphysical) and Ian 
(material) in the scene. Both are shown to be flawed and unable to challenge the 
dominance of the social totality. This analysis will involve a close-reading of both King Lear 
and Blasted. 
 I go on to analyse Scene Five of the play and the puzzling moment where Ian ‘dies’, 
only to simply go on ‘living’. This has been taken, by several Kane critics, to dramatize his 
continued entrapment within a prevailing immanence; however, I contend that, by 
deconstructing both conventional materialist and metaphysical understandings of the world 
in Scene Four, Kane forms a space for transcendence in Scene Five.721 Both alive and dead, 
Ian is at once bound ‘in’ the material world and yet also thrown metaphysically ‘beyond’ it. 
He is, as I will show, also both ‘in’ and catastrophically ‘out’ of tragic closure. This 
paradoxical subjective condition, I contend, appropriates the liminal, even ecstatic, states 
‘between’ life and death that Shakespeare dramatizes time and again in King Lear. This will 
again involve a close reading of King Lear and Blasted, though I will also analyse aspects of 
the original performance and its relationship with the 1993 Max Stafford-Clark production 
of King Lear at the Royal Court. I will also consider the cultural ‘afterlife’ of the image of the 
dead-alive Ian.  
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To read the final scene of Blasted, I will utilize the notion of ‘ephemeral life’, 
propounded by Adorno.722 Ephemeral life names for Adorno a form of immanent 
transcendence, a state both in the material world and cast beyond it. It reflects the way in 
which Adorno, in a move similar to Kane, re-conceptualizes the metaphysical as 
antithetically distinct from the material.723 Before developing a close reading of Blasted and 
its appropriation of King Lear, I want to analyse the way Adorno challenges the inherited 
philosophical distinction between the material and the metaphysical in the wake of 
Auschwitz. I concentrate particularly on Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems – a series of 
lectures delivered over 1965 and posthumously published in 2000 – and the 1966 Negative 
Dialectics. 
 
1. Metaphysics ‘After’ Auschwitz: Materializing the Metaphysical 
 
While he has often been viewed as the progenitor of a purely negative critical philosophy, 
towards the end of his life Adorno began to engage with the metaphysical tradition in both 
classical philosophy and in German idealism. The OED defines ‘metaphysics’ as ‘that branch 
of knowledge concerned with first principles’ such as ‘being, knowing, identity, time and 
space’.724 Metaphysics is the form of philosophy concerned with determining ‘ultimate’ or 
‘absolute’ values, addressing deep-seated questions of ontology and epistemology. Adorno 
observes that the desire to determine ultimate metaphysical values meant that classical 
philosophers (most notably Plato) were required to imagine a numinous ‘other place’ or 
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world ‘beyond’ where the disturbing state of flux wrought on and by the temporal material 
world is suspended. This meant that metaphysics became, Adorno contends, ‘the 
philosophical theory of all that pertained to the Beyond’, as opposed to the immediacy of 
the material world, and a theory of the ‘transcendental in contradiction to the sphere of 
immanence’.725  
This is not to say  that Adorno naïvely subscribes to the notion that there is a pure 
and immutable world ‘beyond’ the material world, which exists outside of ‘fallen’ historical 
time and provides a meaning for immanence – whether it be the realm of the ideal 
imagined by Plato, the heaven of Christianity or even the Utopia of Marxism. His own 
version of metaphysics is, paradoxically, transient and related to the ‘most fragile of 
experiences’.726 
Developing many of the insights found in Metaphysics, in his 1966 work Negative 
Dialectics and its famous final chapter, ‘Meditations on Metaphysics’, Adorno makes the 
case that, while most contemporary philosophy – most particularly the ‘logical’ positivism of 
his contemporary Ludwig Wittgenstein – has set out to completely overturn metaphysics, 
his own analysis of the metaphysical tradition seeks to revivify metaphysics precisely by 
abandoning its most fundamental presuppositions. Adorno understands his own, 
idiosyncratic conception of metaphysics arising from the transformation – even the decay – 
of the fundamental concept of traditional metaphysical thinking: the notion of a world 
beyond or behind the material world that imparts meaning to immanence and where the 
‘true’ (and ‘good’) life is possible. Adorno states that his own conception of metaphysics has 
                                                          
725
 Theodor Adorno, Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Rolf Tiedemann 
(Oxford: Polity, 2000), p. 3. 
726
 Ibid, p. 141. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
290 
 
‘its basis in the total suspension of metaphysics’.727 Such thinking, however, is ‘in solidarity 
with metaphysics at the moment of the demise of metaphysics’; it will allow a new 
metaphysics to develop that, by breaking with the idea of a pure world beyond, can merge 
with materialism.728  
The ‘course of history’ most obviously refers to the genocidal horror unleashed 
during the Holocaust. The need to rethink metaphysics is for Adorno particularly acute in 
the face of Auschwitz. Adorno contends that the traditional conception of a metaphysical 
beyond where ‘existing suffering is done away with’ and finally ‘revoked’ becomes 
untenable in the face of the irredeemable horror represented by the concentration 
camps.729 Even more ominously, however, Auschwitz can also be said to realize the 
immutable and unchanging realm ‘beyond’ the ‘normal’ world posited by traditional 
metaphysical thought. Adorno argues the camps instituted a world apparently ‘outside’ the 
unstable exigencies of historical time, a world that transformed (material) particularity to 
(metaphysical) universality. This, as Adorno contends, has become the organizing principle 
of modern society as a whole, which by violently colonizing every form of otherness, admits 
of nothing beyond its own borders and takes on the disconcerting guise of a metaphysical 
absolute.730  
On the one hand, Auschwitz represents the horrifying culmination of metaphysics, 
where the ‘bare harsh remnants of the living’ take on ‘the appearance of the Absolute’.731 
On the other hand, it also urgently calls for the possibility of transcendence, where ‘the 
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electrified barbed wire surrounding the camp’ might be ‘escaped from’.732 Under the 
daunting historical conditions of post-Auschwitz culture, the classical philosophical 
conception of metaphysics has, Adorno contends, to be rethought. For transcendence to be 
possible in the face of the totalized world of Auschwitz, metaphysics must be stripped of its 
traditional conceptual ties to the mundus intelligibilis notions of the ideal, the absolute and 
the universal.  
Not unlike Benjamin, Adorno makes the case that transcendence should be sought, 
not in the order of the immutable à la classical metaphysics, but in those moments that 
betray the false totality of modern social life and adumbrate something ‘beyond’ the 
ostensibly interminable horizon of modern culture, which otherwise ‘tolerates nothing 
outside itself’.733 Adorno argues that the apparently ‘closed’ world of immanence 
represented by post-Auschwitz society ‘is nevertheless interspersed’ with ‘the breaks which 
give the lie to identity’ and prompt the question: ‘So is that all?’ – a question that, for 
Adorno, opens up the possibility that there might be something other than the ‘unalterably 
existent, the world’.734  
Adorno contends that metaphysics is intimately related to the possibility of 
subjectivity and freedom; it represents a moment of transcendence from totalized material 
conditions that constrain the subject and limit his/her experience. Such moments transpire, 
for Adorno, when the subject is confronted with something non-identical, fragmented and 
transient, which interrupts the otherwise unchallenged reign of identity in contemporary 
damaged life. Breaks in the total identity of society are, as I have set out in previous 
chapters, typically to be found in moments of crisis and catastrophe, when the prevailing 
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order is ruptured. But for Adorno, the aesthetic – and particularly late modernist aesthetics 
– should be also seen as both materially and metaphysically momentous. This is not because 
the artwork depicts ‘another world’, but because in its fragmentariness and dissonance the 
modernist artwork resists identity, undoing its own reifying inscription into the social 
totality. What in Aesthetic Theory Adorno calls the ‘spiritual dimension’ of the artwork 
means its negation of empirical reality, which holds out the possibility that the world may be 
otherwise.735 He writes that ‘in the negation of that world the possibility of another world 
which does not yet exist becomes conceivable’.736 It is through its negation of the ‘known 
world’ that the artwork – however fleetingly – produces a semblance of freedom for the 
subject, showing the world as it is to be contingent, not the absolute totality it appears to 
be.     
It is the subjective experience of something beyond the horizon of the closed totality 
of post-Auschwitz culture that Adorno calls ‘ephemeral life’. It is, however, worth pausing to 
recognize that ephemeral life is not necessarily a notion that is fully developed or rigorously 
applied by Adorno (he enigmatically states in Negative Dialectics that ‘there is no origin save 
ephemeral life’).737 This is perhaps because Adorno came to metaphysics towards the end of 
his life, without having the chance to fully develop his re-interpretation of the metaphysical 
tradition. The notion of ephemeral life has, however, been fleshed out in the ground-
breaking work of Alistair Morgan, who provides an astute analysis of the various forms of 
‘life’ conceptualized by Adorno. He states that Adorno understands ‘mere life’ as ‘self-
preservation in nature’; ‘damaged life’ denotes the reified life of late capitalist society; and 
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‘ephemeral life’ means the fleeting moment of transcendence that happens within damaged 
life.738 Morgan writes  
 
the term ephemeral life refers to a […] bid [on the part of Adorno] to give an 
interpretation of the possibility of metaphysical experience, a metaphysical 
experience that contrary to the tradition of metaphysics will lie in the particular, the 
transitory and the non-conceptual.739  
 
 
Morgan makes the case that, for Adorno, any experience of the beyond must also and 
necessarily make the subject cognizant of the closed totality of modern life, drawing 
attention to a world of pure immanence. Adorno, in other words, rehabilitates metaphysics 
within a framework of a critical materialist theory of society, where the metaphysical 
consists in the possibility of experiencing some form of alterity and otherness. Espen 
Hammer writes that ‘metaphysical experience is Janus-faced: while tracing a moment of 
transcendence, it also makes us aware of the negativity of immanence’.740 Such experience 
is critical: without moments of ephemeral life it would not be possible to confront and resist 
the radical societal ‘evil’ the totalized world of Auschwitz both embodied and, ultimately, 
exposed. Within a totalized world that itself takes on the semblance of the absolute, 
metaphysics remain, as Hammer observes, ‘relevant for ethical orientation and political 
struggle’.741 
  Adorno may not develop the idea of ephemerality in his writings, but it is vital, both 
for ‘ethical orientation and political struggle’. I want to develop the notion of ephemeral life 
by using the concept in a reading of Blasted. I will show that ephemeral life epitomizes the 
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impossible position that Ian, in the beyond and yet also interred in immanence, occupies at 
the end of Blasted.  
Prior to developing a reading of her appropriation of Shakespeare, I want to consider 
the way in which Kane conceptualizes and practises the act of literary/theatrical 
appropriation. This evinces the political position she adopts in her playwriting. Kane is less 
concerned with identity politics – and the contestatory approach to the canon it has 
informed – than with the crisis of subjectivity precipitated by contemporary totalized 
society.  
 
2. ‘Last in a Long Line of Literary Kleptomaniacs’: Kane, Appropriation and Identity Politics 
 
 
While she was initially branded (and derided) in the British press as the enfant terrible of a 
radical new form of theatrical practice – variously designated as the ‘New Brutalism’, ‘Smack 
and Sodomy Theatre’ and ‘The Theatre of Urban Ennui’ – that broke radically with past 
forms, Kane positioned herself as a product and appropriator of the European canonical 
tradition, acknowledging her debt to Shakespeare, Ford, Büchner, Ibsen, Eliot, Camus, 
Artaud, Huxley, Beckett, Bond, Barker and Crimp.742 The speaker in the 1999 Kane play 4.48 
Psychosis memorably refers to her/himself as the ‘Last in a long line of literary 
kleptomaniacs’, where ‘Theft is the holy act / On a twisted path to expression’.743 While the 
theatrical voice of 4.48 Psychosis cannot be identified with Kane herself, Kane undoubtedly 
saw the appropriation of past works as a way of developing and abetting her own literary 
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and theatrical ‘expression’. Kane did not always acknowledge her referent texts, but it is 
hard to avoid the implication of 4.48 Psychosis that Kane herself is engaged in various acts 
of literary ‘theft’.  
The idea of literary ‘theft’ recalls, of course, the Latin root of appropriation in 
propruis – meaning, as I set out in the Introduction, ‘belonging to’, the ‘property of’ – with 
the ‘a’-prefix denoting ‘an approach towards’. Theft would indicate that appropriation is the 
seizure of ‘property’ that belongs to another, but her ‘approach’ towards literary theft 
indicates that Kane is not only engaged in acts of violent proprietorial seizure; for her, 
appropriation is also a ‘holy’ act imbued with sacred reverence – almost as if Kane were a 
bowed penitent approaching a religious icon that she is, paradoxically, planning to steal. 
From the words of 4.48 Psychosis, it would seem that there is something sacred about the 
(more often than not, canonical) works Kane appropriates and about the act of 
appropriation itself, which Kane imagines in 4.48 Psychosis ‘a time honoured tradition’.744 
There are obvious parallels with Barker and his paradoxical conception of appropriation as 
violation/reverence.745  
Her indebtedness to the canon and its appropriation caused Kane to remark that her 
plays ‘certainly exist within a theatrical tradition’, even if that is at the ‘extreme end of the 
tradition’. 746 This obviously relates to the idea of being ‘last in a long line’ of other 
appropriators; but it also speaks to her particular indebtedness to the more avant-garde 
end of the modernist tradition, which places Kane, I contend, as a late modernist.747 Kane 
                                                          
744
 4.48 Psychosis, p. 213. Perhaps appropriately, appropriation seems to have originally come into usage to 
denote the requisition of land and resources by the ecclesiastical authorities of the Medieval Church – so 
appropriation might be said to have always been an act of ‘holy theft’, ‘appropriation. n.’, OED Online. 
745
 See Chapter Six, pp. 258-259. 
746
 Quoted in ‘Love Me or Kill Me’, p. 26. 
747
 Blasted also shares it title with the short-lived Vorticist journal BLAST!, edited by Wyndham Lewis, which 
had two editions in 1914. See Paul Edwards and Jane Beckett, Blast: Vorticism, 1914-1918 (London: Ashgate, 
2000). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
296 
 
was careful to state, however, that, while she appropriated past works, her plays are not 
about interrogating other works or the cultural politics of ‘representation’ whether that is 
based on feminist, post-colonial or queer politics.748 Kane viewed appropriation as a way of 
aligning herself with the canon and enabling the development of her distinct but canonically 
informed ‘vision’.749  
This approach to the canon and its appropriation is part of a more pervasive 
refutation of modern day identity politics. Kane did not set out to represent the cause of 
marginalized identities in her playwriting and was suspicious of the way identity-categories 
are produced. ‘Class, race and gender divisions are symptomatic of societies based on 
violence or the threat of violence, not the cause’.750 The divisions which contemporary 
identity politics seeks to address and redress are not, Kane insists, the cause of violence, but 
are the result of societies based on violence. Underlying the divisions of class, race and 
gender is, for Kane, a more systematic violence, through which divisions are produced: 
identity-thinking.  
In Blasted, Ian typifies the prescriptive and intrinsically violent nature of identity-
thinking. Ian spends much of the play pinning others to predetermined, categorized 
identities, epitomized by the classist – ‘scum’ (1:19) – racist – ‘wog’ (1:3;6) – sexist – ‘witch’ 
(1:19) – homophobic – ‘lesbos’ (1:18); ‘cocksucker’ (1:19) – and ableist – ‘spaz’ (1:5) – 
ascriptions he directs against Cate and the unseen ‘characters’ both he and Cate refer to in 
the play. So pervasive is the violent and abusive language Ian uses to identify others that it 
finally disarms a reading that would seek to advance a particular identity politics and 
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adumbrates the presence of a deeper ‘rationale’ underlying his unrepentant racism, sexism, 
ableism and various other ‘isms’ – the rationale of identity-thinking. It is worth noting that 
Ian is not only a racist, a sexist and a homophobe – though he does undeniably embody all 
of those bigotries and more – but that he is also the representative of an ‘enlightened’ and 
avowedly ‘scientific’ (4:56) worldview, which has little truck with the more ‘mythic’ 
worldview espoused by the religiously-inclined Cate.751 These ostensibly divergent 
characteristics are not incidental: the racism, sexism and ableism represented in Blasted is 
tied to a character that stands for modern scientific reason. The violent language Ian uses to 
identify others is symptomatic of the dialectic of Enlightenment: Ian typifies the way in 
which the discursive categories that Enlightenment rationality uses to produce knowledge 
about the world invariably result in domination and even a ‘mythic’ and irrational fear of the 
‘other’.752  
It is not the case that Ian goes unchallenged in the play. During the various dialogic 
‘battles’ that inform the opening scene of Blasted, Cate often confronts Ian over his 
language-use, uncomfortable with the universally hostile way in which he categorizes 
others. The way Cate challenges Ian, however, betrays the inadequacy of identity politics. 
The more sensitive language Cate uses, which is intended to minimize prejudice and 
discrimination, fails to challenge the underlying rationale of identity-thinking by ultimately 
failing to challenge the ‘category’ to which Ian and Cate are – in the end – both referring. In 
the opening moments of the play, Ian tells Cate that he now hates Leeds, which ‘stinks’ 
because of the ‘Wogs and Pakis’ that are ‘taking over’ (1:5). Not untypically, Cate challenges 
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Ian; but she only contests the words he uses, not the underlying principle of categorization 
itself: 
 
Cate:   You should not call them that.  
Ian: Why not?  
Cate:   It’s not very nice. (1:5) 
 
The use of the words ‘should not’ implies a linguistic consensus to which Ian should adhere; 
but revealingly, the ‘them’ (1:5) Cate uses in the dispute indicates that she is still talking 
about the same ‘others’ referred to by Ian, even if she is trying to advocate for a more 
‘politically-correct’ language-game. The referent ‘them’, grammatically speaking, is still the 
‘Wogs and Pakis’ Ian identifies, so that Cate is saying that ‘Wogs and Pakis’ should not be 
called ‘Wogs and Pakis’ any longer, as society now deems it is ‘not very nice’. What the 
dialogue reveals is that a preoccupation with language-use – however well-intentioned – 
does not necessarily challenge and is even complicit with the oppression it aims to mitigate, 
as it fails to interrogate the underlying categories that are used to discriminate between and 
divide human beings.  
The suspicion that identity politics serves to pin subjects to prescribed identities is 
something that Kane publicly addressed, particularly insofar as identity politics might 
constrain her own authorial intentions. Kane bristled at the critical presumption that, as a 
‘female playwright’, it was her duty to represent contemporary sexual and gender politics, 
insisting that she had ‘no responsibility as a woman writer’, with its attendant obligation to 
write about ‘sexual politics’.753 Kane steadfastly refused to become ‘a representative of any 
social category to which I happen to belong’, repudiating the prescriptive designation of ‘a 
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woman writer’.754 Kane addressed questions that – as she put it – ‘concerned all human 
beings’.755  
This shift from identity politics to questions relating to human existence in its widest 
possible sense might seem at best politically retrogressive and at worst hopelessly naïve, 
implying that there are ‘universal’ problems faced by ‘all human beings’ regardless of the 
culturally determined distinctions of class, race, gender or sexuality. This, however, is 
precisely the political vision that informs Blasted. Far from setting out to represent the 
‘cause’ of women or any other identifiable subjectivity in society, in Blasted Kane puts into 
question nothing short of the immanent and homogenized ‘totality’ of contemporary 
society itself, which by violently erasing any conception of something beyond its borders – 
and by pinning subjects to homogenized forms of identity – confines and deforms ‘all 
human beings’.   
Dan Rebellato contends that, in an era of late capitalist globalization, Kane was 
deeply suspicious of ‘the totalizing ideological forces whose power over reality had never 
seemed more complete’, precipitating a move away from ‘the categories of political identity 
and action that had been developed in the 1970s and 1980s’ toward an interrogation of the 
(apparent) totality of social and political reality itself.756 This is typified in Blasted by the 
culturally homogenized space of the hotel room, where the action of the play takes place. 
The stage directions famously begin with an unmistakable sense of spatial specificity – ‘a 
hotel room in Leeds’ – but go on to completely erase that specificity by stating that the room 
is of the kind ‘so expensive it could be anywhere in the world’ (1:7). Kane begins Blasted by 
presenting a culture that has, to use the term preferred by Adorno, become totalized – the 
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culture of globalized late capitalism. So firmly pinioned is the subject within the social 
totality in Blasted that no other reality seems remotely possible and there is ‘nowhere to go’ 
(4:53).  
This situation is not, of course, simply ‘equivalent’ to the concentration camp. 
Blasted is, however, a play that has the Holocaust – and its relationship with contemporary 
totalized society – on its ‘mind’, most obviously as the concentration camp was brought 
back into popular and artistic consciousness by the horror of the Bosnian War and the 
death-camps at Srebrenica and Omarska.757 Ian tells Cate in the opening scene of the play 
that Hitler was ‘wrong about the Jews’ and that it is the ‘queers’ and ‘wogs’ he should have 
‘gone after’ (1:19) – proclaiming the benefits of a new industrial-military genocide: ‘Send a 
bomber over’ (1:19).758 Blasted is a play haunted by spectre of the totalized world of 
Auschwitz.  
The shift from identity politics to a political vision that sets out to interrogate 
contemporary totality is enabled by the way Kane appropriates other texts – and most 
notably the way she appropriates King Lear. In the next section, I provide a close reading of 
Scene Four of Blasted and its appropriation of Shakespeare. I show that, far from pursuing a 
politically or ideologically corrective approach to the appropriation of King Lear, Kane re-
deploys the play to confront the immanence of totalized, post-Auschwitz society and its 
damaged subject. 
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3. ‘Rewriting’ the Dover Cliff Scene:  Problematizing the Material and the Metaphysical 
 
 
While Blasted contains various allusions to and palimpsestic traces of King Lear, perhaps the 
most consistently realized and sustained appropriation of the play in Blasted is its re-
imagining of the Dover cliff scene in Scene Four, where Ian – reprising Gloucester – tries to 
kill himself, only to have Cate – reprising Edgar – intervene to stop the suicide, afterward 
claiming that divine forces have miraculously ‘stepped in’ to save Ian from committing a 
grave sin. When asked about the scene, Kane called it ‘a blatant rewrite of Shakespeare’: ‘as 
simple as that’.759  
Kane is drawn to the scene at Dover cliff due to its existential and metaphysical 
questions pertaining to human suffering, suicide, the possibility of divine ‘intervention’ and 
of a world beyond the material world – a decision that reflects her desire to interrogate a 
homogeneous and ‘other-less’ present. In the next section, I provide a close reading of King 
Lear in order to pave the way for an interpretation of the way that Kane appropriates the 
‘cliff’ in Blasted. 
 
3.1. The Shakespearean Cliff 
 
In the scene from King Lear, Edgar extemporizes a wholly imaginary ‘chalky bourn’ (IV.vi.49) 
for Gloucester to pitch himself from, in a bid to rekindle some of his faith in the benevolent 
intervention of God (or in the pagan world of King Lear, ‘the gods’) in human life and in a 
world ‘beyond’. ‘Why I do trifle thus with his despair’, claims Edgar, ‘Is done to cure it’ 
(IV.vi.33-34) – though it is hard to avoid the suspicion that a vengeful Edgar is punishing 
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Gloucester by making him ‘suffer’ more life, as Ian alleges against Cate: ‘I know you want to 
punish me, trying to make me live’ (4:55). Of course, the audience is ‘in’ on the trick Edgar is 
pulling – at least by the time Gloucester has taken his grotesque ‘fall’ onto the stage. But 
while Gloucester does accept the version of events Edgar narrates, the way in which the 
scene is scripted constantly undermines the narrative of divine intervention and salvation 
Edgar proposes.  
Once he has dispassionately watched his father fall flat on his face, Edgar – dropping 
the persona of Poor Tom in favour of an anonymous passer-by – tells his prostrate father 
that his life is ‘a miracle’ (IV.vi.55) and, with troubling cynicism, ascribes his survival of his 
deathward fall to the intervention of the ‘gods’ (IV.v.61-64) who have interceded to save 
him. Gloucester is initially distraught to find that the gods are even cruel enough to deny 
him death:  
 
Is wretchedness deprived that benefit   
To end itself by death? ’Twas yet some comfort  
When misery could beguile the tyrant’s rage  
And frustrate his proud will. (IV.vi.61-64)  
 
His prolonged existence is for Gloucester less the miracle Edgar says it is than a curse: 
Gloucester imagines immanence as a ‘tyrannical’ (Adorno would say totalized) regime, 
where even death falls outside the ‘will’ of the individual and any hope that ‘things may 
change, or cease’ (III.i.7) has been crushed. But while the language Edgar uses is patently at 
risk of giving the game away by implying that faith is simply a form of wishful thinking – 
‘think that’ (IV.vi.62) – Gloucester ultimately takes the moral/theological lesson on board, 
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resolving to ‘bear / Affliction till it do cry out itself / “Enough, enough” and die’ (IV.vi.75-
77).760  
There is, however, an obvious ambiguity in the wording. On the one hand, 
Gloucester seems to be saying that he will bear suffering until affliction ‘itself’ dies. On the 
other hand, there is nothing to indicate that Gloucester imagines himself surviving beyond 
the ‘death’ of his affliction: it may be that Gloucester imagines affliction ending when he 
dies – as he ultimately does when, as Edgar relates to Kent, his heart bursts ‘smilingly’ 
(V.iii.198) on finding that his ‘legitimate’ (but once ‘no dearer’ (I.i.19) for that) son is still 
alive. It is not necessarily the case that ‘all sorrows’ are ‘redeemed’ (V.iii.264) by the 
promise of future happiness – in life or in the afterlife. It might only be the human lot to 
stoically endure ‘going hence’ as ‘coming hither’ (V.ii.10) – without the promise of 
transcendence. 
While his conceit of the cliff-face is intended to impart a ‘miraculous’ experience and 
prove to Gloucester that there is another world beyond that inhabited by a ‘poor, bare, 
forked’ (III.vi.105-106) humanity, the metatheatrical trick Edgar pulls only goes to show that 
the universe is as ‘dark and comfortless’ (III.vii.84) as Gloucester fears, that there is no 
metaphysical beyond nor a benevolently intervening divinity that shapes human ends. This 
collapse of any metaphysical beyond, as I touched on in Chapter Three, prompted Jan Kott 
to contend that King Lear should be read as a prototypical piece of absurdist theatre, an 
Endgame of the early modern era that foreshows the Godless universe dramatized in the 
plays of Beckett. Dover cliff depicts for Kott a fundamentally absurd impasse, where any 
kind of metaphysical beyond that might provide human life (and suffering) with meaning 
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has collapsed, God (or the gods) are shown not to exist and faith relies on artifice.761 
Gloucester calls upon the gods to witness his ‘tragic’ leap into the abyss – ‘O you mighty 
gods / This world I do renounce in your sights’ (IV.vi.34-35) – but Edgar (and the audience) is 
the final and indeed only witness as a duped Gloucester absurdly slumps onto ‘even’ 
(IV.vi.3) ground. Quite simply, the gods (God) do not exist: the immanent world is all there 
is. 
By showing the ‘cozened and beguiled’ (V.iii.152) Gloucester falling flat on his face, 
Shakespeare dramatizes, in the words of Kott, ‘a parable of universal human fate’: the scene 
at Dover cliff is a ‘total situation’ in a cosmos where God has died or gone unanswerably 
missing, so that there is ‘nothing’ (IV.vi.9) beyond the world which might suffuse life and the 
suffering it engenders with meaning.762 The upshot is an interminable imprisonment within 
immanence, which Kott takes to be metaphorically rendered through the (apparent) 
impossibility of death in the play. Kott makes the case that, in the Dover cliff scene, 
Shakespeare portrays a situation where it is not only impossible to ‘die bravely’ (IV.vi.194) – 
or tragically – any longer, but even to die at all.763 Kott believes that the impossibility of 
death in Beckett and King Lear witnesses the impossibility of tragedy: where tragedy relies 
on a metaphysical plane and the possibility of transcendence, even if that possibility is 
thwarted, absurdism allows no way out of a situation because there is no metaphysical 
beyond to which protagonists can truly ‘call’ or aspire.764 This world is, it seems, all that 
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really exists – an all-encompassing ‘immanent barrel’ from which even the ‘out’ of death has 
been cruelly banished.765 
This reading of King Lear has some intriguing parallels with Adorno and his own 
conception of death in Beckett. Beckett portrays for Adorno the impossibility of 
transcendence in Auschwitz and post-Auschwitz culture – an imprisonment in immanence. 
‘Even the experience of death’, writes Adorno, ‘does not suffice as something final and 
undoubted, as metaphysics’.766 Adorno contends that, in the totalized world of Auschwitz, a 
sort of purgatorial non-existence was created, ‘inhabited by living skeletons and putrefying 
bodies’ – perhaps not unlike the ‘stinking’ and ‘rotting’ (1:11) body of the terminally ill Ian, 
who might be said to resemble a sort of Muselmann, or walking corpse.767 Only where Kott 
seems to accept that ‘there is no escape’, for Adorno such a stance ‘renders absolute the 
entrapment of human beings by the totality, and so sees no other possibility than to 
submit’.768 It is for precisely that reason Adorno seeks to provide a critical space for 
transcendence by problematizing the usual philosophical distinction between the material 
and metaphysical.   
Few if any dramatists influenced Kane as profoundly as Beckett, so it should hardly 
be surprising to find that her appropriation of the Dover cliff scene has parallels with the 
absurdist reading of King Lear famously proposed by Kott. In ‘The Beckettian World of Sarah 
Kane’, Saunders makes the case that the legacy of Beckett is ‘all pervasive’ in the plays of 
Kane, stating that ‘from Blasted onwards the plays utilize a variety of dramatic techniques 
that evoke a Beckettian atmosphere’, ‘manifested through direct or indirect quotation, the 
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use of pseudo-couples, the recycling of familiar Beckettian imagery and dramatic motifs and 
the integration of linguistic and rhythmic echoes’.769 Beckett casts his shadow over Blasted 
and its appropriation of the Dover cliff scene: Saunders notes that, in a reinterpretation of 
Endgame and its famous response to the vexing prospect that God does not exist – ‘the 
bastard’, Hamm famously blasphemes (2:119) – the appropriation of the Dover cliff scene 
ends with Ian calling the God he does not believe exists a ‘cunt’ (4:57).770 Kane – herself a 
lapsed evangelical Christian – deploys a re-versioned take on the Dover cliff scene in Blasted 
to depict a world where any notion of a pure metaphysical beyond has become untenable. 
This is not to say, however, that Kane is ‘rewriting’ the Dover cliff scene solely in order to 
portray an absurdist Beckettian impasse, where there is no metaphysical beyond and death 
has been rendered impossible by the uninterrupted reign of immanence. Kane appropriates 
the Dover cliff scene in Blasted to set up a philosophically inflected dispute between 
material (Ian) and metaphysical (Cate) worldviews. She does so to produce a space for the 
transcendent, tragic freedom that Kott takes to be dispelled in the closed worlds of 
absurdism. I will now provide a close reading of the appropriated ‘cliff’ scene in Blasted, 
showing that her appropriation allows Kane to undermine the positions adopted by both Ian 
and Cate.  
 
3.2. ‘A blatant rewrite’: The ‘Cliff’ in Blasted 
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In her ‘rewrite’, Kane puts a Chekhovian spin on the Dover cliff scene, replacing the cliff with 
a misfiring pistol.771 Shortly after his rape and blinding at the hands of the Soldier, Ian asks a 
reluctant Cate to find his gun so that he can shoot himself, which Ian thinks of as simply 
‘speeding up’ (4:56) his terminal illness. Cate, however, removes the bullets from the gun 
(4:54) before passing it to Ian, afterward imputing his ‘miraculous’ survival to divine 
intervention: 
 
Ian:  End it.  
       Got to, Cate, I’m ill.  
       Just speeding it up a bit. 
Cate: (Thinks hard.) 
 Ian: Please. 
 Cate: (Gives him the gun.) 
 Ian: (Takes the gun and puts it in his mouth. 
          He takes it out again.) 
         Don’t stand behind me. 
 
        He puts the gun back in his mouth 
         He pulls the trigger. The gun clicks, empty. 
         He shoots again. And again and again and again. 
         He takes the gun out of his mouth. 
 
Ian:  Fuck. 
Cate:  Fate, see. You’re not meant to do it. God –  
Ian:  The cunt. (4:56-57)    
 
This ostensibly ‘fateful’ turn of events is contrived to prove to Ian that ‘It is wrong to kill 
yourself’ (4:54) because, as Cate plaintively puts it, suicide is a sin and ‘God would not like it’ 
(4:55). Ian, however, remains as staunchly atheistic as he was before his ‘cliff’ moment, 
telling Cate that it is pointless to pray for the baby she brings to the room in the hope that it 
does not go to ‘bad places’ because ‘it is dead’ (4:58) – and so going nowhere. Despite his 
lingering hope that Cate will pray for him (4:58) – which perhaps says more about his desire 
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to be remembered by Cate after his death than it does about a nascent religiosity, typical of 
his growing neediness in the play – Ian does not progress through his brush with death 
beyond his previous scepticism, where he treats the notion of God with characteristically 
derisory scorn:  
 
 Ian:  There isn’t one 
 Cate:  How do you know? 
 Ian:  No God. No Father Christmas. No fairies. No Narnia. No fucking nothing.  
 Cate:  Got to be something. 
 Ian:  Why? 
 Cate:  Doesn’t make sense otherwise. 
Ian:  Don’t be fucking stupid, doesn’t make sense anyway. No reason for there to 
be a God just because it’d be better if there was. (4:55) 
 
What the intervening Cate syllogistically proposes to Ian is a theodicy: there has to be 
‘something’ (4:55) to ‘make sense’ (4:55) of the fallen world and of evil – represented, most 
urgently, by death – otherwise life is meaningless and irredeemable. Unlike his 
Shakespearean prototype Gloucester, however, Ian remains stubbornly unconvinced, 
producing a nihilistic ‘nothing’ in the face of the ‘something’ propounded by Cate – a 
dichotomy that, of course, surfaces time and again in King Lear: ‘Can you make no use of 
nothing, Nuncle?’ (I.iv.117-118). Ian, not without due cause, declaims that it is ‘stupid’ (4:55) 
to believe in a metaphysical world beyond simply because it would be ‘better if there was’ 
to redeem life and the world in the present. God is, as far as Ian sees it, no more than a 
story told to children, keeping the same ontological company as ‘fairies’  (‘Fairies and gods / 
Prosper it with thee’ (IV.vi.29-30) says Gloucester, making the same mystical analogy) and 
‘Narnia’ (4:55).  
Ian is convinced that there is no beyond and that, to try and wring some meaning 
from existence by appealing to ‘something’ other than the world as it is, is at best misguided 
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and at worst downright idiotic. It is a view he shares, in part, with Adorno: in words that 
echo the ‘cliff’ scenes dramatized in both King Lear and Blasted, Adorno writes in Negative 
Dialectics that  
 
if someone who is in despair and wants to kill themselves asks whoever is faithfully 
trying to persuade them not to do so what the meaning of life is, the helpless helper 
will be unable to provide him with one; as soon as he tries to, it is to be spurned, the 
echo of a consensus omnium which comes down to the dictum that the emperor 
needs soldiers.772  
 
The fallacious ‘dictums’ used to try and vindicate life inevitably ‘condemns to mockery any 
conception of a meaning for immanence, a meaning which might radiate from some 
affirmatively posited transcendence’.773 The type of metaphysical beyond that Cate posits 
has patently become untenable, relying on the completely specious reasoning – ‘no reason’ 
(4:55) – that there has to be ‘something’ other than the fallen world because otherwise life 
would be unlivable, ‘condemning’ her faith to the ‘mockery’ of Ian. It also relies on a 
deliberate sham: it is, after all, Cate herself who removes all the bullets from the pistol, not 
God. 
But at the same time, the strictly materialist stance represented by Ian is equally 
problematic. ‘Everything’, Ian confidently pronounces, has ‘a scientific explanation’ (4:56) – 
though there is an obvious contradiction between his conviction that ‘everything’ is 
scientifically explainable and that the world simply does not ‘make sense’ (4:55). Even more 
problematically, by dismissing without hesitation anything outside or beyond the existent 
material world as ‘nothing’, Ian inevitably ends up turning the world into nothing less than 
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‘everything’.774 Ian, in a paradox no doubt lost on him, transforms the world as it is into a 
metaphysical ‘absolute’ – the type of permanent, unchangeable and ‘final’ realm imagined 
by the metaphysically inclined thinking he ostensibly sets himself against. This, as Adorno 
recognizes, is the danger inherent in completely abandoning metaphysical thought, which 
risks irreversibly turning the ‘existent into the absolute’. ‘Leaving nothing remaining but the 
merely existent, it recoils into myth, into metaphysics. For it is nothing other than the closed 
totality of immanence of that which is’.775 The embodiment of a homogenized rationality, 
Ian cannot conceptualize otherness: his unreflective commitment to identity-thinking means 
that anything which falls outside of the categories posited by rationalized enlightened 
thought cannot truly be said to ‘exist’. For him, ‘what is rational is actual and what is actual 
is rational’.776 
But while an otherwise desperate Ian articulates his position with undimmed 
rhetorical force, he ends up (unknowingly) undermining himself. By inadvertently using the 
double-negative of ‘No […] nothing’ (4:55) in his debate with Cate, Ian produces a weakened 
affirmative, implying there might be something (or at least, not ‘nothing’) beyond the world 
as it is – and perhaps even beyond death – after all. The ‘no-nothing’ inadvertently posited 
by Ian is clearly not the positively affirmed ‘something’ propounded by Cate, but it upends 
his stated conviction that the world he and Cate occupy is ‘everything’. It is a negation of a 
totalized world which appears as ‘everything’ that also refuses to posit ‘something’ beyond 
in the way Cate does – perhaps trying to fortify Ian against suicide, or perhaps cruelly 
denying him the release which should (but of course, does not) come with death. What may 
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lie beyond the world as it is remains in Blasted completely open-ended, arising only through 
the inadvertent – but nonetheless telling – negation of the ‘known world’. Adorno writes 
that ‘metaphysics rests in the conception of something which is not’ – but ‘something which 
is also not only not’.777  
By reworking the constant allusions to ‘something’, ‘nothing’ and ‘everything’ found 
in King Lear, Kane undermines the material and metaphysical worldviews that are voiced by 
Ian and Cate. She also echoes the philosophical invocation of ‘not-nothing’ in King Lear. 
Howard Caygill contends that, in his plays, Shakespeare interrupts the conventional 
philosophical distinction between being and nothing, so that the question ‘To be, or not to 
be’ (Hamlet, III.i.56) offers only a limited conception of the way in which Shakespeare thinks 
about ontology. Caygill notes that ‘Shakespeare often “negates the negation”, but does so 
without arriving at an “affirmation of being”’.778 He writes that Shakespeare typically makes 
‘nothing’ substantive, speaking of it as it had its own peculiar ‘being’ (‘Edgar I nothing am’ 
(II.iii.21) – the contorted, negatively exilic ontology that so preoccupies Rudkin – is a prime 
evocation of that principle in King Lear) and plays (not unlike Kane) with ‘double-negations’ 
that leave ‘both something and nothing suspended’.779 It is, contends Caygill, patently not 
right for Lear to declare that ‘nothing will come of nothing’ (I.i.90); however, in King Lear the 
‘negation of the negation has no definite result’, so that the ‘monster of nothing’ is a type of 
‘not nothing’, the ‘impossible and perhaps even unthinkable state of a nothing that is 
something’.780  
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Despite his perspicacious reading, Caygill – perplexingly – does not refer to Adorno, 
choosing to bring Shakespeare into a philosophical dialogue with Hegel and Heidegger. But 
his analysis of the something-nothing of Shakespearean drama might indicate a deep 
homology between the ‘performative evocation of not-nothing’ in Shakespeare and the 
negative dialectics proposed by Adorno, which does not imagine a positive ‘something’ 
arising from the ‘negation of the negation’, but retains a sense of openness – or non-
identity, as Adorno calls it.781 The type of negative dialectical philosophy Adorno proposes 
does not terminate in a positively affirmed and identifiable ‘something’; instead, it results in 
precisely the same species of indefinite ‘not-nothing’ that Caygill sees Shakespeare invoking 
in King Lear.  
By invoking the ‘not-nothing’ of King Lear, Ian raises the open-ended prospect of 
something other than the world as it stands, adumbrating the possibility that reality itself is 
not as enveloping as it might seem – and can even be transcended. Far from settling on a 
final perspective, the appropriation of Dover cliff in Blasted leaves both metaphysical and 
materialist worldviews destabilized. This lays the ground for the transformed understanding 
of the metaphysical and material – and the possibility of ephemeral life – in Scene Five of 
Blasted. It is to Scene Five that I now turn, with its uncanny image of the simultaneously 
dead and alive Ian.  
 
4. ‘Thought you were dead’: Death in Blasted and King Lear 
 
4.1. Death in Blasted: Metaphysical or Material? 
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The tension between metaphysics (Cate) and materialism (Ian) in Blasted revolves around 
the question of whether or not there is ‘life’ after death. This is a question that runs 
throughout the whole action of the play and may even be considered its most enduring 
theme. From the outset, Ian is in no doubt as to the irresolvable negativity of death, which 
in his Hamlet-like belief that the fundamental ontological ‘question’ is ‘To be, or not to be’ 
(III.i.56), he calls ‘not being’: ‘Death. Not being’ (1:10). Ian, in words that will come back to 
haunt him, tells Cate that it is not possible to ‘die and come back. That’s not dying, it’s 
fainting. When you die, it’s the end’ (4:56). Ian reiterates his belief (or rather, his unbelief) in 
the face of opposition, telling Cate he has ‘seen dead people’: ‘They’re not somewhere else, 
they’re dead’ (4:55).  
Ian is in little doubt that corpses are no more than ‘dead meat’ (1:9) – or as Lear puts 
it, ‘dead and rotten’ (V.iii.283). Cate, however, resists his scepticism, making the case for 
God – ‘I believe in God’ (4:55) – and for another life in the beyond. ‘People who’ve died and 
come back say they’ve seen tunnels and lights’ (4:55-56). Cate also likens her fits – which, as 
I will contend in the penultimate section, resemble the ‘undead’ state of Ian – to the 
experience of death and ‘waking up’ in the afterlife: ‘You fall asleep and then you wake up’ 
(1:10). Cate does have moments of doubt – as when she prays for the dead baby ‘in case’ 
(5:58) and tells Ian it is pointless to pray for him (5:58) – but, for the most part, she is 
convinced that death is a transition to ‘better places’ (1:3) beyond the ‘bad places’ (5:58) of 
the fallen world. 
Once again, however, the play complicates both positions. At the end of Blasted, Ian 
is depicted in a series of tableaux-like moments, as, fleetingly illuminated by flashes of light 
that interrupt a prevailing darkness, he is seen masturbating, defecating, sleeping and 
suffering from a nightmare, trying (once again) to commit suicide, hugging the corpse of the 
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dead Soldier for warmth and comfort and, finally, cannibalizing the infant brought into the 
remnants of the hotel by Cate – perhaps not unlike the ‘barbarous Scythian’ of King Lear, 
who ‘makes his generation messes / To gorge his appetite’ (I.i.117-119). This series ends 
with the final death of Ian; however, while he does not ascend to a pure and immutable 
Christian beyond, death is also far from the unqualified ‘end’ Ian imagined. Ian dies at the 
end of Blasted, but the demise of his material body is not the wholly negative state it should 
be:  
 
A beat, then he climbs in after it [the baby] and lies down, his head poking out of the 
floor. 
 
He dies with relief. 
 
It starts to rain on him, coming through the roof. 
 
Eventually 
 
Ian: Shit. (5:60) 
 
 
Ian (Pip Donaghy), dead and alive. 1995 Royal Court Upstairs, dir. James McDonald. Photograph: Tristram 
Kenton. 
 
The audience might be forgiven for saying, as Ian does to Cate: ‘Thought you were dead’ 
(1:10).  
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This strange moment – and the scenes of degradation that precede it, where Ian is 
depicted in various states of physical ‘wretchedness’ (King Lear, IV.vi.61)  – has attracted 
sustained critical attention. Readings have tended to fall into distinct camps: humanist 
interpretations (Greig, Saunders) and absurdist interpretations (Carney, Soncini, Rabey, 
Gritzner). Both tend to read Blasted intertextually by interpreting its final scene through the 
prism of other playwrights – most notably Shakespeare and Beckett. For both David Greig 
and Graham Saunders, Kane depicts ‘Shakespearean anatomy’ of ‘a reduced man’, akin to 
‘Lear on the heath and Timon in his cave’.782 Ian is able to rediscover his otherwise ‘lost’ 
humanity through his suffering, becoming for Greig ‘a human being, weeping, shitting, 
lonely, broken, dying and, in the final moments of the play, comforted’.783 Saunders similarly 
contends that – not unlike his intertextual forebear Lear – Ian undergoes a ‘painful journey’ 
towards ‘self-awareness’, turning from ‘perpetrator’ and ‘bystander’ into ‘victim’ (4.48 
Psychosis, 231).784  
The other trend in Kane criticism has been to read the final image of the undead Ian 
through the prism of Beckettian absurdism – most obviously the image of Winnie in Happy 
Days, who is buried up to her neck, and Nag and Nell in Endgame, whose heads pop 
intermittently out of the barrels (the Kottian immanent ‘barrel’) the pair are interred in. 
Sean Carney contends that Blasted ‘resembles the tragedy of the absurd’, as by failing to die 
– ‘Away, and let me die’ (King Lear, IV.vi.48) – Ian embodies the impossibility of 
metaphysical transcendence.785 The same point is made by Sara Soncini, who refers to the 
‘unmistakable visual quotation’ of the (quite literally) earth-bound Winnie in Happy Days, 
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and Gritzner, who contends that Blasted ends in ‘a Beckettian domain’.786 David Ian Rabey 
similarly states that the final image of the undead Ian is a ‘mockery of desecrated absolutes’ 
and ‘a tour de force of the tragedy of the grotesque’, with its total denial of metaphysical 
transcendence.787 
The problem is that critics are relying on conceptual categories which the play itself 
is challenging and deconstructing. The absurdist take on the play relies on a philosophical 
distinction between the material and the metaphysical to insist that Ian remains interred 
within a totalized immanence, while humanist readings ignore the way the dead-alive Ian 
challenges the material limits of the human. Both miss that Kane provides a philosophical 
‘frame’ through which to interpret the image of the undead Ian in her appropriation of 
Dover ‘cliff’, which destabilizes the inherited distinction between the metaphysical and 
material.  
Through its final image of the ‘undead’ Ian, Blasted precludes the possibility of 
forming a simple dichotomy between the material and the metaphysical, the ‘here-and-
now’ and the beyond. Ian is at once dead and alive, ‘in’ the material world, and yet also 
metaphysically ‘out’ of it, a position that is both transcendent and experiential. The material 
and the metaphysical is not an either/or in Blasted, but a both/and. Ian attains a type of 
transcendence that, at the same time, reflects the totalized immanence of the material 
world. His sudden return to life and presence in negation is a powerful moment of Adornian 
ephemeral life.  
It would be hard to overstate the status of the image of the undead Ian to Blasted. 
The image, as Carney has also shown, has even come to metonymically ‘stand’ for Blasted 
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itself, often being used to identify or promote the play: it is the front cover of the original 
Methuen edition of the play; it appears in the ‘defence’ mounted by James McDonald in The 
Independent; it is on the front cover of the Blasted edition of the Modern Theatre Guide; it is 
printed (along with other images) with the play in Theater; and it featured in promotional 
material for the 2001 Royal Court staging.788 It is an image that might be said to embody the 
unique ‘rationale’ at work in the play, which in the suspension of conventional notions of a 
metaphysical beyond, pushes towards the conception of a material/immanent 
transcendence.  
Critics have tended to read Blasted intertextually, but, by analysing death in King 
Lear, I want to show that the strange moment where Ian dies but also simply continues 
living has parallels with the ‘“now dead, now alive”’ pattern – as Booth calls it – found in 
King Lear.789 I demonstrate the parallels between the plays to show that, in its violation of 
death, or ‘the end’, Blasted shares with King Lear a Catastrophist violation of aesthetic and 
generic closure.  
 
4.2. Dying ‘Indeed’: Death in King Lear 
 
For some critics, King Lear is a play that dramatizes the ‘futility’ of ‘escape from Being 
through death’, where the apparent inability of characters to ‘Fall, and cease’ (V.iii.262) is 
symptomatic of the impossibility of transcending a prevailing immanence. 790 Sean Lawrence 
states that Shakespeare portrays a world where death is (often permanently) deferred. King 
Lear depicts for Lawrence nothing short of the ‘horrifying tragedy of inescapable being’ – a 
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reading that might align the play more closely with absurdism than with the ‘tragedy’ 
posited by Lawrence.791 It is a (somewhat nihilistic) reading shared by Joseph Wittreich and 
Frank Kermode, who makes the case that King Lear depicts the ‘tragedy of sempiternity’, 
where ‘everything tends toward a conclusion that does not occur’ and ‘even personal death 
is terribly delayed’.792  
Such readings can broadly be said to conform to the Kottian reading of King Lear, 
where the impossibility of death speaks to the impossibility of transcending immanence, of 
going beyond the world as it is. Yet the ostensible impossibility of death in King Lear can be 
– and has been – overstated. It is not that death has become impossible; instead, the play 
dramatizes the apparent impossibility of determining the distinction between death and life, 
being and not being. This is apparent in the ‘resurrection’ of Gloucester after his ‘fall’ from 
Dover cliff; the flickering uncertainty about the final state of Lear; and, perhaps most 
pressingly, the ambiguity surrounding the untimely ‘death’ (or otherwise) of Cordelia at the 
end of the play.  
Gloucester ‘revives’ (IV.vi.47) after (apparently) plummeting from the top of Dover 
cliff; yet there is some question as to whether Gloucester really might have died in his ‘fall’. 
‘Alive or dead?’ (IV.vi.44-45) wonders Edgar with shocking impassiveness, as he looks down 
on his father, concerned that his ‘conceit’ (IV.vi.42) of the cliff face may have been so 
convincing that it might have robbed the ‘treasury of life’ (IV.vi.43). ‘Gone, sir; farewell’ 
(IV.vi.42) remarks Edgar after Gloucester falls, seemingly moving ‘off’ (IV.vi.30) as his father 
demands but perhaps also anticipating that Gloucester may ‘pass indeed’ (IV.vi.47). The 
word ‘indeed’ is both an intensifier and a metatheatrical pun (‘in-deed’): on the one hand, it 
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indicates that Gloucester really may have died; on the other hand, it indicates that death in 
the theatre is and can only ever be in-deed – that is, a performance, a point I touch on again 
below.  
The same ambiguity occurs in the final moment of the play, where Lear finally dies. 
Or does he? ‘O he is gone indeed’ (V.iii.314) laments Edgar, repeating the same pun on 
‘indeed’ and insinuating doubt about the death: ‘Vex not his ghost’ (V.iii.331). Edgar even 
believes that Lear only ‘faints’ (V.iii.310) – aligning his death to the fit-induced ‘fainting’ (1:9) 
that afflicts Cate in Blasted, a state that she compares to death. Kent tells Edgar to let Lear 
‘pass’ (V.iii.312) but, by using the present tense, Kent only throws more doubt on the death 
of Lear: has Lear passed, or is he still passing? What is the distinction? In the Folio, the stage 
direction ‘He dies’ occurs after Lear insists that those few survivors gathered around him 
‘look’ to Cordelia; yet in the Quarto, no stage direction occurs, leaving the question of 
precisely when (if?) Lear dies potentially open to question (the ‘O, o, o, o’ (V.iii.309) of the 
Quarto is, as R.A. Foakes writes, traditionally understood to be a dying groan, though it does 
not have to be).793  
The most intense ontological scrutiny falls on Cordelia, who seems – at least to Lear 
– to float precariously between the states of life and death, even putting into question 
whether these ostensibly distinct states can ever be finally and absolutely distinguished. ‘I 
know when one is dead and when one lives. / She is dead as earth’ (V.iii.274-275) howls 
(V.iii.270) Lear in the crushing finale to the play; and yet, Lear instantly undermines his own 
certainty with the hope that Cordelia still ‘lives’: ‘Lend me a looking-glass. / If that her 
breath will mist or stain the stone, / Why then, she lives’ (V.iii.275-277). The ontological 
uncertainty surrounding Cordelia is, of course, a famed aspect of King Lear; yet the apparent 
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unknowability – at least to Lear – of her final state is a single moment amongst many where 
the question of whether a character is dead or alive remains disconcertingly open to 
interpretation.  
This ‘now-dead, now-alive’ pattern is literalized at the end of Blasted. Kane 
appropriates the uncanny states somewhere between dead and alive in King Lear, where a 
dead character seemingly ‘returns’ to life or does not quite finally and fully ‘die’, hovering 
between the world and the beyond in the (often rapturous) moment of ‘passing’. She does 
so to produce a moment of ephemerality that places a world of totalized immanence into 
question. This ideational kinship between King Lear and the final image of Ian in his 
contradicted dead-alive state is also evidenced by the visual parallels between Blasted and 
the 1993 Max Stafford-Clark production of King Lear at the Royal Court (where Kane was 
already working by 1993). This production, as various critics noted at the time, visually 
echoed the Bosnian War, with its Blasted-like images of gun-toting soldiers, brutalizing the 
‘poor naked wretches’ Lear prays to.794 The production also included a character buried up 
to his neck – Kent, when he is put in the stocks by the ‘fiery’ (II.ii.281) Duke of Cornwall and 
Regan:  
 
 
Kent (Philip Jackson) in the stocks. 1993 Royal Court, dir. Max Stafford-Clark. Photograph: Peter Hartwell. 
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The image has obvious resonances with the end of Blasted. It is a speculative point, but it is 
almost as if Kane amalgamates the image of the partially buried Kent with the recurrent 
images of dead-and-alive characters in King Lear at the end of Blasted, to produce her vision 
of ephemerality.  
By denying the finality of death, both Shakespeare and Kane resist positing a final 
‘status’, allowing the dialectic between discrete states (dead or alive) to remain open-ended 
– in other words, a negative dialectic. The ostensible ‘death’ of Ian is inherently ambiguous 
and refuses definitive interpretive closure; but it also, I want to contend, refuses 
conventional aesthetic closure. If in the final moments of Blasted Kane produce a ‘negative’ 
dialectic, her theatrical aesthetic can be thought of as structurally homologous with the 
Theatre of Catastrophe. It is the fragmentary form of Blasted that I consider in the next 
section.  
 
4.3. Death and the Theatre of Catastrophe  
 
 
Ken Urban notes that, not unlike Barker, Kane does not provide any sense of formal 
‘resolution’ in her plays. By ‘dramatizing moments where comfortable designations break 
down and everything must be rethought’ – as in the strange ‘death’ of Ian, which seems to 
suspend the ‘comfortable designations’ of life and death – Kane ‘literally recasts dramatic 
form’, obliterating the usual generic criterion by which a play may be interpreted.795 Kane 
was deeply indebted to Beckett, but she also cites Barker as having a profound influence on 
her conception of form, and even drew parallels between Shakespeare and Barker, who she 
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called ‘the Shakespeare of our age’ (Kane also played Bradshaw in a student production of 
the 1983 Barker play Victory, while studying at Bristol University).796 Blasted shares with 
Catastrophist form the violation of tragic closure, aligning the play with both Barker and 
King Lear.  
 One of the ways in which King Lear suspends aesthetic closure is by suspending ‘the 
promised end’ (V.iii.261) of death, which, as I have shown, is never quite as definitive – 
never quite as final – as it appears to be. The same is obviously true of Blasted: Kane 
appropriates the irresolvable tension about ‘when one is dead’/ ‘when one lives’ to push 
beyond the containment of generic closure, where tragedy typically ends in death.797 Ian, in 
his contradictory state, is both in and out of the totality; but he is also both in and out of 
conventional tragic aesthetics. This liminal position testifies to the way in which Ian 
preserves a form of (tragic) autonomy – freedom. Ian is not finally bounded by the social 
totality. Neither is he finally bounded by the (deathly) closure of aesthetic form. This aligns 
Ian with both the Lear(s) of Seven Lears and the figure of Shakespeare/Edgar in Will’s Way: 
all finally outstrip generic closure and, in the process, retain the possibility of subjective 
freedom.  
 In Chapters Five and Six, I demonstrated the way in which sudden, performative 
‘turns’ serve to violate both narrative progression and formal closure, opening the space for 
subjective autonomy. Ian, however, is immobilized in a makeshift grave, so that an actor is 
not necessarily able to embody the type of Catastrophic turn seen in Rudkin and Barker 
(which leads some critics to align Kane with the incapacitated subjectivities of absurdism). 
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Nevertheless, I would make the case that his sudden return (re-turn) to life still inheres to 
the idea of the Catastrophic ‘turn’. It is an abrupt turn in events that violates narrative 
development, where from the outset Ian is terminally ill and so ‘dying’, and the possibility of 
aesthetic closure. 
The indeterminacy is only amplified in performance. Unlike the play-script, which 
provides the stage direction ‘He dies’, without some change in the mise-en-scène it is not 
necessarily the case that a theatre audience will comprehend that Ian has died. What– 
precisely – has happened to Ian is inherently ambiguous in performance. In his analysis of 
the 2001 revival of Blasted at the Royal Court, Urban remarks that the actor playing Ian let 
out a final Lear-esque (‘O, o, o, o’) groan, ‘as if he was finally passing on, but nothing in the 
physical reality of the space – the lighting, sound or set – connoted a transition from one 
world to another’.798 The performance provided no obvious illustrative shift through which 
to interpret the apparent ‘death’ of Ian. What has happened to him remained completely 
open-ended.    
Part of the way in which Blasted achieves its formal openness is by constantly 
undermining its own theatrical illusion, so opening up the dialectical tension between sign 
and substance, showing and being, illusion and reality that shapes theatrical space. By 
having Ian preternaturally ‘survive’ his own end, Blasted suspends its own verisimilar play-
world, undermining the representation of a ‘realistic’ theatrical death. Kane is drawing 
attention to the way in which death in the theatre can only ever be, as Edgar says in King 
Lear, ‘an image of that horror’ (V.iii.262). The same has been said of King Lear and its 
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interrupted deaths, which self-reflexively dramatize the ‘foundational impossibility’ of death 
in theatre.799 
This obviously ties the death and resurrection of Ian to the catastrophic bomb blast 
that shatters the realistic setting of Blasted, which begins in the recognizable and realistic 
theatrical space of a hotel room, but ends up fragmenting beyond recognition. The choice of 
a pistol in Blasted is also revealing. Shakespeare critics have been drawn to the Dover cliff 
scene because of the way it problematizes early modern conventions of stage space and 
representation. By verbalizing the scene from a clifftop, Edgar is providing a piece of 
rhetorical ‘scene-painting’ in order to elaborate the unadorned, flat space of the early 
modern stage into a realistic narrative illusion.800 This space is shown to be a chimera. But, 
for Kott, 
 
In the naturalistic theatre one can perform a murder scene, or a scene of terror. The 
shot may be fired from a revolver or a toy pistol. But in mime there is no difference 
between a revolver and a toy pistol: in fact neither exists. Like death, the shot is only 
a performance, a parable, a symbol.801 
 
By having Ian repeatedly fire his ammunition-less pistol, Kane subtly draws attention to the 
purely symbolic nature of stage space, in the same fashion as Shakespeare with his ‘cliff-
face’. 
Perhaps most critically, the final image of the undead Ian also has parallels with the 
fits which Cate intermittently suffers from – fits she memorably likens to death. The fits that 
disturb Cate throughout the opening scenes of the play also suspend ‘normal’ material 
reality, showing the world that Cate (and Ian) usually inhabit to be provisional and 
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contingent, not absolute. Such fits mirror the way an audience experiences Blasted, which 
by constantly undermining its own representation of a ‘realistic’ dramatic world brings the 
ostensible integrity of reality itself into question. I want finally to show that, by disrupting its 
own artistic semblance of reality, Blasted precipitates the (fit-like) aesthetic affect Adorno 
calls the shudder.  
 
5. Fits and Shudders: Formalizing Ephemeral Life 
 
 
The way in which Ian dies before being (inexplicably) resurrected finds a parallel in the 
deathly fits that Cate suffers from whenever she is put under duress. These fits represent a 
transcendent experience that is at once material and metaphysical, in time and space but 
also beyond it: ‘Don’t know much about it, I just go. Feels like I am away for minutes or 
months sometimes, then I come back just where I was’ (1:10). Cate likens her fits to the 
experience of dying and resurrection in the afterlife – though of course she, like Ian, does 
not ascend to heaven but ends up ‘just where I was’: ‘You fall asleep and then you wake up’ 
(1:10).802  
Cate also draws a parallel between her fit-induced state and the deathly self-loss 
precipitated by ecstatic jouissance – which is in sharp relief to the shallow and unfulfilling 
‘enjoyment’ the terminally ill Ian claims he finds in gin and cigarettes, an enjoyment which is 
spatially and temporally constricted to the ‘here-and-now’ (‘Enjoy myself’, states Ian, ‘while 
I am here’ (1:12; italics added)). When Ian tells Cate that she takes him to ‘another place’, 
Cate – uninterested in his advances – responds: ‘It’s like that when I have a fit’ (1:22) and 
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when she ‘touches’ herself: ‘Just before I am wondering what it’ll be like, and just after I am 
thinking about the next one, but just as it happens it’s lovely, I don’t think of nothing else’ 
(1:23). 803  
Her fits and jouissance endow Cate with a kind of negative existence somewhere 
between being and not being: ‘I am not, I am not’ (1:9). Cate is fighting back against Ian and 
his belittling insults about her being ‘stupid’ (1:8), but the contradictory declaration of being 
(‘I am’) and not being (‘not’) might also reflect her conflicted ontological status – the same 
status Ian occupies when he is both alive (‘I am’) and dead (‘I am not): ‘I am, I am not’ (1:8). 
In her most expansive insight on her fits, Cate reproduces the same contradiction between 
‘being’ and ‘not being’, telling Ian that the world appears ‘the same’, but that it is also 
negated:  
 
The world don’t exist, not like this. 
Looks the same but – 
Time slows down 
A dream I get stuck in, can’t do nothing about it (1:22) 
 
The world ‘is’ but also ‘is not’: the fits that Cate suffers from happen in the world but also 
take her out of it, so while the world ‘looks the same’ it is also radically (if temporarily) 
negated: ‘The world don’t exist / not like this’ (1:22). Through her deathly fits, Cate 
undergoes a transcendent experience that, by transitorily taking her beyond everyday 
quotidian reality, suddenly brings the solid self-evidence of that reality into question: ‘That 
was real?’ (1:9). Kane observes that, with the bomb blast that rips through the hotel room, 
Blasted formally ‘degenerates’ into a Cate-like ‘fit’, where normal reality is (violently) 
                                                          
803
 By contrast, the ‘Scouse tart’ whom Ian condemns for ‘spreading her legs’ is ‘not worth the space’ (1:13). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
327 
 
negated and ‘don’t exist, not like this’.804 This negation of conventional stage space serves 
to self-reflexively deconstruct ‘reality’ and forms a space for ephemeral life. It is not simply 
that Kane wants to portray the ephemeral transcendence of reality in Blasted; it is also part 
of its intended affect.  
 Adorno, as I set out in Chapter One, uses the phrase ‘the shudder’ to capture his 
conception of aesthetic response.805 The shudder, as Adorno perceives it, is intimately 
related to transcendence, to ephemeral life. By virtue of the shudder the subject is 
(momentarily, but ecstatically) shifted out of a totalized social world, gaining a semblance of 
freedom. Such affect is, for Adorno, precipitated by works of art that are formally 
inharmonious. 
Kane draws on a modernist aesthetics of fragmentariness, indeterminacy and 
ambiguity in order to precipitate something akin to the type of transcendent, metaphysical 
experience that Adorno relates to the shudder. This – as with the other playwrights under 
study – is not something Kane necessarily substantiates. Her conception of aesthetic 
response is an ideal, not a consistently realized reality. But it obviously fits with her political 
conception of late capitalist totality and its denial of autonomy. Kane strives to empower a 
subject, dimly imprisoned in the socially sanctioned intuition that the world is all there is, to 
conceive of the idea of something more than the existent, beyond the totalized ‘immediacy 
of the “reality principle”’.806 She does so, as I have shown, by appropriating Shakespeare 
and King Lear. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the appropriation of King Lear in Blasted. I have shown that Kane 
appropriates the infamous Dover cliff scene from King Lear in Scene Four of Blasted in order 
to interrogate the unbroken immanence of late capitalist society, which has become as 
pervasive as to have taken on the guise of a ‘metaphysical’ absolute. This appropriation 
evinces a concern with the crisis of subjectivity at the so-called end of history, where the 
subject is pinioned within the totality of post-Auschwitz culture in a way that compromises 
freedom. I have also shown that Kane, by problematizing conventional metaphysical and 
materialist positions in a way that has parallels with Adorno, re-forges the possibility of 
transcendence. I have also analysed the final scene of the play and made the case that the 
strange moment in which Ian dies but also ostensibly ‘returns’ to life can be seen as a 
moment of ephemeral life – a form of material transcendence. This ‘now dead, now alive’ 
pattern self-reflexively draws attention to the type of bifurcated presence that is unique to 
stage space, pointing to the representational dichotomy of sign (death) and substance (the 
still living body of performer) that informs the theatrical aesthetic. It does so, I have 
contended, to formalize ephemerality and produce the ‘aesthetic comportment’ Adorno 
calls the shudder. 
 My chosen case studies analysed, I turn now to provide a conclusion to the thesis. 
This will be split into a postscript, in which I consider the legacy of Catastrophe post-1997, 
before I give a conclusion to the thesis as whole, in which I state the significance, and 
originality, of the research I have undertaken into Catastrophist appropriations of King Lear 
‘after’ Auschwitz.   
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Conclusion 
 
‘The current amazement that the things we are experiencing are “still” possible in 
the twentieth century is not philosophical. This amazement is not the beginning of 
knowledge — unless it is the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it 
is untenable’ – Walter Benjamin.807  
 
1. Catastrophist Legacies   
 
Drawing on Benjamin, Adorno insists that any study of the past forms a constellation with 
the present in which it is re-memorialized.808 This research has taken place against the 
backdrop of an increasingly catastrophic age, from climate change and the destruction of 
the natural environment to refugee crises caused by conflicts on a scale which have not 
been seen since the Second World War. Perhaps most concerning is a resurgent far-right, 
which has taken hold not only in Europe and America, but also other parts of the world. 
Since the economic dislocation of 2008 and the so-called credit crunch, late global 
capitalism has taken an alarmingly fascistic turn – cueing the type of un-philosophical 
amazement that ‘such things are “still” possible’, not only in the twentieth century, but also 
the twenty first.809  
Jean-Luc Nancy, drawing on Adorno, contends in his After Fukushima: The 
Equivalence of Catastrophes, that ‘the general equivalence’ rendered by the commodity-
form has now absorbed ‘all the spheres of the existence of humans, and along with them all 
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things that exist’.810 The Fukushima disaster – which is a geological, biological, social, 
economic, and political disaster – reveals that ‘the interdependent totality of our 
rationalized world’ is a world of human creation and at the same time ‘a world to which 
virtually all beings are entirely subjected’.811 My analysis of King Lear ‘after’ Auschwitz has 
comprised the period from 1939-1997, from the outbreak of the Second World War to the 
election of New Labour, which I take to represent the hegemonic victory of late capitalist 
ideology. I have shown that Catastrophism can be understood as a response to late 
capitalist culture, which represents the global totalization of capitalist society and the 
reification of ever more inclusive areas of human life. This, however, brings up a final 
question. Late capitalist dynamics, as Nancy observes, have only intensified in recent times – 
often with catastrophic (and fascistic) outcomes for humanity. What then is the legacy of 
Catastrophism? By way of a postscript, I want briefly to consider the 1999 play Five Day 
Lear, by the Sheffield-based company Forced Entertainment, and the 2010 Dennis Kelly play 
The Gods Weep. 
 
1.1. Five Day Lear 
 
Five Day Lear was performed for the first (and last) time in early 1999 at the Lantern 
Theatre, Sheffield, the work of perhaps the best-known experimental performance company 
in the UK – Forced Entertainment, founded in Sheffield in 1984 by Tim Etchells.812 The 
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project involved a week-long workshop on the play, which culminated in a 40-minute long 
video, called Mark Does Lear, where Etchells had his brother Mark try and re-tell the plot of 
King Lear, and the performance of Five Day Lear itself. The aim of the workshops – and the 
final performance – was, as Etchells remarks, to reduce King Lear ‘to rubble’, to pound the 
play into a state of ruination and see if anything ‘new and strange and beautiful’ emerged 
from the ‘devastation’.813  The play took the form of a staged reading where fragments from 
the play were enacted, interrupted and played over again in various discontinuous ways, 
interspersed with video cuts and audio recordings from the abridged, 1962 BBC radio 
version of King Lear from the ‘Living Shakespeare’ series – the same year as the Brook 
production.814 
Forced Entertainment have often been viewed as pioneers of a non-text-based, post-
dramatic theatre form, which eschews an original text for a more open-ended and 
intertextual approach to performance, where various found materials intertwine with 
allusions to canonical plays and fragments from a constantly shifting consumer and media 
culture.815 It is an aesthetic which has often been aligned with postmodernism, where there 
is nothing to be found in a performance that is not ‘a quotation of something else’.816 Five 
Day Lear is unusual in that it represents a sustained engagement with (and appropriation of) 
a single (Shakespearean, no less) text. But the fractured and fragmented aesthetic of Five 
Day Lear – along with a wider discourse around ruins, rubble, and devastation – also has 
obvious overlaps with the late modernism of Adorno and his conception of a post-Auschwitz 
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aesthetic of catastrophe, whereby King Lear is appropriated for the purposes of a writing of 
the ruins.  
The idea of reducing King Lear to a state of ruination so that something ‘new’ may 
emerge has obvious resonances with the intertextual poetics of Barker, who similarly sets 
out to ‘desecrate’ the play – though he does so as a paradoxical act of ‘reverence’. The idea 
can also be found in the work of Rudkin, whose conceptualization of subjectivity and 
authorship relies on the idea and aesthetics of catastrophe. But most of all, Five Day Lear 
shares its Catastrophist aesthetic form and its historical concerns with Kane. Robert 
Shaughnessy writes that the relationship between King Lear and Five Day Lear should be 
seen ‘in terms of bombing and being bombed’.817 The play, which had its single performance 
on 9 April 1999, took place at the end of a fortnight of NATO bombing in the former 
Yugoslavia, in a conflict that involved the ethnic-cleansing of Albanian Kosovans.818 Forced 
Entertainment had turned to King Lear at a time when Europe had (once again) lurched into 
a genocidal ethnic war, the violent shudders of the same conflict that had inspired Kane to 
appropriate King Lear.  
During the action of Five Day Lear, allusions were often made to the conflict, the 
scale of collateral civilian casualties and ‘the refugee crisis’ which it had provoked.819 Near 
the end of the performance, the performers gave a halting ‘update’ on the plight of the 
refugees: 
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Forty thousand refugees have gone missing. Thirteen thousand of them are reported 
to … be … fine. Ten thousand of them are still … it is still unknown … of their 
whereabouts … The United States will take – 820 
 
The performance ended with the final speech from King Lear while, in the background, the 
video shifted to a bloodied Gloucester, silently mouthing the words. Finally – ‘from beneath 
the rubble of the play’ – the sound of a baby crying was heard.821 It was an ambiguous 
dénouement that at once signified suffering innocence and the possibility of hope. Five Day 
Lear was left somewhere between nihilistic despair (‘We came crying hither’) and a more 
Christian-humanist interpretation of King Lear that insists on the redemptive possibility of 
new life.  
 
1.2. The Gods Weep 
 
The Gods Weep, staged in 2010 at Hampstead Theatre, sought to provide a macro-view of 
the capitalist process and its impact on subjects – a view obviously inspired by the 
worldwide economic crash of 2008.822 The play itself is a wholesale rewrite of King Lear 
which takes place over Three Acts.823 In the play, Lear is transformed into Colm (played 
originally by Jeremy Irons) – the founder and CEO of a vast international company. In Act 
One, Colm reveals his decision to step down – but to keep the title of ‘Chairman’, splitting 
the power and duties of the CEO between his mutually antagonistic subordinates, Richard 
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and Catherine. Colm also states his intention to retain control of Belize, where the company 
is involved in ‘food security’ (1:35) – which entails leasing out the fertile farmland found in 
the country to Western nations.824 The plan is scuppered by Jimmy – the wastrel son of 
Colm – and undermined by both Richard and Catherine who, disgusted to find that Colm 
intends to use his control of Belize to sell produce back to the local population at a reduced 
rate, plan to seize control of the country. The united front presented by Richard and 
Catherine does not last, however, with an Astrologer prophesying the company is ‘going to 
war’ (1:37).   
 This prophesy of infighting comes literally – and bloodily – to pass at the start of Act 
Two, as the battle between Richard and Catherine degenerates, without warning, into a civil 
war fought over an indeterminate territory, with Nazi-type war-crimes committed by both 
camps. While the rival factions destroy each other, an increasingly demented Colm finds 
refuge living in anti-pastoral isolation with Barbara, the daughter of a man he once 
ruthlessly destroyed. Over the course of Act Three, Colm and Barbara scrap a subsidence 
life, while Colm holds out hope that his suffering might deliver ‘absolution’ (3:172). At the 
end of the play, Barbara is suddenly shot, as Jimmy – who seems to have prevailed in the 
war – comes to find and ‘rescue’ Colm. Jimmy tries to address himself to Colm and enact 
reconciliation, but Colm has been left totally ‘broken’: ‘We should put him out of his misery’ 
(3:180). 
 For the most part, the play met with underwhelming – and often hostile – reviews, 
while Kelly himself described the original five-hour version of the piece ‘a total fucking 
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mess’.825 Critics seemed most aggrieved at the sudden transformation of a drama seemingly 
about corporate capitalism into scenes of a mass conflagration with parallels to the 
atrocities of the Second World War, complaining of the ‘explosive disorientation’ which took 
place at the start of Act Two, which calls for ‘Soldiers. Militia, noise’ (2:83).826 Charles 
Spencer admitted to having found Act One ‘moderately entertaining’ for ‘an anti-capitalist 
soap opera’; but the ‘fantastic shift’ in Act Two – where ‘the suits are discovered in battle 
fatigues’, with ‘interminable scenes of shooting, torture and atrocity’ – seemed 
‘unmotivated’.827  
 Spencer is in little doubt as to who is to blame for the apparent formlessness of The 
Gods Weep: 
 
This is a piece strongly influenced by the grim, preachy dramas of horror and 
catastrophe that were dished up for so long by Edward Bond and Howard Barker. I 
thought we had more or less banished their baleful influence from our stages, but 
now up pops Kelly like some unstoppable, living-dead monster in a horror movie 
intent on wreaking further havoc.828 
 
 
It would seem Spencer has not seen much Bond of late – and possibly any Barker at all, who 
could never be described as ‘preachy’. He is, however, not necessarily wrong to point out 
the parallels between The Gods Weep and Catastrophist anti-form. Most of all, the sudden 
shift from a claustrophobic boardroom to a full-scale war has obvious resonances with 
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Blasted, which has its own abrupt war and mortar blast. Like Blasted, the play suddenly 
collapses the formal and physical perimeters between a reifying late capitalist culture and 
fascistic violence. This obviously perplexed critics – but the formal fragmentation of The 
Gods Weep can be placed in a wider genealogy of Catastrophist appropriations of King Lear 
‘after’ Auschwitz. 
 This is not to collapse the distinction between Five Day Lear and The Gods Weep and 
Catastrophism. Both plays remain formally open-ended, providing little sense of closure. 
Neither piece, however, is necessarily concerned with the type of autonomous, tragic 
subjectivities found in Catastrophism. The plays both appropriate King Lear to interrogate 
recent (and genocidal) catastrophes, producing a critique of reification; but the autonomy 
which – for Adorno – is so vitally needed to contest a totalized post-Auschwitz culture is 
absent.        
 
2. Summary of Findings  
 
This thesis has analysed Catastrophist appropriations of King Lear in post-war British 
playwriting, concentrating on the plays of David Rudkin, Howard Barker and Sarah Kane. I 
have shown that King Lear has played a vital and often formative role in Catastrophism – a 
form of tragic playwriting and drama that does not seek to resolve the contradiction 
between subject and society, but which retains the autonomy, the freedom, of the tragic 
subject. This is a response to the withering of the subject in modern society – something 
which found its nadir at Auschwitz. I have shown that Catastrophism is deeply influenced by 
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Theodor Adorno, whose theories around aesthetic fragmentation have informed post-
Auschwitz appropriations of King Lear, as have his ideas around ‘the nullity demonstrated to 
subjects in the concentration camps’, which has ‘overtaken the form of subjectivity itself’.829 
Adorno, as I set out in Chapter One, does not necessarily support the idea of a post-
Auschwitz tragic drama, but his conceptualization of the dialectic of Enlightenment and his 
theory of non-identity nevertheless imply a theory of the tragic for the post-Holocaust era. I 
have also analysed the formal and thematic features of King Lear that have made it so 
pivotal for Catastrophist drama and writing. Chapter Two shows that King Lear not only 
represents the catastrophic shift into modernity, but also violates its own formal closure – 
or in early modern usage, the catastrophe. This aligns the play with the type of catastrophic, 
formal fragmentation Adorno calls for in post-Auschwitz art. Its open-endedness also invites 
creative response – appropriation – and licenses interrogations of tragic closure and non-
identity.  
Since the Second World War, King Lear has not only toppled Hamlet as the 
Shakespeare play for ‘our times’; it has also been used in criticism, performance and 
playwriting to variously reflect on, respond to and ‘write’ the disaster of the Holocaust. 
Catastrophist appropriations of the play are, as I set out in Chapter Three, embedded in a 
wider discourse around King Lear and Auschwitz and are not only responsive to the play 
‘itself’. This discourse has comprised post-war Christian and humanist readings of the play 
and is also apparent in the absurdist understanding of the play that emerged via Jan Kott 
and Peter Brook in the 1960s. It also relates to Edward Bond and his landmark 1971 play 
Lear, in which Bond appropriates King Lear in response to the Holocaust and the 
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catastrophes of modernity. This play, as I show in Chapter Four, is torn between rival 
conceptions of history: a Marxist-Hegelian conception of the historical process as the 
universal development of human emancipation and a more disillusioned interrogation of all 
enlightened ideals about the possibility of personal and historical progress. This leads to a 
contradiction, where the tragic subject is supposedly free to act, to engage with the world 
and its injustice, but whose engagement can only take place within a pre-established 
teleology.  
 My case studies on Bond, Rudkin, Barker and Kane all bear out the various forms of 
creative intervention and practice that appropriation can entail, whether that means a 
wholesale rewrite of the ‘original’ play (Bond), sequels or prequels (Barker), the 
appropriation of a single character or of an author (Rudkin), or the appropriation of a scene 
or motif (Kane). These playwrights appropriate King Lear to interrogate post-Auschwitz 
society and form spaces for non-identity. My analysis of Rudkin in Chapter Five shows that 
Edgar – and his transformation into Poor Tom – underpins the way in which Rudkin 
conceptualizes subjectivity and his own exilic status as an author, which entails a process of 
self re-authorship. With his 1989 play Seven Lears, Barker writes a prequel to King Lear that 
challenges a conventional Christian-humanist reading of Shakespeare. His play, as I show in 
Chapter Six, subverts the storm scenes from King Lear to challenge the idea that the 
common good is a universal ethical ‘rule’ to which the subject is supposed to subscribe. His 
appropriation insists on the moral autonomy of the subject – something both Adorno and 
Barker view as critical after the atrocity of Auschwitz. My final case study on the 1995 
Blasted shows that Kane appropriates the scene at Dover ‘cliff’ to deconstruct the 
conventional philosophical distinction between materialist and metaphysical worldviews. 
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She does so to carve out a space for transcendence in a violently totalized late capitalist 
system.  
This study is the first to analyse appropriations of King Lear in post-war British 
playwriting, making a distinctive contribution to the critical literature around the play and its 
post-war reception. This study is also the first to bring various appropriations of the play 
into dialogue, to show that King Lear has played a vital historical role in various ideational 
and dramaturgical responses to the Holocaust in post-war playwriting. This – until now – has 
not been fully appreciated in Shakespeare Studies or in post-war British Theatre Studies, 
meaning the unique status of the play in post-Holocaust drama has been neglected. By 
concentrating on the plays of Rudkin, Barker and Kane, I have shown that Catastrophism 
represents a compelling iteration of post-war British playwriting and its response to – and 
appropriation of – King Lear in the aftermath of Auschwitz. These playwrights have been 
neglected in Shakespeare Studies, partly due to the ongoing influence of Cultural Materialist 
criticism and its politicized conception of appropriation. To neglect the Catastrophists, 
however, is to neglect a vital part of the cultural and artistic ‘conversation’ around King 
Lear, the Holocaust and the status of the human subject ‘after’ Auschwitz. Part of the 
reason for providing a postscript that analyses some more recent appropriations is to show 
that Catastrophism continues to have an influence on the way contemporary playwrights 
approach King Lear. This, I suspect, will continue to be the case far beyond Five Day Lear 
and The Gods Weep.  
This study is not only relevant to the fields of Shakespeare Studies, post-war British 
Theatre Studies and Holocaust Studies, however; it is also a timely intervention in our own 
historical moment. The unnerving lurch to far-right politics in Europe and across the world 
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have, I believe, made King Lear and Catastrophist ideas around disaster and autonomy all 
the more urgent. Ours is an age in which people are more and more being treated as 
‘things’ – where subjects are reduced to objects – and where nationalist movements are 
sweeping up ever increasing sections of the population. Under such conditions, the 
necessity of autonomy – of freedom from reifying institutions and oppressive systems of 
thought – may perhaps be more critical than at any time since the early twentieth century. 
This is a study that, not unlike Catastrophism, does not ‘end’, but opens out into an 
uncertain future.   
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Appendix 
Written Interview with David Rudkin 
25 August 2016 
 
DR:  As I think is well known, my Revivalist upbringing forbad me theatre – my first 
encounters were with drama rather: Shakespeare in the classroom, and because I 
was doing Classics, Greek Tragedy. I remember meeting Gloster’s [sic] blinding, and 
Lear’s lasting impression on me, of extremity and wildness. Even struggled through 
in Aeschylus’ monstrous Greek, Kassandra’s visions in Agamemnon (the horned bull 
in the net…) were stamped upon me (still are) as living nightmare; and in The 
Bacchae the rending of Pentheus was a haunting image of transgressive enormity 
that I was to exorcise only when I ventured to reconstruct the appalling passage 
missing (?suppressed by Byzantine monks?) from the Greek, for my radio piece 
Macedonia three years ago. Such were a Revivalist boy’s exemplars of ‘theatre’.  
 
Your questions. 
 
RA:  Shakespeare has, at times, been something of a ghostly presence in your drama: he 
makes a vicarious appearance in your first play, Afore Night Come, where the Irish 
vagrant Roche is given the nickname ‘Shakespeare’, and he also makes a spectral 
appearance in your 2012 play Merlin Unchained, where at one point the bardic 
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‘wonder worker’ Merlin is called ‘Shakespeare’. These (mis)identifications are very 
intriguing – not least in Afore Night Come, where Roche/Shakespeare is violently 
sacrificed by his ‘fellow’ fruit-pickers.  Why do you think these plays remember – and 
dismember – ‘Shakespeare’? 
 
DR:  Brahms was once asked – by a critic, was it? or perhaps a younger and much less 
circumspect composer – why did he not approach writing a first symphony until in 
his 40s, and at opus 68? ‘Can you imagine,’ Brahms replied, ‘how it feels to presume 
to write a symphony, and have that giant Beethoven breathing down one’s neck?’ 
Sh(akespeare) does – or should – exert a chastening presence on anyone who 
presumes to write for the space. I write as I must, Sh or no; but I acknowledge him, 
seriously, and in my own relaxed way. 
 
The documentary dimension of Afore is drawn directly from the pear orchard where 
I worked in Sept 1959. Roche is taken from the life there, name and all; because of 
his Irishman’s natural ‘poetry’ of speech – and in a second language, to boot – the 
foreman inimically dubbed him ‘Shakespeare’, and it stuck. The two boy outsiders in 
the play are disallowed their own names too; as are the homosexual, and the ‘little’ 
man. It’s a way tribalism has, of disauthenticating individuals who don’t belong. I had 
met it in the army a few years before. 
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Deep readers of Afore will have a field day interpreting ‘my’ murder of 
‘Shakespeare’. But I had no issue with Sh then; I did not yet consciously think of 
myself as a ‘dramatist’. Afore was the play in which I discovered that I was; and in it, 
a lot came roaring out from my unconscious, and my intellectual right hand did not 
know what my demonic left hand was writing. (There are things in that play that only 
now I understand. But those are for me.) One never recaptures that awful innocent 
veracity. 
 
The reference in Merlin is more, as I remember, a veiled revisiting to that first play. 
In the Garganel scenes, set today, Merlin is speaking an Irish English, not a Welsh 
(=British) as in the ‘earlier’ landscape of the play. The Irish Merlin rather resembles 
Roche, and I permitted him to. He is something of a crazy king enthroned on a 
dunghill – which brings King Lear into the frame (Edgar, too, you might say…) 
 
RA:  Shakespeare appears as ‘himself’ in your 1984 monologue Will’s Way. How did Will’s 
Way come about? 
   
DR:  RSC asked me to write a lunch-time piece for a Youth Festival, to be done in the old 
Other Place. I knew that space well – and almost immediately thought of Sh himself, 
giving one of those regular Saturday morning talks that were then (1980s) a popular 
tradition there. Over one afternoon, in my caravan studio in a neighbour’s orchard, I 
thought the whole piece aloud into a cassette recorder. With a character like Sh, you 
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don’t surround yourself with critical volumes, and check and double-check and cross-
check every word in fear and trembling. You take a run at it. If I’d done it the next 
morning, it would have been a different piece. I think the piece itself says something 
like that. 
 
RA:  In Will’s Way, Shakespeare talks at some length about King Lear and Edgar, who 
memorably transforms himself into the figure of a roving bedlamite – ‘Poor Tom’. 
The ‘Edgar I nothing am’ speech seems to echo throughout your writings – from 
Merlin (‘Now nothing am’), Hitchcock (‘Hitchcock eye; nothing am’), Amadu (‘What I 
Amadu am?’) and to Shakespeare himself (‘Shakespeare I nothing am’). What, for 
you, is significant about Edgar’s speech? 
 
DR:  Mainly, the drastic syntax. There’s a catastrophic existentialism in it. I never forget 
Albert Finney in the Laughton Lear (c. 1958). He began the physical transformation of 
himself during the speech, almost entirely by acting and voice; and when he tried 
out ‘Poor Turleygod’, his face seemed visibly to crack. At ‘I nothing am’ it was as if 
that facial fissure had become the rending earth itself, and into that chasm we were 
all about to descend and be lost. (Some poor critic, I remember, wrote that Finney 
‘does the best he can with the unaccountable part of Edgar’ – one reason why I 
haven’t read critics in over 40 years.) 
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RA:  You have spoken in the past of the existential necessity of ‘self re-authoring’, 
particularly in a society that – as you put it – seeks to mechanically ‘reduce us to 
identities that are predictable’. Do you see Edgar as the type of ‘self re-authoring’ 
figure you mean? 
 
DR:  I don’t think of Edgar as adopting ‘self-reauthoring’ as a philosophical programme. I 
think later in the lecture you quote, I say ‘it’s a matter of survival, really’. Always 
existential, these choices; never theoretical. 
 
What interests me in the ‘Dover Cliff’ scene is how Edgar is functioning as a 
dramatist here – and an Artaudian one: leading his father into and through a 
traumatic experience, i.e. the logical moral outcome of his father’s suicidal ideation, 
to a second chance, to learn, and grow. Artaud spoke of the necessity for our theatre 
to be ‘an operation without anaesthetic’. 
 
RA:  In Will’s Way, Shakespeare remarks that he authors (and indeed re-authors) his own 
self through his theatrical creations, and picks Edgar-Poor Tom as a figure who – like 
himself – re-authors himself through a ‘character’. How far are you ‘authoring’ your 
own self through Shakespeare in Will’s Way – and do you similarly identify your own 
playwriting process with Edgar and his restless self-transformations?    
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DR:  I felt that in my own much lesser way I was experimenting with ‘being’ Sh in his 
domestic and carnal and professional dimension, and in his imaginative process. It 
was ‘my’ Sh (whose else could it be?) – or one of them. As I say above (and in the 
piece), written or given the next day it would have turned out very different. 
 
RA: I believe I am right in saying that you directed an amateur production of King Lear in 
the mid-1960s, at Bromsgrove. What did you take from your experience directing the 
play, both in terms of your own ideas about theatre and about the play itself? 
 
DR:  It was a very minimalist staging – much informed by the Peter Brook Lear of 1962. I 
don’t remember any great revelations. I was more exercised by how to make the 
moral meaning of each moment physically visible. I do remember some details. I 
schooled Edmund (at Edgar’s first entrance) to sing his Fa Sol La Mi not as F G A then 
down to E (which is ineffective) but on up to B natural, which also in that melodic 
context Mi could denote. Sung so, that phrase spans an interval traditionally (for 
reasons to do with mediaeval harmony) heard as transgressive, and known as 
diabolus in musica: an angular interval of the augmented 4th , ever since then 
conventionally used in Western music (Berlioz, Liszt, Wagner et al.) as the devil’s 
signature, and in Victorian and Edwardian music-hall too, when the villain appeared.  
Another venturesome reading I remember was of Kent’s ‘None of these rogues and 
cowards But Ajax is their fool.’ As it is, that’s puzzling, I think: but say it ‘a jacks [=a 
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shit can] is there full’, and you hear why he gets put in the stocks. I’ve not seen 
either of these readings adopted in any other Lear. 
 
I kept my production text, heavily annotated, and interleaved with diagrams and 
sketches; but some 12 years later, in a depression, I burned it. 
 
RA:  It is only after the Second World War and the catastrophe of the Holocaust that King 
Lear began to widely be considered ‘the’ great Shakespeare play, toppling the 
previously ascendant Hamlet. The Holocaust can – in many ways – be seen as the 
harrowing but ‘logical’ outcome of a social process you have often critiqued: the 
‘mechanical’ reduction of human beings to disposable objects. In Will’s Way, 
Shakespeare talks about King Lear in terms of ‘new social principles’ that take a 
‘much more mechanical, mercenary approach to a man’, lamenting that ‘I think 
people will come to matter less’. I am interested in how far your response to King 
Lear may be informed by historical events like the Holocaust. Do you think the play 
speaks to the catastrophes of the twentieth century – and beyond? 
 
DR:  Adorno has pessimistically argued that the Holocaust makes any future orderly 
‘symphonic’ art irrelevant. (He seems, surprisingly, to be overlooking Mahler’s Sixth, 
which paradoxically uses positive symphonic process to demonstrate a negative 
result.) I don’t go all the way with Adorno. I think, rather, that we have a 
responsibility to endeavour to integrate the Holocaust (and all its freight) into the 
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‘order’ and logic of our art. I feel that to align Lear with any exclusive historical 
resonance, is to risk reductivism. The Holocaust can be characterised in many ways:  
in one sense, it’s the ultimate manifestation of German Romanticism, a cultural self-
idealising that repudiates its own ‘shadow’; in another, it’s an expression of the 
psychopathology of capitalism – a denial of human excrementality. Horrifyingly 
enough, it’s latent in so-called ‘fundamentalist’ Islamism – which I see as not ‘radical’ 
at all, but psychologically regressive. As Nazism was/is. Worse than the Holocaust is 
already on its way. We humans are feeble creatures driven by an urge to catastrophe 
for ourselves and abjection for others, and to an infantile fantasising of the universe:  
and in the chasm into which that will plunge us, Lear shall always speak. If any of us 
survive to hear it. 
 
RA:  Finally, the political situation at the end of King Lear is very unclear, but in the Folio 
version of the play at least it seems that Edgar has become the designated King of 
Britain. Given the way Edgar constantly transmutes himself over the course of the 
play, embracing human indeterminateness, open-endedness and freedom, do you 
read the end of King Lear optimistically – as the promise, to quote the play, of a 
‘better way’ for society? 
 
DR:  Sh’s ‘ideal’ king, Henry V, prepares himself for kinghood by inhabiting the lower 
depths of his kingdom-to-be. But he’s essentially a tourist there. Edgar does likewise 
– but in a more existentialist way: he becomes an abject. It’s a characteristic Sh 
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ending, the emergence of an uncontaminated new young king, who’ll sort things out.  
That optimism is always formal; it’s not a happy ending as such, it’s to restore the 
positive centre. The inference is inescapable, that Edgar is on his journey to be king. 
But Sh does not give us his usual upcoming coronation, and that has to be significant. 
I think Sh recognizes that at the ending of a play whose cosmos is so faulted and 
flawed, and whose pessimism is so deep, a formal promise of a ‘healer’ will not sit 
well. He left that to the Nahum Tates of this world.   
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One-to-One Interview with Howard Barker 
Brighton, 26 August 2016 
 
RA: I just wanted to start by asking you about the genesis of Seven Lears. Obviously, it 
was staged in 1989 and you had already rewritten a Shakespeare play. 
HB: Did I? What was it? 
RA: Henry V in Two Parts. 
HB: Oh god! 
RA: Yes, a radio play [laughter]. 
HB: Oh, nearly my first radio play, yes. I didn’t think anyone knew about that. 
RA: Yes, David [Ian Rabey] alerted me to it, in fact. I just wanted to ask, as I say, about 
the genesis of Seven Lears and what prompted you to return to Shakespeare at that 
point in the late 1980s. 
HB: I can’t remember why, as you put it, I returned to Shakespeare. It’s the play I know 
best of Shakespeare. I can’t remember what rewrites I’d done to that point. You 
mentioned that Henry V one which is a very early piece. I’ve also done it with Lessing 
and I’ve done it with Middleton. I can’t really remember the order of that. I do it 
quite often. I did with Chekhov. These interrogations, which is an elegant way of 
putting it, of these classic authors has occurred throughout my writing life; as some 
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painters go back and repaint great art by Velázquez and so on. It’s respectful. It may 
not seem so to you reading it but it is an act of...a mixture of homage and contempt 
[laughter]. What had always struck me about Lear is that there is no woman. There is 
no wife. I learned about five years after writing that I wasn’t the first person who’d 
had that thought, of course. I can’t have been and someone had written a play called 
Lear’s Wife in the 1940s or 1950s? 
RA: I think it was in 1910s, King Lear’s Wife, by Gordon Bottomley.  
HB: Anyway, it’s a thought that would occur to anyone who was interested. I couldn’t 
understand, for the life of me, why he’d left it out. It didn’t make sense because 
anyone who’s lived in a family, as you and I have, this kind of reference to the absent 
person and saying, ‘If your mum was here...’ I’ve heard my dad say that. ‘If your dad 
was in the room, you wouldn’t say that’. Whatever the phrase is, it’s part of the 
discourse of family life. She’s not quoted, I believe, at any point at all. You’re going to 
correct me? If so, I don’t know where. 
RA: It’s just a very brief reference and it happens a lot in Shakespeare where a father will 
impugn his wife’s fidelity. It’s a similar thing here but you’re absolutely right and it’s 
the only time. 
HB: It must be tiny. 
RA: It’s a really more a generalized statement about wives and not his wife specifically. 
He tells Regan that if she weren’t glad to see him it might be that his wife’s tomb is 
‘sepulchring an adulteress’. 
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HB: Okay, so it’s a bit odd. You could say (because writers do this) he just couldn’t be 
bothered. He overlooked it. I prefer to think there was a reason for it; a sort of 
repression going on of some sort. It was such a big accident, it began to look 
conscious, so I thought, ‘Maybe there’s a history one could imagine that would solve 
that absence and make a certain sense of it’ and so I filled it in, as it were. That’s a 
dark space in the play, in my opinion, and it’s filled in by me with a suggestion which 
ties in with something else. King Lear’s an idiot which, in some ways, makes you 
wonder why it’s a great tragedy because normally, one doesn’t have feelings of 
tremendous pity for idiots. The actual Fool is always calling him a fool and Lear says, 
‘Yes, I am a fool’. I thought, ‘How can he have been a powerful monarch if he was a 
fool. It makes no sense. Fools don’t last in history for very long’, so I came up with a 
conceit that he had been, on the contrary, so acutely self-conscious and thoughtful 
that it gave him agony and he wanted to dispose of his own self-consciousness...the 
pain of existence, as he conceived it. That is the process of the ‘Seven Lears’ and how 
he strips himself of thought and tries to hide in idiocy. That would lead right into 
Shakespeare’s piece because his behaviour in the first scene is transparently idiotic. I 
made a bridge, as it were. 
RA: That’s fascinating. Over the course of your play, he absolutely goes from that 
incredibly insightful, sensitive, eloquent figure into someone that, at the end, can 
barely formulate a sentence, can barely speak. 
HB: Yes. I thought that was a way of leading into King Lear, as an explanation for this 
man’s barbaric and idiotic behaviour. 
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RA: It’s interesting when you say about the consciousness of the removal of the mother 
figure, because in the play that King Lear is based on, The True Chronicle History of 
King Leir... 
HB: You’ve read that? 
RA: Yes, it’s not a great work [laughter] but it’s explained from the outset that the Queen 
has just died and, therefore, the daughters need to be married and obviously, 
Shakespeare wanted that explanation gone. It seems very purposeful. 
HB: In the original text, there is a Queen but she dies at what age? 
RA: I don’t think the age is specified but as the play begins, she has just died and the fact 
of having to marry the daughters off is explained more. None of the daughters are 
married at the beginning of the play. 
HB: So it’s about that, as opposed to inheriting property. 
RA: Exactly, it’s about the fact that the mother has gone, so therefore the daughters now 
need to go out... 
HB: Need to be looked after. 
RA: Yes [laughter]. 
HB: He obviously decided to ditch all that and just do his own version and quite rightly. 
Why shouldn’t he? 
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RA: I’m interested, as you say, in the missing mother being the catalyst for your 
interrogation. It seems to me that it’s not a feminist gesture… 
HB: Not at all. 
RA: ...in a strict sense and more perhaps to do with a moral transgression, which is why 
she’s not there in Shakespeare. She ends up being murdered by the whole family. 
HB: Oh, I see what you mean. Yes, the fact is Lear can’t bear her. In my piece, she’s an 
intolerably, unbearably moralistic person and that maddens him and drives him to 
murder her with the children, as it were, semi-participating. I’m sorry not to have 
read my piece again but I’ve a feeling Cordelia is up for the murder, as they say. 
RA: Very much so, yes [laughter]. 
HB: Also, of course, in my piece there’s a sense in which she has a rather sad affair with 
Kent. As Kent is in the Shakespeare, he’s a man of tremendous moral sensibility and 
rectitude and his feelings for her are, as much erotic life is, developed from pity for 
her and her vulnerability. I made everything crossover and tie up, I think, quite well.  
I don’t think I left anything hanging. Sure, of course, the piece almost opens with the 
boy, Lear, being educated by the Bishop, who’s an immoralist, already trying to save 
him from his own sensibility and giving up some Machiavellian rules by which to rule 
the country. That’s the function of this figure who gets murdered later. 
RA: I was going to mention that murder because it’s driven, apparently, by Kent and 
Clarissa’s desire to remove this figure so that Lear can be a better person. Obviously, 
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they seem to struggle with that apparent contradiction between their own 
assumption of moral goodness and the fact that they have had to murder this man. 
HB: Yes, it’s one of those Stalinist ‘Isn’t it a pity but we have to kill you’ thing. 
RA: Yes [laughter]. 
HB: It’s the Bishop who parodies that kind of Stalinist argument and says, ‘Oh, what a 
shame. I have to die’ or something like that, doesn’t he?   
RA: Yes. 
HB: His political insights are reactionary but brilliantly acute, I hope. 
RA: Yes, absolutely, and he is the ‘education’ for Lear as well, as he describes himself. 
HB: Does Lear go along with what the Bishop says? I don’t think he does intellectually but 
he kind of carries it out actually, when it comes to it. 
RA: It seems almost, as you say, that he’s always resisting his own insight, particularly if 
the Bishop articulates something close to it. It’s not simply blindly following. 
HB: He doesn’t appear to absorb it. No, no, he quarrels with him. 
RA: Yes, absolutely. 
HB: In fact, he gets into a position where I think he does become mad in which he plays 
this against that and that against this and for everything that happens, he manages 
to find a counter argument. It may happen when they go to attack the other country 
and burn it and he says, ‘Yes, of course, it may seem bad but...’ and then he concocts 
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a perfectly argued reason why it was quite a good idea to set light to someone else’s 
country. It’s that sort of super-sophisticated mind that I think he has to shed in order 
to become King Lear, the idiot we know from Shakespeare. 
RA: Just on that topic about the kind of changes that Lear goes through, obviously, in 
King Lear, the common idea about the play is that, while he might start as incredibly 
stupid and misguided, he does undergo some kind of personal, moral growth and 
starts to be a better person. How would you respond to that? 
HB: Yes, but I’m not interested in that. 
RA: [Laughter]. 
HB: I can’t bear that. I don’t know quite where it comes from. I suppose some Christian... 
RA: Absolutely, yes. I think so. 
HB: It’s odd and it’s not entirely related to that but I’m not sure I can write another 
tragedy myself because I’ve begun to think, maybe earlier this year, that you can’t 
write a tragedy about someone you don’t respect, to some extent. I’ve no respect 
for Lear, so I’m not really interested in what happens to him. The treasures I’ve 
written, and I’m thinking of The Europeans in particular, like Katrin’s agonies, 
Gertrude’s sensibilities...these are people I like but their projects are impossible of 
fulfilment. They cannot be done in the world and so they’re doomed. I suppose I feel 
if I can’t carry through the – I’m being a bit dismal here – but if I can’t carry through 
the project, or they can’t, then probably there’s no point in the tragedy. I’m not sure. 
I’m not being clear. I’m just saying I’ve run out of steam for that. I find Hamlet a 
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great play because I esteem the wickedness of Hamlet but I can’t really rate Lear 
because he’s too stupid. What must one say about Shakespeare? It’s all in the poetry 
and you can’t fuss around with the motivations.  
RA: I think so. 
HB: Whereas, I think I construct better than he does. 
RA: I’m really interested in what you said about the ‘wickedness’ of Hamlet and being 
attracted to that. Are you attracted to the demonic side of Hamlet’s character? 
HB: Yes, absolutely. His wit, I suppose. 
RA: Do you think that Lear, perhaps, lacks that demonic aspect to his character? 
HB: Yes, he does. Most Shakespeare characters are witty: Shakespeare must have been a 
self-consciously witty person. That’s all very brilliant. I’ve forgotten the question 
really. 
RA: I’m thinking just in terms of the demonic, perhaps Edgar has a kind of demonic, 
almost… 
HB: Edmund. 
RA: Edgar... 
HB: Is it? 
RA: ...where he’s ‘possessed’ by Poor Tom. 
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HB: He’s just dressing up and playing, isn’t he? 
RA: Possibly [laughter]. 
HB: No, it’s Edmund who’s the interesting one, it seems to me [laughter] – the moral 
tragedy of Edmund. 
RA: So you think he has a more demonic character? 
HB: Absolutely. His desire to seduce both sisters and to kill without mercy. I think he’s 
vastly more interesting but, of course, he’s a minor character and we’re never going 
to feel sympathy for him, and anyway he does what so many Shakespeare characters 
do which is grovel and apologize at the end. Doesn’t Edmund do that? 
RA: He does, yes. 
HB: I don’t like that. 
RA: Yes, he says, ‘Some good I mean to do before I die’. 
HB: Yes, it’s terrible.  
RA: [Laughter]. 
HB: Really, really terrible. 
RA: Do you feel like he’s contained by the play, in that he’s unleashed and then put back 
in a box? 
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HB: Yes, I think so. I can’t talk about Shakespeare’s psychology because I’ve not studied it 
but he’s obviously drawn to wickedness. Macbeth is tremendous. He always has to 
capitulate in the same way because he plays for a public. I don’t ever think of what 
the audience thinks. I think Shakespeare probably did and he wanted to satisfy them 
in a conventional way. There are other satisfactions, of course… 
RA: I think there was certainly more of a commercial aspect to his theatre, which he 
seems to have recognized in some of his plays. He writes quite insultingly about 
theatre audiences on occasion, with a sense of resentment and frustration 
[laughter]. Just on that topic about the idea of Edmund being, perhaps, unleashed 
and then contained, in terms of the fact that your own ‘Theatre of Catastrophe’ 
resists resolution and reconciliation... 
HB: Reconciliation is the word, yes. 
RA: ...and King Lear, in its own way, does violate the anticipated ending, or what would 
have been the original, anticipated ending, which is Lear and Cordelia reconciled and 
going off into the sunset together. Instead of which, Shakespeare kills her.   
HB: I approve of that because life is arbitrary. There’s an arbitrary moment in my play, 
which the audience, to my pleasure, always finds surprisingly amusing – when I’ve 
seen it as it’s not been produced much. It’s where Lear says to a herdsman who’s 
passing, ‘Have you seen a woman? I’m looking for my mistress. Have you seen her?’  
I can’t remember how but Lear gives him a knife. Anyway, the herdsman comes back 
and says, ‘Actually, I’ve changed my mind. I will do the murder you’ve asked me to 
do’. Lear says, ‘No, too late now’ and sticks it in him and kills him. It’s entirely a 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
360 
 
whim, arbitrary, and this is the sort of thing that’s forbidden in conscience-driven, 
English, leftish, radical theatre. Arbitrary acts which, to them, seem to be only 
instinctive are simply not allowed but when you let that happen (and it was 
wonderfully played) something is released in the audience. It’s probably an innate 
sense of chaos which I think theatre can liberate all the time but which conscience-
driven, Royal Court theatre continually represses and tries to replace by 
enlightenment. To go back to Shakespeare’s death of Cordelia, I must applaud that. 
It seems to be perfectly right she’s dead.  
RA: To me, it seems more of a logical conclusion. 
HB: It wouldn’t then be a tragedy, would it, if she was fine? 
RA: Of course, it would be… 
HB: Father restored to daughter. Not interesting. 
RA: Yes, with regard to that, I wonder if you see King Lear, perhaps, as having its own 
Catastrophist...potential, perhaps. Maybe you’re recuperating that aspect of its 
moral chaos in Seven Lears? 
HB: Well yes, except essentially, the balance between good and evil is very well 
preserved in King Lear. There’s never much chance, in a Shakespeare play, of the 
chaos getting out of hand. The unpleasant daughters are killed, aren’t they? Both of 
them are strangled or something. 
RA: Yes, one kills the other, and then kills herself.  
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HB: Is that right? 
RA: Yes [laughter]. 
HB: The good girl dies which is Catastrophic, perhaps, yes but on the whole, everything is 
reordered. The whole point of the Theatre of Catastrophe is that it is never ordered 
and so in a way, the audience goes home from a play by me, unlike Shakespeare, 
with dislocated thought. I’m not trying to do that but it’s probably the effect. There’s 
no assurance in it. The only assurance comes from the play and from the text. Do 
you know what I mean? Not the text as meaning but the text as sound, visuality and 
so on. I’ve always said there are no rewards in my plays, except the reward of the 
performance of the roles, which must be done in a way that’s hypnotic, thrilling, and 
this comes out of the language. Of course, I’m not a poet in the same way as 
Shakespeare but it is poetic discourse and played properly, it’s riveting. To me, that’s 
the contract between the stage and the audience. They’re not going to get any 
enlightenment from it. 
RA: It was the first play of yours I read. 
HB: Oh, was it? 
RA: In my own personal experience, I felt deeply disordered by it [laughter]. I read it 
three or four times, I think, after that first time. 
HB: Well, maybe that’s why it’s not done very much, Richard. I think students do it 
sometimes. I haven’t heard of a professional production for decades. It somehow 
offends, especially the English who are wretchedly moralistic people. 
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RA: Particularly that moment you mentioned with the herdsman, where in King Lear – 
and talking about that kind of that soft leftist reading – Lear strips naked and reaches 
the same status as the poor. In your play, he meets the herdsman and says, ‘I have 
nothing in common with you’. 
HB: That’s right. They can’t talk. They have nothing to say. It’s very offensive to 
everything that humanism is about. Isn’t that my life? That is my life, in art. I set 
myself against liberal humanism as a governing principle in the theatre. I’m not 
talking about society but theatre. I don’t want to be dealing with values like that with 
an art form which, in any case, repudiates it from the outset. 
RA: And always has? 
HB: I think always has, despite the fact the Christian Church was forever trying to annex 
it, or the Communist Party was trying to annex it, or David Hare and the National 
Theatre are trying to annex it. You can’t do it. It writhes. It hates. It’s instinct it likes. 
RA: I remember in Arguments for a Theatre you say that ‘King Lear has been turned from 
a savage play into a placid story’.   
HB: I can’t remember saying that but I might have done. 
RA: I mean David Hare directed King Lear at the National in 1986… 
HB: So I believe. 
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RA: I just wonder if you had any views, in terms of King Lear, on it being appropriated or 
recruited for that kind of liberal humanism. Did you have a specific instance of that 
in mind? 
HB: No, I didn’t. I’m not sure I’ve even seen it on stage actually. I have seen the Russian 
version on film, which is like the Hamlet, by Kozintsev. 
RA: Kozintsev, yes. 
HB: I think that’s sensational. 
RA: Yes, an absolutely brilliant film. 
HB: Totally brilliant and you know now, it’s sad to say, the English can’t do it anymore.  
It’s gone, but those people can and I touch wood and pray the Russian culture stays 
what it is. Russia is a great culture and they can really deliver intensity, by instinct.  
The man who plays Hamlet, [Innokenti] Smoktunovsky, is incredible. 
RA: Yes, it’s a remarkable performance.   
HB: It’s witty and it’s full of sex and we have no ability to perform sex here. 
RA: Just the images from those films as well are unbelievably striking. 
HB: Yes, they are. 
RA: Hamlet’s father’s ghost is projected as this huge shadow, while Hamlet is a tiny 
figure walking along the battlements.  
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HB: There are nice details that other people have copied so much, like the horses going a 
bit berserk, in the ghost scene. And every bloody role is fabulously played, as if by an 
ensemble. There’s no rubbish; even the third porter from the right [laughter]. I mean 
that’s sensational. There’s the marker for me. Hamlet and King Lear are 
contaminated by that absurd kind of humanistic attitude we suffer from here. If it’s 
cruel, it’s cruel. 
RA: And King Lear is very cruel. 
HB: So is Hamlet. When Claudius says, ‘What have you done with Polonius’ body?’ 
Hamlet simply issues a string of contemptuous remarks about the corpse. It actually 
makes me laugh. It ridicules conscience. 
RA: I completely understand what you say about that demonic energy... 
HB: When I made Gertrude – The Cry, I felt compelled to humiliate Hamlet as a moralist 
which, of course, he half is and half isn’t [laughter], as always, but I took against the 
side of him which was precious and disapproving of his mother because I dislike like 
the scene in which he attacks his mother. Who am I to like it or not like it? It’s there 
but do you know what I mean? It doesn’t appeal to me because his attitude to his 
mother is... prosaic, without imagination, adolescent, obviously. There’s not an inch 
given in Hamlet about why Gertrude and Claudius ended up as lovers. It wasn’t his 
method, and it is mine. 
RA: Even the way that Hamlet replays the affair between them, in his own ‘play’, is 
morally troubling... 
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HB: Oh yes. 
RA: ...and very crass. In the dumb show, Gertrude is seen to be won over by being given 
gifts and material possessions [laughter]. 
HB: He renders what, in my version, is a very sophisticated passion into something which 
perhaps a man of 16 or 17 might feel. It’s somewhat coarse but then it would be a 
different play if it wasn’t, so there you are. 
RA: I tend to agree. In my reading, it’s the less attractive side of his character, certainly; a 
kind of patrician remoteness from the body. 
HB: Yes. The Russian version takes care of that by having him very, very physical with 
Ophelia, or at least very menacing towards Ophelia, which you wouldn’t be allowed 
to do in a production now [laughter]. If you look at the way the actor plays that to 
her, it’s very, very masculine, but also neurotic, as masculinity is.  
RA: I think the way that Ophelia is played as well, the actress is so stiff and so puppet-
like. I think the first scene you see her... 
HB: Fantastic scene. 
RA: ...where she’s just dancing mechanically to the music. 
HB: Yes. It’s incomparable and we’ll never see the like of it again, I shouldn’t think. 
RA: I wonder if you’ve seen the Peter Brook film of King Lear? 
HB: No, I haven’t. 
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RA: It’s worth seeing. For me, it doesn’t rate with those. 
HB: Who’s the actor in that? 
RA: Paul Scofield. 
HB: I like him. 
RA: He gives a fantastic performance in that film. It’s a very different type of film. It’s 
more self-consciously absurdist, I think, in its take. 
HB: In that day? 
RA: Yes, I think so. There are lots of very extreme close-ups on Lear’s writhing face. It’s 
worth seeing. 
HB: I’ll get it. 
RA: Just to pick up on the fact that Seven Lears hasn’t been staged as much as it might 
have been. Obviously, over that era, you were writing plays like The Possibilities, The 
Last Supper and The Bite of the Night as well. I wonder if you could elaborate on how 
you think Seven Lears contributes to the Catastrophist aesthetic that you were 
developing around that time. 
HB: No, I can’t [laughter]. 
RA: Okay [laughter]. 
HB: I can’t think what was going on at the time. 
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RA: Do you think that perhaps the play has been overlooked, in terms of your own 
oeuvre? 
HB: Well, they’re all overlooked [laughter]. You named four there, I think, and only one 
of them has been performed since. The Last Supper has never been restaged. Hardly 
surprisingly, perhaps, the one about Helen of Troy [The Bite of the Night] has not 
been done. No one can deal with them. In fact, they can’t deal with my work at any 
time at all, except for the one – Scenes from an Execution, which has become almost 
an embarrassment to me because it’s not my best play by a long, long chalk. It’s 
rationalist. It’s got some very beautiful moments but basically, it’s so easy to put a 
key in and to lock it. We get the story; we get the argument; it’s all over. There’s no 
agonizingly, contradictory experience at all. It’s not a tragedy, is it? It’s sad but it’s 
not a tragedy. 
RA: I suppose you think that’s probably why it has been taken up? 
HB: Yes, because it’s a humanist play. It’s about the State being naughty; the Church 
being backward and reactionary; while the artist challenging the State has a 
monopoly on morality. It’s like The Guardian; you pick it up and you know exactly 
what you’re going to get from it. I’ve got a big production of it in Lyon. It will be a 
wonderful show but I’m not sure I can even go and see it because I can’t watch it 
now. If I was to direct it, I’d make the Church powerful. I’d force them into a 
different sort of conflict. That’s the only one that gets turned over and over again, 
apart from The Possibilities, fortunately, yes. It plays in Europe quite a lot. 
RA: Those are fantastic. 
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HB: They’re all contradictions, but why a play like Seven Lears is not taken up, I couldn’t 
say, except for that dominant pattern of thought of our time. 
RA: I think even in the world of Barker Studies, reading through academic criticism on 
your work, it seems to me to be oddly overlooked. I really value that play.   
HB: Thank you. Some people do. I have met others [laughter]. 
RA: Yes, [laughter] of course. I get the feeling I already know the answer to this question 
but you talk about conversations with dead poets. I just wonder if there’s a sense in 
which you feel yourself, in any way, part of a wider conversation around that play 
with other playwrights that are interested? 
HB: Not really. 
RA: It’s your personal interest. 
HB: Yes, I think it was an A-Level text of mine, so I knew it for a long time. I don’t engage 
with it now at all. I haven’t read it recently. No, it’s just the simple fact of seeing a 
hole in a text and trying to widen it and understand why it exists, has been allowed 
to exist. 
RA: It’s interesting that King Lear, in criticism and in performance, after the Second 
World War gains more and more interest… 
HB: I didn’t know that. 
RA: From the Holocaust onwards. It seems to just gather…particularly in Shakespeare 
criticism...critics after the war will often say, ‘Now that we’ve lived through the wars 
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and Auschwitz, King Lear seems the most important play to us’. I just wonder if you 
would... 
HB: Why that play? Because it’s a world of chaos? Because it’s a misguided world driven 
by a mentally unstable person? I don’t know. You could say Macbeth would work as 
well; the idea of slaughtered innocence. 
RA: Absolutely, yes but certainly, before the Second World War, Hamlet seems to be 
‘the’ Shakespeare play and then the interest shifts towards King Lear – but I think 
you’re right; it’s something to do with a sense of moral anomie, I guess…the camps.  
HB: I think we’re getting a sense that there are really only the two that matter and that’s 
Hamlet and King Lear.  
RA: I guess, in terms of King Lear, the idea of catastrophe and the wider sense of social 
and political catastrophe continues to resonate. 
HB: Yes, I suppose so but one point about Lear’s world, surely, is its whimsicality. Is Hitler 
whimsical? Well, you could say so. They get crazy ideas and they carry them out. 
Think of Stalin measuring the battlefront with a ruler on a globe. He put the ruler on 
the globe and said to the Red Army Commander, ‘You’ve got to get there by 
Thursday’. They are bizarre figures and I suppose in the sense that they all seem 
crazy, you would say that maybe Lear was a crazy King…But everyone’s mind is 
blown after the War and consequently you get all that absurdist theatre which is 
such trash in actual fact. The intellectual class can’t deal with so much irrationality. 
The intellectual class slides into complete impotence. It cannot explain that degree 
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of malevolence and inhumanity and it must explain things. The whole Enlightenment 
Project has collapsed. We’re trying to dig it up now again and peddling it [laughter] 
but everything that happened from 1789 – more or less – led to the camps. No 
wonder they had to retreat into absurdism. Only if you were an irrationalist would 
you be able to answer some of that or not answer, but respond to it. There are three 
volumes behind you by [E.M.] Cioran. Do you know Cioran? 
RA: No, I don’t. 
HB: Grab one from a shelf. Don’t take mine. I can’t part with them! People like Cioran 
originate from the other side of European culture, where I come from where, I would 
argue half of Shakespeare. He’s half a Jesuit, in my opinion. I have no evidence for 
that. Who can do it now? After Shakespeare, nothing in the English theatre touches 
instinct and irrationality. I mean nothing interesting happens until you get to me. It’s 
rationalist, on the one hand, it’s comic, on the other. You get Bernard Shaw with his 
relentless rationalization. You care for nothing in a Shaw. You’re then up with Pinter 
and now David Hare who are the official artists of humanism. There is no dark force 
in English theatre after Shakespeare. 
RA: King Lear was often seen as being a kind of prototypically absurdist play in the post-
war period.  
HB: What? In 1945-1947? 
RA: Probably a bit later, from the 1960s. 
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HB: I don’t think it’s absurdist at all. I think you could treat it as a realist play. You could 
treat it thoroughly realistically, couldn’t you? That’s how I’d do it. 
RA: I tend to agree. It does seem, for me, that someone like Beckett is a kind of 
frustrated Christian or humanist. That if life doesn’t make sense in terms of God or 
human progress then it doesn’t have any meaning.  
HB: He’s also terribly likable, isn’t he?   
RA: I do like many of his plays [laughter]. 
HB: I put him alongside Chekhov really. They’re good for a night out because you go to 
the theatre to see Uncle Vanya (which I loathe) and it’s all about impotence; so he 
can’t have the girl; so he fires a gun; it misses; so it’s all a bit sad and they end up 
doing some knitting. Fine and it’s all beautifully expressed. Of course, it has to be 
beautiful so we all go home thinking, ‘Well, it’s alright that I’m such a failure because 
that’s life’. I think that’s exactly what Becket does. It’s witty. It’s consoling because it 
is witty; no other reason. It’s witty and ‘life’s like that’. That’s it. A perfect prelude to 
dinner. 
RA: In your plays, and I suppose this is why tragedy... 
HB: It’s the reverse. I think it’s the reverse. 
RA: Yes, the tragedy is so important, because it’s the opposite of impotence.  
HB: It’s restless. I don’t know how you could have a nice dinner after a play of mine. I’m 
sure you could but...I know people have told me when they’ve seen it, ‘I came away 
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and I wasn’t able to digest…[laughter] accommodate it’. Believe me, Richard, I’ll tell 
you, I’m not trying to do that. It’s not an effort. 
RA: Do find it’s just whether...? 
HB: ...I have a reactionary brain. By which I mean, I react.  
RA: Do find it’s the logic of when you’re writing, perhaps, as well, it just takes you to 
 these...? 
HB: It drives itself. It’s what Joseph de Maistre said about the French revolution…once it 
starts, you can’t stop it. With me, I don’t know what I’m writing next. I never know 
what the outcome is. I’ve probably said this. I don’t know where it’s going. It comes 
on its own each day or maybe it doesn’t but it has its own velocity. The characters 
have integrity, they are independent.  
RA: It follows its own way. 
HB: It does. If that continually offends, I don’t care. I have no desire to offend but I do 
offend, it would appear. I’m following the trajectory of the collisions and emotions.  
RA: I guess the motivation for those characters as well, have their own kind of 
independent drive? 
HB: It might even be boredom I think. Someone said, ‘How do you write each bit?’ and I 
said, ‘It’s very unconscious but when I sense the appearance of a cliché, I’ll do 
anything to evade it. I’ll take a sharp turn away’. Nothing that happens is really 
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predictable. I do not know but I doubt there’s much in Seven Lears that you could 
say, ‘I saw that coming’ because you can’t, can you? 
RA: No, at no point. 
HB: No, and that’s partly effort but it’s also partly instinct. 
RA: On that topic of sharp turns and the unpredictable…I must say that when I first read 
Seven Lears, I had read King Lear many times and I always thought of it as being a 
proto-socialist play. 
HB: King Lear? 
RA: Yes, and... 
HB: Because of his solidarity with the poor? 
RA: Exactly, exactly. When I came to read your play and Lear has that moment of 
enlightenment, if you like, right at the beginning of the play, where he discovers that 
the prison... 
HB: The corpses and the dead… 
RA: ...Yes, and he has a moment of sympathetic identification and talks about the need 
to reform his society to make it better… 
HB: It’s only brief…! 
RA: Yes, it is – but I remember thinking at the time, ‘Yes, this is absolutely right’ and 
identifying with that idea and being... 
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HB: Wounded? 
RA: Wounded, yes, definitely. 
HB: Yes, because later on, he decides they have to stay down there, doesn’t he? 
RA: He does. He refuses to align his own... 
HB: Soul with that. There you are; you’ve put your finger on it. The theatre is governed 
by people who are humanist and they can’t tolerate dissonance. They think it’s 
mischievous. I do think, in their contemptuous way, they think I’m being 
mischievous. 
RA: Just on the topic, I just wanted to ask you about the full title of Seven Lears. It’s 
Seven Lears: The Pursuit of the Good and yet obviously, over the play, Lear would 
seem to be – and at points describes himself – as being ‘evil’. 
HB: Yes, but I don’t think he ever renounces the idea that what he’s trying to get to is 
good. He just keeps redefining what good is which is, after all, what society does, 
doesn’t it? What was good in 1914 is certainly not good now. Goodness is an 
unstable commodity, isn’t it? That’s what he does. He starts off with a very fixed, 
Christian, humanist view of pain and then, as he moves on, he accommodates pain 
into another kind of system of his own creation and moves the word ‘good’ around. 
RA: The fact Clarissa is murdered at the end... 
HB: Oh, Clarissa is good. Nauseatingly good. He says so. 
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RA: ...but also has a very strict understanding of what good means and should be and 
tries to impose that on those around her. The word that I was really interested in is 
in the prologue to the play is ‘necessary’. It talks about the family hatred toward the 
wife/mother and says that, while it is ‘unjust’, it may have been ‘necessary’. That 
word ‘necessary’ is obviously very morally ambivalent [laughter]. 
HB: Yes, it’s asking for trouble, isn’t it? Necessary to preserve his sanity, I suppose, even 
though the play is about his loss of sanity. Clarissa’s a very, very pitiful figure. I 
wouldn’t bestow the word ‘tragic’ on her, but she’s terribly sad. She’s not a bad 
woman at all. She’s conventionally the opposite. She wants to be loved and she 
wants to love him but he continually writhes away from it because everything she 
says offends something in him; some deep sense of truth which he thinks she is 
overriding or ignoring and she maddens him. That’s why I think it’s necessary that 
either she goes or he does. 
RA: I see. 
HB: He decides it’s her. 
RA: So it’s the idea you’ve talked about before, where you have these intimate 
relationships that finally terminate in...termination [laughter]. 
HB: Yes, though it’s scarcely a passionate relationship which most of the love affairs of 
my plays tend to be; after all, it’s her mother he loves. He’s obsessed by the mother 
and not the girl. His marriage to Clarissa seems to be very dynastic and innocent. 
RA: Similar to Hamlet’s marriage, I guess, in Gertrude – The Cry.  
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HB: Oh yes, absolutely sexless. 
RA: Yes, and talking about it being almost a national duty [laughter]. 
HB: My emphasis is always on desire having its own legitimacies. My short piece Dog 
Death in Macedonia… 
RA: Yes, I saw that. 
HB: Did you? 
RA: Yes…I was thinking about that, actually, where Euripides is pissed on at the end, I 
seem to remember. 
HB: Yes, his mistress pisses on him. Well, she tries and doesn’t, actually. She’s too 
anxious to piss. 
RA: I thought, in a way, that where you talk about something that seems to be somehow 
degrading towards another writer or another presence is actually an act of respect. 
HB: Yes, although I wasn’t even thinking of him as a fellow writer at that point. I was just 
thinking of him as a person who happened to wash up in this place Macedonia 
[laughter] and was hating his life, and how her act is a gesture of love. Why shouldn’t 
it be? But this is England. Oh god, it’s England [laughter]. 
RA: I loved that line where Euripides declares, ‘Blame Plato for everything’ [laughter]. 
HB: Don’t we all? [laughter]. 
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RA: I just wanted to ask you, perhaps, one last Shakespeare question which is about the 
distinction between Seven Lears and Gertrude – The Cry and your development as a 
playwright. Seven Lears was originally staged the same year [1989] the first edition 
of Arguments for a Theatre was published, while Gertrude – The Cry – 2002 I think 
was the first staging – precedes Death, the One and the Art of Theatre, which 
appears few years after [2004]. I was just wondering if, perhaps, these plays...it’s 
very reductive to say this… but perhaps can be seen as...if Seven Lears is more of a 
Catastrophist play, then perhaps Gertrude is more akin to the ‘Art of Theatre’ as you 
would come to define it? 
HB: Oh gosh! I didn’t think there was much of a development between my Art of Theatre 
and Catastrophe [laughter].  
RA: I suppose in terms of the even more intense focus on ideas of death and eroticism. 
HB: Yes, they are more intense in Gertrude, of course. When you are younger, you are 
wittier. There’s a lot to be found simply in terms of wittiness in Seven Lears. It is 
cruel in that way. It feels quite a young man’s play, but by the time I get to Gertrude 
– The Cry, I think I’m...Oh, I don’t know...more concentrated at every level. I will not 
use the word ‘pessimistic’. There’s a curse hanging over the characters in those later 
texts.  
RA: It also seems that perhaps Gertrude is more claustrophobic, in the sense that in 
Seven Lears you have quite a sense of a wider society.   
HB: Yes, and places alter. 
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RA: Yes. 
HB: The siting of Gertrude – The Cry is intensive. It could be just one room. There’s a 
funeral scene and a scene in a park, but it’s much tighter. It’s also more obsessed 
with death. In Seven Lears, Lear talks of death a great deal but it’s the way a younger 
man would talk about death as being something that’s only possible [laughter]. It’s 
the slow, determined appearance of death in Gertrude which distinguishes it. 
Claudius draws death onto himself and understands, at last, that’s where he must go 
and why he’s going there and that she, for all her magnificence is the means by 
which he must get to it. The real beauty of that play, and I think it is a beautiful play, 
is the way she helps him die at the end. She has two very long speeches where she 
says, ‘I’ll do this. I’ll do that. I’ll marry this other man and we’ll fuck. Oh, you’re still 
alive. I’ll give you some more’ and she lays on more of this pain on him. It’s a 
considered murder. 
RA: As if she is inducting him into it. 
HB: Yes, and I think that’s beautiful and I don’t think I’ve ever known that to happen in a 
play. I think it’s both original and very beautiful. To talk a man to death for love.  
RA: For Lear, it’s more a philosophical conundrum; whereas, for Claudius, it’s a driving... 
HB: Yes, it’s beyond philosophy. It’s instinctive but what fuels Lear is what I always think 
a clever, young student should be, as you probably are. This idea smashing into that 
idea. I think it’s a celebration of... I hate that word [laughter]... youthfulness. It 
shows what I think is beautiful about youth, even though it’s often wrong and he’s 
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often wrong. The joy with which he receives an idea and proclaims it, before 
exchanging it for another, is pure youth, I think. 
RA: I think he describes himself as a child at one point, doesn’t he? 
HB: He does. 
RA: It’s a constant probing of limits, all the time. 
HB: Now I’m talking about it, I think it’s a good play. 
RA: Just, perhaps, one last question, I don’t want to intrude too much on your time but... 
HB: No, keep going if you want. 
RA: ...are your Conversations with Shakespeare ongoing? Macbeth obviously interests 
you. 
HB: I don’t think they’ll be ongoing. I’m seventy now and I write continuously, as you 
probably know, but I don’t know that I want to negotiate anything with an existing 
text anymore. I can’t be sure. 
RA: So it’s a conversation that’s had a full stop? 
HB: I can’t be sure. No, maybe or certainly a dot, dot, dot... 
 
 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
380 
 
Bibliography 
 
(For ease of reference, I have separated works by and relating to Edward Bond, David 
Rudkin, Howard Barker, Sarah Kane, Shakespeare and King Lear from a more general 
bibliography.) 
General  
 
 Adonis, Andrew and Hames, Tim: A Conservative Revolution?: The Thatcher-Reagan 
Decade in Perspective (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
1994). 
 Adorno, Theodor: Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: 
Continuum, 2012). 
 Adorno, Theodor: Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music: Fragments and Texts, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). 
 Adorno, Theodor: Can One Live After Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone et al, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2003). 
 Adorno, Theodor and Mann, Thomas: Theodor Adorno and Thomas Mann, 
Correspondence 1943–1955, trans. Nicholas Walker, ed. Christoph Gödde and 
Thomas Sprecher (Cambridge: Polity 2006) 
 Adorno, Theodor and Horkheimer, Max: Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John 
Cumming (London, Verso: 2010). 
 Adorno, Theodor: History and Freedom: Lectures, 1964-1965, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone, ed. Ralf Tiedemann (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 
 Adorno, Theodor: Metaphysics: Concepts and Problems, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. 
Rolf Tiedemann (Oxford: Polity, 2000). 
 Adorno, Theodor: Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. 
Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
381 
 
 Adorno, Theodor: Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Bloomsbury, 
2015). 
 Adorno, Theodor: ‘On the Question: “What is German?”’, New German Critique, 36 
(1985), pp. 121-131. 
 Adorno, Theodor: Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1983).  
 Adorno, Theodor: Problems of Moral Philosophy, trans. Rodney Livingstone, ed. 
Thomas Schröder, (Cambridge: Polity, 2001). 
 Adorno, Theodor: ‘The Actuality of Philosophy’, Telos, 31 (1977), pp. 120-133. 
 Adorno, Theodor et al: The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1950). 
 Adorno, Theodor: The Jargon of Authenticity (London: Routledge, 2003).   
 Adorno, Theodor: The Stars Down to Earth and Other Essays on the Irrational in 
Culture, ed. Stephen Crook (New York and London: Routledge, 2004). 
 Adorno, Theodor:  ‘Theorie der Halbbildung’, Gesammelte Schriften Band 8 
Soziologische Schriften I (2003), pp.  93–121. 
 Agamben, Giorgio: Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, CL: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
 Agamben, Giorgio: Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 2002). 
 Alexander, Edward: The Holocaust: History and the War of Ideas (New Brunswick and 
London: Transaction Publishers, 1994). 
 Alfaro, María Jesús Martínez: ‘Intertextuality: Origins and Development of the 
Concept’, Atlantis, 18:1/2 (1996), pp. 268-285. 
 Alied, Amani: ‘A Desacralisation of Violence in Modern British Playwriting’ 
(Manchester, University of Manchester: PhD, 2015). 
 Anderson, Perry: The Origins of Postmodernity (London: Verso, 1998). 
 Angermann, Asaf: ‘The Ghosts of Normativity: Temporality and Recurrence in 
Adorno’s Ethics of Dissonance’, The Germanic Review, 90:4 (2015), pp. 260–272. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
382 
 
 Appiah, Anthony: ‘Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social 
Reproduction’, Multiculturalism, ed. Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994).  
 Appiah, Anthony: The Ethics of Identity (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 
2005).  
 Arendt, Hannah: Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: 
Penguin, 2006). 
 Arendt, Hannah: The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Penguin, 2017). 
 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K Thomson (London: Penguin, 2004). 
 Aristotle: Poetics, trans. Gerald Franck Else (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1967). 
 Aristotle: The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair (London: Penguin, 1992). 
 Armatta, Judith: Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010). 
 Artaud, Antonin: The Theatre and Its Double, trans. Victor Corti (London: OneWorld 
Classics, 2010). 
 Bailes, Sara Jane: Performance Theatre and the Poetics of Failure: Forced 
Entertainment, Goat Island and Elevator Repair Service (London: Routledge, 2011). 
 Barthes, Roland: Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 
1977). 
 Bashevkin, Sylvia: Women on the Defensive: Living Through Conservative Times 
(London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
 Baudrillard, Jean: Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, trans. various, ed. Mark Poster 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
 Bauer, Karin: Adorno’s Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of 
Wagner (Albany: State of New York University Press, 1999). 
 Bauman, Zygmunt: Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
 Bauman, Zygmunt: Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity, 1989). 
 Beckett, Samuel: The Complete Works of Samuel Beckett (London: Faber and Faber, 
2006). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
383 
 
 Benecke, Patricia: ‘The Making of…From the Beginnings to Hidden J’, Not Even a 
Game Anymore: The Theatre of Forced Entertainment, ed. Judith Hemler and Florian 
Malzacher (Berlin: Alexander Verlag, 2012), pp. 27-50. 
 Benjamin, Walter: The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London: 
Verso, 1998). 
 Blanchot, Maurice: The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). 
 Blanton, C.D.: Epic Negation: The Dialectical Poetics of Late Modernism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 Bielsa, Esperanca: ‘Theodor W. Adorno’s Homecoming’, European Journal of Social 
Theory 19:3 (2016), pp. 374-390. 
 Bottomore, Tom: The Frankfurt School and Its Critics (London: Routledge, 2002). 
 Bottoms, Stephens and Gough, Richard (eds.): ‘Performing Literatures’, Performance 
Research, 14:1 (2009). 
 Boss, Michael et al: Re-Mapping Exile: Realities and Metaphors in Irish Literature and 
History (Lancaster: Aarhus University Press, 2005). 
 Bowie, Andrew: Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
 Bowie, Andrew: Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche, 2nd edition 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 
 Brenton, Howard: H.I.D (Hess is Dead) (London: Nick Hern Books, 2000). 
 Brook, Peter: The Empty Space (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
 Brown, Sarah and Silverstone, Catherine (eds.): Tragedy in Transition (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007). 
 Brown, Wendy: States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995). 
 Burke, Sean: The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in 
Barthes, Foucault and Derrida, 2nd edition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2008). 
 Butler, Christopher: Modernism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
384 
 
 Butler, Judith: Giving an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2005). 
 Carney, Sean: The Politics and Poetics of Contemporary English Tragedy (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2013).  
 Chandler David and Reid, Julian: The Neoliberal Subject: Resilience, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability (London and New York: Roman and Littlefield, 2016). 
 Chasin, Alexandra: Selling Out: The Gay and Lesbian Movement Goes to Market 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). 
 Churchill, Caryl: Serious Money, ed. Bill Naismith (London: Methuen, 2002). 
 Claussen, Detlev: Theodor W. Adorno: One Last Genius, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
 Cesarani, David: Final Solution: The Fate of the Jews 1933-49 (London: Macmillan, 
2016). 
 Cook, Deborah (ed.): Adorno: Key Concepts (Oxford: Routledge, 2014). 
 Cook, Deborah: Adorno on Nature (London: Routledge, 2014). 
 Cook, Deborah: Adorno, Habermas and the Search for a Rational Society (London: 
Routledge, 2004). 
 Craig, Edward (ed.): Concise Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2000). 
 Crines, Andrew S. et al: The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 
 Daddario, Will and Gritzner, Karoline (eds.): Adorno and Performance (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillian, 2014). 
 Dallymer, Fred: ‘The Politics of Nonidentity: Adorno, Postmodernism - And Edward 
Said’, Political Theory, 25:1 (1997), pp. 33-56. 
 Davies, Peter and Lynch, Derek (eds.): The Routledge Companion to the Fascism and 
the Far Right (London and New York: Routledge, 2002). 
 Deane, Seamus: ‘Imperialism/Nationalism’, Critical Terms for Literary Study, ed. 
Frank Lentricchia and Thomas McLaughlin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995), pp. 354-368. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
385 
 
 DeCarioli, Steven: ‘Boundary Stones: Giorgio Agamben and the Field of Sovereignty’, 
Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life, ed. Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCarioli 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).   
 Deleuze, Gilles and Guatarri, Félix, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004).  
 Derrida, Jacques: Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, trans. Eric Prenowitz 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
 Dews, Peter: Logic of Disintegration: Poststructuralist Thought and the Claims of 
Critical Theory (London: Verso, 2007).   
 Duncan, Hal: Rhapsody: Notes on Strange Fictions (Maple Shade NJ: Lethe Press, 
2014). 
 Durão, Fabio Akcelrud (ed.): Culture Industry Today (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2010). 
 Eagleton, Terry: Sweet Violence: The Idea of the Tragic (London: Blackwell, 2003). 
 Edgar, David: Albert Speer (London: Nick Hern Books, 2000). 
 Evans, Eric J.: Thatcher and Thatcherism, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2004). 
 Erasmus, Desiderius: The Collected Works of Erasmus: Adages, ed. Richard J. Schoeck 
and Beatrice Corrigan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982). 
 Fernie, Ewan: The Demonic: Literature and Experience (London: Routledge, 2013). 
 Finlayson, James: ‘Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable’, European Journal of 
Philosophy, 10:1 (2002), pp. 1-25. 
 Finlayson, James: ‘Modern Art, Metaphysics and Radical Evil’, Modernism/Modernity, 
10:1 (2003), pp. 71-95. 
 Foucault, Michel: The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-
1979, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
 Foucault, Michel: ‘What is an Author?’, Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology, Volume 2, ed. James D. Faubion and Paul Rabinow (New York: The 
New Press, 1994) pp. 205-222. 
 Forsdyke, Sara: Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient 
Greece (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
 Foster, Hal (ed.): Postmodern Culture (London: Pluto Press, 1985). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
386 
 
 Foster, Roger: Adorno and Philosophical Modernism: The Inside of Things (New York 
and London: Lexington Books, 2016). 
 Fraser, Scott: A Politic Theatre: The Drama of David Hare (Amsterdam and Atlanta: 
Rodopi, 1996). 
 Fuchs, Elinor (ed.): Plays of the Holocaust: An International Anthology (New York: 
Theatre Communications Group, 1997). 
 Fukuyama, Francis: The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 2012). 
 Gandesha, Samir: ‘Enlightenment as Tragedy: Reflections on Adorno’s Ethics’, Thesis 
Eleven, 65:1 (2001), pp. 109–30.  
 Gerhardt, Christina (ed.): ‘Adorno and Ethics’, New German Critique, 97:1 (2006). 
 Gielgud, John: Sir John Gielgud: A Life in Letters, ed. Richard Mangan (New York: 
Arcade Publishing, 2004). 
 Genter, Robert: Late Modernism: Art, Culture, and Politics in Cold War America 
(Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 
 George, Theodor D.: Tragedies of Spirit: Tracing Finitude in Hegel’s Phenomenology 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2006). 
 Gerstenberger, Katharina and Nusser, Tanja (eds.): Catastrophe and Catharsis: 
Perspectives on Disasters and Redemption in German Culture and Beyond (Rochester 
NY: Camden House, 2015). 
 Gramsci, Antonio: Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971). 
 Granville-Barker, Henry: The Use of the Drama (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1945). 
 Gritzner, Karoline: Adorno and Modern Theatre: The Drama of the Damaged Self in 
Bond, Rudkin, Barker and Kane (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
 Gritzner, Karoline: ‘Adorno on Tragedy: Reading Catastrophe in Late Capitalist 
Culture’, Critical Engagements: A Journal of Criticism and Theory 1:2 (2007), pp. 25-
52. 
 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian 
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1993). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
387 
 
 Habermas, Jürgen: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
 Halberstam, Joshua: ‘From Kant to Auschwitz’, Social Theory and Practice, 14:1 
(1988), pp. 41-54. 
 Hammer, Espen: Adorno and the Political (Oxford: Routledge, 2006).    
 Harding, James Martin: Adorno and “A Writing of the Ruins” (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1997). 
 Harvey, David: A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
 Hayes, Peter and Roth, John K. (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Holocaust Studies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 Heartfield, James: The ‘Death of the Subject’ Explained (Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam 
University Press, 2002). 
 Heberle, Renee J. (ed.): Feminist Interpretations of Theodor Adorno (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania University Press, 2006).   
 Hecht, Anthony: Selected Poems, ed. James McClatchy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
2011). 
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, 
ed. Stephen Houlgate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977). 
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: 
Dover Publications, 2004). 
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Philosophy of Mind, trans. W. Wallace and A.V. 
Miller, ed. Michael Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 Helmling, Steven: Adorno’s Poetics of Critique (London: Continuum, 2009). 
 Helmling, Steven: ‘Constellation and Critique: Adorno’s Constellation, Benjamin’s 
Dialectical Image’, Postmodern Culture 14:1 (2003), pp. 32-47. 
 Heyes, Cressida: ‘Identity Politics’, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/identity-politics/.  
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
388 
 
 Holloway, David: The Late Modernism of Cormac McCarthy (London: Greenwood 
Press, 2002). 
 Homden, Carol: The Plays of David Hare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995).  
 Horkheimer, Max: Critique of Instrumental Reason, trans. Matthew Jay O’Connell et 
al (London: Verso, 2012) 
 Horkheimer, Max: The Eclipse of Reason (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
 Horlacher, Rebekka: The Educated Subject and the German Concept of Bildung: A 
Comparative Cultural History (New York and Oxford: Routledge, 2016). 
 Huhn, Tom and Zuidervaart, Lambert (eds.): The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays on 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (Cambridge MA.: MIT Press, 1999). 
 Hutcheon, Linda: A Theory of Adaptation, 2nd edition (Oxford: Routledge, 2013). 
 Innes, Christopher: Modern British Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002). 
 Jackson, Ben and Saunders, Robert (eds.): Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 Jacobson, Eric: Metaphysics of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter 
Benjamin and Gershom Scholem (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 
 Jameson, Fredric: A Singular Modernity (London: Verso, 2012). 
 Jameson, Fredric: Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (London: 
Verso, 2007). 
 Jameson, Fredric: Marxism and Form (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). 
 Jameson, Fredric: Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: 
Verso, 1991).   
 Jarvis, Simon:  Adorno: A Critical Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 
1998). 
 Jay, Martin: Adorno (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1984). 
 Jay, Martin: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
 Jay, Martin: Permanent Exiles: Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to 
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
389 
 
 Jay, Martin: The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the 
Institute for Social Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley, L.A. and London: University of 
California Press, 1996). 
 Kant, Immanuel: Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
 Kant, Immanuel: The Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. 
H.J. Paton (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 
 Kantorowicz, Ernst: The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology 
(Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
 Keefe, Barrie: King of England and Bastard Angel: Two Plays (London: Methuen, 
1988). 
 Kelly, Dennis: ‘Dennis Kelly talks about The Gods Weep’, YouTube. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnpdWqsV5CI  
 Kelly, Dennis: Plays One (London: Oberon, 2008). 
 Kelly, Dennis: The Gods Weep (London: Oberon, 2010). 
 Kermode, Frank: The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
 Kott, Jan: The Theatre of Essence (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1984). 
 Kristeva, Julia: Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature, trans. Thomas 
Gora et al, ed. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980). 
 Kristeva, Julia: Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982).   
 Kristeva, Julia: Strangers to Ourselves, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991). 
 Kundnani, Hans: Utopia Or Auschwitz: Germany’s 1968 Generation and the Holocaust 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2009). 
 Kurlansky, Mark: 1968: The Year that Rocked the World (London: Vintage, 2010). 
 Lang, Berel: The Future of the Holocaust: Between History and Memory (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1999). 
 Langer, Lawrence L.: Preempting the Holocaust (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1998). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
390 
 
 Lausten, Carsten Bagge and Uglit, Rasmus: ‘Eichmann’s Kant’, The Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy New Series, 21:3 (2007), pp. 166-180. 
 Lee, Lisa Yun: Dialectics of the Body: Corporeality in the Philosophy of T.W Adorno 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
 Levi, Primo: Auschwitz Report (London: Verso, 2006). 
 Levi, Primo: If This Is A Man/The Truce (London: Abacus, 2013). 
 Levi, Primo: The Drowned and the Saved (London: Abacus Books, 2013). 
 Lincoln, Bruce: Death, War, and Sacrifice: Studies in Ideology and Practice (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
 Lukács, György: History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone (Pontypool: The Merlin Press, 1971). 
 Lukács, György: Soul and Form, trans. Anna Bostock (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010). 
 Lefevere, André: ‘Why Waste Our Time on Rewrites? The Trouble with Interpretation 
and the Role of Rewriting in an Alternative Paradigm’, The Manipulation of 
Literature: Studies in Literary Translation, ed. T. Hermans (London: Croom Helm, 
1983), pp. 215-243. 
 Lehman, Hans-Thies: Postdramatic Theatre, trans. Karen Jürs-Munby (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2006). 
 Lyotard, Jean-François: ‘Adorno as the Devil’, Telos, 19 (1974), pp. 127-137. 
 Lyotard, Jean-François: Libidinal Economy, trans. Ian Hamilton Grant (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015). 
 Lyotard, Jean-François: The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988). 
 Lyotard, Jean-François: The Postmodern Condition, trans. Geoff Bennington and 
Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986). 
 Lyotard, Jean-François: The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence, 1982-1985, 
trans. and ed. Julian Pefanis and Morgan Thomas (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota, 1997). 
 Magone, José M. (ed.): Routledge Handbook of European Politics (Oxford: Routledge, 
2015). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
391 
 
 Mandel, Ernest: Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1998). 
 Marcuse, Herbert: One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society, trans. Douglas Kellner (Oxford: Routledge, 2002). 
 Marcuse, Herbert: The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics 
(London: Beacon Press, 1977). 
 McCullough, Christopher: Theatre and Europe, 1957-95 (Bristol: Intellect Books, 
1996). 
 McDonald, Bradley J.: ‘Theodor Adorno, Alterglobalization, and Non-identity Politics’, 
New Political Science, 34:3 (2012), pp. 321-337. 
 Meiner, Carsten and Veel, Kristin (eds.): The Cultural Life of Catastrophes and Crises 
(Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter, 2012). 
 Milling, Jane: Modern British Playwriting: the 1980s: Voices, Documents, New 
Interpretations (London: Methuen, 2012). 
 Monmouth, Geoffrey: The History of the Kings of Britain, trans. Lewis Thorpe 
(London: Penguin, 1966). 
 Montaigne, Michel de: The Complete Essays, trans. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 
2003). 
 Mooers, Colin: Imperial Subjects: Citizenship in an Age of Crisis and Empire (New York 
and London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
 Morgan, Alistair: ‘Mere Life, Damaged Life and Ephemeral Life: Adorno and the 
Concept of Life’, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 19:1 (2014), pp. 
113-127. 
 Murray, Simone: The Adaptation Industry: The Cultural Economy of Contemporary 
Literary Adaptation (London; Routledge, 2012). 
 Nancy, Jen-Luc: After Fukushima: The Equivalence of Catastrophes (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2015). 
 Neiwert, David: Alt-America: The Rise of the Radical Right in the Age of Trump (New 
York and London: Verso, 2017). 
 Nivalainen, Markku: ‘On Thinking the Tragic with Adorno’, The European Legacy, 21:7 
(2016), pp. 644–663. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
392 
 
 Oppo, Andrea: Philosophical Aesthetics and Samuel Beckett (Oxford: Peter Lang, 
2008). 
 Peacock, Keith: Thatcher’s Theatre: British Theatre and Drama in the Eighties 
(Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 1999). 
 Pendas, Devin O.: The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965: Genocide, History, and 
the Limits of the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 Pensky, Max: The Actuality of Adorno: Critical Essays on Adorno and the Postmodern 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1997). 
 Plunka, Gene A.: Holocaust Drama: The Theater of Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
 Poole, Adrian: Tragedy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
 Postone, Moshie and Santner, Eric: Catastrophe and Meaning: The Holocaust and the 
Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
 Postone, Moishe: ‘Theorizing the Contemporary World: Robert Brenner, Giovanni 
Arrighi, David Harvey’, Political Economy and Global Capitalism: The 21st Century, 
Present and Future, ed. Robert Albritton et al (London: Anthem Press, 2007). 
 Prentki, Tim and Preston, Sheila (eds.): The Applied Theatre Reader (London: 
Routledge, 2009). 
 Pusick, Charles: ‘Negative Reason: Adorno and the Critique of Neoliberal Society’ 
(Philadelphia, Villanova University: PhD, 2017). 
 Rabellato, Dan: ‘“And I Will Reach Out My Hand With A Kind of Infinite Slowness And 
Say The Perfect Thing”: The Utopian Theatre of Suspect Culture’, Contemporary 
Theatre Review, 13:1 (2003), pp. 61-80. 
 Rabey, David Ian: English Drama Since 1940 (Oxford: Routledge, 2014). 
 Rabey, David Ian: The Wye Plays (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2004). 
 Rabinowicz, Wlodek: Universalizability: A Study in Morals and Metaphysics 
(Dordrecht and London: D. Reidel Publishing, 1979). 
 Rancière, Jacques: On the Shores of Politics, trans. Liz Heron (London and New York: 
Verso, 1995). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
393 
 
 Rayman, Joshua: ‘Dialectics of Exile: Adorno, Mann, and the Culture Industry’, 
Monatshefte, 106:3 (2014), pp. 402-425. 
 Rensmann, Lars: ‘Returning from Forced Exile: Some Observations on Theodor W. 
Adorno’s and Hannah Arendt’s Experience of Postwar Germany and Their Political 
Theories of Totalitarianism’, Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, 49 (2004), p. 380-406.   
 Richardson, Samuel: Clarissa, or, The History of a Young Lady (London: Penguin, 
1985). 
 Roth, Jack: Ethics During and After the Holocaust: In the Shadow of Birkenau 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
 Rosen, Alan: Dislocating the End: Climax, Closure, and the Invention of Genre 
(Oxford: Peter Lang, 2001). 
 Said, Edward: Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994). 
 Said, Edward: Reflections on Exile: And Other Literary and Cultural Essays (London: 
Granta Books, 2000). 
 Samuels, Diane: Kindertransport (London: Nick Hern Books, 2008). 
 Sanders, Julie: Adaptation and Appropriation (Oxford: Routledge, 2006). 
 Sayers, Sean: Marx and Alienation: Essays on Hegelian Themes (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
 Schweppenhäuser, Gerhard: Theodor W. Adorno: An Introduction, trans. James 
Rolleston (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009). 
 Shearing, David: ‘Scenographic Landscapes’, Studies in Theatre and Performance, 
34:1 (2014), pp. 38-52. 
 Sherman, David: Sartre and Adorno, Dialectics of Subjectivity (New York: State of 
New York University Press, 2007). 
 Silber, John: Kant's Ethics: The Good, Freedom, and the Will (Boston and Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2012). 
 Sinfield, Alan: Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading 
(Berkley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1992). 
 Sjoholm, Cecilia: Kristeva and the Political (Oxford: Routledge, 2005). 
 Skloot, Robert (ed.): The Theatre of the Holocaust, Volume 2: Six Plays (Madison and 
London, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1997). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
394 
 
 Smith, Anna: Julia Kristeva: Readings of Exile and Estrangement (Basingstoke and 
London: Macmillan Press, 1996). 
 Snyder, Timothy: Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (London: 
Penguin, 2015). 
 Spariosu, Mihai: Modernism and Exile: Liminality and the Utopian Imagination 
(London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014). 
 Spencer, Charles ‘The Gods Weep, RSC’, The Telegraph. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/theatre/london-shows/7472953/The-Gods-
Weep-RSC-Hampstead-Theatre-review.html  
 Spencer, Robert: ‘Thoughts from Abroad: Theodor Adorno as Postcolonial Theorist’, 
Culture, Theory and Critique, 51:3 (2010), pp. 207-221. 
 Steinbacher, Sybille: Auschwitz: A History, trans. Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin, 
2005). 
 Steiner, George: The Death of Tragedy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 
 Stocker, Paul: English Uprising: Brexit and the Mainstreaming of the Far Right 
(London: Melville House, 2017). 
 Suzuki, Mihoko: ‘The Essay as Form of Critique: Reading Cavendish’s The World’s Olio 
through Montaigne and Bacon (and Adorno)’, Prose Studies, 22:3 (1999), pp. 1-16. 
 Szondi, Peter: An Essay on The Tragic, trans. Paul Fleming (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002). 
 Taylor, Cecil Philip: Good & And a Nightingale Sang…(London: Methuen, 1990). 
 Taylor, Ronald (trans. and ed.): Aesthetics and Politics (London: Verso, 2007). 
 Terada, Rei: Looking Away: Phenomenality and Dissatisfaction, Kant to Adorno 
(Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
 Tester, Jim S.: A History of Western Astrology (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1987). 
 Thibodeau, Martin: Hegel and Greek Tragedy, trans. Hans Jakob Wilhelm (New York 
and Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013). 
 Tismaneanu, Vladimir (ed.): Promises of 1968: Crisis, Illusion, and Utopia (Budapest 
and New York: CEU Press, 2011).  
 Vatter, Michael: The Republic of the Living: Biopolitics and the Critique of Civil Society 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2014). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
395 
 
 Vogt, Erik: ‘“The Useless Residue of the Western Idea of Art”: Adorno and Lacoue-
Labarthe Concerning Art “After” Auschwitz’, Adorno and the Concept of Genocide, 
ed. Ryan Crawford and Erik Vogt (Leiden and Boston: Brill Rodopi, 2014), pp. 29-45. 
 Watson, James R.: ‘Negligible Quantities in the Wrong State of Things Matter’, 
Adorno and the Concept of Genocide, ed. Ryan Crawford and Erik Vogt (Leiden and 
Boston: Brill Rodopi, 2014), pp. 100-114. 
 Weber, Max: Political Writings, trans. Ronald Speirs, ed. Peter Lassman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 Webber, Mark J.: ‘Metaphorizing the Holocaust: The Ethics of Comparison’, Images 
8:15–16 (2011), pp. 5-30. 
 Williams, Raymond: Drama from Ibsen to Brecht (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968). 
 Williams, Raymond: The Long Revolution (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961). 
 Wood, Allen W: Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
 Wyman, David S. (ed.): The World Reacts to the Holocaust (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
 Yanow, Dvora: Constructing “Race” and “Ethnicity” in America: Category Making in 
Public Policy and Administration (Oxford: Routledge, 2015). 
 Young, Iris Marion: Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990). 
Barker 
 
 Angel-Perez, Elisabeth  and Khamphommala, Vanasay: ‘Les 7 Lears de Barker: pour 
une Généalogie de la Catastrophe’, Shakespeare en Devenir. 
http://shakespeare.edel.univ-poitiers.fr/index.php?id=65  
 Barker, Howard/ Houth, Eduardo: A Style and its Origins (London: Oberon, 2003). 
 Barker, Howard: Arguments for a Theatre, 2nd edition (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1993).  
 Barker, Howard: Arguments for a Theatre, 3rd edition (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1997). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
396 
 
 Barker, Howard: Arguments for a Theatre, 4th edition (London: Oberon, 2016). 
 Barker, Howard: ‘BLOK/EKO: A Synopsis’, Studies in Theatre and Performance, 32:3 
(2012), pp. 255-256. 
 Barker, Howard: Death, The One and the Art of Theatre (Oxford: Routledge, 2004). 
 Barker, Howard: ‘Education Is Friction’, Teaching Literature: Writers and Teachers 
Talking, ed. Judy Kravis (Cork: Cork University Press, 1995), pp. 261-264.  
 Barker, Howard: Collected Plays, Vol. 2 (London: Calder, 1993). 
 Barker, Howard: Collected Plays: Vol. 3 (London: Calder, 1986). 
 Barker, Howard: Collected Plays, Vol. 5 (London: Calder, 2001). 
 Barker, Howard: Howard Barker Interviews, 1980-2010: Conversations in 
Catastrophe, ed. Mark Brown (Bristol: Intellect, 2011). 
 Barker, Howard: Plays One (London Oberon, 2006). 
 Barker, Howard: Plays Two (London: Oberon, 2006). 
 Barker, Howard: Plays Three (London: Oberon, 2007). 
 Barker, Howard: Plays Four (London, Oberon: 2008) 
 Barker, Howard: Plays Five (London: Oberon, 2009) 
 Barker, Howard: Plays Six (London: Oberon, 2010). 
 Barker, Howard: Plays Seven (London: Oberon, 2012). 
 Barker, Howard: Plays Eight (London: Oberon, 2014). 
 Barker, Howard: Seven Lears and Golgo (London: Calder, 1990). 
 Barker, Howard: The Ecstatic Bible: A New Testament (London: Oberon, 2004). 
 Barker, Howard: Women Beware Women and Pity in History (London: Calder, 1986). 
 Barker, Howard. ‘The Ethics of Relevance and the Triumph of the Literal’, 
(Dis)Continuities: Trends and Traditions in Contemporary Theatre and Drama in 
English, ed. Margarete Rubik and Elke Mettinger-Schartmann (Trier: 
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2002), pp. 85-90.  
 Berns, Ute: ‘... to Liberate the Individual Against Opinion-Making Pressures: 
Interview with Howard Barker’, Hard Times, 53 (1995), pp. 16-21.  
 Barnett, David: ‘Howard Barker: Polemic Theatre and Dramatic Practice: Nietzsche, 
Metatheatre and the Play The Europeans’, Modern Drama, 44:4 (2001), pp. 458-475. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
397 
 
 Boon, Richard, and Price, Amanda: ‘Maps of the World: “Neo-Jacobeanism” and 
Contemporary British Theatre’, Modern Drama, 41:4 (1998), pp. 635-654.  
 Chinna, Steve: ‘The Elemental Gertrude: Howard Barker’s Refashioning of Hamlet’s 
Mother’, ‘This Earthly Stage’: World and Stage in Late Medieval and Early Modern 
England, ed. Brett D. Hirsch and Christopher Wortham (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), pp. 
104-114. 
 Constantinidou, Despina Alexandra: ‘Bataillean Catastrophe in Howard Barker’s 
Judith’, Gramma, 9:1 (2001) pp. 129-138.  
 Fakhrkonandeh, Alireza: ‘Asyntactic Contact with Fleshless Words: Con/tactile 
Aesth/Ethics in The Castle’, Journal of Contemporary Drama in English, 1:2 (2013), 
pp. 279-297. 
 Freeland, Thomas: ‘The End of Rhetoric and the Residuum of Pain: Bodying Language 
in the Theatre of Howard Barker’, Modern Drama, 54:1 (2011), pp. 78-98. 
 Gallant, Desmond: ‘Brechtian Sexual Politics in the Plays of Howard Barker’, Modern 
Drama, 40:3 (1997), pp. 403-413.  
 Germanou, Maro: ‘History, Politics and the Subject in a Postcommunist World: The 
Case of Barker's Fair Slaughter’, East-Central European Traumas and a Millennial 
Condition, ed. Zbigniew Bialas and Wieslaw Krajka (Boulder, CO: East European 
Monographs, 1999), pp. 151-163.  
 Gritzner, Karoline: ‘Catastrophic Sexualities in Howard Barker’s Theatre of 
Transgression’, Genealogies of Identity: Interdisciplinary Readings on Sex and 
Sexuality, ed. Breen, Margaret and Peters, Fiona (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2005), pp. 95-
106. 
 Gritzner, Karoline: ‘Poetry and Intensification in Howard Barker’s Theatre of 
Plethora’, Studies in Theatre and Performance, 32:3 (2012), pp. 337-345. 
 Gritzner, Karoline: (Post)Modern Subjectivity and the New Expressionism: Howard 
Barker, Sarah Kane, and Forced Entertainment, Contemporary Theatre Review, 18:3 
(2008), pp. 328-340. 
 Gritzner, Karoline: ‘Some Notes Toward Autonomy in Howard Barker’s Art of 
Theatre’, Hyperion 5:1 (2010), pp. 29-33. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
398 
 
 Groves, Peter: ‘Sacred Tragedy: An Exploration into the Spiritual Dimension of the 
Theatre of Howard Barker’ (Warwick, University of Warwick: PhD, 2014). 
 Hutchings, William: ‘“Creative Vandalism”; Or, A Tragedy Transformed: Howard 
Barker’s “Collaboration” with Thomas Middleton on the 1986 Version of Women 
Beware Women,’ Text and Presentation, ed. Karelisa Hartigan (Lanham, MD: 
University Presses of America, 1988), pp. 93-101.  
 Lamb, Charles. Howard Barker's Theatre of Seduction (Amsterdam: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 1997).  
 Kilpatrick, David: ‘Review of Gertrude – The Cry’, Theatre Journal, 55:4 (2003), pp. 
704-706.  
 Khamphommala, Vanasay: Spectres de Shakespeare dans l'oeuvre de Howard Barker 
(Paris-Sorbonne: PUPS, 2015). 
 Khamphommala, Vanasay: ‘“Watch Out for Two-handed Swords’: Double-Edged 
Poetics in Howard Barker's Henry V in Two Parts (1971)’, Shakespeare Survey, 
Volume 63: Shakespeare’s English Histories, ed. Peter Holland, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
 Klotz, Günther: ‘Howard Barker: Paradigm of Postmodernism’, New Theatre 
Quarterly, 7:25 (1991), pp. 20-26.  
 Mangan, Mick: ‘From Plethora to Bare Sufficiency’, Studies in Theatre and 
Performance, 32:3 (2012), pp. 321-335.  
 Mangold, Alex: ‘Reading Barker with Lacan: Twenty Aside in Woman, the One and 
the Real’, Studies in Theatre and Performance, 32:3 (2012), pp. 317-319.  
 Macgregor, Catherine: ‘Undoing the Body Politic: Representing Rape in Women 
Beware Women’, Theatre Research International, 23:1 (1998) pp. 14-23.  
 Morel, Michel: ‘Women Beware Women by Howard Barker (with Thomas 
Middleton): The 'Terrible Consistency’, Drama on Drama: Dimensions of Theatricality 
on the Contemporary British Stage, ed. Nicole Boireau (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 
pp. 59-71.  
 Peters, Jens: ‘Crowd or Chorus? Howard Barker’s mise-en-scène and the Tradition of 
the Chorus in the European theatre of the Twentieth Century’, Studies in Theatre and 
Performance, 32:2 (2012), pp. 305-316. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
399 
 
 Rabey, David Ian: ‘Chasing the Ellipses: Staging Howard Barker’s The Forty (Few 
Words)’, Studies in Theatre and Performance, 32:3 (2012), pp. 285-304 
 Rabey, David Ian: ‘Howard Barker (1946- )’, British Playwrights, 1956-1995: A 
Research and Production Sourcebook, ed. William W. Demastes (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1996), pp. 28-38.  
 Rabey, David Ian: Howard Barker: Politics and Desire, An Expository Study of His 
Drama and Poetry, 1969-1987 (London: Macmillan, 1989). 
 Rabey, David Ian: Howard Barker: Ecstasy and Death, An Expository Study of His 
Drama, Theory and Production, 1988-2008 (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2009). 
 Rabey, David Ian: ‘For the Absent Truth Erect: Impotency and Potency in Howard 
Barker’s Recent Drama’, Essays in Theatre/Études Théâtrales 10:1 (1991), pp. 31-37.  
 Rabey, David Ian and Goldingay, Sarah (eds.): Howard Barker’s Art of Theatre: Essays 
on His Plays, Poetry and Production Work (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2013). 
 Rabey, David Ian and Gritzner, Karoline (eds.): Theatre of Catastrophe: New Essays in 
Howard Barker (London: Oberon, 2006). 
 Sack, Daniel: ‘The Brilliance of the Servant Without Qualities: Bare Life and the Horde 
Offstage’, Studies in Theatre and Performance, 32:3 (2012), pp. 257-267. 
 Sakellaridou, Elizabeth ‘A Lover’s Discourse – but Whose? Inversions of the Fascist 
Aesthetic in Howard Barker’s Und and Other Recent English Plays’, European Journal 
of English Studies, 7:1 (2003), pp. 87-107. 
 Saunders, Graham: “‘Missing Mothers and Absent Fathers’: Howard Barker's Seven 
Lears and Elaine Feinstein's Lear's Daughters’, Modern Drama, 42:3 (1999), pp. 401-
410.  
 Saunders, Graham: ‘Howard Barker’s “Monstrous Assaults”: Eroticism, Death and the 
Antique Text’, Eroticism and Death in Theatre and Performance, ed. Karoline Gritzner 
(Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2010), pp. 144-159.   
 Shaughnessy, Robert: ‘Howard Barker, the Wrestling School, and the Cult of the 
Author’, New Theatre Quarterly, 5:19 (1989), pp. 264-271. 
 Smith, Andy and Reynolds, James (eds.): Howard Barker's Theatre: Wrestling with 
Catastrophe (London: Methuen, 2015). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
400 
 
 Thomas, Alan: ‘Howard Barker: Modern Allegorist’, Modern Drama, 35:3 (1992), pp. 
433-443.  
 Tomlin, Liz: ‘The Politics of Catastrophe: Confrontation or Confirmation in Howard 
Barker’s Theatre’, Modern Drama, 43:1 (2000), pp. 66-77. 
 Wilcher, Robert: ‘Honouring the Audience: The Theatre of Howard Barker’, British 
and Irish Drama since 1960, ed. James Acheson (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 
176-189.    
Bond 
 
 Billingham, Peter: Edward Bond: A Critical Study (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 
2014). 
 Bond, Edward: Coffee: A Tragedy (London: Methuen, 1996). 
 Bond, Edward: Edward Bond’s Letters, Volume 5, ed. Ian Stuart (Routledge: London, 
2001). 
 Bond, Edward: Plays 3 (London: Methuen, 1999). 
 Bond, Edward: Plays 7 (London: Methuen, 2003).  
 Bond, Edward: Selections from the Notebooks of Edward Bond: Volume One 1959-
1980, ed. Ian Stuart (London: Methuen, 2000) 
 Bond, Edward:  Selections from the Notebooks Of Edward Bond: Volume 2 1980-
1995, ed. Ian Stuart (London: Methuen, 2000). 
 Bond, Edward: The Hidden Plot (London: Methuen, 2000). 
 Bond, Edward:  ‘The First Word’ (2012), Edward Bond. 
http://www.edwardbond.org/Comment/comment.html  
 Bond, Edward: ‘The Third Crisis: The State of Future Drama’ (2012), Edward Bond. 
http://www.edwardbond.org/Comment/comment.html 
 Bond, Edward: The War Plays (London: Methuen, 1988).                                            
 Bulman, James C.: ‘Bond, Shakespeare and the Absurd’, Modern Drama, 29:1 (1986), 
pp. 60-70. 
 Gaskill, William: A Sense of Direction: Life at the Royal Court (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1988). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
401 
 
 Hay, Malcom and Roberts, Philip: Edward Bond: A Companion to the Plays (London: 
TQ Publications, 1978). 
 Hirst, David: Edward Bond (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985). 
 Innes, Christopher: ‘The Political Spectrum of Edward Bond: From Rationalism to 
Rhapsody’, Modern Drama, 25:2 (1982), pp. 189-206. 
 Katafiasz, Kate: ‘Alienation is the Theatre of Auschwitz: An Exploration of Form in 
Edward Bond’s Theatre’, Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child: Edward Bond’s Plays 
for Young People, ed. David Davis (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books, 2005), pp. 25-
48. 
 Katafiasz, Kate: ‘Quarrelling with Brecht: Understanding Bond’s Post-Structuralist 
Political Aesthetic’, Studies in Theatre and Performance, 28:3 (2008), pp. 273-251. 
 Lawson, Mark: ‘Edward Bond: 'War Horse? Obscene. Downton? Spiteful’, The 
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/stage/2016/may/22/edward-bond-
medea-war-dea-play-sutton-interview  
 Saunders, Graham: ‘“A theatre of ruins’: Edward Bond and Samuel Beckett: 
Theatrical Antagonists’, Studies in Theatre and Performance, 25:1 (2005), pp. 67-77. 
 Smith, Leslie: ‘Edward Bond's Lear’, Comparative Drama, 13:1 (1979), pp. 65-85. 
 Spencer, Jenny S.: Dramatic Strategies in the Plays of Edward Bond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
 Zapf, Hubert: ‘Two Concepts of Society in Drama: Bertolt Brecht’s The Good Woman 
of Setzuan and Edward Bond’s Lear’, Modern Drama, 31:3 (1988), p. 352-364. 
Kane 
 
 Ablett, Sarah: ‘Approaching Abjection in Sarah Kane’s Blasted’, Performance 
Research: A Journal of the Performing Arts, 19:1 (2014), pp. 63-71.   
 Ablett, Sarah: ‘Sarah Kane’s Blasted – The Genesis of the Subject’, Journal of 
Contemporary Drama in English, 1:2 (2013), pp. 249–260.  
 Barry, Elizabeth: ‘Beckett, Sarah Kane and the Theatre of Catastrophe’, Beckett’s 
Literary Legacies, ed. Matthew Feldman and Mark Nixon (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars, 2007), pp. 169-187. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
402 
 
 Carney, Sean: ‘The Tragedy of History in Sarah Kane’s Blasted’, Theatre Survey, 1:2 
(2005), pp 275-296.  
 Delgado-Garcia, Cristina: ‘Subversion, Refusal and Contingency: The Transgression of 
Liberal Humanist Subjectivity and Characterization in Sarah Kane’s Cleansed, Crave, 
and 4:48 Psychosis’, Modern Drama, 55:2 (2012), pp. 230-250. 
 De Vos, Laurens and Saunders, Graham (eds.): Sarah Kane: In Context (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2010). 
 Diedrich, Antje: ‘“Last in a Long Line of Literary Kleptomaniacs”: Intertextuality in 
Sarah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis’, Modern Drama, 56:3 (2013), pp. 374-398. 
 Gritzner, Karoline. ‘The Fading of the Subject in Sarah Kane's Later Work’, 
Consciousness, Theatre, Literature and the Arts, ed. Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräfe 
(Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2006), pp. 249-257. 
 Iball, Helen. Sarah Kane's Blasted (London: Continuum, 2008). 
 Kane, Sarah: Complete Plays: Blasted, Phaedra's Love, Cleansed, Crave, 4.48 
Psychosis, Skin (London: Methuen, 2001). 
 Lepage, Louise: ‘Rethinking Sarah Kane’s Characters: A Human(ist) Form and Politics’, 
Modern Drama, 57:2 (2014), pp. 252-272.  
 Mangold, Alex: ‘“The Empty I” - Echoes of Subjectivity in Sarah Kane's Crave’, 
Consciousness, Theatre, Literature and the Arts, ed. Daniel Meyer-Dinkgräfe 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), pp. 116-126. 
 Rebellato, Dan: ‘Brief Encounter: An Interview with Sarah Kane’, Dan Rebellato. 
http://www.danrebellato.co.uk/sarah-kane-interview/ 
 Saunders, Graham: About Kane: The Playwright and the Work (London: Faber and 
Faber, 2009).  
 Saunders, Graham: ‘Love me or kill me’: Sarah Kane and the Theatre of Extremes 
(Manchester: Manchester UP, 2001).  
 Saunders, Graham. ‘“Just a word on the page and there is the drama”: Sarah Kane’s 
Theatrical Legacy’, Contemporary Theatre Review, 13:1 (2003), pp. 97-110. 
 Saunders, Graham: ‘“Out Vile Jelly”: Sarah Kane’s Blasted and Shakespeare’s King 
Lear’, New Theatre Quarterly, 20:1 (2004), pp. 69-78.  
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
403 
 
 Sierz, Aleks: ‘“Cool Britannia?” “In-yer-face” writing in the British Theatre Today’, 
New Theatre Quarterly, 14:56 (1998), pp. 324-333. 
 Sierz, Aleks: In-Yer-Face Theatre: British Drama Today (London: Faber and Faber, 
2001). 
 Sierz, Aleks: “‘The element that most outrages”: Morality, Censorship and Sarah 
Kane's Blasted’, European Studies, 17 (2001), pp. 225-239. 
 Solga, Kim: ‘Blasted’s Hysteria: Rape, Realism, and the Thresholds of the Visible’, 
Modern Drama, 50:3 (2007), pp. 346-74. 
 Soncini, Sara: ‘New Order, New Borders: Post-Cold War Europe on the British Stage’, 
New Myths of Europe, ed. Richard Littlejohns and Sara Soncini (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2007), pp. 247-61. 
 Soncini, Sara: ‘“A horror so deep only ritual can contain it”: The Art of Dying in the 
Theatre of Sarah Kane’, Other Modernities, 4:10 (2010), pp. 116-131. 
 Stephenson, Heidi Langridge, Natasha: Rage and Reason: Women Playwrights on 
Playwriting (London: Methuen, 1997). 
 Urban, Kenneth: ‘An Ethics of Catastrophe: The Theatre of Sarah Kane’, PAJ: A 
Journal of Performance and Art, 23:2 (2002), pp. 36-46.  
 Urban, Kenneth: ‘Towards a Theory of Cruel Britannia: Coolness, Cruelty, and the 
Nineties’, New Theatre Quarterly, 20:4 (2004), pp. 354-72. 
 Wandor, Michelene, Post-war British Drama: Looking Back in Gender (London: 
Routledge, 2001). 
 Waters, Steve: ‘Sarah Kane: From Terror to Trauma’, A Companion to Modern British 
and Irish Drama, 1880-2005, ed. Mary Luckhurst (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 
371-82. 
 Ward, Ian: ‘Rape Mythology in the Plays of Sarah Kane’, Comparative Drama, 47:2 
(2013), pp. 225-248 
 Wixson, Christopher: ‘“In Better Places”: Space, Identity, and Alienation in Sarah 
Kane’s Blasted’, in Comparative Drama, 39:1 (2005), pp. 75-91.  
 Zazzali, Peter: ‘The Brutality of Redemption’, PAJ: A Journal of Performance and Art, 
31:1 (2009), pp. 123-128.  
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
404 
 
 Zimmermann, Heiner: ‘Theatrical Transgression in Totalitarian and Democratic 
Societies: Shakespeare as a Trojan Horse and the Scandal of Sarah Kane’, Crossing 
Borders: Intercultural Drama and Theatre at the Turn of the Millennium, ed. 
Bernhard Reitz and Alyce von Rothkirch (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 
2001), pp. 173-182. 
Rudkin 
 
 Brown, Dennis: ‘David Rudkin’, British Dramatists since World War II: Part 2 (Detroit, 
MI: Thomson Gale, 1982), pp. 433-439.  
 Childs, Victoria: ‘Penda's Fen’, Vertigo, 3:1 (2006).  
 Dahl, Mary Karen: ‘Stage Violence as Thaumaturgic Technique’, Violence in Drama 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), pp. 251-259.  
 Fisher, Mark: ‘Visionary Television: World on a Wire and Artemis 81’, Film Quarterly, 
64:2 (2010), pp. 58-63.  
 Gritzner, Karoline: ‘Red Sun and the Promise of Myth’, Red Sun and Merlin 
Unchained, David Rudkin (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2011), pp. 57-69.  
 Hawkins, Maureen S.G.: ‘Brenton’s The Romans in Britain and Rudkin’s The Saxon 
Shore: Audience, Purpose, and Dramatic Response to the Conflict in Northern 
Ireland’, Politics and Performance in Contemporary Northern Ireland, ed. John 
Harrington and Elizabeth Mitchell (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1999), pp. 157-173.  
 Rabey, David Ian: ‘Broken Magic: A Director’s Perspective on Merlin Unchained’, Red 
Sun and Merlin Unchained, David Rudkin (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2011), pp.229-242. 
 David Ian Rabey: ‘Burning Alone in the Dark: David Rudkin Talks to David Ian Rabey’, 
Planet, 114 (1995-1996), pp. 91-99. 
 Rabey, David Ian: David Rudkin: Sacred Disobedience, An Expository Study of His 
Drama 1959-1996 (Oxford: Routledge, 1997).  
 Rabey, David Ian: ‘The Bite of Exiled Love: Abjective Protagonists in Some 
Contemporary Anglo-Irish Dramas’, Essays in Theatre/Etudes Theatrales, 13:1 (1994), 
pp. 29-43.  
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
405 
 
 Remshardt, Ralf: ‘Ghelderode, Rudkin and The Triumph of Death’, Staging the Savage 
God: The Grotesque in Performance (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2004), pp. 202-216.  
 Richtarik, Marilynn. ‘Across the Water: Northern Irish Drama in London’, South 
Carolina Review, 33:2 (2001), pp. 121-127. 
 Richtarik, Marilyn: Acting Between the Lines: The Field Day Theatre Company and 
Irish Cultural Politics 1980-1984 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
 Rudkin, David: Afore Night Come (London: Oberon Modern Plays, 2001).  
 Rudkin, David: ‘An Affliction of Images: An Interview with David Rudkin’, Encore, 11:4 
(1964), pp. 7-16. 
 Rudkin, David: Artemis 81, dir. Alistair Reid (BBC DVD, 2011). 
 Rudkin, David: Cries from Casement as His Bones are Brought to Dublin (London: 
BBC, 1974). 
 Rudkin, David: Interrogations, dir. Stephen Garrett (Central Independent Television: 
Carlton Videocassettes, 1985).   
 Rudkin, David: ‘Mongrel Nation’, Vertigo, 2:5 (2003). 
 Rudkin, David: ‘On Being an Artaudian Dramatist’, Past Masters: Antonin Artaud 
Conference, 8-10 November 1996 (Aberystwyth: Centre for Performance Research, 
1996). 
 Rudkin, David: Penda’s Fen, dir. Alan Clarke (BFI DVD, 2016). 
 Rudkin, David: Red Sun and Merlin Unchained (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2011). 
 Rudkin, David: ‘Some Eros-Thanatos Interfaces in Attic Tragedy’, Eroticism and Death 
in Theatre and Performance, ed. Karoline Gritzner (Hatfield: University of 
Hertfordshire Press, 2010), pp. 12-27. 
 Rudkin, David: ‘The Chameleon & the Kilt: The Complexities of Roger Casement’, 
Encounter, 41 (1973), pp. 70-77.  
 Rudkin, David: ‘The Life of a Vampyr’, Vertigo 4:1 (2008).  
 Rudkin, David: The Lovesong of Alfred J. Hitchcock (London: Oberon Modern Plays, 
2014). 
 Rudkin, David: The Saxon Shore (London: Eyre Methuen, 1986). 
 Rudkin, David: The Sons of Light (London: Eyre Methuen, 1981). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
406 
 
 Rudkin, David: The Triumph of Death (London: Eyre Methuen, 1981). 
 Rudkin, David: Will’s Way (Halford: The Celandine Press, 1993). 
 Sandu, Sukhdev (ed.): The Edge is Where the Centre Is: David Rudkin and Penda’s 
Fen, An Archaeology (Brooklyn NY: Keegan and Cooke, 2015). 
 Wilcher, Robert: ‘Only a Bard: The Theatre of David Rudkin’, Red Sun and Merlin 
Unchained, David Rudkin (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2011), pp. 247-259. 
 Wilcher, Robert: ‘The Communal Dream of Myth: David Rudkin’s The Triumph of 
Death’, Modern Drama, 35:4 (1992), pp. 571-584. 
Shakespeare 
 
 Adelman, Janet: Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origin in Shakespeare’s 
Plays, Hamlet to The Tempest (London: Routledge, 1992). 
 Anonymous, King Leir, ed. Tiffany Stern (London: Nick Hern Books, 2002). 
 Archer, Jayne et al: ‘The Autumn King: Remembering the Land in King Lear’, 
Shakespeare Quarterly, 63:4 (2012), pp. 518-543 
 Armstrong, Philip: ‘Uncanny Spectacles: Psychoanalysis and the Texts of King Lear’, 
Textual Practice, 8:3 (1994), p. 414-434. 
 Ashby, Richard: ‘Beyond Lear: Edward Bond, King Lear and Radical Innocence’, 
Borrowers and Lenders (forthcoming).  
 Ashby, Richard: ‘Crowding out Dover “Cliff” in Korol Lir’, Adaptation, 10:2 (2017), pp. 
210–229. 
 Ashby, Richard: ‘Face-off: defacement, ethics and the “neighbour” in The Comedy of 
Errors’, Textual Practice (epub, 2017), pp. 1-20. 
 Ashby, Richard: ‘Pierced to the Soul: The Politics of the Gaze in Richard II’, 
Shakespeare, 11:2 (2015), pp. 201-213. 
 Ashby, Richard: ‘“Retailed to all Posterity”: Post-truth, Oral History and The Popular 
Voice in Richard III’, Cahiers Élisabéthains (forthcoming).  
 Ashby, Richard: ‘Sarah Kane and Blasted: The Arcade Game?’, Contemporary Theatre 
Review (forthcoming). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
407 
 
 Baldwin, T.W.: Shakespeare’s Five-Act Structure: Shakespeare’s Early Plays on the 
Background of Renaissance Theories of Five Act Structure from 1470 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1947). 
 Bate, Jonathon: Shakespearean Constitutions: Politics, Theatre, Criticism 1730-1830 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
 Bate, Jonathon: The Genius of Shakespeare (London: Picador Classics, 2008).   
 Barker, Francis: The Culture of Violence: Essays on Tragedy and History (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993). 
 Belsey, Catherine: The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in English 
Renaissance Drama (London: Methuen, 1985). 
 Bennett, Susan: Performing Nostalgia: Shifting Shakespeare and the Contemporary 
Past (London: Routledge, 1996). 
 Booth, Stephen: King Lear, Macbeth, Indefinition and Tragedy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1983). 
 Bradley, A.C.: Shakespearean Tragedy (London: Penguin, 1991). 
 Bradley, Lynne: Adapting King Lear for the Stage (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 
2010). 
 Carroll, William C.: ‘“The Base Shall Top Th’Legitimate”: The Bedlam Beggar and the 
Role of Edgar in King Lear’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 38:4 (1987), pp. 426-441. 
 Carson, Sussanah (ed.): Shakespeare and Me (London: OneWorld Classics, 2013). 
 Cavell, Stanley: Disowning Knowledge: In Seven Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
 Caygill, Howard: ‘Shakespeare’s Monster of Nothing’, Philosophical Shakespeares, 
ed. John Joughin (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 105-114. 
 Chambers, Colin: Inside the Royal Shakespeare Company: Creativity and the 
Institution (London and New York: Routledge, 2004). 
 Chambers, R.W.: ‘King Lear’ (W.P. Ker Memorial Lecture, 1939, Glasgow: Jackson Son 
and Co., 1940). 
 Chedgzoy, Kate: Shakespeare’s Queer Children: Sexual Politics and Contemporary 
Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
 Cohn, Ruby: Modern Shakespeare Offshoots (Princeton NJ: Princeton, 1974). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
408 
 
 Cohen, Derek: ‘The Malignant Scapegoats of King Lear’, Studies in English Literature 
1500-1900, 49:2 (2009), pp. 371-389.  
 Collie, Rosalie and Flahiff, F.T.: Some Facets of King Lear: Essays in Prismatic Criticism 
(University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1974). 
 Croall, Jonathon: Performing King Lear: Gielgud to Russel Beale (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2015). 
 Cummings, Brian: ‘“Dead March”: Liturgy and Mimesis in Shakespeare’s Funerals’, 
Shakespeare, 8:4 (2010), pp. 368-385. 
 Crystal, David and Crystal, Ben: The Shakespeare Miscellany (London: Penguin, 
2005). 
 Danby, John F.: Shakespeare’s Doctrine of Nature: A Study of King Lear (London: 
Faber, 1949). 
 Danson, Laurence (ed.): On ‘King Lear’ (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1981). 
 De Grazia, Margreta: ‘King Lear in BC Albion’, Medieval Shakespeare: Pasts and 
Presents, ed. Ruth Morse et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
 Delaney, Paul: ‘King Lear and the Decline of Feudalism’, Materialist Shakespeare: A 
History, ed. Ivo Kamps (London: Verso 1995), pp. 20-38.   
 Desmet, Christy and Iyengar, Sujata: ‘Adaptation, Appropriation, or What you Will’, 
Shakespeare, 11: 1 (2015). 
 Desmet, Christy and Sawyer, Robert (eds.): Shakespeare and Appropriation (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1999). 
 Dollimore, Jonathon and Sinfield, Alan (eds.): Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural 
Materialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983). 
 Dollimore, Jonathon: Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of 
Shakespeare and His Contemporaries, 3rd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010). 
 Elsom, John (ed.): Is Shakespeare Still Our Contemporary? (London: Routledge, 
1989). 
 Elton, William: King Lear and the Gods (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 
1966). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
409 
 
 Erickson, Peter: Rewriting Shakespeare, Rewriting Ourselves (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1991). 
 Everett, Barbara: ‘The New King Lear’, Critical Quarterly, 2:4 (1960), pp. 325-339 
 Fernie, Ewan: Shakespeare for Freedom: Why the Plays Matter (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
 Fischlin, Daniel and Fortier, Mark (eds.): Adaptations of Shakespeare (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2000). 
 Foakes, R.A.: Hamlet Versus Lear: Cultural Politics and Shakespeare’s Art (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 1993).  
 Foakes, R.A.: ‘King Lear and the Displacement of Hamlet’, Huntington Library 
Quarterly, 50:3 (1987), pp. 263-278. 
 French, William W: ‘A Kind of Courage: King Lear at the Old Vic, London, 1940’, 
Theatre Topics, 3:1 (1993), pp. 45-55. 
 Galbraith, David: ‘Theories of Comedy’, The Cambridge Companion to Shakespearean 
Comedy, ed. Alexander Leggatt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 
3-17. 
 Goldberg, S.L.: An Essay on King Lear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974). 
 Grady, Hugh (ed.): Great Shakespeareans, Volume Thirteen: Empson, Wilson Knight, 
Barber, Kott (London: Continuum, 2012). 
 Grady, Hugh: Shakespeare’s Impure Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
 Grady, Hugh: Shakespeare’s Universal Wolf: Studies in Early Modern Reification 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 
 Grady, Hugh: The Modernist Shakespeare: Critical Texts in a Material World (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991). 
 Granville-Barker, Henry: Preface to King Lear (London: Nick Hern Books, 1993). 
 Greenblatt, Stephen: Renaissance Self-Fashioning, From More to Shakespeare 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
 Greenblatt, Stephen: ‘Shakespeare and the Exorcists’, Shakespeare and the Question 
of Theory, ed. Patricia Parker and Geoffrey Hartman (New York: Methuen, 1985). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
410 
 
 Greenblatt, Stephen: Shakespearean Negotiations (Berkley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1988). 
 Habicht, Werner: ‘Shakespeare and the German Imagination: Cult, Controversy, and 
Performance’, Shakespeare: World Views, ed. Heather Kerr, Robin Eaden, Madge 
Mitton (London: Associated University Presses, 1996). 
 Halpern, Richard: The Poetics of Primitive Accumulation: English Renaissance Culture 
and the Genealogy of Capital (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
 Hamilton, Jennifer Mae: This Contentious Storm: An Ecocritical and Performance 
History of King Lear (London: Bloomsbury, 2017). 
 Hawkes, Terence: Meaning by Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 1992).  
 Hawkes, Terence: That Shakespearean Rag: Essays on a Critical Process (London: 
Methuen, 1986). 
 Heinemann, Margot: ‘Demystifying the Mystery of State: King Lear and the World 
Turned Upside Down’, Shakespeare Survey, Volume 44: Shakespeare and Politics, ed. 
Stanley Wells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 75-90. 
 Higgins, John: The first parte of the Mirour for magistrates (London: 1574). Early 
English Books Online. 
http://eebo.chadwyck.com.ezproxy01.rhul.ac.uk/search/fulltext?ACTION=ByID&ID=
D20000998418730033&SOURCE=var_spell.cfg&DISPLAY=AUTHOR&WARN=N&FILE=.
./session/1501148434_13628.  
 Hiscock, Andrew and Hopkins, Lisa (eds.): King Lear: A Critical Guide (London: 
Continuum, 2011). 
 Holderness, Graham: ‘Shakespeare Rewound’, Shakespeare Survey, Volume 45: 
Hamlet and its Afterlife, ed. Stanley Wells (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 63-74. 
 Holderness, Graham (ed.): The Shakespeare Myth (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988). 
 Holland, Peter: English Shakespeares: Shakespeare on the English Stage in the 1990s 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 Hodgdon, Barbara: The Shakespeare Trade: Performances and Appropriations 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
411 
 
 Holbrook, Peter: Shakespeare’s Individualism (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2013). 
 Holbrook, Peter: ‘The Left and King Lear’, Textual Practice, 14:2 (2000), p. 343-362.   
 Holland, Peter (ed.) Shakespeare Survey, Volume 55: King Lear and Its Afterlife 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
 Huang, Alexa and Rivlin, Elizabeth (eds.): Shakespeare and the Ethics of 
Appropriation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 Hughes, Ted: Shakespeare and the Goddess of Complete Being (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1992). 
 Hulme, Peter and Sherman, William H (eds.): ‘The Tempest’ and its Travels (London: 
Reaktion, 2000). 
 Hunter, G.K.: Dramatic Identities and Cultural Tradition: Studies in Shakespeare and 
His Contemporaries (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1978). 
 Jones, Emrys: Scenic Form in Shakespeare (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
 Kahan, Jeffrey (ed.): King Lear: New Critical Essays (New York and Oxford: Routledge, 
2008). 
 Kennedy, Dennis: Looking at Shakespeare: A Visual History of Twentieth-Century 
Performance, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 Kettle, Arnold (ed.): Shakespeare in a Changing World (London: Laurence and 
Wishart, 1964). 
 Kingsley-Smith, Jane: Banishment in Shakespeare’s Plays (Birmingham, Shakespeare 
Institute: PhD, 1999). 
 Kingsley-Smith, Jane: Shakespeare’s Drama of Exile (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 
 Knight, G. Wilson: The Wheel of Fire (Oxford: Routledge, 2001) 
 Kott, Jan: Shakespeare Our Contemporary (New York: Norton, 1974). 
 Laroque, François et al (eds.): And That’s True Too: New Essays on King Lear 
(Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009). 
 Lawrence, Sean: ‘The Difficulty of Dying in King Lear’, English Studies in Canada, 34:1 
(2005), pp. 35-52. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
412 
 
 Leggatt, Alexander: Shakespeare in Performance: King Lear, 2nd edition (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005). 
 Leiblein, Leanore ‘Jan Kott, Peter Brook and King Lear’, Journal of Dramatic Theory 
and Criticism, 1:2 (1987), pp. 39-49. 
 Linley, Keith: King Lear in Context: The Cultural Background (London and New York: 
Anthem Press, 2015). 
 Lever, J.W.: The Tragedy of State (London: Methuen, 1974). 
 Loftis, Sonya Freeman: Shakespeare’s Surrogates: Rewriting Renaissance Drama 
(London and New York: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2013). 
 Loughery, Bryan and Taylor, Neil: ‘Ferdinand and Miranda at Chess’, The Cambridge 
Shakespeare Library, Volume II: Shakespeare Criticism, ed. Catherine Alexander 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 30-35. 
 Lowenthal, David: Shakespeare and the Good Life: Ethics and Politics in Dramatic 
Form (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). 
 Mack, Maynard: ‘King Lear’ in Our Time (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1965). 
 Marowitz, Charles: ‘Lear Log’, Tulane Drama Review, 8:2 (1963), pp. 103-121. 
 Marsden, Jean (ed.): The Appropriation of Shakespeare: Post-Renaissance 
Reconstruction of the Works and Myths (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1991). 
 Mason, H.A.: Tragedies of Love (Chatto and Windus: London, 1970). 
 Mentz, Steven: ‘Strange Weather in King Lear’, Shakespeare 6:2 (2010), pp. 139-152. 
 Minor, Benjamin and Thompson, Ayanna: ‘“Edgar I nothing am’: Blackface in King 
Lear’, Staged Transgression in Shakespeare’s England, ed. Rory Loughnane and Edel 
Semple (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
 Moore, Andrew: Shakespeare between Machiavelli and Hobbes: Dead Body Politics 
(New York and London: Lexington Books, 2016). 
 Mullin, Emily: ‘Macready’s Triumph: The Restoration of King Lear to the Stage’, Penn 
History Review, 18:1 (2010), pp. 17-35. 
 Muir, Edwin: ‘The Politics of King Lear’ (W.P. Ker Memorial Lecture, 1946, Glasgow: 
Glasgow University Publications, 1947). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
413 
 
 Muir, Kenneth: Shakespeare's Sources: Comedies and Tragedies (Oxford: Routledge, 
2005). 
 Muir, Kenneth (ed.): Shakespeare Survey, Volume 33: King Lear (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980). 
 Muir, Tom: ‘Without Remainder: Ruins and Tombs in Shakespeare’s Sonnets’, 
Textual Practice, 24:1 (2009), pp. 21-49. 
 Norland, Howard B.: Drama in Early Tudor Britain, 1485-1558 (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995). 
 Novy, Marianne: Transforming Shakespeare: Contemporary Women Re-Visions in 
Literature and Performance (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). 
 Ogden, James and Scouten Arthur (eds.): Lear from Study to Stage: Essays in Criticism 
James Ogden and Arthur (Madison and London: Associated University Presses, 
1997). 
 Palfrey, Simon: Poor Tom: Living King Lear (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014). 
 Paster, Gail Kern: ‘“Minded Like the Weather”: The Tragic Body and Its Passions’, The 
Oxford Handbook to Shakespearean Tragedy, ed. Michael Neill and David Schalkwyk 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 202-217, 
 Peterson, Kaara L. Williams, Deanne (eds.): The Afterlife of Ophelia (New York: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2012). 
 Raw, Lawrence: ‘People’s Theatre and Shakespeare in Wartime: Donald Wolfit’s King 
Lear in London and Leeds, 1944-1945’, Shakespeare, 12:1 (2016), pp. 55-66. 
 Ribner, Irving: ‘“The Gods are Just”: A Reading of King Lear’, Tulane Drama Review, 
2:3 (1958), pp. 34-54. 
 Rosenberg, Marvin: The Masks of King Lear (London: Associated University Press, 
1975). 
 Ryan, Kiernan (ed.): King Lear: New Casebooks (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993). 
 Ryan, Kiernan: Shakespeare (Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2002). 
 Rozett, Martha Tuck: Talking Back to Shakespeare (Newark: University of Delaware 
Press, 1994). 
 Salingar, Leo: Shakespeare and the Traditions of Comedy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974). 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
414 
 
 Schwyzer, Philip ‘The Jacobean Union Controversy and King Lear’, The Accession of 
James I, ed. Glenn Burgess, Rowland Wymer and Jason Lawrence (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006), pp. 34-47. 
 Scott, Michael: Shakespeare and the Modern Dramatist (Basingstoke: The Macmillan 
Press, 1989). 
 Shakespeare, William: King Lear, ed. R.A. Foakes (London: Methuen, 1997). 
 Shakespeare, William: King Lear, ed. Kieran Ryan (London: Penguin, 2005). 
 Shakespeare, William: King Lear: A Parallel Text Edition, 2nd edition, ed. René Weis 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2013).   
 Shakespeare, William: The First Quarto of King Lear, ed. Jay L. Halio (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 Shakespeare, William: The History of King Lear, ed. Stanley Wells (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000) 
 Shakespeare, William: The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works, ed. John 
Jowett et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
 Shaughnessy, Robert: The Shakespeare Effect: A History of Twentieth-Century 
Performance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
 Sidney, Philip: The Countesse of Pembrokes Arcadia (London: 1590). Early English 
Books Online.  
https://data-historicaltexts-jisc-ac-uk.ezproxy01.rhul.ac.uk/view?pubId=eebo-
ocm17202096e&terms=New%20Arcadia&pageTerms=New%20Arcadia&pageId=eeb
o-ocm17202096e-106206-1.  
 Sinfield, Alan: ‘King Lear versus Lear at Stratford’, Critical Quarterly, 24:4 (1982), pp. 
5-14. 
 Smith-Howard, Alicia: Studio Shakespeare: The Royal Shakespeare Company at The 
Other Place (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006). 
 Spencer, Theodor: Shakespeare and the Nature of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1942). 
 Spurgeon, Caroline: Shakespeare’s Imagery and What it Tells Us (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1935). 
  J. Stampfer, ‘The Catharsis of King Lear’, Shakespeare Survey, Volume 13: King Lear, 
ed. Allardyce Nicoll (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 1-10. 
Richard Ashby   King Lear ‘After’ Auschwitz 
 
415 
 
 Stephenson, Jenna: ‘Spatial Ambiguity and the Early-Modern/Postmodern in King 
Lear’, Drama and the Postmodern: Assessing the Limits of Metatheatre, ed. Daniel K. 
Jernigan (New York, Cambria Press, 2008), pp. 23-44. 
 Stone, P. W. K.: The Textual History of ‘King Lear’ (London: Ashgate, 1980). 
 Sullivan, Garrett: ‘Tragic Subjectivities’, The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern 
Tragedy, ed. Emma Smith and Garrett Sullivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), pp. 73-85. 
 Sun, Emily: Succeeding King Lear: Literature, Exposure and the Possibility of Politics 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2010). 
 Tate, Nahum: The History of King Lear, ed. James Black (London: Edward Arnold, 
1976). 
 Taylor, Gary and Warren, Michael (eds.): The Division of the Kingdoms: 
Shakespeare’s Two Versions of King Lear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
 Taylor, Gary: ‘The Rhetorics of Reaction’, Crisis in Editing: Texts of the English 
Renaissance, ed. Randall McLeod (New York: AMS Press, 1994), pp. 19–59. 
 Taylor, Gary: ‘The War in King Lear’, in Shakespeare Survey, Volume 33: King Lear, 
ed. Kenneth Muir (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 27–34. 
 Taylor, Paul: ‘The Woman Question’, The Independent. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/theatre-the-woman-question-
paul-taylor-reviews-max-stafford-clarks-production-of-king-lear-at-the-
1480290.html  
 Tennenhouse, Leonard: Power on Display: The Politics of Shakespeare’s Genres 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
 Vickers, Brian: The One ‘King Lear’ (Cambridge, MA and London: Yale University 
Press, 2016). 
 Warren, Michael: ‘Quarto and Folio King Lear and the Interpretation of Albany and 
Edgar’, Shakespeare, Pattern of Excelling Nature, ed. David Bevington and J. L. Halio 
(Newark: Associated University Press, 1978), pp. 95–107. 
 Wittreich, Joseph: ‘“Image of that Horror”’: History, Prophecy and the Apocalypse in 
King Lear (San Marino: University of California Press, 1984). 
 
